D-Fence: The Case for Strategic Autonomy

By David W. Helton[[1]](#footnote-1)†

**Resolved: The United States Federal Government should substantially reform its policy towards one or more countries in Europe.**

"Strategic Autonomy" is the concept that the countries of the European Union should be able to create, maintain, and activate a military defense capability that doesn't depend on the United States to bail them out. This is not easy, because 27 sovereign countries each have their own weapons systems, their own communications systems, etc., as well as their own priorities on what national defense should look like.   
 On top of the logistical difficulties, the US has also continuously discouraged Europe from building its own military capabilities, under the theory that such a move would subtract resources from and weaken NATO. And if that happens, the US would lose influence, if the Europeans ever figure out how to defend themselves without us. This case argues that, far from harming NATO, EU strategic autonomy would strengthen NATO by making the European military forces more effective.  
 Meanwhile, in parallel, successions of US presidential administrations keep nagging (with little effect) about Europe needing to pay its own way and increase its defense spending to bear their fair share and stop free-riding on the US taxpayers for their defense. So, at the same time, the US is telling them to spend more and do more for their military defense, and then criticizing and stopping them when they do.  
 Toward the goal of Strategic Autonomy, the EU has in the last several years created several initiatives to begin the process of de-fragmentation and cooperation among the various nations in the realm of military capabilities. This plan argues that the US should stop opposing and sabotaging these efforts and, instead, embrace them.  
 Also, the United States has limitations on the types and amounts of weapons we can export to the EU. Countries (or entities like the EU) have to be specifically listed by an act of Congress to receive greater supplies of military exports, under the Arms Export Control Act of 1976. Those countries and organizations that are so listed have the ability to buy a high dollar value of weapons or services without congressional notification through Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) or Foreign Military Sales (FMS). Those dollar value requirements are lower for all other countries, which means those countries must receive more congressional scrutiny before a sale goes through. Experts recommend, and this plan implements, a policy of easier arms exports under AECA '76 in order to help strengthen EU defense capabilities.

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D-Fence: The Case for Strategic Autonomy

Long before Russia invaded Ukraine, the US was calling for European countries to increase their military defense capabilities. At the same time, however, the US has also had a long-standing policy of discouraging the European Union from doing exactly that. Resolving that contradiction in favor of Western security is why we affirm that: the United States Federal Government should substantially reform its policy towards one or more countries in Europe.

OBSERVATION 1. Definitions

Substantial

*Merriam Webster Online Dictionary copyright 2022.* [*https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/substantially*](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/substantially) *(accessed 6 June 2022)*

: considerable in quantity : significantly great

Reform

*Merriam Webster Online Dictionary copyright 2022* [*https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reform*](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reform) *(accessed 6 June 2022)*

: to put or change into an improved form or condition

Policy

Merriam Webster Online Dictionary copyright 2022. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/policy

(accessed 6 June 2022)

**:**a high-level overall plan embracing the general goals and acceptable procedures especially of a governmental body

Strategic Autonomy. Lucia Retter and colleagues at Rand Corporation in 2021 define it as:

Lucia Retter, Stephanie Pezard, Stephen Flanagan, Gene Germanovich,, Pauline Paille 2021. (Retter - research leader at RAND Europe and co-directs RAND Europe's Centre for Defence Economics and Acquisition. Pezard - Senior Political Scientist and Associate Research Department Director for Defense and Political Sciences . Flanagan - adjunct senior fellow at the RAND Corporation; former special assistant to the president and senior director for defense policy and strategy at the National Security Council.   Germanovich - Acting International Portfolio Lead, RAND National Security Research Division; International Defense Researcher. Grand-Clement - Senior Analyst at *RAND* Europe, in the Defence Security and Infrastructure programme. Paille - Analyst, RAND Corp.) 9 Nov 2021 European Strategic Autonomy in Defence <https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1319-1.html>

European strategic autonomy is the ability to act autonomously and the ability to choose whether and in what ways to collaborate with like-minded partners in matters of security and defence.

OBSERVATION 2. INHERENCY, or the structure of the Status Quo.

FACT 1.  The European Union seeks strategic autonomy

The EU is pursuing initiatives designed to integrate and improve their autonomous military capabilities

Lucia Retter, Stephanie Pezard, Stephen Flanagan, Gene Germanovich,, Pauline Paille 2021. (Retter - research leader at RAND Europe and co-directs RAND Europe's Centre for Defence Economics and Acquisition. Pezard - Senior Political Scientist and Associate Research Department Director for Defense and Political Sciences . Flanagan - adjunct senior fellow at the RAND Corporation; former special assistant to the president and senior director for defense policy and strategy at the National Security Council.   Germanovich - Acting International Portfolio Lead, RAND National Security Research Division; International Defense Researcher. Grand-Clement - Senior Analyst at *RAND* Europe, in the Defence Security and Infrastructure programme. Paille - Analyst, RAND Corp.) 9 Nov 2021 European Strategic Autonomy in Defence <https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1319-1.html>

EU-led initiatives in pursuit of European strategic autonomy in defence are important, but its shape will also be determined by external influences. Recent years have seen the European Commission consolidating greater control of defence integration, beginning with the introduction of the European Defence Procurement Directive and the Defence Transfers Directive, followed by the Defence Action Plan and the establishment of the Directorate General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS) and the launch of the European Defence Fund (EDF). These Commission initiatives are complemented by programmes run or facilitated by the European Defence Agency such as the Coordinated Annual Review of Defence (CARD), Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and other pooling and sharing initiatives.

FACT 2. US opposition.

Current US policy mistakenly but effectively blocks improvements in European defense capabilities

Max Bergmann, James Lamond, Siena Cicarelli 2021 (Bergman - a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. Lamond - a fellow at the Center. Cicarelli - a research and program associate for National Security and International Policy at the Center.) June 1, 2021 “The Case for EU Defense” <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/case-eu-defense/> (accessed 13 June 2022)

Europe’s dependence on the United States for its security means that the United States possesses a de facto veto on the direction of European defense. Since the 1990s, the United States has typically used its effective veto power to block the defense ambitions of the European Union. This has frequently resulted in an absurd situation where Washington loudly insists that Europe do more on defense but then strongly objects when Europe’s political union—the European Union—tries to answer the call. This policy approach has been a grand strategic error—one that has weakened NATO militarily, strained the trans-Atlantic alliance, and contributed to the relative decline in Europe’s global clout. As a result, one of America’s closest partners and allies of first resort is not nearly as powerful as it could be.

FACT 3. The Arms Export Control Act of 1976

The Act limits US weapons sales and military cooperation with foreign nations unless they are specifically named by an act of Congress under the Act.

The US needs closer military cooperation with Europe by adding the European Union to the Arms Export Control Act

Sebastien Sprenger 2022 (Europe editor for Defense News) 10 May 2022 "Pentagon pitches law changes to enable US-EU defense cooperation" <https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/05/10/pentagon-pitches-law-changes-to-enable-us-eu-defense-cooperation/> (accessed 2 July 2022)

Pentagon leaders are asking Congress for new authorities when it comes to cooperative defense programs with the European Union, a prospect officials on both sides of the Atlantic have said will complement traditional NATO processes. Defense officials here circulated legislative language to that effect on Capitol Hill this month in hopes of having it included in the annual defense policy bill now on the congressional docket. The proposed bill text would name the European Union, plus its associated bodies like the European Defence Agency, in the Arms Export Control Act, thereby enabling routine defense work with the bloc and its member countries.

OBSERVATION 3. We need our Plan, to be implemented by Congress and the President

1. Congress amends the US Arms Export Control Act of 1976 to treat the EU commission, agencies, and member countries the same as other allies specified in Section 36 of the act. Section 36 gives specific countries and organizations the ability to purchase US services and defense items with lower standards of congressional evaluation.  
2. The US reverses its policy of opposition to European Union strategic autonomy and begins supporting it instead.  
3. Funding through existing budgets of existing agencies and general federal revenues  
4. Enforcement through normal means within the Defense Department and the State Department.   
5. Plan takes effect 3 days after an Affirmative ballot   
6. All Affirmative speeches may clarify.

OBSERVATION 4. ADVANTAGES. Supporting EU defense initiatives is beneficial for 3 reasons

ADVANTAGE 1. Block Russian Aggression. We see this in 3 sub-points

A. Fragmentation weakens European defense. They should have 50% of our capabilities, but they only achieve 15%

Vincent-Immanuel Herr and Martin Speer 2022 (Herr - a fellow at the Charlemagne Prize Academy in Germany and partner at Herr & Speer, a political consulting firm. Speer - a Fellow at the same firm. He has advised European institutions and politicians on various questions regarding policy and communication.) May 18, 2022 “The European Union needs its own army” <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/05/18/european-union-army-ukraine>/ (accessed 19 June 2022)

Currently, the 27 member states of the E.U. can field an impressive 1.3 million active-duty military personnel, roughly on par with the size of the U.S. armed forces (approximately 1.4 million) and significantly bigger than Russia’s military (850,000). The combined military expenditure of the E.U. states is an impressive $225 billion, more than twice the size of Russia’s military budget of a little over $100 billion and roughly three-quarters of China’s $290 billion. Yet these numbers do not translate to effectiveness. In fact, the planning, development and procurement of defense technology by 27 sovereign countries has produced an enormous amount of inefficiency. While the U.S. military uses just 30 weapons systems, the E.U.’s militaries use some 180, six times as many. While the U.S. armed forces use just one main battle tank, the E.U. fields — depending how you count — 11 to 17 different models. Pointing to facts like these, then-European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker suggested, “We are spending half of the American budget when it comes to defense, so we should be efficient at 50 percent of the U.S. We are only 15 percent as efficient.” Integrating European militaries — and centralizing the procurement and development of technology — would doubtlessly increase E.U. military, budgetary and personnel efficiency.

B. Strategic autonomy initiatives are underway to solve

Michelle Shevin-Coetzee 2019 (a former Fulbright Schuman Fellow at German Council on Foreign Relations and Chatham House. 2020 Rosenthal Fellow and part of the 2020 cohort of the Center for Strategic & International Studies’ Nuclear Scholars Initiative. B.A. in International Affairs from George Washington Univ.) October 31, 2019 “Resetting the US-EU Defense Relationship” (accessed 19 June 2022)  <https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/resetting-the-us-eu-defense-relationship/> (brackets in original)

Against the backdrop of achieving strategic autonomy, EU member states are moving forward with their own initiatives, primarily the European Defense Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). [**END QUOTE]** The EDF provides a financial incentive for member states to develop capabilities jointly. It is particularly noteworthy that the European Commission is co-funding this effort—at €13 billion over the course of the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework. The actual development of the joint capabilities will occur through PESCO, a political commitment among 25 member states to deepen defense cooperation. **[THEY GO ON LATER IN THE CONTEXT QUOTE:**] There are currently 34 projects that cut across all domains, from maritime to land. The EDF and PESCO, according to a French official, are a “direct response to [the] call by Americans on burden-sharing.”

C. The Impact: East European security. Increased European capabilities are crucial for defense against Russian aggression

Giovanna De Maio 2021 (nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings Institution) "OPPORTUNITIES TO DEEPEN NATO-EU COOPERATION" Dec 2021 (accessed 3 July 2022) https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/FP\_20211203\_nato\_eu\_cooperation\_demaio.pdf

Similarly, a scenario analysis by the International Institute for Strategic Studies argued that without the help of the United States, conventional forces from European NATO countries would not be able to push back against the hypothetical conquest of Lithuania and part of Poland by the Russian Federation. To ensure that they can successfully respond to a land attack from Russia, or a coordinated Russia-China operation, Europeans need to increase the quality and readiness of their defense apparatus All these analyses indicate that expanded capabilities on the European side are crucial for a stronger NATO posture.

ADVANTAGE 2. Resist Chinese hegemony. We see this in 3 sub-points

A. Now is the time to shift US policy. We need European strategic autonomy for a more reliable partner against China

Hans Binnendijk & Alexander Vershbow 2021. (Binnendijk and Vershbow are both Distinguished Fellows at the Atlantic Council. Binnendijk is a former National Security Coucil Senior Director for Defense Policy. Vershbow is a former NATO Deputy Secretary General and US Assistant Secretary of Defense ) Needed: A trans-Atlantic agreement on European strategic autonomy 10 Oct 2021 <https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2021/10/10/needed-a-transatlantic-agreement-on-european-strategic-autonomy/> (accessed 3 July 2022)

The time for a shift in U.S. policy is ripe for several reasons. Europeans feel a greater need for strategic autonomy because of doubts about American reliability prompted by former President Trump’s disdain for NATO, as well as recent flawed consultations relating to troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Australian submarine deal. The United States is calculating the increased military capabilities it needs to deter an aggressive China in Asia and requires a stronger European partner to share the burdens.

B. China threatens US hegemony

Ashley Tellis 2020 (Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs and a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is also a counselor at the National Bureau of Asian Research and the research director of the Strategic Asia Program) 4 May 2020 "COVID-19 Knocks on American Hegemony" <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/04/covid-19-knocks-on-american-hegemony-pub-81719> (accessed 8 June 2021)

After almost two decades of conflicted hesitancy, the United States finally acknowledged that it is involved in a long-term strategic competition with China. This rivalry, almost by definition, is not merely a wrangle between two major states. Rather, it involves a struggle for dominance in the international system, even if China as the rising power disavows any such ambition. China’s very ascendancy—if sustained—could over time threaten the U.S. hegemony that has been in place since the end of World War II. It is this reality of unequal growth—which has nourished China’s expanding influence and military capabilities—that lies at the root of the evolving rivalry.

C. The Impact: World peace & prosperity. US hegemony is key to global peace & prosperity

Capt. M. V. Prato 2009 (United States Marine Corps,Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Combat Development Command,Marine Corps University) “The Need for American Hegemony” <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA508040> (accessed 3 June 2021)

The world witnessed a vast shift in the polarity of geopolitics after the Cold War. The United States became the world’s greatest hegemon with an unequalled ability to globally project cultural, political, economic, and military power in a manner not seen since the days of the Roman Empire. **[END QUOTE]** Coined the “unipolar moment” by syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer, the disparity of power between the U.S. and all other nations allows the U.S. to influence the world for the mutual benefit of all responsible states. Unfortunately, the United States is increasingly forced to act unilaterally as a result of both foreign and domestic resentment to U.S. dominance and the rise of liberal internationalism. [**He goes on to conclude later in the same context QUOTE**:] The United States must exercise benevolent global hegemony, unilaterally if necessary, to ensure its security and maintain global peace and prosperity.

ADVANTAGE 3. Stronger NATO. We see this in 2 sub points.

A. The Link: Dropping US opposition to EU defense initiatives would strengthen NATO

Erik Brattberg 2020 (director of the Europe Program and a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington) 3 March 2020 <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/03/03/how-washington-views-new-european-defense-initiatives-pub-81229> (accessed 2 July 2022)

The strong and sometimes vocal U.S. opposition to European defense initiatives in recent years is understandable, but is ultimately short-sighted and counter-productive. If successful, new EU defense initiatives have potential to make significant contributions toward strengthening NATO by bringing about more European capabilities and promoting defense technological innovation. There are also concrete examples of how EU defense projects, such as promoting military mobility or countering hybrid warfare, contributes to NATO’s task on the eastern flank.

B. The Impact: Strong NATO deters aggression

Admiral James Stavridis 2019. (former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO) 4 Apr 2019 Why NATO Is Essential For World Peace, According to Its Former Commander <https://time.com/5564171/why-nato-is-essential-world-peace/> (accessed 4 July 2022)

 The greatest single advantage the U.S. has on the global stage is our network of allies, partners and friends. That network is under deliberate pressure: from China, with its “One Belt, One Road” competitive strategy, and from Russia, with its relentless attacks on coalition unity. A strong NATO means not only having allies in a fight, should it come to that, but also a powerful deterrent to the aggression of ambitious adversaries.

2A Evidence: Support EU Strategic Autonomy

DEFINITIONS / TOPICALITY

List of EU nations – all are in Europe.

Gov.UK, no date given ( United Kingdom public sector information website, created by the Government Digital Service to provide a single point of access to HM Government services. The site launched as a beta on 31 January 2012, following on from the Alphagov project.) “Countries in the EU and EEA” <https://www.gov.uk/eueea#:~:text=EU%20countries&text=Austria%2C%20Belgium%2C%20Bulgaria%2C%20Croatia,%2C%20Slovenia%2C%20Spain%20and%20Sweden>. (accessed 16 June 2022)

The European Union (EU) is an economic and political union of 27 countries. It operates an internal (or single) market which allows free movement of goods, capital, services and people between member states. The EU countries are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.

PESCO - what it is and does

Dr. Seth Johnston 2019 (a Fellow of the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School. He was chief of international security cooperation for intelligence at the U.S. Army Europe Headquarters, and he planned and oversaw specialized intelligence support to allied forces during the most significant NATO command structure growth in three decades while at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Johnston earned his doctorate in international relations from Oxford University where he also earned a masters degree in comparative politics as a Marshall Scholar. He earned a B.S. in political science with a nuclear engineering minor at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.) November 2019 “A Europe that Protects? U.S. Opportunities in EU Defense” <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/europe-protects-us-opportunities-eu-defense> (accessed 19 june 2022)

Permanent Structured Cooperation on defense (PESCO) is an EU treaty-based framework for defense cooperation on capability development or operational projects. Launched in 2017, 25 EU member states have agreed to participate in at least one of 34 current projects ranging from common training to development of new capabilities, each led by different member states. The best known PESCO initiative addresses “military mobility,” harmonized procedures and physical infrastructure for the flow of friendly military equipment that aims to introduce something akin to a “military Schengen area.” This signature initiative boasts broad participation among states to address a significant need at relatively low cost, all while remaining complementary to NATO.

EPF purpose and budget

European Commission post 2022 (An official website of the EU. They provide information on the EU, including current actions, initiatives, and board decisions.) Post 2022 “European Peace Facility” <https://fpi.ec.europa.eu/what-we-do/european-peace-facility_en>, (accessed 13 June 2022)

The EPF has a total financial ceiling of €5.69 billion for the period 2021-2027. As the EPF is an off-budget instrument, EU Member States pay their contributions directly every year, based on the estimated annual budget for the EPF. Through the EPF, the EU has the possibility to provide military equipment to increase its partners’ security and defence capacity. In addition to training provided to partners, the EPF also allows the EU to provide equipment, subject to strict safeguards and control mechanisms. Respect of human rights and compliance with international humanitarian law are crucial and will be ensured at each step.

More details on EPF (European Peace Facility)

Daniel Michaels Last Updated 2022 (Daniel Michaels is Brussels Bureau Chief for The Wall Street Journal. He was previously German Business Editor, also overseeing coverage of the European Central Bank. BA in East Asian Studies from Princeton University.) Last Updated: Feb 28, 2022 “EU to Fund Purchase of Weapons for First Time and Ban Entry of Russian Planes Into EU Airspace” <https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news-2022-02-26/card/eu-to-fund-buying-weapons-for-first-time-RsvTAr5xRh7kjDaPA0QJ> (accessed 16 June, 2022)

The funding will come from the European Peace Facility, a financing instrument established by the bloc last March aimed at preventing conflicts and strengthening international security. Able to provide several hundred million dollars annually, it was established outside the EU’s normal budget, in part because inclusion could have complicated arms purchases.

Why the EPF is an off budget mechanism

Dr. Tomas Hamilton 2022 (a Researcher at University of Amsterdam. PhD in Law from King’s College London, an LLM from the University of Cambridge, an LLB from the College of Law, and a BA (Hons) Human Sciences from the University of Oxford.) March 30, 2022 “Articulating Arms Control Law in the EU’s Lethal Military Assistance to Ukraine” <https://www.justsecurity.org/80862/articulating-arms-control-law-in-the-eus-lethal-military-assistance-to-ukraine/> (accessed 14 June 2022)

However, although international law permits EU Member States to agree to jointly provide military assistance to Ukraine, under EU law they are prevented from using the regular EU budgetary framework to do so. Article 41(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) prohibits EU funding from being used for expenditure arising from operations having military or defense implications.. For the first time in its history, the EU is relying on the off-budget EPF financing instrument, created in March 2021 to provide lethal assistance to a third State engaged in armed conflict. The EPF was envisaged primarily for use in Sahel peace-keeping operations and EU missions such as the non-lethal assistance to Mozambique. It was unforeseeable that 12 months later, the EPF would be used to support Ukraine in a large-scale international armed conflict with Russia. The EPF has thus dramatically broadened the legal powers of the EU Council to intervene in Ukraine with military aid, playing a much larger role in the conflict as a bloc than would have been possible under the regular EU budget.


Export control is regulated through the Arms Export Control Act

DOD Defense Pricing and Contracting Revised 2021 (Defense Pricing and Contracting is responsible for pricing and contracting policy matters across the Department of Defense (DoD). We execute statute, executive order, and policy through the timely update of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS) and issuance of memoranda and guidance.) Revised February 24, 2021 “PGI 225.79—EXPORT CONTROL” <https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/pgi/pgi_htm/PGI225_79.htm> (accessed 15 June 2022)

The U.S. Government controls exports of defense articles, technical data, and defense services. The controls are imposed by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the Department of State regulation that implements the AECA export controls. That regulation is the ITAR.

List of actions taken by EPF

European Commission post 2022 (An official website of the EU. They provide information on the EU, including current actions, initiatives, and board decisions.) Post 2022 “European Peace Facility” <https://fpi.ec.europa.eu/what-we-do/european-peace-facility_en> (accessed 13 June 2022)



INHERENCY

Section 36 – exemptions and countries

Defense Security Cooperation Agency no date given (The DCSA, as part of the United States Department of Defense, provides financial and technical assistance, transfer of defense matériel, training and services to allies, and promotes military-to-military contacts.)“Foreign Military Sales Faq” <https://www.dsca.mil/foreign-military-sales-faq> (accessed 23 June 2022)

Section 36 of the U.S. Arms Export Control Act requires Congressional notification for FMS or DCS sales expected to meet or exceed the following thresholds:  
For North Atlantic Treaty Organization member countries, South Korea, Australia, Japan, Israel, and New Zealand: major defense equipment (MDE) of $25M or more; any defense articles or services of $100M or more; or design and construction services of $300M or more.  
For all other countries: MDE of $14M or more; any defense articles and services of $50M or more; or design and construction services of $200M or more.   
For North Atlantic Treaty Organization member countries and organizations, South Korea, Australia, Japan, Israel, and New Zealand there is a 15-day statutory notification period.   
For all other countries there is a 30-day statutory notification period.

The US opposes the EU initiatives in Status Quo

Erik Brattberg 2020 (director of the Europe Program and a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington) 3 March 2020 <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/03/03/how-washington-views-new-european-defense-initiatives-pub-81229> (accessed 2 July 2022)

When it comes to the latest iteration of European defense projects like Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and European Defence Fund (EDF), the principled U.S. reaction has been lukewarm at best, and in some cases even openly antagonistic. While administration officials have gradually gained a better understanding of these initiatives, they have also become more vocal about specific concerns especially related to them.

US policy discourages EU defense

Erik Brattberg 2020 (was director of the Europe Program and a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. Master of science in foreign service from Georgetown Univ. and master’s and bachelor’s degrees in political science from Uppsala Univ.) March 3, 2020 “How Washington Views New European Defense Initiatives” <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/03/03/how-washington-views-new-european-defense-initiatives-pub-81229> (accessed 19 June 2022)

The United States has traditionally held many reservations and mixed views about the evolution of an autonomous European defense identity apart from NATO. It is well-known how in the 1990s the Clinton administration stipulated its famous “three D’s” about how new EU defense initiatives should relate to NATO. The Bush administration held a fairly critical view whereas the Obama administration was generally somewhat more supportive. However, the dominant American view of EU defense cooperation over the past two decades can best be described as disinterest and skepticism about the EU’s ability to implement serious defense proposals. Rather than prioritizing European defense schemes, the main U.S. preference is still for European allies and partners to fulfill their defense spending commitments and focus on strengthening NATO.

A/T “European defense spending is the problem” - Duplication of spending is the problem, increased spending won’t help

Max Bergmann, James Lamond, Siena Cicarelli 2021 (Bergman - a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. Lamond - a fellow at the Center. Cicarelli - a research and program associate for National Security and International Policy at the Center.) June 1, 2021 “The Case for EU Defense” <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/case-eu-defense/> (accessed 13 June 2022)

A major shift is needed because the current problems plaguing European defense are structural. The problem with European defense is less about spending and more about fragmentation. Each European country has its own distinct national military, leading to incredible inefficiencies and waste. NATO does its best to coordinate the hodgepodge of European forces and plays a vital role in focusing on clear gaps in capabilities, setting priorities, establishing commitments, and coordinating forces. NATO’s role is crucial in stitching together 30 national military forces into a military alliance capable of acting together. But marginal spending increases dispersed among individual states does not provide nearly the benefit in security as it should. Strengthening European defense is therefore not just about spending but also about addressing the incessant fragmentation, duplication, and waste.

US policy conflicts with EU programs.

Michelle Shevin-Coetzee 2019 (former Fulbright Schuman Fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) and Chatham House. 2020 Rosenthal Fellow and part of the 2020 cohort of the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Nuclear Scholars Initiative. B.A. in International Affairs from George Washington Univ.) October 31, 2019 “Resetting the US-EU Defense Relationship” <https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/resetting-the-us-eu-defense-relationship/> (accessed 19 June 2022)

EU member states, many of which are also NATO allies, view Washington’s behavior as schizophrenic. On the one hand, they argue, the US asks its European counterparts to shoulder more of a burden. On the other, when Europeans do take concrete steps to invest further in defense, the US criticizes the approach. EU member states, according to an EU official, lament the “mixed messages from the American side,” viewing the 2016 EU Global Strategy as the response to the longstanding US request.

INH: Status Quo US/EU cooperation isn’t enough. SOLV: We have to build a lasting engagement and overcome mistrust

Sophia Besch 2021 (Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for European Reform’s (CER) Berlin office and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council Europe Center. Master’s degrees from the London School of Economics and Sciences Po Paris and is currently pursuing a PhD at King’s College London) 22 Dec 2021 " Rebooting the U.S.-EU Defense Relationship" <https://www.aicgs.org/publication/rebooting-the-u-s-eu-defense-relationship/> (accessed 2 July 2022)

For years, U.S. calls for Europe to ‘do more,’ coupled with skepticism of the EU, have contributed to the Union not living up to its potential on defense policy. Then, under the last U.S. administration, the open opposition of President Trump helped galvanize Europeans to launch a range of new initiatives. It would now be a grave mistake to let the current mutual goodwill and functioning working relationship lull the United States and the EU back into inaction. Instead, both sides should make use of this moment of respite to build lasting and institutionalized structures of engagement on defense that can withstand future tensions.

A/T “US supports EDF/PESCO” - Lukewarm at best, sometimes antagonistic

Erik Brattberg 2020 (was director of the Europe Program and a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. Master of science in foreign service from Georgetown University and master’s and bachelor’s degrees in political science from Uppsala Univ.) March 3, 2020 “How Washington Views New European Defense Initiatives” <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/03/03/how-washington-views-new-european-defense-initiatives-pub-81229> (accessed 19 June 2022)

When it comes to the latest iteration of European defense projects like Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and European Defence Fund (EDF), the principled U.S. reaction has been lukewarm at best, and in some cases even openly antagonistic. While administration officials have gradually gained a better understanding of these initiatives, they have also become more vocal about specific concerns especially related to them.

EU Duplication and Fragmentation = loss of efficiency and capabilities

Max Bergmann, James Lamond, Siena Cicarelli 2021 (Bergman - a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. Lamond - a fellow at the Center. Cicarelli - a research and program associate for National Security and International Policy at the Center.) June 1, 2021 “The Case for EU Defense” <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/case-eu-defense/>(accessed 13 June 2022)

Europe is also paying higher costs because they lose potential economies of scale. A report from McKinsey & Company found that Europe could cut costs on equipment procurement by 30 percent, or $15 billion per year, if they were to make joint procurements, gaining efficiencies and economies of scale. Meanwhile, European states maintain distinct national defense companies, with little of the integration and consolidation that is seen in other EU economic sectors. This has left the European defense sector inefficient and technologically dull, with little investment in research and development.

SOLVENCY/ADVOCACY

US can influence EU defense toward integration: It would overcome European national divisions

Freddie Whitlow 2020 (European Defense Trainee for Finabel researching EU defense integration and interoperability. Master of International Affairs candidate at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin.) June 22, 2020 “The US Should Not Only Support EU Defense Integration It Should Help Shape It” <https://pathforeurope.eu/the-us-should-not-only-support-eu-defense-integration-it-should-help-shape-it/> (accessed 19 June 2022)

A long-held argument is that the security architecture created by the US in the post-World War II environment is what allowed Europe to flourish and kept old animosities at bay. There’s certainly truth to the positive effects the American presence has had in Europe, especially with keeping Moscow’s ambitions at bay. Jen Techau, a former Senior Fellow at the George Marshall Fund and now Senior Speechwriter for the German Ministry of Defense, pointed out that the biggest issue is that Europe still has low political trust amongst other member states through old historical rivalries. This of course alludes to the stabilizing presence America has been. However, this is exactly why US involvement in EU defense integration could make all of the difference.

US can and should influence EU defense

Max Bergmann and Pierre Morcos 2022 (Bergmann - the director of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Former member of the US Secretary of State’s policy planning staff; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security. Morcos - a visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; career diplomat with the French Foreign Service, served as deputy head of the Strategic Affairs and Cybersecurity Division, focusing on NATO and European defense issues.) May 2, 2022 “The Hour of Europe?” [https://www.csis.org/analysis/ hour-europe](https://www.csis.org/analysis/%20hour-europe) (accessed 19 June 2022)

Moreover, the United States does not have to be a passive actor in these conversations. Too often the United States only raises its voice when it has concerns, such as whether EU tech regulations will hurt U.S. companies or whether EU defense efforts will lock out U.S. defense companies. Instead of a reactive and often negative agenda, the United States should articulate a clear and positive vision for where it wants the European Union to go. Washington has more influence in Europe, given NATO and its security presence, than any other region of the world. The Biden administration should use that influence—whether that is to push for internal EU reforms to enable EU enlargement or to spur greater defense investments.

Advocacy: US should support EDF, PESCO, CARD

Dr. Seth Johnston 2019 (a Fellow of the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School. He was chief of international security cooperation for intelligence at the U.S. Army Europe Headquarters; doctorate in international relations from Oxford University where he also earned a masters degree in comparative politics as a Marshall Scholar. He earned a B.S. in political science with a nuclear engineering minor at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.) November 2019 “A Europe that Protects? U.S. Opportunities in EU Defense” <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/europe-protects-us-opportunities-eu-defense> (accessed 19 June 2022)

Continue to work as constructively as possible with European countries and the EU to optimize PESCO, EDF, and CARD.  
1)Encourage European projects that provide the most meaningful capabilities, defined by both NATO and the EU’s own Capability Development Plan, especially high-end systems, equipment, and readiness.  
2)Support the important work on military mobility in Europe.  
3)Appeal to European self-interest to have the greatest possible choice, quality, and access to technology from the participation of third-countries, especially non-EU NATO allies and trusted partners, in PESCO and EDF. Lead by example in welcoming European participation in U.S. defense markets.  
4)Resolve that low-capability projects pursued in isolated defense industrial markets would be the least desirable outcome and serve neither American nor European interests.

A/T "Europe's capabilities too weak" - Good reason to start the plan now. They'll get better if we do

Hans Binnendijk & Alexnader Vershbow 2021. (Binnendijk and Vershbow are both Distinguished Fellows at the Atlantic Council. Binnendijk is a former National Security Coucil Senior Director for Defense Policy. Vershbow is a former NATO Deputy Secretary General and US Assistant Secretary of Defense ) Needed: A trans-Atlantic agreement on European strategic autonomy 10 Oct 2021 <https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2021/10/10/needed-a-transatlantic-agreement-on-european-strategic-autonomy/> (accessed 3 July 2022)

One way to establish a military standard for strategic autonomy is to agree that Europe will provide one-half of NATO’s current agreed “level of ambition.” That would translate into Europe being able to conduct three nearly simultaneous small operations and one major operation on its own. Given Europe’s current lack of enablers, its relatively low readiness rates, and its fragmented military industrial complex, meeting this standard will take time. So strategic autonomy will be a process, not a diplomatic declaration. But the process should start now.

Advocacy: US should stop blocking and start supporting Strategic Autonomy. It's net beneficial for the US

Ronja Kempin and Barbbra Kunz 2018 (Kempin - a senior research fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin. She previously served as a political adviser for CSDP to the German Federal Foreign Office, headed SWP’s “EU’s External Relations” research division, and was a Fritz Thyssen Fellow at Harvard University. Kunz - a research fellow at IFRI’s study committee on French-German Relations; teaches at Paris’ Sorbonne University and was a visiting scholar at SAIS’ Center for Transatlantic Relations.) April 12, 2018 “Washington Should Help Europe Achieve ‘Strategic Autonomy,’ not Fight it” <https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/washington-should-help-europe-achieve-strategic-autonomy-not-fight-it/> (accessed 19 June 2022)

There are many reasons to be skeptical of this new yet age-old debate. First, Washington has a poor understanding of the current intra-European debate, its core notion of strategic autonomy, and its implications, a shortcoming that has its roots in the fact that Europeans themselves have not fully defined the concept. Second, it is in America’s interest for Europeans to attain (or at least move closer to) strategic autonomy. Washington should embrace and support European endeavors, specifically by reassuring its skeptical allies across the Atlantic that it does indeed want a strategically autonomous Europe. The worry for Washington should not be that Europeans strive for strategic autonomy. The real worry should be that they might not make it.

A/T "More study needed" - More action needed. Now is the critical time to act

Sophia Besch 2021 (Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for European Reform’s (CER) Berlin office and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council Europe Center. Master’s degrees from the London School of Economics and Sciences Po Paris and is currently pursuing a PhD at King’s College London) 22 Dec 2021 " Rebooting the U.S.-EU Defense Relationship" <https://www.aicgs.org/publication/rebooting-the-u-s-eu-defense-relationship/> (accessed 2 July 2022)

It would now be a grave mistake to let the current mutual goodwill and functioning working relationship lull the United States and the EU back into inaction. Instead, both sides should make use of this moment of respite to build lasting and institutionalized structures of engagement on defense that can withstand future tensions.

A/T “EU isn’t interested in defense” – EU has lots of new future defense plans

Dr. Luigi Scazzieri 2022 (senior research fellow at the Center for European Refrom. PhD in European Politics from King's College London; MA degrees from London School of Economics and King's College London) March 25, 2022 “Does the Strategic Compass Herald A Stronger EU in Security and Defence?” <https://www.cer.eu/insights/does-strategic-compass-herald-stronger-eu-security-and-defence> (accessed 19 June 2022)

The Compass’ proposals indicate that enhancing resilience to threats will be a major area of focus for the EU in the coming years. The EU plans to boost its own intelligence capabilities, and will carry out threat reviews at least every three years. The EU will develop a “hybrid toolbox” to help respond to threats like disinformation and election interference, for example by creating ‘hybrid rapid response teams’. The EU also plans to strengthen its cyber-defence policy through regular exercises and the Commission is developing a ‘cyber resilience act’ to set standards that would help counter disinformation and election manipulation. Space is also a priority, and the Compass lays out plans to develop a new space strategy for security and defence to build a shared understanding of threats, enhance capabilities, and react more quickly.

A/T “EU isn’t interested in defense” – EU is building a new Rapid Deployment Capability

Luigi Scazzieri 2022 (a senior research fellow at the Center for European Refrom.Before joining the CER, Luigi carried out research at the UK in a Changing Europe Initiative at King's College London, the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Luigi holds a PhD in European Politics from King's College London, MA degrees from the LSE and King's College London and a BA from the University of Cambridge.) March 25, 2022 “Does the Strategic Compass Herald A Stronger EU in Security and Defence?” <https://www.cer.eu/insights/does-strategic-compass-herald-stronger-eu-security-and-defence> (accessed 19 June 2022)

The Compass aims to strengthen the EU’s ability to carry out operations. The flagship proposal is for a 5000-strong military force, the ‘rapid deployment capacity’ (RDC). The RDC, which is scheduled to be operational by 2025, will be made up of reformed EU Battlegroups (military units that have been operational since 2007 but have never been used), and additional forces. The RDC will draw on a larger pool of available forces, and include land, air and maritime components. Crucially, the RDC will be able to call on strategic enablers like airlift, which until now have been provided by the US. The components of the RDC will regularly train together in live exercises to increase their readiness and ability to operate together. The Compass also sets out the ambition to strengthen the EU’s HQ, to plan and command larger military operations.

A/T "Nothing for EU to defend against" - Numerous conflicts and crises EU should deal with, without the US

Josep Borrell 2020 ([High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/taxonomy/term/400381_en)) " Why European strategic autonomy matters" 12 Mar 2020 <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/why-european-strategic-autonomy-matters_en> (accessed 3 July 2020)

Additionally, Europe is today confronted on its periphery with a certain number of conflicts or tensions in the Sahel, in Libya and in the Eastern Mediterranean. In these three cases Europe must act even more, and alone, because these problems do not primarily concern the United States.As one Polish scholar wrote, [“the US will no longer be engaged in large-scale military operations in Africa and the Middle East and will leave to Europe crises and conflict resolution in the European neighbourhood”.](https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2020-08-14/usa-germany-natos-eastern-flank-transformation-us-military) Therefore, we need to close many capability gaps and loopholes and to be present and active in areas where our interests are at stake.

A/T “EDF doesn’t work” - Backed up by other programs

European Commission 2022 (An official website of the EU) May 18, 2022 “EU steps up action to strengthen EU defence capabilities, industrial and technological base: towards an EU framework for Joint defence procurement” <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_3143> (accessed 19 June 2022)

This short-term instrument will pave the way to an EU framework for defence joint procurement. To this end, in the third quarter of 2022, the Commission will propose a European Defence Investment Programme (EDIP) regulation. It will establish the conditions for Member States to form European Defence Capability Consortia (EDCC). Within an EDCC, Member States will jointly procure, for the use of participating Member States, defence capabilities that are developed in a collaborative way within the EU and will benefit from a VAT exemption. Additionally, associated EU financing may be provided for projects of high EU interest.

A/T "Europe is too divided" - EU strategic autonomy is gaining momentum and will overcome division

Lucia Retter, Stephanie Pezard, Stephen Flanagan, Gene Germanovich,, Pauline Paille 2021. (Retter - research leader at RAND Europe and co-directs RAND Europe's Centre for Defence Economics and Acquisition. Pezard - Senior Political Scientist and Associate Research Department Director for Defense and Political Sciences . Flanagan - adjunct senior fellow at the RAND Corporation; former special assistant to the president and senior director for defense policy and strategy at the National Security Council.   Germanovich - Acting International Portfolio Lead, RAND National Security Research Division; International Defense Researcher. Grand-Clement - Senior Analyst at *RAND* Europe, in the Defence Security and Infrastructure programme. Paille - Analyst, RAND Corp.) 9 Nov 2021 European Strategic Autonomy in Defence <https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1319-1.html>

Experts interviewed for this study presented a range of perspectives on the realism of the three different ways in which European strategic autonomy might materialise in the next five years, as discussed in Chapter 3. Yet there was a strong agreement among most interviewees that a five-year time frame is much too short to achieve the maturity of defence integration reflected by Scenario 1, much less Scenario 3. Indeed, some interviewees perceived that the most likely scenario in the next five years is a divided Europe and a US preoccupied with internal problems and focused primarily on China and the Indo-Pacific region (i.e. roughly Scenario 2). A greater number of interviewees, however, saw European strategic autonomy as gaining momentum on the EU defence and security agenda, with most recent efforts underpinning the development of the Strategic Compass as well as the wider burst of EU strategic ambitions via an openly ‘geopolitical’ Commission.

A/T “New programs will fail” - the game has changed

Quentin Lopinot 2018 (a visiting fellow in the Europe Program, focusing on European security issues, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. A career diplomat with the French Foreign Service. Previous positions include deputy head of the Strategic Affairs and Cybersecurity Division, focusing on NATO and European Defense issues.) November 26, 2018 “Why the European Defence Fund Is Good News for U.S. Security Interests” <https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-european-defence-fund-good-news-us-security-interests> (accessed 19 June 2022)

Yet this time could be different for several reasons. The first is that Europe’s security context has dramatically changed over the last few years, including Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its efforts to intimidate several European countries and undermine EU and NATO unity and numerous terrorist attacks, in particular from the Islamic State. These recent events have demonstrated the need for Europeans to be able and willing to deploy and project military force to defend their interests in cases where the United States is unable or unwilling to act. One should not underestimate how this upheaval has fundamentally altered Europe’s assessment of its environment.

Advantage 1 - European Defense / Russian Aggression

EDF will strengthen Europe’s defense.

Michelle Shevin-Coetzee 2019 (a former Fulbright Schuman Fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) and Chatham House. 2020 Rosenthal Fellow and part of the 2020 cohort of the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Nuclear Scholars Initiative. B.A. in International Affairs from George Washington Univ.) October 31, 2019 “Resetting the US-EU Defense Relationship” <https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/resetting-the-us-eu-defense-relationship/> (accessed 19 June 2022)

Likewise, the EDF can bolster member states’ defense capabilities. According to a French official, the EDF is the “key initiative within the EU,” providing an incentive to develop capabilities jointly. The Franco-German Main Ground Combat System and Future Combat Air System projects are two that could develop through the EDF with other countries, as demonstrated by Spain’s recent inclusion in the latter.

New programs – like EDF, PESCO, and DG DEFIS - will give the EU military capability

Raluca Csernatoni Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2021(a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe, where she works on European security and defense with a specific focus on disruptive technologies. PhD and MA in international relations from the Central European University in Budapest.) December 6, 2021 “The EU’s Defense Ambitions: Understanding the Emergence of a European Defense Technological and Industrial Complex” <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/12/06/eu-s-defense-ambitions-understanding-emergence-of-european-defense-technological-and-industrial-complex-pub-85884> (accessed 14 June 2022)

Examples of the EU’s expanded ambitions in security and defense policy include the establishment of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in 2017, the initiation of the European Defence Fund (EDF) in 2019, and the creation of the Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS) in 2021, to name a few. All of these initiatives will have undeniable consequences for the EU’s institutional identity and its political transformation from a purely civilian international actor to a potential military and technological power on the international stage.

EU strategic autonomy projects, like EDF and PESCO, will strengthen Europe without harming NATO

Josep Borrell 2020 ([High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/taxonomy/term/400381_en)) " Why European strategic autonomy matters" 12 Mar 2020 <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/why-european-strategic-autonomy-matters_en> (accessed 3 July 2020)

The EDF and PESCO are very good illustration of pragmatic strategic autonomy. Europe is creating mechanisms for cooperation and contributing to the financing of a European program designed to strengthen Europe's industrial base without undermining Atlantic solidarity. On the contrary, capabilities developed jointly by Member States under those schemes respond also to priorities identified within NATO. What applies to these projects also applies to major intergovernmental industrial projects such as the Aircraft of the Future (SCAF) project, in which France, Germany and Spain are participating. These projects are likely to strengthen Europe without harming the transatlantic relationship.

EU initiatives like EDF improve EU defense by greater cooperation and integration of military capabilities

Luigi Scazzieri 2022 (a senior research fellow at the Center for European Refrom.Before joining the CER, Luigi carried out research at the UK in a Changing Europe Initiative at King's College London, the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Luigi holds a PhD in European Politics from King's College London, MA degrees from the LSE and King's College London and a BA from the University of Cambridge.) March 25, 2022 “Does the Strategic Compass Herald A Stronger EU in Security and Defence?” <https://www.cer.eu/insights/does-strategic-compass-herald-stronger-eu-security-and-defence> (accessed 19 June 2022)

The Compass proposes several practical measures that should, if implemented, help improve EU capabilities and facilitate co-operation. The EU will try to encourage co-operation by organising annual defence ministerial meetings on EU capability initiatives and by establishing a defence innovation hub in the European Defence Agency. The Compass hints that the EU may increase the size of the European Defence Fund (EDF), which is supposed to foster joint investment in R&D and military capability development. The Commission is also working on new financing solutions for defence capabilities and a VAT waiver for defence equipment. A new bonus system for the EDF would allocate more of its funds to projects involving member-states jointly acquiring or owning capabilities.

EU Strategic Autonomy would benefit Europe and the US and reduce need for US intervention in some cases

Pierre Morcos and Donatienne Ruy 2021 (Morcos - a visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. A career diplomat with the French Foreign Service, he most recently served as deputy head of the Strategic Affairs and Cybersecurity Division, focusing on NATO and European defense issues. Ruy - is the director of the Abshire-Inamori Leadership Academy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. MA in global affairs from the Jackson Institute for Global Affairs at Yale Univ.) February 2, 2021 “A European Peace Facility to Bolster European Foreign Policy?” <https://www.csis.org/analysis/european-peace-facility-bolster-european-foreign-policy> (accessed 19 June 2022)

It is no secret that many in Washington have doubts about European defense, “strategic autonomy,” and their potential for duplication of and decoupling from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As some transatlantic experts have put it, “U.S. leaders have long viewed the EU as just another complicated, multilateral bureaucracy.” Some EU member states themselves have raised concerns regarding duplication and decoupling. However, the EPF could both benefit from and support greater transatlantic cooperation. More streamlined and expanded European military and peacekeeping efforts abroad could complement and ultimately amplify U.S. security assistance efforts, provided that Europe and the United States consult each other and coordinate their approaches toward crises of mutual interest. Early action could also prevent a security situation from deteriorating to a point where the United States would have to intervene militarily or provide heavier support to European partners.

Less study needed: Inaction now means consequences down the road - we must act now to strengthen European defense

Sebastian Sprenger citing chief executive of the European Defence Agency Jiří Šedivý 2021 (Sprenger - Europe editor for Defense News.. Šedivý - chief executive of the European Defence Agency in Brussels, former Czech defense minister.) November 3, 2021 “‘We are in a very crucial period’: European Defence Agency boss on collective defense” <https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/feindef/2021/11/03/we-are-in-a-very-crucial-period-european-defence-agency-boss-on-collective-defense/> (accessed 22 June 2022)

I believe that we are in a very crucial period now when we should accelerate cooperation in defense and especially in the area of capabilities developments, including the input of new technologies. Now, why crucial? Because this year is the very first one when we have all the recent defense initiatives on the table, be it the permanent structure cooperation or the European Defence Fund, for example. And now we need to find more synergies; we need to support less fragmentation, starting with capability requirements and goals, and ending with the defense industry.

Advantage 2 - China Hegemony

US cooperation with EU defense would strengthen the West for great power competition with China

Erik Brattberg 2020 (director of the Europe Program and a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington) 3 March 2020 <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/03/03/how-washington-views-new-european-defense-initiatives-pub-81229> (accessed 2 July 2022)

The strong and sometimes vocal U.S. opposition to European defense initiatives in recent years is understandable, but is ultimately short-sighted and counter-productive. If successful, new EU defense initiatives have potential to make significant contributions toward strengthening NATO by bringing about more European capabilities and promoting defense technological innovation. There are also concrete examples of how EU defense projects, such as promoting military mobility or countering hybrid warfare, contributes to NATO’s task on the eastern flank.   Ultimately, Washington should recognize that European defense presents an opportunity. As the U.S. struggles to gear itself up for sustained period of great power competition against China, having a more militarily capable European partner is an asset. The overarching goal should accordingly be for Europe to be able to take more responsibility for some of its own regional security tasks and, in doing so, also become a stronger partner to the United States.

US and China are in a struggle for international dominance. China threatens US hegemony

Ashley Tellis 2020 (Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs and a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is also a counselor at the National Bureau of Asian Research and the research director of the Strategic Asia Program) 4 May 2020 "COVID-19 Knocks on American Hegemony" (accessed 3 June 2021) https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/04/covid-19-knocks-on-american-hegemony-pub-81719

After almost two decades of conflicted hesitancy, the United States finally acknowledged that it is involved in a long-term strategic competition with China. This rivalry, almost by definition, is not merely a wrangle between two major states. Rather, it involves a struggle for dominance in the international system, even if China as the rising power disavows any such ambition. China’s very ascendancy—if sustained—could over time threaten the U.S. hegemony that has been in place since the end of World War II. It is this reality of unequal growth—which has nourished China’s expanding influence and military capabilities—that lies at the root of the evolving rivalry.

China gaining Asian regional hegemony leads to gaining global hegemony, replacing USA

Min-Hyung Kim 2019 (Department of Political Science and International Relations, Kyung Hee University, South Korea) 4 Feb 2019 “A real driver of US–China trade conflict: The Sino–US competition for global hegemony and its implications for the future” [https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/ITPD-02-2019-003/full/html](about:blank) (accessed 3 June 2021)

Although China repeatedly claims that it does not seek to replace US hegemony in the world, its behavior revealed by the initiatives of the BRI, the AIIB and Made in China 2015 illustrates that its ultimate goal is to be a global hegemon[about:blank - fn010](about:blank#fn010). This is not surprising because all the rising powers in history invariably sought to first dominate the region they are situated ([Mearsheimer, 2011, 2014](about:blank#ref031%20ref032)) and expand their power globally ([Gilpin, 1981](about:blank#ref012)).

Impact: World peace & prosperity at risk without US influence. US hegemony is key to global peace & prosperity

Capt. M. V. Prato 2009 (United States Marine Corps,Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Combat Development Command,Marine Corps University) “The Need for American Hegemony” <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA508040> (accessed 3 June 2021)

The world witnessed a vast shift in the polarity of geopolitics after the Cold War. The United States became the world’s greatest hegemon with an unequalled ability to globally project cultural, political, economic, and military power in a manner not seen since the days of the Roman Empire. **[END QUOTE]** Coined the “unipolar moment” by syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer, the disparity of power between the U.S. and all other nations allows the U.S. to influence the world for the mutual benefit of all responsible states. Unfortunately, the United States is increasingly forced to act unilaterally as a result of both foreign and domestic resentment to U.S. dominance and the rise of liberal internationalism. [**He goes on to conclude later in the same context QUOTE**:] The United States must exercise benevolent global hegemony, unilaterally if necessary, to ensure its security and maintain global peace and prosperity.

Advantage 3 - Stronger NATO

US advocacy for EU Strategic Autonomy could help strengthen NATO

Dr. Stephen J. Flanagan and Lucia Retter 2021 (Flanagan - an adjunct senior fellow at the RAND Corporation;; former special assistant to the president and senior director for defense policy and strategy at the National Security Council (NSC) from 2013 to 2015. Ph.D. in international relations, Fletcher School, Tufts University. Retter - a research leader at RAND Europe and co-directs RAND Europe's Centre for Defence Economics and Acquisition.  M.A. in international relations and international economics, The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies) November 19, 2021 “U.S. Support for European Strategic Autonomy Could Boost Transatlantic Solidarity and Security” <https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/11/us-support-for-european-strategic-autonomy-could-boost.html> (accessed 19, 2022)

Second, Washington could adopt an unambiguously supportive approach to European strategic autonomy. Broad U.S. encouragement could be coupled with renewed calls for Europeans to allocate sufficient resources to EU defence integration initiatives and a continued emphasis on meeting NATO capability targets and regionalisation that can achieve greater burden sharing in practice.

European strategic autonomy = stronger US/Europe alliance

Josep Borrell 2020 ([High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission](https://www.eeas.europa.eu/taxonomy/term/400381_en)) " Why European strategic autonomy matters" 12 Mar 2020 <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/why-european-strategic-autonomy-matters_en> (accessed 3 July 2020)

From the pandemic response to trade, security and climate, or big power games, Europeans and Americans will be working closely together. Only a more capable, and thus more autonomous Europe, can meaningfully work with Joe Biden’s administration, to make multilateralism great again.  That is why the consolidation of the European pillar in defence and security is more necessary. And the pace at which it will develop will be at the heart of the debate on strategic autonomy. Some want to go further than others, because they see it as a political objective that implies a much stronger mobilisation. In addition, about the Atlantic Alliance, it can only truly work if it behaves as an evolving relationship between consenting and equal partners**.**That is why I believe that European strategic autonomy is fully compatible with a stronger transatlantic bond and even a precondition for it.

"NOT" doing the Plan weakens NATO

Michelle Shevin-Coetzee 2019 (a former Fulbright Schuman Fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) and Chatham House; 2020 Rosenthal Fellow and part of the 2020 cohort of the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Nuclear Scholars Initiative. B.A. in International Affairs from George Washington Univ) October 31, 2019 “Resetting the US-EU Defense Relationship” <https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/resetting-the-us-eu-defense-relationship/> (accessed 19 June 2022)

Despite its checkered past in developing a greater EU role in defense, member states are moving forward with new initiatives. By rejecting the manner in which Brussels develops into a defense actor, however, Washington risks losing its ability to shape that discussion—one that is crucial for the future of NATO. The US should encourage member states to sustain their momentum in order to become more capable partners. To do so, Washington should not only pursue a reset that engages the new European Commission and European Council leaders, but also alters its defense policy toward the EU. Only then can the US develop a stronger defense relationship with the EU and, ultimately, Europe as a whole.

DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES

A/T All Disadvantages: Benefits of EU Strategic Autonomy on balance outweigh all risks

Lucia Retter, Stephanie Pezard, Stephen Flanagan, Gene Germanovich,, Pauline Paille 2021. (Retter - research leader at RAND Europe and co-directs RAND Europe's Centre for Defence Economics and Acquisition. Pezard - Senior Political Scientist and Associate Research Department Director for Defense and Political Sciences . Flanagan - adjunct senior fellow at the RAND Corporation; former special assistant to the president and senior director for defense policy and strategy at the National Security Council.   Germanovich - Acting International Portfolio Lead, RAND National Security Research Division; International Defense Researcher. Grand-Clement - Senior Analyst at *RAND* Europe, in the Defence Security and Infrastructure programme. Paille - Analyst, RAND Corp.) 9 Nov 2021 European Strategic Autonomy in Defence <https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1319-1.html>

Naturally, the question arises as to whether the pursuit of European strategic autonomy is the ‘right way of going about it’, and whether the lack of clarity in relation to the concept creates more problems than it solves when it comes to the transatlantic relations. All in all, despite the risks of misunderstanding and miscommunication, the concept of European strategic autonomy, if underpinned by continuing defence consolidation, does seem to offer a unifying principle for a much needed defence integration to enable the EU to take up greater responsibilities for its defence and security matters.

A/T “EDF hurts US arms manufactures” – Small at best, why we set parameters

Quentin Lopinot 2018 (a visiting fellow in the Europe Program, focusing on European security issues, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. A career diplomat with the French Foreign Service, he most recently served as deputy head of the Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Division of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.) November 26, 2018 “Why the European Defence Fund Is Good News for U.S. Security Interests” <https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-european-defence-fund-good-news-us-security-interests> (accessed 19 June 2022)

While the EDF has generally been well-received, recent coverage reveals some concern from defense companies from the United States, the United Kingdom, and smaller EU member states that the establishment of the EDF will only benefit the defense industries of large EU member states, leading to industry consolidation and distorting free and fair competition. Yet this assessment ignores the fact that Europe represents a significant yet relatively minor destination for U.S. arms exports (11 percent over 2013-2017) of which the United Kingdom represents about a third (with 3.7 percent). Such data suggest that EDF would have limited impact over the U.S. defense industry.  
**[END QUOTE. HE GOES ON LATER IN THE SAME ARTICLE WRITING QUOTE:]**Second, the United States should accept that achieving their long-term policy objectives for European security may require some compromise in terms of their short-term industrial interests. This is not an easy one, especially for those in the U.S. administration who take an “America-first” approach to defense sales. One way to overcome this would be to establish clear conditions under which U.S. firms could be involved in projects supported by the EDF. Such eligibility conditions have been defined for pilot projects, and they should now be made permanent. This would allow European subsidiaries of U.S. companies to benefit, by way of derogation and on an ad hoc basis, from the EDF and allow companies eligible for the EDF to cooperate with U.S. firms.

A/T "Hurts US defense industry" - US defense industry isn't being harmed - still selling a lot to Europe

Dr. Daniel Fiott 2019 (PhD; Security and Defence Editor at the EU Institute for Security Studies ) 14 June 2019 THE POISON PILL: EU DEFENCE ON US TERMS? <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/poison-pill-eu-defence-us-terms> (accessed 3 July 2022)

US fears that the EDF and PESCO could discriminate against US defence firms operating in the EU are overblown when seen through the prism of existing data on transatlantic trade in arms, components and services. In fact, the US government’s own data tells a familiar story: the US exports more to the EU market than the Union exports to the US. As Figure 1 indicates, the US Department of State estimates that from 2014 to 2016 the US exported $62.9 billion worth of defence exports to the EU versus $7.6 billion from the Union to the US. This was not an exceptional occurrence: the US has consistently exported more to the EU than vice-versa.3 Notwithstanding questions about the accuracy of US government data,4 the figures show us that US defence firms are extremely competitive in the European defence market and that European firms are not as competitive in the US.

A/T “Arms trade war” - Turn: encourage EU to buy weapons

Erik Brattberg and Tomas Valasek 2019 (Brattberg - Erik Brattberg was director of the Europe Program and a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. He holds a master of science in foreign service (MSFS) from Georgetown University and master’s and bachelor’s degrees in political science from Uppsala University. Valasek - was director of Carnegie Europe and a senior fellow, where his research focused on security and defense, transatlantic relations, and Europe’s Eastern neighborhood. Previously, Valášek served as the permanent representative of the Slovak Republic to NATO for nearly four years. MA in International Affairs from George Washington University and BA in Journalism from University of Georgia.) November  21, 2019 “EU Defense Cooperation: Progress Amid Transatlantic Concerns” <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/11/21/eu-defense-cooperation-progress-amid-transatlantic-concerns-pub-80381> (accessed 20 June 2022)

The smart approach for the Pentagon would be to work through likeminded EU countries such as Sweden and Italy, both of which do considerable business in the United States and stand to lose the most from a transatlantic defense trade war. Rather than simply doubling down, the U.S. administration should actively seek a compromise with the EU on the role of third-party participation and IPR as part of PESCO and EDF projects.

A/T “EU mishandles weapon shipments” – still subject to international law

Tomas Hamilton 2022 (a Researcher at the University of Amsterdam. PhD in Law from King’s College London, an LLM from the University of Cambridge, an LLB from the College of Law, and a BA (Hons) Human Sciences from the University of Oxford.) March 30, 2022 “Articulating Arms Control Law in the EU’s Lethal Military Assistance to Ukraine” <https://www.justsecurity.org/80862/articulating-arms-control-law-in-the-eus-lethal-military-assistance-to-ukraine/> (accessed 14 June 2022)

We know that the EU Council’s previous decisions on military assistance under the EPF, although limited in number, tended to give more context, impose more risk mitigation measures, and be accompanied by greater justification and explanation for their use than the EU’s decision-making on Ukraine has so far offered. And this despite previous EPF assistance measures being far smaller in value (averaging around 10 million euros) than the 1 billion euros for Ukraine. The EPF decisions on Mali, Moldova, Georgia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the African Union, as well as existing assistance to Ukraine from 2021, required various arrangements on accountability for breaches of rights, proper and efficient use of transferred assets, sole use by the intended national armed forces recipients, maintenance and training requirements, post-shipment controls (delivery verification, inventory reporting, on-site visits with follow-up checks), and other measures and controls stipulated by the IMF.

A/T “EU defense is bad for NATO” - EU and NATO are aligned

NATO 2022 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) June 8, 2022 “Relations with the European Union” <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm> (accessed 19 June 2022)

Sharing strategic interests and facing the same challenges, NATO and the European Union (EU) cooperate on issues of common interest and are working side by side in crisis management, capability development and political consultations, as well as providing support to their common partners in the east and south. The EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. The two organisations share a majority of members, have common values and face similar threats and challenges.

A/T "Harms NATO" - Stronger Europe is good for the US and NATO -- builds support for US engagement in Europe

Lucia Retter, Stephanie Pezard, Stephen Flanagan, Gene Germanovich,, Pauline Paille 2021. (Retter - research leader at RAND Europe and co-directs RAND Europe's Centre for Defence Economics and Acquisition. Pezard - Senior Political Scientist and Associate Research Department Director for Defense and Political Sciences . Flanagan - adjunct senior fellow at the RAND Corporation; former special assistant to the president and senior director for defense policy and strategy at the National Security Council.   Germanovich - Acting International Portfolio Lead, RAND National Security Research Division; International Defense Researcher. Grand-Clement - Senior Analyst at *RAND* Europe, in the Defence Security and Infrastructure programme. Paille - Analyst, RAND Corp.) 9 Nov 2021 European Strategic Autonomy in Defence <https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1319-1.html>

A large number of interviewees consulted in this study identified a strong Europe, on balance, as being a positive development for the U.S., both due to the opportunity to create greater burden sharing within NATO and to secure public support for US engagement in Europe in the first place. In addition, some US observers noted that a proactive US policy that encourages a stronger European defence integration could enable previously reluctant EU member states to increase their engagement in European strategic autonomy-related initiatives and activities. Essentially, the US support could help assuage some concerns articulated by some EU member states that European strategic autonomy efforts might represent a direct decoupling of efforts from the U.S., which they heartily oppose (see Chapter 2).

A/T “EU defense is bad for NATO” - EU has helped NATO defense

Giovanna De Maio 2021 (a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She holds a doctorate in international studies from the University of Naples and prior to joining Brookings, she was a Transatlantic Postdoctoral Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, D.C. and at the French Institute of International Affairs in Paris.) December 2021 “Opportunities to deepen NATO-EU cooperation” <https://www.brookings.edu/research/opportunities-to-deepen-nato-eu-cooperation/> (accessed 19 June 2022)

Over the years the two organizations have also operated in tandem, with the EU’s Operation Althea taking over the capacity-building efforts of NATO’s Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004 and with both deploying simultaneous counterpiracy missions off the Somalia coast — Operation Ocean Shield (2009-2016) and Operation Atalanta (2008-2022). Moreover, NATO and the EU seem to also have converged in their respective strategic thinking along the lines of countering Russia and China’s aggressive behavior and malign economic influence, as well as threats coming from disruptive technologies and disinformation. Pressed by these challenges, NATO and the EU have progressively expanded their traditional range of military and civilian activities so much that their missions now partially overlap, with NATO embracing capacity-building and cyberoperations and the EU stepping up on crisis management.

A/T "Duplicates NATO" - Precautions are being taken to fund projects that avoid duplication

Steven Blockmans & Dylan Crosson 2021. (Blockmans - Director of the Brussels-based think tank CEPS and Professor of EU External Relations Law and Governance at the University of Amsterdam. Crosson - Research Assistant at the Centre for European Policy Studies) PESCO: A FORCE FOR POSITIVE INTEGRATION IN EU DEFENCE, EUROPEAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS REVIEW <https://www.ceps.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/EFAR_26_SI06.pdf> (accessed 2 July 2022) (all brackets in original) ("HRVP Borrell" is High Representative/Vice President of the European Commission, Josep Borrell)

The Council recommendation of June 2020 confirms that, three years on from the launch of PESCO, the selective and ambitious approach prevailed. Regarding the inclusive approach, only the merging of projects seems desirable at the moment, as further grouping or clustering would seem redundant. Merging could include that with NATO initiatives. While HRVP Borrell stated in his remarks to the European Parliament in October 2020 that thirty-eight of fortyseven PESCO projects are fully coherent with NATO initiatives and that ‘the need to avoid overlap with NATO priorities is considered when selecting new PESCO projects’, there are concerns about the duplication of efforts. For example, the PESCO GeoMETOC Coordination Element and NATO’s GeoMETOC Centre of Excellence seem to be duplicative, as well as the maritime counter-mine systems developed within PESCO/OCCAR on one hand and NATO on the other. Borrell added that the remaining nine projects ‘are more of an operational nature, combining existing capabilities, or they specifically contribute to the development of European technological sectors [such as in] the case for instance of the [third-wave] “Material and Components for Technological EU Competitiveness” [project]’.

A/T “EU defense displaces NATO” – Can’t. Some EU members are not in NATO.

Max Bergmann, James Lamond, Siena Cicarelli 2021 (Bergman - a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. Lamond - a fellow at the Center. Cicarelli - a research and program associate for National Security and International Policy at the Center.) June 1, 2021 “The Case for EU Defense” <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/case-eu-defense/> (accessed 13 June 2022)

To be clear, EU defense will in no way replace or displace NATO. The NATO alliance is the most successful military alliance in history because it forged an unbreakable bond across the Atlantic, uniting the United States and Canada with Europe. Additionally, there are prominent European countries, such as Norway and the United Kingdom, that are not members of the EU. EU defense, therefore, could never replace NATO’s critical role. Instead, as this report argues, the EU could help strengthen the alliance by building a stronger European pillar, creating a more unified, efficient, and capable partner for the United States through NATO.

A/T “EU will reject NATO/must have either EU or NATO defense”- False choice fallacy.

Max Bergmann, James Lamond, Siena Cicarelli 2021 (Bergman - a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. Lamond - a fellow at the Center. Cicarelli - a research and program associate for National Security and International Policy at the Center.) June 1, 2021 “The Case for EU Defense” <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/case-eu-defense/> (accessed 13 June 2022)

This report rejects the notion that NATO and EU defense are incompatible and at odds. Supporting EU defense does not mean choosing the EU over NATO. This is a false choice and a faulty premise. The EU and NATO are not opposing organizations. They are, in fact, fundamentally tethered. Implicit in U.S. opposition is a fear of a powerful EU that could supplant NATO and become a thorn in America’s side. But the EU is not divorced from the 21 NATO member states that make up the EU. If the EU and United States became rivals, then NATO would itself be obsolete, as it would be divided against itself. Such fanciful scenarios would not be the result of the EU developing a defense capacity but the result of a massive diplomatic breakdown. Such a breakdown is highly unlikely, and U.S. foreign policy should be doing everything possible to avoid this scenario.

A/T “EU defense increases duplication” – Even if, small issue that’s easily fixed

Max Bergmann, James Lamond, Siena Cicarelli 2021 (Bergman - a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. Lamond - a fellow at the Center. Cicarelli - a research and program associate for National Security and International Policy at the Center.) June 1, 2021 “The Case for EU Defense” <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/case-eu-defense/> (accessed 13 June 2022)

As this report argues, the EU could significantly strengthen NATO and the trans-Atlantic alliance. Integrating European forces, acquiring key capabilities, rationalizing and harmonizing the sprawling EU defense sector, and investing in cutting-edge research are some of the areas where the EU could play a critical role. As the EU develops its own defense capabilities, there would inevitably be some institutional overlap and duplication with NATO, just as there is with any other national military. But even if the EU’s defense efforts were to create some overlap and institutional friction, this would be a rather small bureaucratic concern—one that could easily be addressed by better EU-NATO coordination. Yet the bureaucratic worry over duplication has been elevated to such an extent that it has become untethered from its actual significance, which is quite minor. Instead of fretting over bureaucratic trivia, the United States and NATO should focus on incorporating the EU defense effort into NATO and embedding the EU in the Atlantic framework.

A/T “EU will reject the US” - Not the EU’s goal

Ronja Kempin and Barbbra Kunz 2018 (Kempin - a senior research fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin, where she focuses on defense and security. She previously served as a political adviser for CSDP to the German Federal Foreign Office, headed SWP’s “EU’s External Relations” research division, and was a Fritz Thyssen Fellow at Harvard University. Kunz - a research fellow at IFRI’s study committee on French-German Relations. She works on European defense and security, particularly in France, Germany and the Nordic countries. She teaches at Paris’ Sorbonne University and was a visiting scholar at SAIS’ Center for Transatlantic Relations.) April 12, 2018 “Washington Should Help Europe Achieve ‘Strategic Autonomy,’ not Fight it” <https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/washington-should-help-europe-achieve-strategic-autonomy-not-fight-it/> (accessed 19 June 2022)

Europe has moved beyond ideologically driven efforts to build a counterweight to American power. Emancipation from the United States is clearly no longer on the agenda for anyone. European governments recognize that the United States is and will remain their most important geopolitical ally. Likewise, no one contests NATO’s role in collective defense. The European Union debate about strategic autonomy is exclusively about crisis management and operations outside the union, not about collective defense, deterring Russia, or replacing NATO — indeed, the EU’s Lisbon Treaty unequivocally states that the Union’s Common and Security and Defense Policy is about “missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention, and strengthening international security.”

1. † David passed away on 19 August 2022. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)