Negative: Golden Shield

By “Coach Vance” Trefethen

Case Summary: The AFF plan stops all US technology exports to China related to its "Golden Shield" project. This is a surveillance project by the Chinese government that may be oppressing human rights, and specifically against Uyghurs (pronounced "wee - gurrs").

Negative: Golden Shield 3

TOPICALITY 3

1. No significant reform 3

Link: Sanctions for "technological support" to human rights violations against Uyghurs in China is Status Quo policy 3

Violation: Doing the Status Quo or a little bit more of the Status Quo isn't significant reform 3

Impact: No Affirmative team in the round 3

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE 3

1. No link to the U.S. 3

Not one of the abuses listed in the opening quote has any link to technology coming from US exports of anything 3

2. No link to imported technology 4

Golden Shield once relied on outside technology, but no longer needs it 4

China doesn't need Western technology - they can get along just fine without US systems 4

3. Widespread support 4

Chinese people widely support surveillance and aren't worried about privacy implications 4

Majority of Chinese support Social Credit System (SCS) (=Social Scoring) because it promotes convenience and stability. And Americans want it too 5

4. Golden Shield isn't torturing anyone 5

Golden Shield is about internet censorship, not torture 5

5. China "Social Scoring" is exaggerated 5

“Threat” of China’s system is exaggerated and social scoring is a science fiction story that doesn’t actually exist 5

China’s “scoring” system isn’t really “social scoring” 6

6. "Social Scoring" isn't harmful 6

We all do scoring all the time and we have for years – in our everyday social interactions 6

Social scoring rewards and promotes good behavior like trust, kindness and manners 6

7. "Widespread Surveillance" isn't a problem 7

We have it in the US too: Facial recognition is so widespread that no one has any reasonable expectation of privacy 7

SOLVENCY 7

1. Already tried & failed. AFF Plan was already tried and failed in 2020 7

US policy tried to block exports of surveillance technology but they can’t write rules that define it [technology has multiple uses – commercial use and government use overlap] 7

2. Diffusion of technology is inevitable 7

Technological innovation spreads globally regardless of whether we try to stop it. Better to benefit from the openness and grow our own instead of trying to stop theirs 7

3. Won’t help human rights 8

"Values" problem, not a "Tech" problem. Focus on technology won't improve human rights in China 8

No amount of technological sanction will improve human rights in China 8

Social Scoring (SCS) isn't the problem, it's the security apparatus and the government's discrimination against minorities 8

Technology doesn't matter, what matters is government accountability and public trust in government 9

4. Can’t solve without allies 9

Turn: Pushing China on human rights abuse of technology without allies on board makes things worse 9

US allies have as much technology as we do, so if we want to sanction China, we have to involve them [which AFF Plan doesn’t do] 9

Unilateral US human rights pressure on China is unlikely to succeed without allies 10

DISADVANTAGES 11

1. Inflaming US/China discord 11

Link: AFF Plan hypes up US unilateral criticism of China on human rights 11

Link: US criticism turns the next generation of young Chinese against us 11

Link: Disengagement from China leads to miscalculations and confirms China’s perception of the US as a threat 11

Link: Treating China as an enemy would be foolish and guarantee their hostility 11

Impact: Increased risk of war with China 12

2. Hurts us more than them 12

Human rights-based technology campaign against China would impose big costs on the US and lead to "technological and economic divorce" from China 12

Canceling Science & Technology (S&T) cooperation with China wouldn’t eliminate the risks and would backfire, making our economy and national security worse off 12

Even if China has problems: Barriers to the flow of research will end up hurting US national security and the global economy 13

Complete cutoff of research cooperation isn’t worth it because it harms the US and global economy 13

Bifurcating (=a hard split in two) US / China technology into hostile camps would make America weaker 13

3. Chinese technology retaliation. Withdrawal of Chinese technology cooperation with the US 13

Link: 56% of Chinese Artificial Intelligence (AI) researchers work in the US 13

Link: Retaliation likely. Last time the US sanctioned Chinese technology, they retaliated 14

Link & Brink: Foreign talent is badly needed in the US – we lose American innovation without it, and we can’t compete… with China! 14

Impact: We lose economic growth, higher wages and new jobs if we lose AI productivity 14

Negative: Golden Shield

TOPICALITY

1. No significant reform

Link: Sanctions for "technological support" to human rights violations against Uyghurs in China is Status Quo policy

Jon Bateman 2022 (a fellow in the Technology and International Affairs Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He previously worked as a senior intelligence analyst, policy adviser, and speechwriter in the U.S. Department of Defense, most recently serving as special assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) (accessed 12 Oct 2022) "U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”" https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Bateman\_US-China\_Decoupling\_final.pdf

In 2017, Trump declared that “serious human rights abuse and corruption around the world” constituted a national emergency, invoking IEEPA and the Global Magnitsky Act. Seventeen Chinese individuals and organizations have been designated under this authority (mostly for activities in Xinjiang), and many more could be targeted in the future—including people or companies that provide “technological support” to Chinese human rights abuses. (The Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 and the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act of 2021 call for additional Xinjiang-related sanctions to be imposed.)

Violation: Doing the Status Quo or a little bit more of the Status Quo isn't significant reform

Significant reform requires a substantial change to Status Quo trends and policies. Just doing a little more of the Status Quo isn't significant reform. REPEALING all technology-related human rights sanctions on China would have been a significant reform. But just endorsing what the Status Quo is already doing doesn't uphold the resolution.

Impact: No Affirmative team in the round

If no one is really affirming the resolution in this debate round, then no matter who wins, you should write "Negative" on the ballot.

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE

1. No link to the U.S.

Not one of the abuses listed in the opening quote has any link to technology coming from US exports of anything

"Forced to pledge loyalty to the Communist Party" - Nothing to do with technology or exports.  
"Forced to renounce Islam" - No technology involved there either.  
"Sing praises of communism and learn Mandarin" - Don't need technology to sing or learn a foreign language  
"Cameras and microphones everywhere" - Cameras and microphones have been around for 100 years.  
"Torture and sleep deprivation" - Torture has been around for thousands of years, the US isn't endorsing it  
"Risk detention if they visit their children" - Detention has been practiced for thousands of years. That's a bad policy, not a dangerous technology.

2. No link to imported technology

Golden Shield once relied on outside technology, but no longer needs it

Susanne Sataline 2012 (independent journalist who lives in Hong Kong and the New York region; graduate of Columbia University’s Masters of Fine Arts program and was a Nieman fellow at Harvard Univ) "Issue: China’s Big Data Sweep" 30 Apr 2012 (accessed 11 Oct 2022) https://businessresearcher.sagepub.com/sbr-1946-106448-2887399/20180430/chinas-big-data-sweep?download=pdf



China doesn't need Western technology - they can get along just fine without US systems

Elina Sinkkonen & Jussi Lassila 2022 (Both are Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs) June 2022 "Digital Authoritarianism and Technological Cooperation in Sino-Russian Relations: Common Goals and Diverging Standpoints" https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-97012-3\_9 (accessed 12 Oct 2022)

 Along with China’s increasing innovation capacity in fields such as ICT, AI or quantum communication, its ability to shape international standards in these emerging fields will strengthen (Seaman, [2020](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-97012-3_9#ref-CR57), p. 10). Technical standards, BRI funding instruments and the rise of Chinese tech companies are helping China build entire technological ecosystems which can both help China evade integration into US-dominated technological systems and sell Chinese products abroad. China’s priorities for 2021 include building technological strength, a new type of ‘whole-of-nation’ system and creating less interdependent industrial supply chains (‘Zhongyang jingji gongzuo’, [2020](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-97012-3_9#ref-CR80), December 18).

3. Widespread support

Chinese people widely support surveillance and aren't worried about privacy implications

Elina Sinkkonen & Jussi Lassila 2022 (Both are Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs) June 2022 "Digital Authoritarianism and Technological Cooperation in Sino-Russian Relations: Common Goals and Diverging Standpoints" https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-97012-3\_9 (accessed 12 Oct 2022)

Despite the fragmented and opaque nature of China’s social credit system, Kostka (2019) found a surprisingly high degree of support for it among citizens. Particularly unexpected was that wealthier and better educated Chinese residing in urban areas as well as older people reported the highest level of support. In interviews conducted after the online survey, some respondents explained that they are not worried about privacy when it comes to the social credit system. Chinese public actors already have access to all the information collected in the system, which is why respondents thought the social credit system could not worsen their situation (Kostka, [2019](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-97012-3_9#ref-CR37)).

Majority of Chinese support Social Credit System (SCS) (=Social Scoring) because it promotes convenience and stability. And Americans want it too

Prof. Ralph Schroeder 2022 (Programme Director for the MSc in Social Science of the Internet, Oxford Univ., England) International Journal of Communication, "Aadhaar and the Social Credit System: Personal Data Governance in India and China" (accessed 12 Oct 2022)(in this context, the "authoritarian country" is China and the "imperfect democracy" is India, and the comments apply to both)

There is a larger point here, however, which is that the majority of Chinese citizens regard the system positively, including how the system ensures social stability and promotes moral behavior. That is in keeping with the legitimacy of the political system, “performance legitimacy” (Zhao, 2009) within a meritocratic political culture (Bell & Wang, 2020). The vantage point from which the Chinese media system can be regarded as Orwellian is external, from the perspective of democratic societies with civil and political rights and in which media are autonomous and provide for unfettered expression. A more accurate internal perspective, however, is one whereby Chinese citizens willingly embrace the SCS and how it shapes their social lives. This makes it closer to a Huxleyan “Brave New World” of consumerism in which people become accustomed to convenience but also give up their data in exchange for becoming habituated to online goods and services (Schroeder, 2014). That is not unique to China. Turow (2017) has documented a similar phenomenon in the United States.

4. Golden Shield isn't torturing anyone

Golden Shield is about internet censorship, not torture

Arif Sari, Zakria Abdul Qayyum and Onder Onursal 2017 (Faculty of Business, Department of Management Information Systems, Girne American University, Kyrenia, Cyprus) The Dark Side of the China: The Government, Society and the Great Cannon 5 Dec 2017 (accessed 11 Oct 2022) https://journals.scholarpublishing.org/index.php/TNC/article/download/4062/2427/10451

The Ministry of Public Security of China operates censorship and Internet surveillance initiative. The main purpose of the Golden Shield Project, further referred as the Great Firewall of China (GFW) is blocking and restricting access to unauthorized, forbidden content to Chinese Internet users and anyone else within Chinese borders. Some examples of prohibited or blocked keywords are “Dalai Lama”, “human rights”, “democracy”; most of the widely used social network websites like facebook.com, twitter.com, instagram.com, search engines like Google, media - The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, Youtube, many pages of Wikipedia.

5. China "Social Scoring" is exaggerated

“Threat” of China’s system is exaggerated and social scoring is a science fiction story that doesn’t actually exist

David Matthews 2021 (journalist) US-EU agreement on artificial intelligence seen as a swipe at China – but little else for now 5 Oct 2021 <https://sciencebusiness.net/news/us-eu-agreement-artificial-intelligence-seen-swipe-china-little-else-now> (accessed 10 Dec 2021)

Western reporting of China’s social credit system, characterising it as having Orwellian potential to monitor and crush dissent, has been “overblown and incorrect”, said Daniel Leufer, Europe policy analyst at Access Now, an NGO that campaigns for digital rights. “The actual system is, in most [respects], a relatively banal system for keeping track of administrative sanctions, and has nothing to do with AI,” said Leufer. “This applies to the [EU] AI Act’s prohibition on social scoring too: they are trying, badly, to prohibit a sci-fi application that doesn’t exist.”

China’s “scoring” system isn’t really “social scoring”

Hanna Willems 2019. (Master’s thesis at Hamburg Univ., Germany) “SOCIAL SCORING – A TREND ANALYSIS THE PERCEPTION OF EXPERTS ON THE RISING IMPACT OF SOCIAL SCORING BY ALGORITHM” <https://www.blog.digital-markets.info/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Masterthesis_Scoring_Willems2.pdf> (accessed 10 Dec 2021)

Even though the social credit scoring system in China is a great example for a centralized scoring, it does not necessarily correspond to the term social scoring. Social scoring is an algorithm-based evaluation of all publicly available information online as well as offline, which is either collected or purchased, to rate a person in relation to a comparison group. An important factor about social scoring as it will be regarded in this paper is that this classification process is based on big data accumulated on- and offline and carried out by algorithm.

6. "Social Scoring" isn't harmful

We all do scoring all the time and we have for years – in our everyday social interactions

Hanna Willems 2019. (Master’s thesis at Hamburg Univ., Germany) “SOCIAL SCORING – A TREND ANALYSIS THE PERCEPTION OF EXPERTS ON THE RISING IMPACT OF SOCIAL SCORING BY ALGORITHM” <https://www.blog.digital-markets.info/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Masterthesis_Scoring_Willems2.pdf> (accessed 10 Dec 2021)

Regardless, evaluating people is not an innovative trend – we assess people, we interact with, every day. As an example, when doing a business contract, we evaluate the looks, behavior and speeches of the business partner and based on the given information, make up our mind about the persons trustworthiness. First impressions count, a decision about trustworthiness can be assessed within seconds (Willis and Todorov, 2006: 597, 2006: 592). Grades in schools, which later on affect chances to access follow-up educational institutions, are another great example for scoring methods with a long tradition.

Social scoring rewards and promotes good behavior like trust, kindness and manners

Hanna Willems 2019. (Master’s thesis at Hamburg Univ., Germany) “SOCIAL SCORING – A TREND ANALYSIS THE PERCEPTION OF EXPERTS ON THE RISING IMPACT OF SOCIAL SCORING BY ALGORITHM” <https://www.blog.digital-markets.info/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Masterthesis_Scoring_Willems2.pdf> (accessed 10 Dec 2021)

In this respect, scoring nudges behavior (Yeung, 2016: 119). It rewards trust, kindness and engagement (or whatever behavior or skills the initiator of the score sets as goal). At the same time, at least with centralized and validated systems such as the one in China, chances are that criminals, free riders and abusers can be ruled out, for the score directly shows, whether a person is trustworthy or not (Botsman, 2010: 93). A low score results in limited access to products and services. Knowing that behavior and manners will have a direct impact on opportunities and chances (maybe even have an indirect impact on family and friends), users will focus on creating a good (online) reputation based on responsible and trustworthy behavior (Botsman, 2010: 140).

7. "Widespread Surveillance" isn't a problem

We have it in the US too: Facial recognition is so widespread that no one has any reasonable expectation of privacy

Riya Anchi 2020 (JD candidate at Penn. State Univ. Law School) Facial Recognition Technology: A Fourth Amendment Violation? 24 Feb 2020 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW https://www.pennstatelawreview.org/the-forum/facial-recognition-technology-a-fourth-amendment-violation/

Furthermore, it is also unlikely that society recognizes “the expectation of privacy from facial recognition technology in public places” as reasonable. Today, the use of video surveillance systems in public places is commonplace.  Most people are aware of the use of these surveillance systems.  It is improbable that people would not expect to be subjected to some form of video surveillance in public places. Because video surveillance is the basis of facial recognition, it is unlikely that society would view the expectation of privacy from the use of such technology as reasonable.

SOLVENCY

1. Already tried & failed. AFF Plan was already tried and failed in 2020

US policy tried to block exports of surveillance technology but they can’t write rules that define it [technology has multiple uses – commercial use and government use overlap]

[Dahlia Peterson](https://www.brookings.edu/author/dahlia-peterson/) 2021 (*research analyst at Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology*) 23 Sept 2021 [How China harnesses data fusion to make sense of surveillance data](https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-china-harnesses-data-fusion-to-make-sense-of-surveillance-data/) (accessed 22 Nov 2021) https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-china-harnesses-data-fusion-to-make-sense-of-surveillance-data/

Chinese surveillance systems are heavily reliant on U.S. firms to provide the gear that powers these digital operations. U.S. suppliers such as [Intel, NVIDIA](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/22/technology/china-intel-nvidia-xinjiang.html?campaign_id=2&emc=edit_th_20201123&instance_id=24386&nl=todaysheadlines&regi_id=59336975&segment_id=45224&user_id=e9cd3a1abfdb8be0ee7ff8d23f7999aa), [Cisco](https://theintercept.com/2021/02/18/oracle-china-police-surveillance/), [Seagate and Western Digital](https://www.routledge.com/Chinas-Quest-for-Foreign-Technology-Beyond-Espionage/Hannas-Tatlow/p/book/9780367473570) have all been linked to various aspects of Chinese surveillance systems, but the U.S. government has so far been unable to write rules effectively prohibiting the sales of such equipment. In 2020, the State Department [released](https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/DRL-Industry-Guidance-Project-FINAL-508.pdf) exhaustive guidance for companies’ export considerations, but the document is nonbinding. The difficulty of imposing binding rules against U.S. companies—along with the continued [synergy](https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/06/fight-digital-authoritarianism-giving-people-tools-counter-it/174579/) between the commercial sphere and surveillance states’ technical needs—makes it difficult to prevent the export of such technology.

2. Diffusion of technology is inevitable

Technological innovation spreads globally regardless of whether we try to stop it. Better to benefit from the openness and grow our own instead of trying to stop theirs

Working Group on Science and Technology in U.S.-China Relations 2020 (chaired by Peter Cowhey, Dean of UC San Diego’s School of Global Policy and Strategy, and comprised of 28 China specialists and experts in science and technology from academia, industry, and think tanks, inluding several former government officials) 16 Nov 2020 “MEETING THE CHINA CHALLENGE: A New American Strategy for Technology Competition” <https://china.ucsd.edu/_files/meeting-the-china-challenge_2020_report.pdf> (accessed 19 Nov 2021)

In the global knowledge economy, technological advancement—whether intended to tackle the risks associated with climate change or to advance new health technologies—depends on blending specialized capabilities from many sources. Once created, and regardless of where it is created, knowledge usually spreads despite government controls, allowing more countries to build on its foundation. Take biotechnology as an example: Biotech development promises to generate new scientific insights and tools to double the world’s food supply and manage health risks stemming from an increasingly urbanized and interconnected world. The creation and application of these tools are both inherently global tasks. The United States cannot meet its technological goals if it isolates itself from the growing innovation capabilities outside its borders. In such a complex environment, the only viable leadership strategy is to race faster by investing in American innovation and welcoming talented individuals from all countries.

3. Won’t help human rights

"Values" problem, not a "Tech" problem. Focus on technology won't improve human rights in China

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Effective policies require a clear definition of the problem to solve, and carefully matching means to ends. For example, sanctioning advanced AI technology exchange with China will not improve China’s human rights practices, as China can use pedestrian AI technologies to surveil its minorities and dissidents. Human rights is a values problem, not an AI problem, so AI is the wrong tool to apply.

No amount of technological sanction will improve human rights in China

Jon Bateman 2022 (a fellow in the Technology and International Affairs Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He previously worked as a senior intelligence analyst, policy adviser, and speechwriter in the U.S. Department of Defense, most recently serving as special assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) (accessed 12 Oct 2022) "U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”" https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Bateman\_US-China\_Decoupling\_final.pdf

Much of Beijing’s techno-authoritarianism is a logical outgrowth of the Chinese political system itself—a system the United States cannot change and can barely seem to influence. The Chinese government seeks to preserve the Communist Party’s power at all costs, and the Party stands for a rigid, domineering vision of the Chinese social order. So long as these facts remain true, Beijing will continue developing and employing technologies to achieve its authoritarian ends. Moreover, the indigenous Chinese technology base provides Beijing with ample capability to do so. This means that no amount of U.S. pressure is likely to compel China to relax the basic components of its domestic technological repression. At most, U.S. technology controls can impose modest costs and delays in specific cases where China currently relies on foreign components, such as advanced semiconductors.

Social Scoring (SCS) isn't the problem, it's the security apparatus and the government's discrimination against minorities

Prof. Ralph Schroeder 2022 (Programme Director for the MSc in Social Science of the Internet, Oxford Univ., England) International Journal of Communication, "Aadhaar and the Social Credit System: Personal Data Governance in India and China" (accessed 12 Oct 2022)(in this context, the "authoritarian country" is China and the "imperfect democracy" is India, and the comments apply to both)

Economic inequalities have grown in both countries, but citizenship rights have had a mixed record, being extended further and also curtailed in certain respects. Citizenship rights in relation to personal identification have perhaps had their greatest negative effects in relation to those parts of the population that the state regards as dangerous in both countries and made them subject to greater surveillance. These include Naxalites and the populations of Kashmir and Jammu in India and the Uighurs in China. This is not to do with Aadhaar and the SCS but rather with the security apparatus in both countries. In any event, the main thing that the state needs to provide in both cases is more free and equal rights—plus security against economic disadvantage, including protecting consumers and workers from exploitation or unfairness.

Technology doesn't matter, what matters is government accountability and public trust in government

Prof. Ralph Schroeder 2022 (Programme Director for the MSc in Social Science of the Internet, Oxford Univ., England) International Journal of Communication, "Aadhaar and the Social Credit System: Personal Data Governance in India and China" (accessed 12 Oct 2022)(in this context, the "authoritarian country" is China and the "imperfect democracy" is India, and the comments apply to both)

It is, of course, hard to compare the use of personal data in well-functioning liberal or social democracies with personal data in an authoritarian country and a highly imperfect democracy of more than 1 billion people each. Yet the comparison can highlight that it is possibly not so much the technical and security issues of the system, which are often foregrounded, but rather the social conditions of the accountability of the regime on one side and the public’s trust in government on the other, that matter most.

4. Can’t solve without allies

Turn: Pushing China on human rights abuse of technology without allies on board makes things worse

Elina Sinkkonen & Jussi Lassila 2022 (Both are Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs) June 2022 "Digital Authoritarianism and Technological Cooperation in Sino-Russian Relations: Common Goals and Diverging Standpoints" https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-97012-3\_9 (accessed 12 Oct 2022)

This is not to deny Chinese and Russian human rights abuses or other kinds of nefarious intrusions but to point out that projecting fears about new technologies solely onto authoritarian states creates a distorted picture of current realities. From the EU’s perspective, technological decoupling and trade wars are also threatening. It is somewhat debatable whether the Trump administration’s confrontational strategy in its relations with China was beneficial for US interests, as anti-China rhetoric does not resonate equally among all allies, not to mention the rest of the world. Some experts find that many US security interests in the tech sector could be achieved through negotiating global-level tech standards and making sure tech transfer policies are up to date in allied countries (Kuo, [2021](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-97012-3_9#ref-CR41), March 1). Confrontation has divided the West even further, opening more space for China to march forward with its expansionist industrial policy. Public discourse on great power competition and technological development should integrate all of these elements and avoid painting a black and white picture, which could serve to deepen existing grievances even further.

US allies have as much technology as we do, so if we want to sanction China, we have to involve them [which AFF Plan doesn’t do]

Working Group on Science and Technology in U.S.-China Relations 2020 (chaired by Peter Cowhey, Dean of UC San Diego’s School of Global Policy and Strategy, and comprised of 28 China specialists and experts in science and technology from academia, industry, and think tanks, including several former government officials) 16 Nov 2020 “MEETING THE CHINA CHALLENGE: A New American Strategy for Technology Competition” <https://china.ucsd.edu/_files/meeting-the-china-challenge_2020_report.pdf> (accessed 19 Nov 2021)

The United States used to be the largest market for new technologies. In those days, unilateral action by the United States to close off its market could cripple a new technology. But nowadays, major new technologies are being developed and finding markets outside the United States and other wealthy democracies. Collaboration on policies related to China is therefore critical for U.S. security and competitiveness. The necessary work includes licensing critical export technologies; cooperation to diversify supply chains; and assuring the cross-border flow of data used to develop AI. There is an urgent need to set common goals and create new mechanisms to coordinate policy with allies and like-minded countries.

Unilateral US human rights pressure on China is unlikely to succeed without allies

Lieutenant Colonel Ryan Sullivan 2021 (Army pilot; lived and studied at prestigious Fudan University in Shanghai, China, as an Olmsted Scholar) (article is undated but mentions events that occurred in April 2021) “The U.S., China, and Artificial Intelligence Competition Factors” <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Cyber/2021-10-04%20US%20China%20AI%20Competition%20Factors.pdf?ver=KBcxNomlMXM86FnIuuvNEw%3D%3D> (accessed 19 Nov 2021)

Regarding China, Graham Allison offers that “while U.S. planners must consider all reasonable contingencies, basing our strategy to meet the China challenge on the expectation that the Chinese economy or political system fails would be a mistake.” Finding ways to cooperate or collaborate would prove beneficial to the collective, but such choices on a state-to-state basis could very well lead to conflict. Attempting to challenge or contain China without allies seems unlikely to succeed in the long term.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Inflaming US/China discord

Link: AFF Plan hypes up US unilateral criticism of China on human rights

It’s one of the justifications for their case.

Link: US criticism turns the next generation of young Chinese against us

Lieutenant Colonel Ryan Sullivan 2021 (Army pilot; lived and studied at prestigious Fudan University in Shanghai, China, as an Olmsted Scholar) (article is undated but mentions events that occurred in April 2021) “The U.S., China, and Artificial Intelligence Competition Factors” <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Cyber/2021-10-04%20US%20China%20AI%20Competition%20Factors.pdf?ver=KBcxNomlMXM86FnIuuvNEw%3D%3D> (accessed 19 Nov 2021)

The U.S. should rely more on allies and international institutions, such as the UN, to deliver criticism and press the CCP on human rights issues. Such an approach requires not just shared values and desired end states but close coordination to synthesize and produce statements promptly. If the U.S. is always the loudest voice criticizing the regime and if every infraction meets with aggressive overtures, even our staunchest allies could grow weary and struggle to discern significant issues amongst the white noise. The delivery mechanism and the tone of delivery matter. Trusting our allies, those with shared values, to find their voice and offer broader criticism of China is another means of achieving the desired end of holding the regime accountable. The byproduct of such an approach is the perceived messaging to younger Chinese, as the “worldview they’re exposed to is one in which foreign criticism of the Chinese government is often reflexively thought to be backed by the U.S. government” and criticism of the CCP is viewed as anti-Chinese.

Link: Disengagement from China leads to miscalculations and confirms China’s perception of the US as a threat

Lieutenant Colonel Ryan Sullivan 2021 (Army pilot; lived and studied at prestigious Fudan University in Shanghai, China, as an Olmsted Scholar) (article is undated but mentions events that occurred in April 2021) “The U.S., China, and Artificial Intelligence Competition Factors” <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Cyber/2021-10-04%20US%20China%20AI%20Competition%20Factors.pdf?ver=KBcxNomlMXM86FnIuuvNEw%3D%3D> (accessed 19 Nov 2021)

There are risks of disengagement with China, increasing the likelihood of misperceptions, miscalculation, and confirmation bias in formulating national security strategies. Relying on allies and partnerships to build out an international community to pursue AI global development and mitigate ethical concerns and risks involving data is the best means of competing with China and the way to promote U.S. national interests and build strength through networks of countries who share democratic values.

Link: Treating China as an enemy would be foolish and guarantee their hostility

Doug Bandow 2019 (Senior Fellow, Cato Institute; JD from Stanford Law School) 29 Sept 2019 “Is China or Fear of China the Greater Threat?” <https://www.cato.org/commentary/china-or-fear-china-greater-threat> (accessed 20 Nov 2021)

Beijing poses a serious challenge to American values and interests. However, it is not an enemy. It is not unbeatable. And its future is not certain. Isolation and confrontation would be a foolish response, ensuring the PRC’s hostility, and that of the Chinese people.

Impact: Increased risk of war with China

[Walter Clemens](https://www.chinausfocus.com/author/10442/walter-clemens.html) 2012. (Professor, Boston University) 17 May 2012 “Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in US-China Relations” <https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/self-fulfilling-prophecies-in-us-china-relations> (accessed 20 Nov 2021)

If Washington or Beijing acts as though both sides must collide, confrontation or even war will be more likely. There are sober personalities in each capital who look for ways to avoid the worst and promote mutual gain policies, but they can be swept aside by the proponents of fear and hostility.  
**[END QUOTE. HE GOES ON LATER IN THE SAME CONTEXT, WRITING QUOTE:]**

Washington risks becoming trapped in a self-fulfilling policy. Expecting and preparing for a confrontation with China, U.S. actions may push China to the very behaviors Washington would like to prevent and toward a collision that no sane person could welcome.

2. Hurts us more than them

Human rights-based technology campaign against China would impose big costs on the US and lead to "technological and economic divorce" from China

Jon Bateman 2022 (a fellow in the Technology and International Affairs Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He previously worked as a senior intelligence analyst, policy adviser, and speechwriter in the U.S. Department of Defense, most recently serving as special assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) (accessed 12 Oct 2022) "U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”" https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Bateman\_US-China\_Decoupling\_final.pdf

Meanwhile, a zealous U.S. campaign against the basic apparatus of Chinese techno-authoritarianism could inflict serious costs on the United States. It would likely devastate bilateral diplomatic ties, making cooperation on global issues more difficult and military conflict more likely. It would also be difficult to contain. Consider that virtually all Chinese tech companies contribute in some way to mass surveillance via the operation of draconian statutes such as China’s Cybersecurity Law and National Security Law. In fact, Beijing’s system of mass surveillance and control is suffused throughout the entire Chinese economic and societal structure. Chinese tech and non-tech companies alike send sensitive data to the state, participate in censorship activities, implement various social credit systems, and generally seek to anticipate and demonstrate allegiance to Xi’s sociopolitical edicts.Aggressive attempts to thwart Chinese mass surveillance, censorship, or techno-authoritarianism may well lead toward technological and economic divorce.

Canceling Science & Technology (S&T) cooperation with China wouldn’t eliminate the risks and would backfire, making our economy and national security worse off

Working Group on Science and Technology in U.S.-China Relations 2020 (chaired by Peter Cowhey, Dean of UC San Diego’s School of Global Policy and Strategy, and comprised of 28 China specialists and experts in science and technology from academia, industry, and think tanks, including several former government officials) 16 Nov 2020 “MEETING THE CHINA CHALLENGE: A New American Strategy for Technology Competition” <https://china.ucsd.edu/_files/meeting-the-china-challenge_2020_report.pdf> (accessed 19 Nov 2021)

As long as China pursues its current strategy, the United States must address the security risks of S&T integration with China. But we reject the notion that an S&T divorce from China would eliminate most major risks. Policy action cannot reduce risk to zero, and a national security centered strategy aimed at eliminating all risk would be both unrealistic and destructive to our vibrant society, economy, and innovation ecosystem. In the end, America would be weaker—and therefore less secure.

Even if China has problems: Barriers to the flow of research will end up hurting US national security and the global economy

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Strengthening U.S. domestic regulation of data privacy and security is an essential first step toward establishing global norms that undergird international collaboration with like-minded countries and set guidelines for engagement with China. We recognize that as long as we face a peer competitor that seeks to undercut our comparative advantages and pursue goals we do not share, it will be necessary to impose some limits on openness. We warn, however, that, if not carefully conceived, U.S. barriers to flows of talent, technology, investment, and knowledge will harm American security and competitiveness, and damage the global knowledge economy that enormously benefits the United States and the rest of world.

Complete cutoff of research cooperation isn’t worth it because it harms the US and global economy

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While recognizing the challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China, trying to shut China off from the United States and the global economy ultimately harms the United States. To remain truly competitive, U.S. firms need to operate at scale throughout the world; localize R&D to meet the needs of diverse, fast-growing markets; and hire the best talent wherever it is available. Global operations, including those in China, should support economic activity and job creation in the United States. American policymakers can and should strive to balance these complicated realities to promote the public interest.

Bifurcating (=a hard split in two) US / China technology into hostile camps would make America weaker

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Permitting the global technology system to bifurcate into hostile camps led by the United States and China would be self-defeating and impracticable. Engaging in a race to the bottom with China by emulating its statist and protectionist policies is a recipe for a weaker and less secure America.

3. Chinese technology retaliation. Withdrawal of Chinese technology cooperation with the US

Link: 56% of Chinese Artificial Intelligence (AI) researchers work in the US

Lieutenant Colonel Ryan Sullivan 2021 (Army pilot; lived and studied at prestigious Fudan University in Shanghai, China, as an Olmsted Scholar) (article is undated but mentions events that occurred in April 2021) “The U.S., China, and Artificial Intelligence Competition Factors” <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Cyber/2021-10-04%20US%20China%20AI%20Competition%20Factors.pdf?ver=KBcxNomlMXM86FnIuuvNEw%3D%3D> (accessed 19 Nov 2021)

China’s economic growth and rising middle class require a population with a higher education level and job opportunities upon graduation. China produces nearly one-third of the top-tier AI talent, but 56% of those researchers work in the U.S., while 34% remained in China.

Link: Retaliation likely. Last time the US sanctioned Chinese technology, they retaliated

Nova Daly, Lori Scheetz and John Shane 2021 (with Wiley Rein LLP law firm) China Retaliates Against U.S. Export Restrictions, Adopts New Blocking Rules 14 Jan 2021 <https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/china-retaliates-against-u-s-export-9612488/> (accessed 19 Nov 2021)

Separately, last month, Commerce [banned exports](https://www.wiley.law/alert-Commerce-Bans-Exports-to-Dozens-of-Companies-Including-Chinese-Semiconductor-Drone-Manufacturers) to dozens of Chinese companies, including semiconductor and drone manufacturers, by adding them to the Entity List. Additionally, in November 2020, the administration issued an Executive Order on “Addressing the Threat from Securities Investments that Finance Communist Chinese Military Companies;” and in [August 2020](https://www.wiley.law/alert-Commerce-Tightens-Huawei-Restrictions-Aims-to-Close-Loopholes), the administration ratcheted up export restrictions on Huawei and its affiliates. With Saturday’s move, the Chinese government followed through on its promise that it would retaliate against U.S. restrictions and take steps to safeguard the interests of [Chinese companies](http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/news/202012/20201203024666.shtml) (link in Chinese).

Link & Brink: Foreign talent is badly needed in the US – we lose American innovation without it, and we can’t compete… with China!

Working Group on Science and Technology in U.S.-China Relations 2020 (chaired by Peter Cowhey, Dean of UC San Diego’s School of Global Policy and Strategy, and comprised of 28 China specialists and experts in science and technology from academia, industry, and think tanks, including several former government officials) 16 Nov 2020 “MEETING THE CHINA CHALLENGE: A New American Strategy for Technology Competition” <https://china.ucsd.edu/_files/meeting-the-china-challenge_2020_report.pdf> (accessed 19 Nov 2021)

U.S. openness also ensures a steady flow of badly needed global talent into the United States. America’s ability to attract top talent is essential to its strength while broad restrictions on cross-border collaboration and immigration undermine American innovation. The best way to compete with an ever more capable and increasingly ambitious China is to protect as much of this open order as possible, while devising effective ways to contain the risks.

Impact: We lose economic growth, higher wages and new jobs if we lose AI productivity

International Telecommunications Union 2018 (This research was conducted by Jacques Bughin, McKinsey Global Institute Director and Senior Partner of McKinsey & Company, Jeongmin Seong, Senior fellow, MGI, and MGI’s expert members ) Assessing the Economic Impact of Artificial Intelligence, Sept 2018 <https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/opb/gen/S-GEN-ISSUEPAPER-2018-1-PDF-E.pdf> (accessed 19 June 2021)

As AI contributes to the higher productivity of economies, the increased output from efficiency gains and innovations can be passed to workers in the form of wages and to entrepreneurs and firms in the form of profits. The generation of wealth induced by AI could create spillover effects that boost economic growth. As workers’ incomes rise and they spend more, and firms reinvest their profit into operations, the incremental output can be channeled back into the economy in the form of higher consumption or more productive investment as well as jobs growth.