Negative Brief: Greece - Naval Commitment

By “Coach Vance” Trefethen

AFF Plan increases US Navy deployment and commitment in Greece in and around Souda Bay and some other naval bases.

Negative: Greece Naval Commitment 3

TOPICALITY 3

1. No significant reform 3

Status Quo policy: US already has permanent and increased Navy presence at Souda Bay, Greece 3

Status Quo policy increases US military basing and commitment in Greece 3

Violation: Affirming Status Quo policy defeats the goal of debate 3

Impact: Negative ballot 3

INHERENCY 4

1. Already ramping up 4

US forces are already ramping up deployment in Greece 4

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE 4

1. No threat from Russia 4

Russia's not much of a power in the eastern Mediterranean any more because of Covid, war in Ukraine, and Western sanctions 4

2. No military threat from China 4

China is no military threat in the Mediterranean. They're looking for economic influence [so, US Navy can't solve] 4

3. Not a hotspot for conflict 5

Eastern Mediterranean isn't a hotspot for great power conflict, and there's no urgency for US intervention. Other areas are more important 5

SOLVENCY 5

1. No Strategic Benefit 5

Greece doesn't provide any strategic benefit to the US in today's world 5

2. Wrong Solution #1: Yesterday's threats 6

AFF is worried about Navy ships in Greece, but that's yesterday's news. The real threats NATO faces today are cyber and space 6

3. Wrong Solution #2: The economy, not the military 6

Mediterranean security is important, but the Navy can't solve the real threat: It's economic and financial 6

Military focus = policy failure in the Mediterranean 6

DISADVANTAGES 7

1. Decreased NATO stability 7

Increased naval militarization of the Greek islands destabilizes NATO 7

Increased US deployments to Greece will decrease regional stability and disrupt NATO 7

Impact: Turn the AFF's "Stabilization" advantages. Stability gets worse, not better post-plan. 7

2. Upsets Turkey 8

Link: Turkey believes increased US military commitment to Greece is aimed at threatening Turkey 8

Link: "NOT" acting on the US/Greek military agreement is key to "NOT" turning Turkey into an enemy 8

Brink: (Jan. 2023) High risk of Turkey being pushed over the brink of war with Greece in the foreseeable future 8

Impact: Reduced Mediterranean stability. Turn AFF's "Stability" claims: Stability gets a lot worse if we upset Turkey 9

Impact: Stability turn. Respecting Turkey brings stability. Not respecting Turkey means less stability 9

Impact: No stability without Turkey. Anything that upsets Turkey increases regional instability 9

3. Weaker long-term European security 10

Link: Increased US defense commitment motivates Europeans to slack off 10

Link: Europeans won't fight for each other because they believe America will rescue them 10

Brink: Europe on the brink of slipping back to their old ways of refusing to spend on defense and letting the US pay for it - and it's unsustainable because we can no longer pay for it 10

Link: Only way Europe will increase its defense capabilities is if the US stops defending them 11

Impact: Weaker European security. They're less secure when they rely on the US and we can't defend them in a crisis 11

Negative: Greece Naval Commitment

TOPICALITY

1. No significant reform

Status Quo policy: US already has permanent and increased Navy presence at Souda Bay, Greece

Hakkı Öcal 2022 (an award-winning journalist. He currently serves as academic at Ibn Haldun University) 12 Sept 2022 DAILY SABAH "Biden’s absurd presidency is not 'pointless,' after all" (accessed 6 Jan 2023) https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/columns/bidens-absurd-presidency-is-not-pointless-after-all

Trump forced NATO’s European allies to increase their defense budget; but not trusting their promises, he increased the U.S. naval and land force presence in the countries around the Russian Federation and in the Aegean Sea. Trump said that Greece was the most strategic and reliable ally in the Eastern Mediterranean; and in his National Defense Authorization Act he allocated $50 million for improvements to the facilities at the U.S. naval base at Souda Bay, Crete. Trump commissioned the United States Navy ship, the USS Hershel Williams, to be permanently based at the Souda naval base.

Status Quo policy increases US military basing and commitment in Greece

Begum D. Ersoz 2022 (journalist) 10 Sept 2022 VOICE OF AMERICA News "Turkey-Greece Tensions Could Disrupt NATO Unity, Experts Warn" (accessed 6 Jan 2023) https://www.voanews.com/a/turkey-greece-tensions-could-disrupt-nato-unity-experts-warn/6739413.html (brackets in original)

Athens and Washington extended a bilateral military agreement for five years and the deal was ratified by the Greek parliament in the summer, days before the Greek prime minister’s visit to Washington in mid-May. The deal gives the U.S. more military access to bases in Greece. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley [met](https://www.jcs.mil/Media/News/News-Display/Article/3094256/readout-of-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff-gen-mark-a-milleys-meeting-wit/) with his Greek counterpart, Konstantinos Floros, at the Pentagon in July. “The military leaders discussed mutual items of interest,” said a statement from his office. That visit was followed by Greek Defense Minister Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos’ visit to the Pentagon July 18 to meet with Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. The two discussed the “growing defense partnership between the United States and Greece and the close cooperation on basing, [and] defense modernization,” according to a statement from the Pentagon.

Violation: Affirming Status Quo policy defeats the goal of debate

A significant reform for this topic would have been to cancel or reverse the increased US military partnership with Greece. Affirmatives are supposed to advocate change, Negatives advocate the Status Quo. We can't really debate if both sides are advocating Status Quo.

Impact: Negative ballot

If no one affirms the resolution then there's effectively no Affirmative team in the round. No matter who wins you should write Negative on the ballot.

INHERENCY

1. Already ramping up

US forces are already ramping up deployment in Greece

John Vandiver 2021 (journalist) 24 Sept 2021 STARS & STRIPES " US access to Greek bases may expand as both countries eye security risks in eastern Mediterranean" (accessed 6 Jan 2023) https://www.stripes.com/theaters/europe/2021-09-24/us-navy-military-greece-bases-defense-mediterranean-3001852.html

Last year, the U.S. Navy muscled up in the Mediterranean when it homeported a major vessel, the USS Hershel “Woody” Williams, at Souda, marking the first such ship deployment to the base in at least 40 years. The U.S. Army and Air Force also have expanded missions in other parts of Greece, with a rotating presence at Greek military sites in Stefanovikeio, the port of Alexandroupoli and Larissa Air Base.

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE

1. No threat from Russia

Russia's not much of a power in the eastern Mediterranean any more because of Covid, war in Ukraine, and Western sanctions

Dr. Mehmet Yegin 2022 (PhD; Visiting Fellow at the Americas Research Division at German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin) 11 Oct 2022 "United States Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean" JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN STUDIES (accessed 6 June 2023) https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/soeu-2022-0030/html

Questions are raised about Russia’s long-term presence and influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. After the COVID-19 crisis, there is an increasing need to fund economic recovery, and Russia cannot offer such resources ([Springborg and Williams 2021](https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/soeu-2022-0030/html#j_soeu-2022-0030_ref_067), 17). Russian ability to remain an important actor may drastically deteriorate in the event of growing Western influence in the Middle East and Chinese offers to supply cheap credit to the countries of the region. More importantly, Moscow’s capacity to project military, economic, and diplomatic influence in the Mediterranean has been hindered by its invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine is Russia’s priority and its military presence in the Mediterranean region, particularly in Syria, has been reduced ([Kingsley 2022](https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/soeu-2022-0030/html#j_soeu-2022-0030_ref_040)). Russia’s status in the Mediterranean was hampered by the Western response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the sanctions that followed, further enhancing Moscow’s political and economic isolation.

2. No military threat from China

China is no military threat in the Mediterranean. They're looking for economic influence [so, US Navy can't solve]

Dr. Mehmet Yegin 2022 (PhD; Visiting Fellow at the Americas Research Division at German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin) 11 Oct 2022 "United States Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean" JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN STUDIES (accessed 6 June 2023) https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/soeu-2022-0030/html

China, especially militarily, is in no position to take over from the US in the Eastern Mediterranean nor has it any plans to do so ([Fulton 2019](https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/soeu-2022-0030/html#j_soeu-2022-0030_ref_032), 18). Nonetheless, Beijing’s recent policy moves in the area have raised American concerns about its long-term objectives. Six Middle Eastern nations, including Israel, Egypt, and Algeria, are being courted by China as “strategic fulcrums” that will act as “channels of Chinese influence” in various fields including the military and the economy, and in international politics and ideology ([Marks 2020](https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/soeu-2022-0030/html#j_soeu-2022-0030_ref_047)).

3. Not a hotspot for conflict

Eastern Mediterranean isn't a hotspot for great power conflict, and there's no urgency for US intervention. Other areas are more important

Prof. Hans-Jugen Axt 2022 (professor emeritus at the Institute of Political Science at the University Duisburg-Essen and guest professor at the European Institute for Advanced Behavioural Management of Saarland University, Germany) 11 Oct 2022 " Conflicts and Global Powers in the Eastern Mediterranean. An Introduction" COMPARATIVE SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN STUDIES (accessed 6 Jan 2023) https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/soeu-2022-0052/html

A cautious conclusion can be drawn: the region is dependent on the global powers but limited by two factors: First, the global powers’ interests balance each other out, preventing individual global powers from exerting a dominant influence. Second, the region is important to the global powers, but not to the extent that they would dare to engage in conflict with other global powers there. China is expanding its influence by making offers that can hardly be refused. Russia is in the position of an attentive observer, concerned above all with keeping the influence of the West in check. Although the United States oppose the growing influence of China and Russia, it hardly sees the need or possibility to reject this influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. When it comes to China, the US is focused on the Pacific region, and when it comes to Russia, the US sees many other sources of conflict, such as in the Middle East, the Black Sea region, Southeastern Europe, or the Baltics, where the “Russian Bear” is staking its claims.

SOLVENCY

1. No Strategic Benefit

Greece doesn't provide any strategic benefit to the US in today's world

Prof. Hans-Jugen Axt 2022 (professor emeritus at the Institute of Political Science at the University Duisburg-Essen and guest professor at the European Institute for Advanced Behavioural Management of Saarland University, Germany) 11 Oct 2022 " Conflicts and Global Powers in the Eastern Mediterranean. An Introduction" COMPARATIVE SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN STUDIES (accessed 6 Jan 2023) https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/soeu-2022-0052/html

So, what is the state of relations between the Mediterranean countries and the United States? If we only take the three adversaries Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, we find that Greece has traditionally been very dependent on the United States. This concerned the areas of domestic politics, the economy, and security. Immediately after World War II, when the civil war raged in Greece from 1946 to 1949, it was the US that curbed the “danger of communism” in domestic and military policy ([Couloumbis and Iatridis 1980](https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/soeu-2022-0052/html" \l "j_soeu-2022-0052_ref_011" \o "Couloumbis, T. A., and J. O. Iatridis, eds. 1980. Greek–American Relations: A Critical Review. New York: Pella Publishers.Search in Google Scholar)). The country’s economic reconstruction depended heavily on American support. This has changed since the European Union has become more involved in the country’s development on the one hand and the policy of détente has taken effect in terms of security policy, on the other. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the importance of Greece as part of the protective screen against the Soviet Union also declined. When the US began to perceive China as the greatest challenge, the importance of Greece in Washington’s security policy decreased. Athens became less dependent on the US, but it could hardly build a relationship of interdependence to its advantage.

2. Wrong Solution #1: Yesterday's threats

AFF is worried about Navy ships in Greece, but that's yesterday's news. The real threats NATO faces today are cyber and space

Dr. Jason Blessing, Dr. Katherine Kjellström Elgin, Dr. Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters, and Rakel Tiderman 2021 (Blessing - Visiting Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute; served as a Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Program on “The United States, Europe, and World Order” at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Elgin - PhD, is a Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Ewers-Peters, PhD, is Lecturer and Research Fellow at Leuphana University, Germany. Tiderman is a Research Assistant at the Faculty of Law at the University of Helsinki) Aug 2021 "New Decade, New Challenges, and New Opportunities: The Way Ahead to NATO 2030" (accessed 6 Jan 2023) https://sais.jhu.edu/sites/default/files/NATO2030AndBeyondAccessibleVersion.pdf

Alongside a changing threat landscape and challenges to internal cohesion, new capabilities, resources, and types of warfare have emerged. Since NATO’s last major transformation effort, warfighting has extended from the traditional air, sea, and land domains into the space and cyber domains. New technologies have enabled fighting from increasingly longer distances and have introduced autonomous systems into operational contexts. Artificial intelligence (AI) may even augment and shape decision-making. In addition to increasingly complex and dynamic conventional military operations, new operational concepts have arisen to grapple with the rise in ‘hybrid’ warfare and ‘grey zone’ operations that fall below the threshold of traditional armed conflict. These are unconventional challenges with potentially unforeseeable and force-multiplying effects. Such challenges demand that NATO and its members rethink approaches to defense and deterrence.

3. Wrong Solution #2: The economy, not the military

Mediterranean security is important, but the Navy can't solve the real threat: It's economic and financial

Thibault Muzergues 2022 (Europe & Euro-Med program director at the International Republican Institute) 21 Oct 2022 "THE NEXT MEDITERRANEAN FRONT LINE" (accessed 6 Jan 2023) https://warontherocks.com/2022/10/the-next-mediterranean-front-line/

As a thalassocracy whose leadership hinges on guaranteeing freedom of navigation across the seas, the United States cannot afford to lose the Mediterranean — nor can it allow it to become a territorialized and openly contested sea.  And while the continued presence of the Sixth Fleet certainly provides guarantees of continued military superiority, the lesson learned from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that not all geopolitical problems can be treated in a purely military fashion. China is using economic opportunities rather than hard power to gain a foothold in key ports, preferring financial strangulation to military might in increasing its influence.

Military focus = policy failure in the Mediterranean

Thibault Muzergues 2022 (Europe & Euro-Med program director at the International Republican Institute) 21 Oct 2022 "THE NEXT MEDITERRANEAN FRONT LINE" (accessed 6 Jan 2023) https://warontherocks.com/2022/10/the-next-mediterranean-front-line/

The Mediterranean was always a complex region, difficult to put it inside a single box. U.S. Mediterranean strategies have too often been militarily focused, with the political and economic elements bureaucratically divided between Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. This dissociation has become unsustainable. As the Mediterranean [becomes](https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/ispi_dossier_a_geopolitical_sea_july_2020.pdf) more turbulent, America should adopt a specific Mediterranean strategy that brings together military, geo-economic, and political power to maintain freedom of navigation and stability.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Decreased NATO stability

Increased naval militarization of the Greek islands destabilizes NATO

Hakkı Öcal 2022 (an award-winning journalist. He currently serves as academic at Ibn Haldun University) 12 Sept 2022 DAILY SABAH "Biden’s absurd presidency is not 'pointless,' after all" (accessed 6 Jan 2023) https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/columns/bidens-absurd-presidency-is-not-pointless-after-all

According to Article 13 of the Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 1923 following the end of World War I: “With a view to ensuring the maintenance of peace, the Greek government undertakes to observe the following restrictions in the islands of Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria: No naval base and no fortification will be established in the said islands.” The Dodecanese islands were handed over to Italy with the Treaty of Ouchy signed after the 1912 Turco-Italian War and remained under Italian sovereignty until the 1947 Treaty of Paris. With Italy taking the side of the defeated countries in World War II, the Treaty of Paris was signed with the Allied countries on Feb. 10, 1947, and these islands were ceded to Greece. When Türkiye accuses Greece of violating the agreements, Greece starts to play the victim role. Like the previous administration, the Biden administration defends its bases on the Greek mainland and islands as an alliance within an alliance. The RAND Corporation’s report on the impact of 9/11 and the war in Iraq and its aftermath described them as tectonic events. The warm embrace the U.S. and its Western allies holding Greece is going to have a similar tectonic effect in destabilizing NATO.

Increased US deployments to Greece will decrease regional stability and disrupt NATO

Ahmet Gençtürk 2022 (journalist) 25 May 2022 Growing US military presence in Greece can lead to undesired scenarios in Aegean, experts warn (accessed 6 Jan 2023) https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/growing-us-military-presence-in-greece-can-lead-to-undesired-scenarios-in-aegean-experts-warn/2596928

With the ratification of the Greek-American Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA) by the Greek parliament on May 13, the US has gained access to three military bases in Greece, in addition to the one it is already operating. [**END QUOTE**]Apart from the naval base in Souda Bay in Crete which the US has been operating since 1969, MDCA will permit the US military to use Georgula Barracks in Greece's central province of Volos, Litochoro Training Ground, and army barracks in the northeastern port city of Alexandroupoli. The Greek government has said that the agreement should be seen as an indicator of Greece’s elevated role in Washington. [**HE CONTINUES LATER IN THE CONTEXT QUOTE**:] However, experts have warned that the growing US presence in Greece can lead to undesired scenarios in the Aegean region. Speaking to Anadolu Agency, Ali Bakeer, an assistant professor of international relations at Qatar University, argued that using Greece to undermine Turkiye is an “old and typical strategy” of some Western powers. “Deploying more US troops to Greece will disrupt NATO’s powers, and will only encourage Athens to take risky policies and play the spoiler role more often,” Bakeer said. This would be highly dangerous to the regional stability and security as Athens might overstep the limits, he added.

Impact: Turn the AFF's "Stabilization" advantages. Stability gets worse, not better post-plan.

2. Upsets Turkey

Link: Turkey believes increased US military commitment to Greece is aimed at threatening Turkey

Prof. Ryan Gingeras 2023 (*professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School and is an expert on Turkish, Balkan, and Middle East history*) 3 Jan 2023 " AN HONEST BROKER NO LONGER: THE UNITED STATES BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE" (accessed 6 Jan 2023) https://warontherocks.com/2023/01/an-honest-broker-no-longer-the-united-states-between-turkey-and-greece/

Turkish responses to the signing of the U.S.-Greek defense accord have been uniformly [negative](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gETTkPS-lHw) and [suspicious](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0SfCB9_QuNc). Since the fall of 2019, Turkish media outlets have regularly depicted the agreement as a Greco-American pact [aimed at war with Turkey](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ApBNoX75Fug). Evidence for these misgivings have ranged from [provocative news reports of U.S. arms transfers to Greece](https://www.yenisafak.com/dunya/kusatma-3472531), accusations of joint [Greek-U.S. support for Kurdish terrorist activities](https://www.milliyet.com.tr/yazarlar/tunca-bengin/saldirida-yunan-parmagi-mi-6858450), and [misleading maps](https://youtu.be/qmhnbM8Vjgc?t=63) illustrating an ominous string of “U.S. bases” spanning Greece, Cyprus, and northern Syria.

Link: "NOT" acting on the US/Greek military agreement is key to "NOT" turning Turkey into an enemy

Prof. Ryan Gingeras 2023 (*professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School and is an expert on Turkish, Balkan, and Middle East history*) 3 Jan 2023 " AN HONEST BROKER NO LONGER: THE UNITED STATES BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE" (accessed 6 Jan 2023) https://warontherocks.com/2023/01/an-honest-broker-no-longer-the-united-states-between-turkey-and-greece/

The threat of a Turkish attack upon Greece compels Washington to contend with several undesirable scenarios. If Erdogan intends to wage war, the façade of balancing between Athens and Ankara may become impossible to maintain. For Washington, maintaining peace may come down to two unfavorable choices. U.S. officials could pressure Athens to cede aspects of its sovereignty. Further still, the Biden Administration could abruptly abandon its mutual defense cooperation agreement with Greece. Otherwise, it is more likely the U.S. may be left with the no other alternative but to act as the de facto guarantor of Greece’s territorial sovereignty. Embracing that role, even if it deters Ankara in the short term, puts American policymakers in the contradictory position of having to plan for a possible military conflict with an allied state.

Brink: (Jan. 2023) High risk of Turkey being pushed over the brink of war with Greece in the foreseeable future

Prof. Ryan Gingeras 2023 (*professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School and is an expert on Turkish, Balkan, and Middle East history*) 3 Jan 2023 " AN HONEST BROKER NO LONGER: THE UNITED STATES BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE" (accessed 6 Jan 2023) https://warontherocks.com/2023/01/an-honest-broker-no-longer-the-united-states-between-turkey-and-greece/

Although [some have argued](https://warontherocks.com/2022/11/the-path-ahead-in-turkeys-upcoming-electoral-campaign/) that Erdogan’s posturing may be an election ploy, there appears to be little room for compromise between Greece’s sovereign rights and Ankara’s strategic designs. Moreover, [as one Turkish pundit recently mused](https://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/hasan-basri-yalcin/2022/09/26/midilli-ve-sisam-adalari), the wind now may be at Turkey’s back. With war raging in Ukraine, the West may be compelled to stomach a Turkish attack, for the sake of NATO unity, as it had during Turkey’s 1974 invasion of Cyprus. These fundamental conditions may very well [push Ankara towards war with Athens](https://warontherocks.com/2022/10/why-erdogan-might-choose-war-with-greece/) within the foreseeable future.

Impact: Reduced Mediterranean stability. Turn AFF's "Stability" claims: Stability gets a lot worse if we upset Turkey

Prof. Ryan Gingeras 2023 (*professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School and is an expert on Turkish, Balkan, and Middle East history*) 3 Jan 2023 " AN HONEST BROKER NO LONGER: THE UNITED STATES BETWEEN TURKEY AND GREECE" (accessed 6 Jan 2023) https://warontherocks.com/2023/01/an-honest-broker-no-longer-the-united-states-between-turkey-and-greece/

[U.S.](https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/ICS_EUR_Turkey_Public.pdf) [security](https://www.centcom.mil/ABOUT-US/COMMAND-PRIORITIES/) [planning](https://news.usni.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/USEUCOM-TS-OCT-2015-v5_web.pdf), as well as [NATO’s defense strategy](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf) as a whole, depends upon Turkey’s support as an ally in both Europe and the Middle East. To reconceive of Turkey in antagonistic terms would therefore result in a broader geostrategic reassessment for American planners. Like an aggressive Russia, a belligerent Turkey potentially jeopardizes the free flow of traffic through the Black Sea and Mediterranean. Countering this possible threat would lead to new defense commitments, such as expanded security ties to [Greece](https://warontherocks.com/2022/07/at-the-seam-of-three-regions-the-case-for-more-basing-and-access-in-greece-and-cyprus/), [Cyprus](https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwjV-L-hl6f8AhVcMUQIHbthBlcQFnoECA8QAw&url=https://www.state.gov/lifting-of-defense-trade-restrictions-on-the-republic-of-cyprus-for-fiscal-year-2023/&usg=AOvVaw1ihXGuTu0NgjKvjDwfhMgM), and [Egypt](https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3246906/secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iiis-remarks-welcoming-egyptian-president-a/). While few in the United States may wish to see these changes come to pass, circumstances may demand that Washington recognize Turkish hostilities as a destabilizing force in the world.

Impact: Stability turn. Respecting Turkey brings stability. Not respecting Turkey means less stability

Prince Michael of Liechtenstein 2022. (member of the ruling family of Liechtenstein; graduated from the Vienna University of Economics and Business with a master’s degree in business administration; Chairman of the European Center of Austrian Economics Foundation) 13 Dec 2022 "The risks of ignoring Turkey" (accessed 6 Jan 2023) https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/turkey-west/

Turkey has gained considerable influence in Africa through economic activity. It has the potential to stabilize the Middle East and could play an important role in Central Asia. It is of vital importance for the West. And yet the U.S. and the EU ignore Turkish interests and constantly discredit the country on the international stage. This will backfire. President Erdogan is a pure pragmatist. This makes him change his policies frequently. Many commentators consider Turkish politics unpredictable, but they are logical and driven by national interests. However, this is less true of economic policy. Regrettably, although the economy itself is not weak, inflation is soaring and the Turkish lira has dramatically gone down in value lately. Without Turkey, Europe’s security and interests will be constantly [challenged](https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/war-china-usa/). If they made an effort to understand Ankara, Europeans would be rewarded with a safer and more stable immediate neighborhood.

Impact: No stability without Turkey. Anything that upsets Turkey increases regional instability

Dr. Mehmet Yegin 2021 (PhD; Visiting Fellow at the Americas Research Division at German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin) Aug 2021 "NATO and the Middle East" (accessed 6 Jan 2023) https://sais.jhu.edu/sites/default/files/NATO2030AndBeyondAccessibleVersion.pdf

The price tag of these developments in the East Mediterranean for NATO triggers unnecessary divergences and tensions among Allies, increases instability in the region, and provides opportunities for Russia to become involved. The problems between Turkey and other NATO partners from both the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, such as Egypt and the UAE, also hamper deeper cooperation between the Alliance and countries in the region.

3. Weaker long-term European security

Link: Increased US defense commitment motivates Europeans to slack off

Doug Bandow 2022 (JD from Stanford; senior fellow at the Cato Institute; worked as special assistant to President Ronald Reagan ) 27 July 2022 "So If Europe Wants to Escalate against Russia Who Foots the Bill?" https://www.cato.org/commentary/so-europe-wants-escalate-against-russia-who-foots-bill (accessed 27 Aug 2022)

London earlier pledged that the UK would raise military outlays to 2.5 percent of GDP. Yet, [reported BBC](https://www.bbc.com/news/61984356), this year “the government is going to break the promise on defense spending that it made in its manifesto in 2019.” Even as [Prime Minister Boris Johnson](https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/nato-summit-2022-madrid-boris-johnson-defence-spending-5hpvk6g5m) pledged to do more, he “refused to increase defense spending this year, as ministers and the head of the army plead for more money to deal with the Russian threat.” This rejection came despite warnings by defense secretary Ben Wallace “that the armed forces were surviving on a ‘diet of smoke and mirrors.’” Elsewhere, Europe’s enthusiasm for building up its forces is also ebbing. After all, President Joe Biden has been rushing US forces, men and materiel, to Europe’s defense, proving that Washington will do what it always has done. Why should America’s defense clients put themselves out?

Link: Europeans won't fight for each other because they believe America will rescue them

Doug Bandow 2022 (JD from Stanford; senior fellow at the Cato Institute; worked as special assistant to President Ronald Reagan) 13 July 2022 "Europe Is Rich. So Why Does It Need America’s Help against Russia?" <https://www.cato.org/commentary/europe-rich-so-why-does-it-need-americas-help-against-russia> (accessed 27 Aug 2022)

This persistent reliance on America should come as no surprise. [A 2020 Pew Research Center poll](https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/02/09/nato-seen-favorably-across-member-states/) found little enthusiasm among Europeans to assist one another. The overall median result was 50‐​to‐​38 percent against. Of the 13 European nations polled, majorities in only three – Lithuania, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom – favored fighting for fellow NATO members. That number hit 40 percent in only three other nations – France, Poland, and Spain. Only 34 percent in Germany did so. In every case more people believed that America would defend them. Of course.

Brink: Europe on the brink of slipping back to their old ways of refusing to spend on defense and letting the US pay for it - and it's unsustainable because we can no longer pay for it

Doug Bandow 2022 (JD from Stanford; senior fellow at the Cato Institute; worked as special assistant to President Ronald Reagan ) 27 July 2022 "So If Europe Wants to Escalate against Russia Who Foots the Bill?" https://www.cato.org/commentary/so-europe-wants-escalate-against-russia-who-foots-bill (accessed 27 Aug 2022)

If finally forced to choose between social services at home and military subsidies abroad, America’s aging population is likely to join its European cousins in choosing the former. Then the latter will have to decide whether they believe their countries are worth defending. Russia’s criminal invasion of Ukraine was a great wrong that seemed to wake a militarily somnolent continent. Now the Europeans show signs of slipping back into their previous defense stupor, but the old way of doing things is no longer sustainable.

Link: Only way Europe will increase its defense capabilities is if the US stops defending them

Doug Bandow 2022 (JD from Stanford; senior fellow at the Cato Institute; worked as special assistant to President Ronald Reagan) 13 July 2022 "Europe Is Rich. So Why Does It Need America’s Help against Russia?" <https://www.cato.org/commentary/europe-rich-so-why-does-it-need-americas-help-against-russia> (accessed 27 Aug 2022)

A succession of presidents, secretaries of defense, and secretaries of state have asked, pleaded, insisted, whined, begged, and abased themselves in pressing the Europeans to do at least as much for themselves as the U.S. did. But continental governments took America’s measure, recognized that its foreign policy elite was determined to run the world irrespective of the cost to the American people, and would continue protecting Europe even if the Europeans disarmed completely. If so, Biden and company would express their disappointment … and then send more troops to cover the European shortfall! So the U.S. continues to provide defense welfare to its populous, prosperous “allies.” Instead of adding forces to Europe, Washington should be bringing American personnel home. Europe needs to decide if it believes Russia poses an existential threat and if so, take effective action accordingly. The only way that will happen is if Uncle Sam does less. Starting now.

Impact: Weaker European security. They're less secure when they rely on the US and we can't defend them in a crisis

Hans Binnendikj, Daniel Hamilton and Alexander Vershbow 2022. (Binnendiki - Distinguished Fellow at The Atlantic Council. Hamilton - Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution. Vershbow - Distinguished Fellow - The Atlantic Council. Former NATO Deputy Secretary General; former Assistant Secretary of Defense and former US Ambassador to NATO, Russia and S.Korea) Strategic responsibility: Rebalancing European and trans-Atlantic defense 24 June 2022 https://www.brookings.edu/articles/strategic-responsibility-rebalancing-european-and-trans-atlantic-defense/

China’s aggressive territorial claims in the South and East China Seas, and its threats to the integrity of Taiwan, present a real risk of conflict in the Indo-Pacific, including direct confrontation between China and the United States. In such a situation, critical sea lanes of communication, maritime shipping, and European commercial interactions with China, and with Asia more broadly, would be disrupted. The interests of various European allies in the Indo-Pacific would be at risk. Opportunities would also be created for Russia. U.S. forces might not be available to adequately reinforce European allies against a simultaneous Russian military challenge. The Europeans would need to quickly fill those gaps. They need to plan now how they would do so.