Negative: Section 232 Reform - bad idea

By “Coach Vance” Trefethen

Case Summary: The AFF plan reforms Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Status Quo law allows the President to declare the import of some commodity to be a national security threat and regulate, block or tariff the imports in order to protect domestic production. There are supposed to be a bunch of safeguards and checks on its use and it wasn't used hardly at all until Trump discovered it, bypassed the safeguards, and started declaring lots of things to be "national security" issues. He slapped tariffs on things not really related to national security [AFF will argue] on the theory that saving jobs of US factory workers is kinda like national security. AFF plan adds Congressional approval and additional procedures to slow down or prevent the President from excessive use of the "national security" tariffs. This NEG brief shows why that's unnecessary and causes more problems.

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Negative: Section 232 Reform

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE

1. No claim of harm

It isn't a harm until someone gets harmed

If a tree falls in the forest, it probably does make a sound. But if it doesn't fall on anyone and no one notices, you can't call it a harm, a public policy problem, or something worth an hour and a half of our debate time. Look through the entire flow of the 1AC and you'll see nowhere is there any piece of evidence or even any Affirmative claim that anyone was harmed by anything that has ever happened under Section 232.

The bottom line is: It's not a harm until someone gets harmed. No one was harmed, so it's not worth our time debating it and by itself that warrants a Negative ballot

2. No economic harm from Section 232

Lots of economic growth and investment occurred under Trump's Section 232 tariffs, with no negative economic effects

Adam S. Hersh and Dr. Robert E. Scott 2021 (Hersh - Senior Economist at Economic Policy Institute; formerly Senior Economist at the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute and the Center for American Progress; former Research Associate at Univ. of Mass. Political Economy Research Institute, and taught macroeconomics at Univ. of Mass., Amherst. Scott - PhD in economics; director of trade and manufacturing policy research at Economic Policy Institute) 25 May 2021 " Aluminum producing and consuming industries have thrived under U.S. Section 232 import measures" https://www.epi.org/publication/aluminum-producing-and-consuming-industries-have-thrived-under-u-s-section-232-import-measures/ (accessed 30 Oct 2022)

This report demonstrates that import measures imposed in 2018 under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 enabled U.S. aluminum output, employment, and capital investment to rebound, while creating no adverse effects for aluminum-consuming industries such as motor vehicle parts, construction goods, and canned beverages. Despite dire predictions of import measure critics, aluminum-consuming industries and the broader U.S. economy thrived under these measures.

No evidence of any meaningful adverse economic impact to Section 232

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There is no evidence of a meaningful adverse effect of Section 232 on industries or consumers. Econometric analysis of the causal relationship between primary aluminum prices and prices of aluminum-consuming end-use goods—including canned beer and other beverages, construction goods, furniture, and motor vehicle bodies—shows the effects are statistically zero to economically trivial. The lack of a meaningful causal relationship indicates Section 232 import measures had no adverse effect on downstream industries or consumers.

A/T "EU retaliated for Sec. 232 with tariffs on US whiskey" - But it had no impact.

Adam S. Hersh and Dr. Robert E. Scott 2021 (Hersh - Senior Economist at Economic Policy Institute; formerly Senior Economist at the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute and the Center for American Progress; former Research Associate at Univ. of Mass. Political Economy Research Institute, and taught macroeconomics at Univ. of Mass., Amherst. Scott - PhD in economics; director of trade and manufacturing policy research at Economic Policy Institute) 25 May 2021 " Aluminum producing and consuming industries have thrived under U.S. Section 232 import measures" https://www.epi.org/publication/aluminum-producing-and-consuming-industries-have-thrived-under-u-s-section-232-import-measures/ (accessed 30 Oct 2022)

A booming domestic market offset falling exports for tariff-impacted U.S. whiskey. The U.S. aluminum import policy elicited retaliatory tariffs by the European Union (EU) against U.S. whiskey and bourbon exports. While U.S. whiskey exports to the EU fell, exports to the rest of the world fell more. Waning U.S. whiskey exports to countries not imposing new tariffs indicates that producers diverted production to capitalize on the booming domestic market for “super premium” spirits, which grew 11% in 2019, or faster than any year since 2015.

Sec. 232 tariffs on aluminum and steel didn't hurt jobs in other industries. In fact, those industries grew rapidly

Adam S. Hersh and Dr. Robert E. Scott 2021 (Hersh - Senior Economist at Economic Policy Institute; formerly Senior Economist at the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute and the Center for American Progress; former Research Associate at Univ. of Mass. Political Economy Research Institute, and taught macroeconomics at Univ. of Mass., Amherst. Scott - PhD in economics; director of trade and manufacturing policy research at Economic Policy Institute) 25 May 2021 " Aluminum producing and consuming industries have thrived under U.S. Section 232 import measures" https://www.epi.org/publication/aluminum-producing-and-consuming-industries-have-thrived-under-u-s-section-232-import-measures/ (accessed 30 Oct 2022)

When the tariffs on aluminum (and steel) imports were imposed, critics claimed that while the tariffs would save thousands of jobs in primary metals industries, hundreds of thousands of jobs would be eliminated in the rest of the economy. These critics referenced a 2018 study by the Trade Partnership, which wildly exaggerated the impacts of the tariffs (Francois and Baughman 2018; Scott 2018a). This report demonstrates that the negative effects claimed in the Trade Partnership study and feared by other critics have yet to be found in the U.S. economy. In total, the U.S. manufacturing sector added 210,000 new jobs between February 2018, the month before the tariffs took effect, and February 2020, the month before the onset of the COVID-19 economic shock. Outside of manufacturing, the economy added more than 4 million new jobs in this same period. Looking more specifically at the industries aluminum producers supply, there remains no evidence that the imposition of tariffs on aluminum have had the kinds of negative employment impacts—in downstream manufacturing or other parts of the economy—that were predicted by critics of those tariffs.

Studies predicting lost jobs from Sec. 232 tariffs were completely wrong. Jobs increased!

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The Trade Partnership studies claimed that while the tariffs would save thousands of jobs in primary metals industries, several hundred thousand jobs would be lost in the rest of the economy. In fact, the U.S. economy added nearly 4.3 million jobs on net. A majority of the actual job gains, 3.8 million, came from service-sector industries, although the Trade Partnership studies estimated that a majority of their projected job losses, nearly 377,000, would occur in the service sector. The Trade Partnership projections were no more accurate when it came to manufacturing employment. In the real world, the U.S. economy added 210,000 manufacturing jobs following Section 232 import measures, whereas the Trade Partnership predicted manufacturing would lose nearly 20,000 jobs.

All the harmful predictions were wrong: The aluminum industry benefited, and no one was harmed by Sec. 232 tariffs

Adam S. Hersh and Dr. Robert E. Scott 2021 (Hersh - Senior Economist at Economic Policy Institute; formerly Senior Economist at the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute and the Center for American Progress; former Research Associate at Univ. of Mass. Political Economy Research Institute, and taught macroeconomics at Univ. of Mass., Amherst. Scott - PhD in economics; director of trade and manufacturing policy research at Economic Policy Institute) 25 May 2021 " Aluminum producing and consuming industries have thrived under U.S. Section 232 import measures" https://www.epi.org/publication/aluminum-producing-and-consuming-industries-have-thrived-under-u-s-section-232-import-measures/ (accessed 30 Oct 2022)

The resurgence of the U.S. aluminum industry—with minimal apparent knock-on effects in other parts of the economy—belies claims by critics, pundits, and representatives of many firms in downstream industries, who argued that the Section 232 tariffs would have a devastating negative impact on a wide range of domestic industries (Francois and Baughman 2018). For example, according to Bloomberg, Ford Motor Co. “began the year by warning that rising costs for raw materials like steel and aluminum, coupled with unfavorable exchange rates, would add $1.6 billion to its costs this year” (Naughton 2018). Of course, increases in the real value of the dollar, which gained nearly 8% from before the Section 232 measures until the start of the pandemic, raise the cost of everything that domestic automobile manufacturers import from the rest of the world (including finished vehicles and parts), and changes in the cost of metals are a tiny fraction of their overall costs (Scott 2018a). In fact, econometric evidence presented in this report shows that changes in primary aluminum prices have statistically insignificant or economically negligible causal impacts on downstream aluminum-using goods such as canned beverages, construction materials, motor vehicle parts, kitchen utensils, and furniture. Complementary data compiled here demonstrate that Section 232 aluminum measures have had no significant, industry-specific or economywide negative impacts on employment or output in U.S. manufacturing or other domestic industries.

A/T "Harms beer industry" - Sec. 232 tariffs had no effect on beer industry aluminum cans

Adam S. Hersh and Dr. Robert E. Scott 2021 (Hersh - Senior Economist at Economic Policy Institute; formerly Senior Economist at the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute and the Center for American Progress; former Research Associate at Univ. of Mass. Political Economy Research Institute, and taught macroeconomics at Univ. of Mass., Amherst. Scott - PhD in economics; director of trade and manufacturing policy research at Economic Policy Institute) 25 May 2021 " Aluminum producing and consuming industries have thrived under U.S. Section 232 import measures" https://www.epi.org/publication/aluminum-producing-and-consuming-industries-have-thrived-under-u-s-section-232-import-measures/ (accessed 30 Oct 2022)

The Section 232 duties have had virtually no impact on the beer industry or other canned beverage industries and, as discussed in further detail below, careful statistical analysis shows that the price of aluminum has no discernible causal effect on the price of canned beer and other beverage products. A private consulting study prepared for the beer industry reports that the aluminum used in beverage cans represents only 5.7% of the manufacturers’ cost of beer in cans (John Dunham & Associates 2018).  In other words, even assuming that a 10% tariff passes entirely through to the costs of cans, that would equal less than 0.6% of beer production costs—immaterial in an industry that spends tens of billions of dollars annually on marketing and sponsorships. Price data compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS 2021d) show that in the two years after Section 232 measures were implemented, canned beer prices increased less than 0.5% annually—far below overall consumer price inflation—while sales maintained a stable, rising trend (Census 2021).

A/T "Harms automotive industry" - Sec. 232 tariffs had no impact on the automotive industry


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Similarly, we find no causal effect of aluminum prices on motor vehicle body manufacturing—where aluminum accounts for 14% of the value chain—nor do we find a causal effect for nonresidential construction goods (6%) or commercial furniture (3%). The econometric results indicate that any change in primary aluminum prices is expected to result in no change in the price of the end-use product. We do find evidence of a causal relationship between primary aluminum prices and motor vehicle parts, as well as for aluminum kitchen utensils. However, while these results are statistically significant, the magnitude of the effect is, in essence, economically negligible. In both cases, a 1% increase in the price of primary aluminum is expected to elicit a less than 0.1% change in the price of the end-use good.

3. No abuse of "national security" justification by Trump

Trump's Section 232 tariffs on aluminum were justified by "national security"

Adam S. Hersh and Dr. Robert E. Scott 2021 (Hersh - Senior Economist at Economic Policy Institute; formerly Chief Economist for Congressional Joint Economic Committee Democrats, Senior Economist at the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute and the Center for American Progress; former Research Associate at Univ. of Mass. Political Economy Research Institute, and taught macroeconomics at Univ. of Mass., Amherst. Scott - PhD in economics; director of trade and manufacturing policy research at Economic Policy Institute) 25 May 2021 " Aluminum producing and consuming industries have thrived under U.S. Section 232 import measures" https://www.epi.org/publication/aluminum-producing-and-consuming-industries-have-thrived-under-u-s-section-232-import-measures/ (accessed 30 Oct 2022)



4. No abuse of "national security" in Sec. 232 to consider economic impacts

Sec. 232 allows broad consideration of anything that could affect national security, including economic well-being

**[Note: This federal court decision is specifically referring to some of the Trump Sec. 232 tariffs that AFF says distort the meaning of "national security." The court ruled exactly the opposite to the AFF position by ruling that the definition of "national security" includes his steel tariffs.]**

Judge Richard Taranto 2020 (United States Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) Decision of the Court in the case of American Institute for International Steel, Inc. v. United States 28 Feb 2020 (accessed 30 Oct 2022) https://casetext.com/case/am-inst-for-intl-steel-inc-v-united-states

On March 8, 2018, the President of the United States imposed a 25-percent tariff on certain imported steel products, exercising authority granted to the President by section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, [19 U.S.C. § 1862](https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-19-customs-duties/chapter-7-trade-expansion-program/subchapter-ii-trade-agreements/part-iv-national-security/section-1862-safeguarding-national-security), a provision that traces its lineage to 1955.   
**END QUOTE. HE GOES ON LATER IN THE CONTEXT QUOTE**:

Subsection (d) sets forth a number of "relevant factors" to which Secretary and the President shall "give consideration" in making their determinations regarding national security. *Id*., § 1862(d). These factors include the "domestic production needed for projected national defense  requirements," the "capacity of domestic industries to meet such requirements," and the "requirements of growth of such domestic industries." *Id*. They include, as well, "the impact of foreign competition on the economic welfare of individual domestic industries" and whether the "weakening of our internal economy may impair the national security." *Id*. The statute enumerates other considerations as well, but the enumeration is set forth "without excluding other relevant factors." *Id*.

5. A/T "Trump put tariffs on our allies"

Response 1. So what?

The tree fell in the woods but no one was standing under it. It's not a harm until someone gets harmed.

Response 2. Allies with whom we have a "security relationship" were given the option of reaching an alternative arrangement that would remove or modify the trade rules

Judge Richard Taranto 2020 (United States Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) Decision of the Court in the case of American Institute for International Steel, Inc. v. United States 28 Feb 2020 (accessed 30 Oct 2022) <https://casetext.com/case/am-inst-for-intl-steel-inc-v-united-states> (ellipses in original)

The President determined that the tariff was "necessary and appropriate" and would help "ensure that domestic producers can continue to supply all the steel necessary for critical industries and national defense." *Id*. at 11,626. The President also welcomed any country with which the United States has a security relationship to "discuss . . . alternative ways to address the threatened impairment of the national security caused by imports from that country." *Id*. The President stated that, upon reaching an alternative arrangement with a country, he may "remove or modify the restriction on steel articles imports from that country and, if necessary, make any corresponding adjustments to the tariff as it applies to other countries."

Trump gave exemptions to allies

Judge Richard Taranto 2020 (United States Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) Decision of the Court in the case of American Institute for International Steel, Inc. v. United States 28 Feb 2020 (accessed 30 Oct 2022) <https://casetext.com/case/am-inst-for-intl-steel-inc-v-united-states>

On March 22, 2018, the President issued Proclamation 9711, temporarily exempting Australia, Argentina, South Korea, Brazil, and the European Union from the tariff. 83 Fed. Reg. 13,361 (Mar. 28, 2018). The President determined that the United States has an important security interest with each of the exempted sovereigns and that—in light of ongoing negotiations with each—the appropriate way to address the threat to the national security was to continue discussions and increase strategic partnerships, "including those with respect to reducing global excess capacity."

6. No legal/constitutional "abuse" with letting the President set tariffs

Sec. 232 does not delegate too much authority to the President from Congress. Federal court says no constitutional problem

Judge Richard Taranto 2020 (United States Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) Decision of the Court in the case of American Institute for International Steel, Inc. v. United States 28 Feb 2020 (accessed 30 Oct 2022) <https://casetext.com/case/am-inst-for-intl-steel-inc-v-united-states>

The Court's ruling in Algonquin answers the question of the constitutionality of section 232 presented here. The Court's rejection of the nondelegation-doctrine challenge to section 232 was a necessary step in the Court's rationale for ultimately construing the statute as it did, and the constitutional ruling is therefore binding precedent. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, [517 U.S. 44, 67](https://casetext.com/case/seminole-tribe-florida-v-florida#p67) (1996) ("When an opinion issues for the Court, it is not only the result but also those portions of the opinion necessary to  that result by which we are bound."). Moreover, the rationale of the Court's rejection of the nondelegation-doctrine challenge rests on the determination that the standards governing the President's and Secretary's determinations under section 232 are constitutionally adequate.

Supreme Court says Congress can delegate tariff rate decision-making to the President, without violating the Constitution

Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas 1940. Decision of the court in United States v. Bush Co. 20 May 1940 60 S.Ct. 944 <https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-bush-co#p380> (accessed 30 Oct 2022)

It has long been held that where Congress has authorized a public officer to take some specified legislative action when in his judgment that action is necessary or appropriate to carry out the policy of Congress, the judgment of the officer as to the existence of the facts calling for that action is not subject to review. *Martin* v. *Mott*, 12 Wheat. 19; *Monongahela Bridge Co*. v. *United States*, [216 U.S. 177](https://casetext.com/case/monongahela-bridge-v-united-states); *Dakota Central Telephone Co*. v. *South Dakota*, [250 U.S. 163](https://casetext.com/case/dakota-cent-tel-co-v-south-dakota); *United States* v. *Chemical Foundation, Inc.*, [272 U.S. 1](https://casetext.com/case/united-states-v-chemical-foundation-2). As stated by Mr. Justice Story in *Martin* v. *Mott, supra*, pp. 31-32: "Whenever a statute gives a discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, it is a sound rule of construction, that the statute constitutes him the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts." For the judiciary to probe the reasoning which underlies this Proclamation would amount to a clear invasion of the legislative and executive domains. Under the Constitution it is exclusively for Congress, or those to whom it delegates authority, to determine what tariffs shall be imposed.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Weakens WTO

Link: Eliminating Section 232 tariffs "because it puts tariffs on allies" (as AFF claims) creates an incentive for China to raise issues that will weaken the WTO

Barbara C. Matthews 2021. (nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center; JD and LLM in comparative and international law from Duke Law School.  BScFS. from Georgetown Univ. School of Foreign Service. Member of the New York Bar, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Bretton Woods Committee) "Transatlantic tariffs, national security, and geopolitical priorities" 1 June 2021 (accessed 29 Oct 2022) https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/tradeworld/transatlantic-tariffs-national-security-and-geopolitical-priorities/

Eliminating the Section 232 tariffs would certainly go a long way towards assuaging the diplomatic insult of being deemed a national security threat to the United States. But making this decision based on geopolitical grounds potentially undermines the ability to make progress regarding state subsidies that distort global markets. Transatlantic policymakers have thus created a potentially problematic framework for discussion. If US officials lift the Section 232 tariffs on EU steel and aluminum imports, they effectively determine that European state subsidies and market intervention in this sector is not as important as geopolitical priorities. In other words, they suggest that the problem with the tariffs were not state subsidies themselves – but who was giving them. Prioritizing preferential treatment for allied nations makes it far more difficult to persuade China by making arguments about substantive market distortion. Any such move instead could backfire, incentivizing China to call out the various government subsidies being distributed as part of the pandemic-era recovery process. Pursuing all these initiatives outside the WTO umbrella potentially further weakens the global trade body.

Brink: WTO is on the brink of collapse

Maurice Fermont 2019 (advisor on international trade & investment at BusinessEurope) "The WTO has never been more relevant – or more at risk of collapse" 15 Nov 2019 (accessed 29 Oct 2022) https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/the-wto-has-never-been-more-relevant-or-more-at-risk-of-collapse/

The growing share of global trade from 20% of the world GDP in 1995 to 30% in 2018 means the WTO is more important than ever as the guardian of multilateral trade. Yet the current paralysis on rulemaking and reform, the US-China trade war, and the coming paralysis of the Dispute Settlement Body are bringing the WTO to the brink of collapse.

Impact: Economic well-being and reduced risk of war depend on functioning of the WTO

[Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala](https://www.brookings.edu/experts/ngozi-okonjo-iweala-2/) 2020 (Nonresident Distinguished Fellow - [Global Economy and Development](https://www.brookings.edu/program/global-economy-and-development/), [Africa Growth Initiative](https://www.brookings.edu/project/africa-growth-initiative/), Brookings Institution) 22 June 2020 (accessed 29 Oct 2022) https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/reviving-the-wto/

But despite these challenges, the WTO has not been a “failure.” Rather, it has built upon the successes of its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which entered into force in 1948. The rules-based multilateral trading system that began with GATT has contributed immensely to global economic growth over the last seven decades, by reducing average tariffs and steadily eliminating non-tariff barriers. As a result, living standards have improved in most countries. Moreover, rules-based global trade has helped to underpin peace and security, because trading partners are more likely to resolve differences through negotiations than through armed conflict.

2. Lost jobs

Trump used Section 232 to create thousands of jobs

Adam S. Hersh and Dr. Robert E. Scott 2021 (Hersh - Senior Economist at Economic Policy Institute; formerly Senior Economist at the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute and the Center for American Progress; former Research Associate at Univ. of Mass. Political Economy Research Institute. Scott - PhD in economics; director of trade and manufacturing policy research at Economic Policy Institute) 25 May 2021 " Aluminum producing and consuming industries have thrived under U.S. Section 232 import measures" https://www.epi.org/publication/aluminum-producing-and-consuming-industries-have-thrived-under-u-s-section-232-import-measures/ (accessed 30 Oct 2022)

Projects, investments, jobs, and capacity are on the rise since the initiation of the Section 232 aluminum tariffs. At least 55 new and expansion projects are in downstream aluminum industries producing extruded (rod and bar, pipe and tube, and extruded shapes) and rolled (sheet and plate) products. These new and expanded facilities will employ nearly 4,500 additional workers, generate $6 billion in new investments, and add nearly 1 million metric tons of annual rolling and extrusion capacity to the downstream domestic aluminum industry.

Section 232 measures led to more jobs

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Section 232 measures led to an uptick in employment. Since implementing the Section 232 import measures, U.S. employment in primary and downstream aluminum industries increased by 1,200 on net by February 2020, at the start of the COVID-19 crisis. Employment in the industry was buttressed by 5,570 jobs created by restarted and newly expanded primary aluminum production and secondary rolling and extrusion mills.

3. Lost military capability

Link: Trump imposed Sec. 232 tariffs to protect the survival of US aluminum production

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In spring 2017, the U.S. aluminum industry was in a precarious position, prompting the U.S. Department of Commerce and the president to initiate a Section 232 National Security Investigation, authorized by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, into threats posed by aluminum (and steel) imports. The root cause of this threat was, and continues to be, the growth of excess capacity and overproduction in China and other countries where government supports distort global markets and put the survival of U.S. aluminum production at stake.

Link & Brink: Only 1 US producer of aluminum, and without it the military is at risk

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The risks of a diminished aluminum industry extend far beyond the harm done to U.S. businesses and their workers. Aluminum is an essential input for military uses ranging from armor plating for vehicles and naval vessels, to aircraft and other aerospace applications. Currently, there is only one operating U.S. smelter capable of producing the high-purity aluminum required for defense applications (the other comparable smelters are located in China, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates).

Link: Aluminum is essential to US military capabilities

Prof. Mimi Sheller 2014 (sociology professor at Drexel Univ.) The Uneasy Alliance Between Aluminum and Warfare (article was posted in 2019 as an article adapted from a book written in 2014) (accessed 30 Oct 2022) https://thereader.mitpress.mit.edu/the-uneasy-alliance-between-aluminum-and-warfare/

In fact, during both World Wars I and II, about 90 percent of U.S. aluminum production went into military uses; the metal remains essential to many components of modern warfare. It’s a central ingredient of BLU-82, known as the “[daisy cutter](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/nov/07/afghanistan.terrorism6),” used for carpet bombing Vietnam and more recently in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Described as the world’s largest non-nuclear weapon, it contains a slurry of ammonium nitrate, aluminum powder, and a polystyrene-based thickener, which when it explodes generates a massive pressure wave estimated at 1,000 pounds per square inch. In addition to bombs, a host of small arms make use of aluminum, including the M-72 light antitank weapon, the M16 assault rifle, and the barrel of the M79 grenade launcher. Missiles, meanwhile, make even more significant use of the light metal. The Hawk missile “depends largely on aluminum for its speed and maneuverability” according to Alcoa, and the Polaris missile requires 4000 pounds of the light metal, not to mention a few more thousand pounds of aluminum in powder form for its propellant mix. The Russian air-to-air R-27 missile, as well as India’s nuclear-capable [Prithvi II](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/nuclear-capable-missile-prithvi-ii-successfully-test-fired/articleshow/69979848.cms), are also made of aluminum alloys. Naval vessels, too, are heavily reliant on aluminum, which lends them speed, range, and maneuverability.

Link: Lost military capabilities = lost US global influence and deterrence of bad guys

Dakota L. Wood 2022. (Senior Research Fellow for Defense Programs in the Center for National Defense, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation. He served for two decades as an officer in the U.S. Marine Corps, including service as a strategic analyst for the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Secretary of Defense’s Director of Net Assessment) 2023 INDEX OF US MILITARY STRENGTH (ethical note about the date: The article's copyright date is 2023, but it is available online and was accessed on 30 Oct 2022, so it was obviously written some time in 2022) http://thf\_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2022/Military\_Index/2023\_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf

For decades, the perception of American strength and resolve has helped to deter adventurous bad actors and tyrannical dictators and has underwritten a vast network of U.S. allies and partners. Regrettably, both that perception and, as a consequence, its deterrent and reassuring effects are eroding.  
**END QUOTE. THEY GO ON LATER IN THE ARTICLE TO WRITE QUOTE:**  
“As currently postured, the U.S. military is at growing risk of not being able to meet the demands of defending America’s vital national interests. It is rated as weak relative to the force needed to defend national interests on a global stage against actual challenges in the world as it is rather than as we wish it were.

Impact: Losing US hegemony risks apocalyptic consequences and loss of global peace and prosperity

Brook Manville 2018 (principal of Brook Manville LLC, consulting on strategy and organization) 14 Oct 2018 “Why A Crumbling World Order Urgently Needs U.S. Leadership” FORBES <https://www.forbes.com/sites/brookmanville/2018/10/14/why-a-crumbling-world-order-urgently-needs-u-s-leadership/#2bb8912f2e61> (brackets added) (accessed 18 June 2022)

The botanical metaphor in [Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Robert] Kagan’s book title began our recent conversation. “We’ve been living in a tranquil garden of largely peaceful practices and liberal expectations across much of the world, ignoring the dark forces of jungle multiplying under the rocks. If we don’t defend civilization’s cultivation—especially American’s guarantee of peace and economic integration across the world—the toxic creatures and weeds will roar back.” Thus [China’s determined military rise](about:blank), [Russia’s continuing aggressions](about:blank), [fiery authoritarians on the march in so many once democratic countries](about:blank). As [Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Robert] Kagan continued, “[Trump has been damaging the system](about:blank)—he too seems to have forgotten what good it has delivered—but actually America’s desire for maintaining the global order has been diminishing for years. After [the dissolution of the Soviet empire in the 1990s](about:blank), people talked about [‘the end of history”](about:blank)—that America didn’t have to worry anymore about war or aggression. History doesn’t end, it simply paused. The ugliest aspects of human nature are surging again.”  
**Vanishing Leadership, Vanishing Peace**  
Kagan’s apocalyptic message, repeated [in other recent writings](about:blank), is lucid and terrifying, all the more devastating for its relentless use of history. It’s a footnoted plea that “we’ve seen this movie before.” He reminds us that Americans have frequently turned away from defending world order, with regrettably familiar outcomes: to be dragged in later at greater cost (e.g. [helping to stop Hitler earlier might have prevented World War II](about:blank)); or, simply hoping that “the problem would go away,” to watch it get ten times worse (e.g. [Obama’s policy in Syria](about:blank)). Kagan acknowledges that America has sometimes misstepped (e.g. Viet Nam, Iraq), but he still argues that overall our foreign engagement has produced more peace and prosperity than not. “History shows,” he summarized, “that world order has never been achieved without some constructive force to keep the peace. The relative harmony and fair play we’ve created in the modern world will vanish if the U.S. forsakes international leadership.”