Negative: Global Trade Accountability Act - bad idea

By “Coach Vance” Trefethen

Case Summary: The AFF plan requires Congress to vote for approval of any Presidential decision to increase trade barriers (like tariffs). In the Status Quo, there are numerous tariffs that the President can raise or lower based on delegation of authority from Congress. The Constitution specifies that Congress has power to set tariffs, but they have passed laws granting the President power to do it on his own. AFF believes that raising tariffs (but not lowering them!) should be approved by Congress and not merely by the President due to concerns about democracy and Separation of Powers (too much power concentrated in the office of the President). They also believe tariffs are bad, so anything that prevents them from being raised easily is good, in their view.

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Negative: Global Trade Accountability Act

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE

1. Positive economic impact.

**The President raising tariffs under his delegated authority has historically helped the US economy. A good example is the tariffs Pres. Trump raised under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, which is one of the policies the AFF plan would reform and take away that power from the President.**

Lots of economic growth and investment occurred under Trump's Section 232 tariffs, with no negative economic effects

Adam S. Hersh and Dr. Robert E. Scott 2021 (Hersh - Senior Economist at Economic Policy Institute; formerly Senior Economist at the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute and the Center for American Progress; former Research Associate at Univ. of Mass. Political Economy Research Institute, and taught macroeconomics at Univ. of Mass., Amherst. Scott - PhD in economics; director of trade and manufacturing policy research at Economic Policy Institute) 25 May 2021 " Aluminum producing and consuming industries have thrived under U.S. Section 232 import measures" https://www.epi.org/publication/aluminum-producing-and-consuming-industries-have-thrived-under-u-s-section-232-import-measures/ (accessed 30 Oct 2022)

This report demonstrates that import measures imposed in 2018 under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 enabled U.S. aluminum output, employment, and capital investment to rebound, while creating no adverse effects for aluminum-consuming industries such as motor vehicle parts, construction goods, and canned beverages. Despite dire predictions of import measure critics, aluminum-consuming industries and the broader U.S. economy thrived under these measures.

No evidence of any meaningful adverse economic impact to Section 232

Adam S. Hersh and Dr. Robert E. Scott 2021 (Hersh - Senior Economist at Economic Policy Institute; formerly Senior Economist at the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute and the Center for American Progress; former Research Associate at Univ. of Mass. Political Economy Research Institute, and taught macroeconomics at Univ. of Mass., Amherst. Scott - PhD in economics; director of trade and manufacturing policy research at Economic Policy Institute) 25 May 2021 " Aluminum producing and consuming industries have thrived under U.S. Section 232 import measures" https://www.epi.org/publication/aluminum-producing-and-consuming-industries-have-thrived-under-u-s-section-232-import-measures/ (accessed 30 Oct 2022)

There is no evidence of a meaningful adverse effect of Section 232 on industries or consumers. Econometric analysis of the causal relationship between primary aluminum prices and prices of aluminum-consuming end-use goods—including canned beer and other beverages, construction goods, furniture, and motor vehicle bodies—shows the effects are statistically zero to economically trivial. The lack of a meaningful causal relationship indicates Section 232 import measures had no adverse effect on downstream industries or consumers.

A/T "EU retaliated for Sec. 232 with tariffs on US whiskey" - But it had no impact.

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A booming domestic market offset falling exports for tariff-impacted U.S. whiskey. The U.S. aluminum import policy elicited retaliatory tariffs by the European Union (EU) against U.S. whiskey and bourbon exports. While U.S. whiskey exports to the EU fell, exports to the rest of the world fell more. Waning U.S. whiskey exports to countries not imposing new tariffs indicates that producers diverted production to capitalize on the booming domestic market for “super premium” spirits, which grew 11% in 2019, or faster than any year since 2015.

Sec. 232 tariffs on aluminum and steel didn't hurt jobs in other industries. In fact, those industries grew rapidly

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When the tariffs on aluminum (and steel) imports were imposed, critics claimed that while the tariffs would save thousands of jobs in primary metals industries, hundreds of thousands of jobs would be eliminated in the rest of the economy. These critics referenced a 2018 study by the Trade Partnership, which wildly exaggerated the impacts of the tariffs (Francois and Baughman 2018; Scott 2018a). This report demonstrates that the negative effects claimed in the Trade Partnership study and feared by other critics have yet to be found in the U.S. economy. In total, the U.S. manufacturing sector added 210,000 new jobs between February 2018, the month before the tariffs took effect, and February 2020, the month before the onset of the COVID-19 economic shock. Outside of manufacturing, the economy added more than 4 million new jobs in this same period. Looking more specifically at the industries aluminum producers supply, there remains no evidence that the imposition of tariffs on aluminum have had the kinds of negative employment impacts—in downstream manufacturing or other parts of the economy—that were predicted by critics of those tariffs.

Studies predicting lost jobs from Sec. 232 tariffs were completely wrong. Jobs increased!

Adam S. Hersh and Dr. Robert E. Scott 2021 (Hersh - Senior Economist at Economic Policy Institute; formerly Senior Economist at the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute and the Center for American Progress; former Research Associate at Univ. of Mass. Political Economy Research Institute, and taught macroeconomics at Univ. of Mass., Amherst. Scott - PhD in economics; director of trade and manufacturing policy research at Economic Policy Institute) 25 May 2021 " Aluminum producing and consuming industries have thrived under U.S. Section 232 import measures" https://www.epi.org/publication/aluminum-producing-and-consuming-industries-have-thrived-under-u-s-section-232-import-measures/ (accessed 30 Oct 2022)

The Trade Partnership studies claimed that while the tariffs would save thousands of jobs in primary metals industries, several hundred thousand jobs would be lost in the rest of the economy. In fact, the U.S. economy added nearly 4.3 million jobs on net. A majority of the actual job gains, 3.8 million, came from service-sector industries, although the Trade Partnership studies estimated that a majority of their projected job losses, nearly 377,000, would occur in the service sector. The Trade Partnership projections were no more accurate when it came to manufacturing employment. In the real world, the U.S. economy added 210,000 manufacturing jobs following Section 232 import measures, whereas the Trade Partnership predicted manufacturing would lose nearly 20,000 jobs.

All the harmful predictions were wrong: The aluminum industry benefited, and no one was harmed by Sec. 232 tariffs

Adam S. Hersh and Dr. Robert E. Scott 2021 (Hersh - Senior Economist at Economic Policy Institute; formerly Senior Economist at the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute and the Center for American Progress; former Research Associate at Univ. of Mass. Political Economy Research Institute, and taught macroeconomics at Univ. of Mass., Amherst. Scott - PhD in economics; director of trade and manufacturing policy research at Economic Policy Institute) 25 May 2021 " Aluminum producing and consuming industries have thrived under U.S. Section 232 import measures" https://www.epi.org/publication/aluminum-producing-and-consuming-industries-have-thrived-under-u-s-section-232-import-measures/ (accessed 30 Oct 2022)

The resurgence of the U.S. aluminum industry—with minimal apparent knock-on effects in other parts of the economy—belies claims by critics, pundits, and representatives of many firms in downstream industries, who argued that the Section 232 tariffs would have a devastating negative impact on a wide range of domestic industries (Francois and Baughman 2018). For example, according to Bloomberg, Ford Motor Co. “began the year by warning that rising costs for raw materials like steel and aluminum, coupled with unfavorable exchange rates, would add $1.6 billion to its costs this year” (Naughton 2018). Of course, increases in the real value of the dollar, which gained nearly 8% from before the Section 232 measures until the start of the pandemic, raise the cost of everything that domestic automobile manufacturers import from the rest of the world (including finished vehicles and parts), and changes in the cost of metals are a tiny fraction of their overall costs (Scott 2018a). In fact, econometric evidence presented in this report shows that changes in primary aluminum prices have statistically insignificant or economically negligible causal impacts on downstream aluminum-using goods such as canned beverages, construction materials, motor vehicle parts, kitchen utensils, and furniture. Complementary data compiled here demonstrate that Section 232 aluminum measures have had no significant, industry-specific or economywide negative impacts on employment or output in U.S. manufacturing or other domestic industries.

A/T "Harms automotive industry" - Sec. 232 tariffs had no impact on the automotive industry


Adam S. Hersh and Dr. Robert E. Scott 2021 (Hersh - Senior Economist at Economic Policy Institute; formerly Senior Economist at the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute and the Center for American Progress; former Research Associate at Univ. of Mass. Political Economy Research Institute, and taught macroeconomics at Univ. of Mass., Amherst. Scott - PhD in economics; director of trade and manufacturing policy research at Economic Policy Institute) 25 May 2021 " Aluminum producing and consuming industries have thrived under U.S. Section 232 import measures" https://www.epi.org/publication/aluminum-producing-and-consuming-industries-have-thrived-under-u-s-section-232-import-measures/ (accessed 30 Oct 2022)

Similarly, we find no causal effect of aluminum prices on motor vehicle body manufacturing—where aluminum accounts for 14% of the value chain—nor do we find a causal effect for nonresidential construction goods (6%) or commercial furniture (3%). The econometric results indicate that any change in primary aluminum prices is expected to result in no change in the price of the end-use product. We do find evidence of a causal relationship between primary aluminum prices and motor vehicle parts, as well as for aluminum kitchen utensils. However, while these results are statistically significant, the magnitude of the effect is, in essence, economically negligible. In both cases, a 1% increase in the price of primary aluminum is expected to elicit a less than 0.1% change in the price of the end-use good.

2. National security benefits outweigh the costs

Trump's Section 232 tariffs on aluminum were justified by "national security"

Adam S. Hersh and Dr. Robert E. Scott 2021 (Hersh - Senior Economist at Economic Policy Institute; formerly Chief Economist for Congressional Joint Economic Committee Democrats, Senior Economist at the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute and the Center for American Progress; former Research Associate at Univ. of Mass. Political Economy Research Institute, and taught macroeconomics at Univ. of Mass., Amherst. Scott - PhD in economics; director of trade and manufacturing policy research at Economic Policy Institute) 25 May 2021 " Aluminum producing and consuming industries have thrived under U.S. Section 232 import measures" https://www.epi.org/publication/aluminum-producing-and-consuming-industries-have-thrived-under-u-s-section-232-import-measures/ (accessed 30 Oct 2022)



National security includes economic well-being

Judge Richard Taranto 2020 (United States Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) Decision of the Court in the case of American Institute for International Steel, Inc. v. United States 28 Feb 2020 (accessed 30 Oct 2022) https://casetext.com/case/am-inst-for-intl-steel-inc-v-united-states

On March 8, 2018, the President of the United States imposed a 25-percent tariff on certain imported steel products, exercising authority granted to the President by section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, [19 U.S.C. § 1862](https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-19-customs-duties/chapter-7-trade-expansion-program/subchapter-ii-trade-agreements/part-iv-national-security/section-1862-safeguarding-national-security), a provision that traces its lineage to 1955.   
**END QUOTE. HE GOES ON LATER IN THE CONTEXT QUOTE**:

Subsection (d) sets forth a number of "relevant factors" to which Secretary and the President shall "give consideration" in making their determinations regarding national security. *Id*., § 1862(d). These factors include the "domestic production needed for projected national defense  requirements," the "capacity of domestic industries to meet such requirements," and the "requirements of growth of such domestic industries." *Id*. They include, as well, "the impact of foreign competition on the economic welfare of individual domestic industries" and whether the "weakening of our internal economy may impair the national security." *Id*. The statute enumerates other considerations as well, but the enumeration is set forth "without excluding other relevant factors." *Id*.

3. No legal/constitutional "abuse" with letting the President set tariffs

Federal court says no constitutional problem with Congress delegating tariff adjustments to the President

Judge Richard Taranto 2020 (United States Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) Decision of the Court in the case of American Institute for International Steel, Inc. v. United States 28 Feb 2020 (accessed 30 Oct 2022) <https://casetext.com/case/am-inst-for-intl-steel-inc-v-united-states>

The Court's ruling in Algonquin answers the question of the constitutionality of section 232 presented here. The Court's rejection of the nondelegation-doctrine challenge to section 232 was a necessary step in the Court's rationale for ultimately construing the statute as it did, and the constitutional ruling is therefore binding precedent. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, [517 U.S. 44, 67](https://casetext.com/case/seminole-tribe-florida-v-florida#p67) (1996) ("When an opinion issues for the Court, it is not only the result but also those portions of the opinion necessary to  that result by which we are bound."). Moreover, the rationale of the Court's rejection of the nondelegation-doctrine challenge rests on the determination that the standards governing the President's and Secretary's determinations under section 232 are constitutionally adequate.

Supreme Court says Congress can delegate tariff rate decision-making to the President, without violating the Constitution

Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas 1940. Decision of the court in United States v. Bush Co. 20 May 1940 60 S.Ct. 944 <https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-bush-co#p380> (accessed 30 Oct 2022)

It has long been held that where Congress has authorized a public officer to take some specified legislative action when in his judgment that action is necessary or appropriate to carry out the policy of Congress, the judgment of the officer as to the existence of the facts calling for that action is not subject to review. *Martin* v. *Mott*, 12 Wheat. 19; *Monongahela Bridge Co*. v. *United States*, [216 U.S. 177](https://casetext.com/case/monongahela-bridge-v-united-states); *Dakota Central Telephone Co*. v. *South Dakota*, [250 U.S. 163](https://casetext.com/case/dakota-cent-tel-co-v-south-dakota); *United States* v. *Chemical Foundation, Inc.*, [272 U.S. 1](https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-chemical-foundation-2). As stated by Mr. Justice Story in *Martin* v. *Mott, supra*, pp. 31-32: "Whenever a statute gives a discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, it is a sound rule of construction, that the statute constitutes him the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts." For the judiciary to probe the reasoning which underlies this Proclamation would amount to a clear invasion of the legislative and executive domains. Under the Constitution it is exclusively for Congress, or those to whom it delegates authority, to determine what tariffs shall be imposed.

Supreme Court says: Adjusting tariffs, as authorized by Congress, does not give the President unconstitutional level of power

Cameron Silverberg 2021 (J.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School) STANFORD LAW REVIEW, May 2021, Trading Power: Tariffs and the Nondelegation Doctrine (accessed 20 Nov 2022) https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2021/05/Silverberg-73-Stan.-L.-Rev.-1289.pdf

That reasoning reappeared in the seminal case of J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, the decision that gave birth to the “intelligible principle” test. As noted above, the Court considered a statute that enabled the President to adjust preexisting tariff rates when he or she determined that the established tariff rates did not “equalize the . . . differences in costs of production in the United States and the principal competing country.” Once again, there was no mention of a foreign-commerce exception to the nondelegation doctrine. Rather, the statute was constitutional because it set limits upon the executive branch. The President could not impose new tariffs or get rid of those already on the books; instead, the President was a factfinder entrusted to adjust tariff rates so as “to compete on terms of equality with foreign producers.” These seminal cases provide yet more support for what is already clear from text, history, purpose, and congressional practice. Congress can make broad delegations of its trade authority, but it cannot transfer that authority in full to the President.

4. No harm to "trade wars"

Foreign trade has little impact on the economy: Other factors (immigration, capital flows, technology) have far more impact

Prof. Richard B. Freeman 2003. (prof. of economics, Harvard Univ.;  Senior Research Fellow in Labour Markets at the London School of Economics' [Centre for Economic Performance](http://cep.lse.ac.uk/) ) Trade Wars: The Exaggerated Impact of Trade in Economic Debate, World Economy Annual Lecture, 26 June 2003, revisions Sept 2003 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=450881> (accessed 22 June 2022)

While complete autarky or imposition of advanced country standards on LDCs would have huge effects on economies around the world, the actual policies around which debate has focused and observed changes in trade patterns have not come close to having their ballyhooed or feared effects on labor markets or on economies writ large. Both the proponents and opponents of globalization WC [Washington Consensus] style have exaggerated the importance of trade. Instead of dominating economic outcomes, changes in trade policy and trade have had modest impacts on labour market and economic outcomes beyond trade flows. Other aspects of globalization – immigration, capital flows, and technology transfer – have greater impacts on the labour market, with volatile capital flows creating great risk for the well-being of workers.

US/China trade war doesn't have much impact

Mark Weisbrot 2019 (codirector of the Center for Economic and Policy Research) US-CHINA TRADE WAR CAUSES DAMAGE, BUT IS EXAGGERATED (accessed 20 Nov 2022) 6 Sept 2019 https://therealnews.com/us-china-trade-war-causes-damage-but-is-exaggerated

If you look at the actual trade between the two countries, it’s just not that big, so it wouldn’t push the U.S. into a recession. So for example, our total exports to China are about a little over half a percent of our GDP, our output. And that’s down about 22% from 2018 to 2019 if you look at the first seven months of data that we have. So that’s just not going to have a huge impact on the U.S. economy. And the Chinese economy is a whole different story. We can look at that if you want. Obviously, their exports to us are much larger, to the U.S. are maybe a little over 2% of our GDP, and a little bit larger share of theirs. But again, China can adapt. They have a lot more tools than we would have. They control most of the banking and financial system. And in 2009 when there was a world recession for example, they lost more than 3% of GDP in exports–which is many times more than this–and they still grew 10% that year because they just shifted their economic activity. So again, there’s countries in Asia that are being affected–South Korea and Japan and other countries–as these supply chains become more uncertain, because they don’t know what Trump is going to do. But the idea that this is going to push the U.S. economy or the world economy into recession, I think those are very unlikely.

US/China "trade war" is insignificant compared to the total size of the economy

Derek Scissors 2019 (*resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute*) 3 Sept 2019 " Why the China trade war is justified" (accessed 20 Nov 2022) THE HILL https://thehill.com/opinion/international/459767-why-the-china-trade-war-is-justified/

The trade “war” between the United States and China is exaggerated and overblown. Seemingly stark numbers pale against [national net wealth](https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20181206/html/b1.htm) in excess of $99 trillion and annual consumption expenditure in excess of $14 trillion at the end of 2018.

Studies show no correlation historically between increasing or decreasing trade and economic growth

Prof. Richard B. Freeman 2003. (prof. of economics, Harvard Univ.;  Senior Research Fellow in Labour Markets at the London School of Economics' [Centre for Economic Performance](http://cep.lse.ac.uk/) ) Trade Wars: The Exaggerated Impact of Trade in Economic Debate, World Economy Annual Lecture, 26 June 2003, revisions Sept 2003 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=450881> (accessed 22 June 2022)

Most disappointing is the failure of seemingly simple demonstrations that “globalizers”, defined as countries that reduce trade barriers and/or expand trade, have better growth records than other countries. The definition of who is a globalizer varies from researcher to researcher (compare Rodrik,1999 with Dollar and Kraay, 2000) and even in the same paper from revision to revision (compare Dollar and Kraay, 2000 with Dollar and Kraay 2001), with correspondingly disparate findings. Since Dollar and Kray’s globalizers had higher tariff rates than nonglobalizers in the 1990s as well as in the 1980s (Dollar and Kray, figure 2) and lower ratios of trade to GDP in both decades (figure 2), moreover, it is unclear how to interpret differences among the groups. The statement that low tariffs and trade are bad for growth is as consistent with the data in the figures as the claim that reductions in tariffs and increases in growth are good for growth. What is needed is a general equilibrium model of how the entry of China and India into the global economy. In any case, the collapse of Argentina, a country on all lists of globalizers, devastates any simple comparisons.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Lost jobs

Trump used Presidential tariff policy to create thousands of jobs

Adam S. Hersh and Dr. Robert E. Scott 2021 (Hersh - Senior Economist at Economic Policy Institute; formerly Senior Economist at the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute and the Center for American Progress; former Research Associate at Univ. of Mass. Political Economy Research Institute. Scott - PhD in economics; director of trade and manufacturing policy research at Economic Policy Institute) 25 May 2021 " Aluminum producing and consuming industries have thrived under U.S. Section 232 import measures" https://www.epi.org/publication/aluminum-producing-and-consuming-industries-have-thrived-under-u-s-section-232-import-measures/ (accessed 30 Oct 2022)

Projects, investments, jobs, and capacity are on the rise since the initiation of the Section 232 aluminum tariffs. At least 55 new and expansion projects are in downstream aluminum industries producing extruded (rod and bar, pipe and tube, and extruded shapes) and rolled (sheet and plate) products. These new and expanded facilities will employ nearly 4,500 additional workers, generate $6 billion in new investments, and add nearly 1 million metric tons of annual rolling and extrusion capacity to the downstream domestic aluminum industry.

Trump's Presidential tariff policies led to more jobs

Adam S. Hersh and Dr. Robert E. Scott 2021 (Hersh - Senior Economist at Economic Policy Institute; formerly Senior Economist at the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute and the Center for American Progress; former Research Associate at Univ. of Mass. Political Economy Research Institute. Scott - PhD in economics; director of trade and manufacturing policy research at Economic Policy Institute) 25 May 2021 " Aluminum producing and consuming industries have thrived under U.S. Section 232 import measures" https://www.epi.org/publication/aluminum-producing-and-consuming-industries-have-thrived-under-u-s-section-232-import-measures/ (accessed 30 Oct 2022)

Section 232 measures led to an uptick in employment. Since implementing the Section 232 import measures, U.S. employment in primary and downstream aluminum industries increased by 1,200 on net by February 2020, at the start of the COVID-19 crisis. Employment in the industry was buttressed by 5,570 jobs created by restarted and newly expanded primary aluminum production and secondary rolling and extrusion mills.

2. Chinese mercantilism

Link: Section 337.

**It's an Executive Branch action that restricts imports if they are produced by intellectual property infringement or other unfair trade practice, and it's done without Congress.**

Congressional Research Service 2009. (non-partisan research agency of Congress) Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Enforcement: Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 26 Oct 2009 (accessed 21 Nov 2022) https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20091026\_RS22880\_b0dca281e1d44ce5ae52d140f3ae71e7e16226ae.html

Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. §1337) is the primary option available to U.S. companies to protect themselves from imports into the United States of goods made by foreign companies that infringe U.S. intellectual property rights (IPR), such as patents, trademarks, and copyrights.The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) administers Section 337 investigations. The ITC is a quasi-judicial federal government agency responsible for investigating and arbitrating complaints of unfair trade practices. The majority of unfair competition acts asserted under Section 337 involve allegations of patent infringement. These cases tend to be complex and require adjudication by the ITC. In the case of most copyrights and trademarks, the Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency, is empowered to make on-the-spot determinations of IPR infringement.

Link: US should be INCREASING, not decreasing protection of the US economy against predatory Chinese illegal trade practices, including Section 337

Dr. Robert D. Atkinson 2022 (Ph.D. in city and regional planning; founder and president of International Technology & Innovation Foundation) 21 Nov 2022 "How to Mitigate the Damage From China’s Unfair Trade Practices by Giving USITC Power to Make Them Less Profitable" (accessed 21 Nov 2022) https://itif.org/publications/2022/11/21/how-to-mitigate-the-damage-from-chinas-unfair-trade-practices/

As such, the federal government needs to embrace an approach that seeks to limit China’s ability to profit from industrial predation. In particular, Congress should amend the Tariff Act of 1930 to enable stronger use of the USITC’s Section 337 statute, amending it to make it easier to exclude goods and services from China supported by systemically unfair trade practices. Even though the statute was originally envisioned to help address unfair foreign trade practices, Section 337 is generally not seen as a tool to address Chinese industrial predation. Rather, it has evolved into a secondary patent “court” in which multinationals from allied countries bring patent cases, often against each other. Instead, it should be used much more vigorously to prevent the import of products from firms in other non-market, non-rule-of-law economies such as China’s that systemically benefit from unfair government policies and practices.

Link: Definition of mercantilism. It's government intervention to help its domestic industries to damage foreign competitors, and it's what China is doing

Stephen Ezell 2013. (Senior Analyst, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation) 24 July 2013 China’s Economic Mercantilism <http://www.industryweek.com/public-policy/chinas-economic-mercantilism> (brackets added) (accessed 26 June 2022)

But by 2006, that began to change, as China made the strategic decision to shift away from attracting the commodity-based production facilities of foreign MNCs [multi-national corporations] toward a “China Inc.” development model focused on helping Chinese firms, often at the expense of foreign firms. The path to prosperity and autonomy now became “indigenous innovation” (in Chinese, zizhu chuagnxin), with a focus on helping Chinese firms move up the value-chain to higher-value-added production activities. To get there, China has embraced economic mercantilism on an unprecedented scale, using a wide array of policies to assist Chinese firms while discriminating against foreign establishments attempting to compete in China.

Link: "Free trade" with China, which AFF is advocating, enables them to practice mercantilist policies against us

Ian Fletcher 2010 (adjunct fellow at the U.S. Business and Industry Council; formerly an economist in private practice serving mainly hedge funds and private equity firms) Six Reasons for U.S. to Abandon Free-Trade Myth 26 Oct 2010 <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-10-26/six-reasons-for-u-s-to-drop-free-trade-myth-commentary-by-ian-fletcher> (accessed 26 June 2022)

The fifth dubious assumption is that free trade won’t turn benign trading partners into dangerous trading rivals. But free trade often does do this, as we see today in China, whose growth is massively dependent upon exports. This is especially likely when trading partners practice mercantilism, the 400-year-old strategy of deliberately gaming the world trading system by methods like currency manipulation and hidden tariffs.

Impact: US economic and political decline and rise of Chinese totalitarianism

Dr. Howard Richman, Prof. Raymond Richman & Prof. Jesse Richman 2010. (Howard Richman - PhD from Univ of Pittsburgh. Raymond Richman- professor emeritus of public and international affairs at Univ of Pittsburgh. Jesse Richman – PhD; associate professor of political science at Old Dominion Univ) 10 Dec 2010 Bernanke to China: Stop Hurting Us or You'll Hurt Us (accessed 26 June 2022) <http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2010/12/bernanke_to_china_stop_hurting.html>

If we don't act against mercantilism, the future is predictable: America will decline as an economic and political power.  Eventually, China will replace the United States as the dominant power on the world stage, and totalitarianism will likely replace democracy as the world's dominant political philosophy.  All because our leaders wouldn't balance budgets and trade.

Impact: Mercantilism will kill US jobs and economic growth

Dr Robert D Atkinson 2012. (president of the [Information Technology and Innovation Foundation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_Technology_and_Innovation_Foundation), a public policy [think tank](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Think_tank); formerly vice president of the [Progressive Policy Institute](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Progressive_Policy_Institute); PhD in City and Regional Planning) February 2012 Enough is Enough: Confronting Chinese Innovation Mercantilism <http://www2.itif.org/2012-enough-enough-chinese-mercantilism.pdf> (accessed 26 June 2022)

Further integration of global supply chains that link the United States and China could be good for both nations but not if Chinese policies continue to be based on absolute advantage and mercantilism. In this case, the results will be more of the same: the loss of U.S. industrial and high-tech output, and the jobs and GDP growth that go with it.

3. Lost military capability

Link: Trump imposed tariffs to protect US aluminum production [which he couldn’t have done after an AFF plan]

Adam S. Hersh and Dr. Robert E. Scott 2021 (Hersh - Senior Economist at Economic Policy Institute; formerly Senior Economist at the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute and the Center for American Progress; former Research Associate at Univ. of Mass. Political Economy Research Institute. Scott - PhD in economics; director of trade and manufacturing policy research at Economic Policy Institute) 25 May 2021 " Aluminum producing and consuming industries have thrived under U.S. Section 232 import measures" https://www.epi.org/publication/aluminum-producing-and-consuming-industries-have-thrived-under-u-s-section-232-import-measures/ (accessed 30 Oct 2022)

In spring 2017, the U.S. aluminum industry was in a precarious position, prompting the U.S. Department of Commerce and the president to initiate a Section 232 National Security Investigation, authorized by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, into threats posed by aluminum (and steel) imports. The root cause of this threat was, and continues to be, the growth of excess capacity and overproduction in China and other countries where government supports distort global markets and put the survival of U.S. aluminum production at stake.

Link & Brink: Only 1 US producer of aluminum, and without it the military is at risk

Adam S. Hersh and Dr. Robert E. Scott 2021 (Hersh - Senior Economist at Economic Policy Institute; formerly Senior Economist at the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute and the Center for American Progress; former Research Associate at Univ. of Mass. Political Economy Research Institute. Scott - PhD in economics; director of trade and manufacturing policy research at Economic Policy Institute) 25 May 2021 " Aluminum producing and consuming industries have thrived under U.S. Section 232 import measures" https://www.epi.org/publication/aluminum-producing-and-consuming-industries-have-thrived-under-u-s-section-232-import-measures/ (accessed 30 Oct 2022)

The risks of a diminished aluminum industry extend far beyond the harm done to U.S. businesses and their workers. Aluminum is an essential input for military uses ranging from armor plating for vehicles and naval vessels, to aircraft and other aerospace applications. Currently, there is only one operating U.S. smelter capable of producing the high-purity aluminum required for defense applications (the other comparable smelters are located in China, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates).

Link: Aluminum is essential to US military capabilities

Prof. Mimi Sheller 2014 (sociology professor at Drexel Univ.) The Uneasy Alliance Between Aluminum and Warfare (article was posted in 2019 as an article adapted from a book written in 2014) (accessed 30 Oct 2022) https://thereader.mitpress.mit.edu/the-uneasy-alliance-between-aluminum-and-warfare/

In fact, during both World Wars I and II, about 90 percent of U.S. aluminum production went into military uses; the metal remains essential to many components of modern warfare. It’s a central ingredient of BLU-82, known as the “[daisy cutter](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/nov/07/afghanistan.terrorism6),” used for carpet bombing Vietnam and more recently in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Described as the world’s largest non-nuclear weapon, it contains a slurry of ammonium nitrate, aluminum powder, and a polystyrene-based thickener, which when it explodes generates a massive pressure wave estimated at 1,000 pounds per square inch. In addition to bombs, a host of small arms make use of aluminum, including the M-72 light antitank weapon, the M16 assault rifle, and the barrel of the M79 grenade launcher. Missiles, meanwhile, make even more significant use of the light metal. The Hawk missile “depends largely on aluminum for its speed and maneuverability” according to Alcoa, and the Polaris missile requires 4000 pounds of the light metal, not to mention a few more thousand pounds of aluminum in powder form for its propellant mix. The Russian air-to-air R-27 missile, as well as India’s nuclear-capable [Prithvi II](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/nuclear-capable-missile-prithvi-ii-successfully-test-fired/articleshow/69979848.cms), are also made of aluminum alloys. Naval vessels, too, are heavily reliant on aluminum, which lends them speed, range, and maneuverability.

Link: Lost military capabilities = lost US global influence and deterrence of bad guys

Dakota L. Wood 2022. (Senior Research Fellow for Defense Programs in the Center for National Defense, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation. He served for two decades as an officer in the U.S. Marine Corps, including service as a strategic analyst for the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Secretary of Defense’s Director of Net Assessment) 2023 INDEX OF US MILITARY STRENGTH (ethical note about the date: The article's copyright date is 2023, but it is available online and was accessed on 30 Oct 2022, so it was obviously written some time in 2022) http://thf\_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2022/Military\_Index/2023\_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf

For decades, the perception of American strength and resolve has helped to deter adventurous bad actors and tyrannical dictators and has underwritten a vast network of U.S. allies and partners. Regrettably, both that perception and, as a consequence, its deterrent and reassuring effects are eroding.  
**END QUOTE. THEY GO ON LATER IN THE ARTICLE TO WRITE QUOTE:**  
“As currently postured, the U.S. military is at growing risk of not being able to meet the demands of defending America’s vital national interests. It is rated as weak relative to the force needed to defend national interests on a global stage against actual challenges in the world as it is rather than as we wish it were.

Impact: Losing US hegemony risks apocalyptic consequences and loss of global peace and prosperity

Brook Manville 2018 (principal of Brook Manville LLC, consulting on strategy and organization) 14 Oct 2018 “Why A Crumbling World Order Urgently Needs U.S. Leadership” FORBES <https://www.forbes.com/sites/brookmanville/2018/10/14/why-a-crumbling-world-order-urgently-needs-u-s-leadership/#2bb8912f2e61> (brackets added) (accessed 18 June 2022)

The botanical metaphor in [Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Robert] Kagan’s book title began our recent conversation. “We’ve been living in a tranquil garden of largely peaceful practices and liberal expectations across much of the world, ignoring the dark forces of jungle multiplying under the rocks. If we don’t defend civilization’s cultivation—especially American’s guarantee of peace and economic integration across the world—the toxic creatures and weeds will roar back.” Thus [China’s determined military rise](about:blank), [Russia’s continuing aggressions](about:blank), [fiery authoritarians on the march in so many once democratic countries](about:blank). As [Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Robert] Kagan continued, “[Trump has been damaging the system](about:blank)—he too seems to have forgotten what good it has delivered—but actually America’s desire for maintaining the global order has been diminishing for years. After [the dissolution of the Soviet empire in the 1990s](about:blank), people talked about [‘the end of history”](about:blank)—that America didn’t have to worry anymore about war or aggression. History doesn’t end, it simply paused. The ugliest aspects of human nature are surging again.”  
**Vanishing Leadership, Vanishing Peace**  
Kagan’s apocalyptic message, repeated [in other recent writings](about:blank), is lucid and terrifying, all the more devastating for its relentless use of history. It’s a footnoted plea that “we’ve seen this movie before.” He reminds us that Americans have frequently turned away from defending world order, with regrettably familiar outcomes: to be dragged in later at greater cost (e.g. [helping to stop Hitler earlier might have prevented World War II](about:blank)); or, simply hoping that “the problem would go away,” to watch it get ten times worse (e.g. [Obama’s policy in Syria](about:blank)). Kagan acknowledges that America has sometimes misstepped (e.g. Viet Nam, Iraq), but he still argues that overall our foreign engagement has produced more peace and prosperity than not. “History shows,” he summarized, “that world order has never been achieved without some constructive force to keep the peace. The relative harmony and fair play we’ve created in the modern world will vanish if the U.S. forsakes international leadership.”