Generic Negative: Trade Sanctions Fail

By “Coach Vance” Trefethen

Some AFF plans will impose trade sanctions on various countries for various reasons. We can't predict what all of them will be, so it pays to be prepared with a generic NEG brief arguing that trade sanctions pretty much always fail or cause more problems than they solve. Once you know specifically what trade sanctions cases AFF's are running, you can write specific NEG briefs against them, but use the generic until you have that information or if you get hit with a surprise sanctions case.

Generic Negative: Trade Sanctions Fail 3

SOLVENCY 3

1. Not effective at change 3

Sanctions rarely work and when they do they take a very long time 3

Power of "economic weapon" is limited. Sanctions, even severe ones, mostly just don't work 3

A/T "Sanctions fixed South Africa" - Actually, they didn't. The "success story" is missing a lot of facts 3

2. Circumvention 4

Even US allies trade with sanctioned countries, allowing them to bypass the sanctions. Example: Iran, UAE and Turkey 4

"Sanctions Busting" happens 2 ways: 1) Profit motivated illicit trading. 2) Politically motivated foreign aid. 4

3. More study needed 4

Before quickly imposing sanctions, we need to just slow down the decision-making process and spend more time studying potential costs and side effects 4

DISADVANTAGES 5

1. Common people harmed 5

Examples of Iraq and Russia prove: Evil leaders ignore sanctions and let the common people suffer their effects 5

Sanctions cause death and suffering in the target population with no change in government behavior 5

Sanctions motivate regimes to crack down on opposition and deny civil rights 5

2. Non-sanctioned countries harmed 6

Economic sanctions spill over to harm other non-sanctioned countries 6

Non-sanctioned 3rd countries are harmed, and the harm to them comes back to harm the sanctioning country 6

3. Hardens resistance 6

Sanctions make target country angry and harden resistance to the desired reforms. Example: N. Korea 6

Rallying effect: Target country population rallies in support of their bad leader. AFF harms get worse: Strengthens bad regime's hold on power 7

Sanctions add prestige to the target government and make compliance less likely, resistance more likely 7

4. Harm to the U.S. 7

Foreign trade sanctions cost billions of dollars in losses and hundreds of thousands of US jobs 7

US companies relocate abroad to escape sanction policies 7

Crime and enforcement costs 8

US policymakers falsely believe that because sanctions are quick and easy to impose, therefore they have no costs 8

5. Undermining the US Dollar 8

Link: Sanctions risk undermining global dominance of the US dollar, reducing US economic power, and splintering the world financial system 8

Brink: Sanction-driven policy may soon ruin US financial dominance and unravel the global financial system 9

Link: Sanctions weaponize the dollar and risk big global financial backlash leaving everyone worse off 9

Impact: Inflation and poorer US consumers 9

6. Reduced US global influence 10

Link: Sanctions require coercion to enforce, harming US relationship with allies and other nations, and driving them closer to the sanctioned target country 10

Link: Disregarding our allies weakens US hegemony because we need them to maintain global leadership 10

Link: US should be increasing its commitment to allies right now. It's essential to maintaining US hegemony 10

Link: Sanctions create new alliances against the U.S. 11

Link: Russia and China both would like to stop US hegemony 11

Link: Sanctions create or strengthen alliances that challenge US hegemony 11

Brink: Global order is in crisis, the international system is fragile, and US leadership is in danger of retreat 12

Impact: Apocalyptic consequences if we lose US hegemony 12

Impact: World peace & prosperity at risk without US influence. US hegemony is key to global peace & prosperity 13

Generic Negative: Trade Sanctions Fail

SOLVENCY

1. Not effective at change

Sanctions rarely work and when they do they take a very long time

Robin Wright 2022 (distinguished fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars) 7 Mar 2022 "Why Sanctions Too Often Fail" <https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/why-sanctions-too-often-fail> (accessed 17 July 2022)

Years of sanctions failed in North Korea, Venezuela, and Iraq. Cuba has faced [layers of U.S. trade and arms embargoes](https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/donald-trump-reverses-barack-obamas-cuba-policy) since 1960. The Communist regime is still in power. The Syrian President, [Bashar al-Assad](https://www.newyorker.com/tag/bashar-al-assad), faced multiple sanctions for his brutal repression after the Arab Spring uprising, in 2011, turned into a civil war. Hundreds of thousands have died, yet Assad is still firmly entrenched in Damascus. Sanctions are often sagas. Success in South Africa took three decades. The Iran model, which the U.S. has invoked for Russia, has had gyrating effects. Sanctions also produce heartbreak. The agony is the [differential in timing](https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/for-ukraine-far-too-little-too-late). A gun, shell, or bomb can kill in seconds. Sanctions take a comparative eon in the scheme of war or a humanitarian crisis. “They rarely work,” Benn Steil, of the Council on Foreign Relations, told me. “But, when they do work, they tend to take a very long time.”

Power of "economic weapon" is limited. Sanctions, even severe ones, mostly just don't work

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Sanctions rarely change a regime’s ideology or behavior. Russia will, no doubt, face severe economic pain for its invasion of Ukraine. Putin “grossly underestimated” the political will of the West to enact such a complex set of sanctions, including on Putin, Steil told me. In a joint statement on Friday, the G-7 warned that it will continue to impose “severe” sanctions. The group of the world’s most powerful economies demanded that Russia end its invasion. But history shows that the economic weapon is a limited one.

A/T "Sanctions fixed South Africa" - Actually, they didn't. The "success story" is missing a lot of facts

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South Africa, during the era of racial apartheid, was widely considered a rare sanctions success story, Steil told me. In 1962, a [resolution](https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/bbm%3A978-1-4039-1591-7%2F1.pdf) by the U.N. General Assembly called on member states to sever all diplomatic, military, and economic ties. Yet carve-outs in subsequent international sanctions again diluted their effect. International sanctions [excluded](http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp796.pdf) “strategic materials,” as well as coal, diamonds, and some forms of gold, which South Africa produced in abundance. As a result, sanctions had minimal impact on the daily life of ruling whites. Over time, South Africa became [more self-sufficient](https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2013/12/opponents-of-sanctions-on-south-africa-were-wrong-but-that-doesn-t-mean-they-always-work.html). Facing an embargo on energy imports, it developed a world-class system to make oil from coal. Once dependent on arms imports, it ramped up production and became a net exporter. And, for all the pressure and cut-offs, South Africa was still able to develop its first nuclear device in 1982, and by 1989 it had [six bombs](https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/south-africa-nuclear/). The white government finally released Nelson Mandela in 1990. Amid tectonic global political shifts, apartheid ended—three decades after the first sanctions.

2. Circumvention

Even US allies trade with sanctioned countries, allowing them to bypass the sanctions. Example: Iran, UAE and Turkey

Prof. Bryan Early 2015 (Assistant Professor in the Rockefeller College of Public Affairs & Policy at the University at Albany) "Busted Sanctions - Explaining Why Economic Sanctions Fail" https://www.sup.org/books/extra/?id=24154&i=Introduction.html (accessed 17 July 2022)

Iranians have become world-class experts at devising ways of circumventing or undercutting the U.S. and international economic sanctions imposed against it.  These skills have significantly contributed to the country’s ability to survive U.S. sanctions for the past thirty-plus years. Second, the transactions highlight the critical role that third parties to sanctions disputes can play in undercutting sanctioning efforts. Via their policies, both Turkey and the UAE undercut the effectiveness of the U.S. and EU financial sanctions against Iran. And, finally, the identities of the third parties involved in conducting the sanctions-busting transactions are also intriguing. The UAE has been a close military ally of the United States since 1994, and Turkey is a NATO ally of the United States and most of the EU’s members.

"Sanctions Busting" happens 2 ways: 1) Profit motivated illicit trading. 2) Politically motivated foreign aid.

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In observing the states involved in various sanctions-busting cases, there appear to be two distinct profiles for the types of sanctions-busting activities taking place. The first type, as in the UAE–Iran case, appears driven by profit-seeking behavior and relies primarily on the use of international trade. In contrast, the second type of sanctions-busting relationship appears motivated mainly by politics and employs foreign aid. The massive aid packages that the Soviet Union provided to Cuba to undercut the U.S. sanctioning effort against the country during the Cold War exemplify this type of sanctions busting. Although the motives and methods associated with the two types of sanctions busting are different, both appear capable of undercutting the effectiveness of U.S. sanctioning efforts.

3. More study needed

Before quickly imposing sanctions, we need to just slow down the decision-making process and spend more time studying potential costs and side effects

Dr. Arta Moeini and Dr. Christopher Mott 2021. (Moeini - *Research Director of the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy; Research Fellow at the Center for the Study of Statesmanship in Washington D.C. ; elected member of the Academy of Philosophy and Letters. Mott - Research Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy and a former researcher and desk officer at U.S. Dept of State*) 16 Sept 2021 "Economic Sanctions: A Failed Approach" - The Institute for Peace and Diplomacy <https://peacediplomacy.org/2021/09/16/economic-sanctions-a-failed-approach/> (accessed 17 July 2022)

Institutional inertia, ideological motivations, and intransigence of elites could all be to blame for the surge in sanctions, even as preponderance of evidence proves them, on the whole, ineffectual. Governments must therefore aim at structural reform to the decision-making process to guard against reflexive enactments of sanctions and raise accountability. They must implement and incentivize checks in the policy process to flag potential costs and strategic fallout from sanctions and to systematically educate North Atlantic foreign policy personnel to recognize that punitive economic measures against rogue regimes and entities are often perceived by these groups as coercive attempts to effectuate system-level change by an outside power through economic warfare.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Common people harmed

Examples of Iraq and Russia prove: Evil leaders ignore sanctions and let the common people suffer their effects

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Iraq was one of the worst sanctions failures, demonstrating that dictators willing to starve their people and isolate their countries can simply ignore them. In 1990, President Saddam Hussein’s unprovoked invasion of Kuwait spawned the same kind of international fury visible today over [Putin’s aggression](https://www.newyorker.com/books/double-take/russias-war-on-ukraine-in-context) against Ukraine. Within four days of Iraq’s attack, the U.N. [imposed sanctions](https://merip.org/2020/06/the-enduring-lessons-of-the-iraq-sanctions/) that banned world trade with Baghdad. Saddam refused to withdraw. Six months later, a U.S.-led military assault expelled Iraqi forces, but the Iraqi leader refused to comply with the terms of the ceasefire. Sanctions dragged on. The toll was horrific. By 1997, a third of Iraqi children were malnourished, according to UNICEF. In 1999, the Red Cross [reported](https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/report/57jqap.htm) that the economy of Iraq—which once had one of the highest standards of living in the oil-rich Middle East—was “in tatters.” The suffering had little impact on Saddam; he balked at coöperating with U.N. inspectors charged with monitoring his weapons of mass destruction. In 2003, the U.S. launched a [second invasion](https://www.newyorker.com/tag/iraq-war)—and Saddam was eventually caught and executed. Dictators often ignore sanctions, no matter the cost to themselves or their states. Putin, so far, seems not to care, either.

Sanctions cause death and suffering in the target population with no change in government behavior

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The United States does not bear the costs for its failed sanctions policies alone. A rising body of scholarship has detailed the harsh and often unintended consequences of economic sanctions on their targets. In the case of Iraq, it is estimated that the sanctions imposed against the country after the first Gulf War (1991–2003) contributed to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians within the country.  The civilian costs the sanctions inflicted in this case were extreme but otherwise not anomalous. Leaders of sanctioned states, and especially authoritarian ones, have proven adept at insulating themselves from economic sanctions and passing along their burdens to politically disenfranchised communities within their countries. The declines in public health experienced by sanctioned states are a powerful indicator of these effects. Recent studies have also shown that sanctioned governments increase their repressiveness, and their human rights records worsen. These findings suggest that economic sanctions can have devastating impacts on the civilian populations of the countries they target.  The human costs of sanctioning efforts can still be high even when they fail to achieve their intended goals.

Sanctions motivate regimes to crack down on opposition and deny civil rights

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Moreover, with international sanctions characterized as acts of war, the national emergency of war and spirit of patriotic resistance are routinely and easily abused to [crack down](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/societies-under-siege-9780198749325?cc=us&lang=en&) on the opposition (often, urban middle classes who are seen as Western sympathizers). Thus, sanctions, ironically, strengthen the bonds between the political elites and the lower classes that suffer most under the weight of sanctions, while disempowering the very groups that might in time challenge the regime internally through civil disobedience, demands for openness, or acts of rebellion.

2. Non-sanctioned countries harmed

Economic sanctions spill over to harm other non-sanctioned countries

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Economic sanctions’ negative effects are not solely limited to their senders and targets but spill over to involve other countries as well. For example, economic sanctions often prove disruptive to their targets’ broader network of trade relationships with third-party states. As an unintended consequence, sanctions can thus do a great deal of harm to their targets’ trading partners. By encouraging the development of illicit trade and smuggling networks, sanctions can also empower organized criminal enterprises within sanctioned states and their neighbors. These externalities may generate resentment among third-party states that they direct back toward the United States.

Non-sanctioned 3rd countries are harmed, and the harm to them comes back to harm the sanctioning country

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With sanctioning now a ubiquitous practice, neutral nations in the Western alliance are also adversely affected either by having their commercial and financial relations with targeted countries disrupted or feeling as if their hand is forced due to diplomatic peer pressure and moral grandstanding. This can destabilize otherwise healthy trade networks and [undermine the financial credibility](https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/financial-sanctions-dilemma) of the nations pushing and imposing the sanctions.

3. Hardens resistance

Sanctions make target country angry and harden resistance to the desired reforms. Example: N. Korea

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Sanctions and embargoes on North Korea, first imposed after the Korean War in the nineteen-fifties, have been a total failure. Over three generations, the Kim dynasty has only become more belligerent, better armed, and more obstinate. In 2000, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright went to Pyongyang to [offer a deal](https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-oct-23-mn-40758-story.html)—some sanctions relief and humanitarian aid in exchange for limits on its ambitious ballistic-missile program. North Korea was emerging from a historic four-year famine that reportedly killed millions, but the talks failed. Four subsequent U.S. Presidents imposed ever-tougher sanctions on North Korea. The world’s [most isolated regime](https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/09/18/the-risk-of-nuclear-war-with-north-korea) is now estimated to have dozens of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles to fire them across Asia and the Pacific.

Rallying effect: Target country population rallies in support of their bad leader. AFF harms get worse: Strengthens bad regime's hold on power

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The effectiveness of sanctions to induce change in regime behavior is highly suspect. Economic sanctions often harm the average citizen, while political elites can more easily evade them using their control over the state. This imbalance can actually strengthen the regime’s hold on power.  In imposing sanctions, North Atlantic powers may increase social solidarity and state allegiance in the targeted country, producing a rallying effect for both the ‘rogue’ state and the population.

Sanctions add prestige to the target government and make compliance less likely, resistance more likely

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On a related note, [some studies](https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.89.2.409) have found that the added domestic prestige (and hence security) a regime gains by resisting sanctions offsets the costs of its non-compliance to foreign demands, suggesting that sanctions would generally stunt rather than encourage political reforms abroad.

4. Harm to the U.S.

Foreign trade sanctions cost billions of dollars in losses and hundreds of thousands of US jobs

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Failed sanctions costs come at a high price for U.S. businesses and U.S. workers. It was estimated that during the 1990s the U.S. government’s sanctions policies cost American businesses approximately $12 to $18 billion a year in lost exports. In one of the only studies of its type, Gary Hufbauer and his coauthors estimated that the U.S. government’s sanctions cost the U.S. economy roughly 200,000 jobs in 1995 due to lost export opportunities. By denying American companies the ability to compete with foreign competitors in some markets, the U.S. government’s sanctions can hurt their overall competitiveness.

US companies relocate abroad to escape sanction policies

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These policies also can encourage U.S. firms to relocate their business operations abroad to countries that impose far fewer sanctions. For example, Halliburton’s decision to move its corporate headquarters to the United Arab Emirates after it endured congressional investigations into its subsidiary’s business dealings with Iran appears consistent with these motives.

Crime and enforcement costs

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U.S. sanctions can also encourage generally law-abiding companies to engage in smuggling, fraud, and/or money laundering in order to circumvent U.S. sanctions in pursuit of otherwise legitimate, profitable commerce. And whereas a lot of sanctions-busting trade does not technically break any laws, it often requires business enterprises to violate the spirit in which they were imposed. This forces various federal agencies, like the Department of Treasury and the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security, to engage in costly cat-and-mouse games in enforcing U.S. sanctions policies against the firms whose businesses the sanctions are hurting.  If the political objectives for which sanctions are imposed are valid and achievable, these costs may be justifiable; however, at least two-thirds of the time these costs are incurred for naught.

US policymakers falsely believe that because sanctions are quick and easy to impose, therefore they have no costs

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It also helps that both the president and Congress can impose economic sanctions, and they can do so relatively quickly and with few upfront costs. Even with their poor overarching track record of success, U.S. policy makers thus often view economic sanctions as the most expedient, preferable policy option available to them in comparison to the range of alternative options they could employ.  Yet, much as the vast bulk of an iceberg sits out of sight below the waterline, many of the costs associated with using economic sanctions are not immediately observable to U.S. policy makers when they decide to employ them. The real costs associated with the use of sanctions tend to be overlooked or ignored.

5. Undermining the US Dollar

Link: Sanctions risk undermining global dominance of the US dollar, reducing US economic power, and splintering the world financial system

Dr. Arta Moeini and Dr. Christopher Mott 2021. (Moeini - *Research Director of the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy; Research Fellow at the Center for the Study of Statesmanship in Washington D.C. ; elected member of the Academy of Philosophy and Letters. Mott - Research Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy and a former researcher and desk officer at U.S. Dept of State*) 16 Sept 2021 "Economic Sanctions: A Failed Approach" - The Institute for Peace and Diplomacy <https://peacediplomacy.org/2021/09/16/economic-sanctions-a-failed-approach/> (accessed 17 July 2022)

Washington’s ability to enact unilateral sanctions but enforce them internationally is only possible because of currency unipolarity creating a dollar-based global system of finance. America’s obsession with sanctions and its weaponizing of the dollar’s reserve currency status (especially for purposes the rest of the world views as narrow-minded, rather tactical, geopolitical tussles) has already led countries in Europe and East Asia to consider constructing [alternative workarounds](https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/counting-the-cost-of-financial-warfare) to bypass Washington’s unilateral sanctions, with China and Russia working in tandem to [end the dollar’s primacy](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/04/09/china-russia-announced-joint-pledge-push-back-against-dollar-hegemony/). The serious drawbacks to Washington’s dollar deterrence strategy—which underwrites the sanctions policy—risks potentially undermining U.S. [dominance of the global monetary order](https://academic.oup.com/isp/article/21/2/109/5762967?login=true), even diminishing U.S economic power and splintering the world’s unified financial system into multiple regionally-differentiated capital markets.

Brink: Sanction-driven policy may soon ruin US financial dominance and unravel the global financial system

Dr. Arta Moeini and Dr. Christopher Mott 2021. (Moeini - *Research Director of the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy; Research Fellow at the Center for the Study of Statesmanship in Washington D.C. ; elected member of the Academy of Philosophy and Letters. Mott - Research Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy and a former researcher and desk officer at U.S. Dept of State*) 16 Sept 2021 "Economic Sanctions: A Failed Approach" - The Institute for Peace and Diplomacy <https://peacediplomacy.org/2021/09/16/economic-sanctions-a-failed-approach/> (accessed 17 July 2022)

Without urgent course correction, the United States could soon become a cautionary tale about how an obsessive, ideology-driven sanctions policy with doubtful efficacy could ruin not only America’s own financial dominance but also unravel the global financial system in the process. In the context of great power competition and deepening multipolarity, such a course appears especially unwise and imprudent.

Link: Sanctions weaponize the dollar and risk big global financial backlash leaving everyone worse off

Robin Wigglesworth and Polina Ivanova 2022 (Wigglesworth - global finance correspondent. Ivanova - foreign correspondent) 7 Apr 2022 FINANCIAL TIMES " Financial warfare: will there be a backlash against the dollar?" <https://www.ft.com/content/220db8f2-2980-410f-aab8-f471369ac3cf> (accessed 17 July 2022)

The power of the sanctions on Russia is based on the dominance of the US dollar, which is the most widely-used currency in trade, financial transactions and central bank reserves. Yet by explicitly weaponising the dollar in this way, the US and its allies risk provoking a backlash that could undermine the US currency and sunder the global financial system into rival blocks that could leave everyone worse off.

Impact: Inflation and poorer US consumers

Karl Happe 2018 (Chief Investment Officer (CIO) Insurance Related Strategies with Allianz Global Investors) "Could the US dollar lose its reserve-currency status?" 15 June 2018 https://www.allianzgi.com/en/insights/outlook-and-commentary/could-the-us-dollar-lose-its-reserve-currency-status (accessed 17 July 2022)

For the US, giving up reserve-currency status may help the country balance its trade relationships, but it would likely hurt the value of the dollar and create inflationary pressure on the prices of consumer goods. Ultimately, the United States’ loss of reserve-currency status may only limit any further decline in wages, and there is a good chance it would also make US consumers a lot poorer.

6. Reduced US global influence

Link: Sanctions require coercion to enforce, harming US relationship with allies and other nations, and driving them closer to the sanctioned target country

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Yet economic sanctions also create lucrative opportunities for some third-party states to profit from exploiting the sanctions imposed against target states. As such, U.S. sanctions can encourage third-party states to forge closer commercial relationships with its sanctioned adversaries. This can be particularly problematic for the United States when those third-party states are also U.S. allies. Because the primary means the U.S. government has to dissuade countries from exploiting its sanctions are coercive in nature, attempts to make sanctions against a target state more effective often involve angering or even alienating third-party governments.[**END QUOTE**] All these factors add to the costs of imposing economic sanctions. In sum, economic sanctions should not be viewed as a low-cost substitute for the use of military force. In the United States’ case, its government’s sanctions cost Americans billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of jobs. Economic sanctions impoverish and often inflict misery on the citizens living in the states against which they are imposed. [**HE CONTINUES LATER IN THE CONTEXT QUOTE**:] Sanctioning efforts can also estrange the United States from the countries whose cooperation it needs to make its sanctions successful and drive them to form closer relationships with the state it’s sanctioning.

Link: Disregarding our allies weakens US hegemony because we need them to maintain global leadership

Ashley Tellis 2020 (Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs and a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is also a counselor at the National Bureau of Asian Research and the research director of the Strategic Asia Program) 4 May 2020 "COVID-19 Knocks on American Hegemony" [**https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/04/covid-19-knocks-on-american-hegemony-pub-81719**](https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/04/covid-19-knocks-on-american-hegemony-pub-81719) (accessed 17 July 2022)

This disregard for the alliance system that the United States has carefully nurtured now for over half a century is grounded fundamentally in a failure to appreciate its importance for both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of American primacy in international politics. All previous administrations intuitively understood the benefits that the alliances provided in material, institutional, and ideational terms and consequently sought to preserve, if not actually deepen, them. The Covid-19 pandemic ordinarily would have stimulated the United States to lead a collective response, if not globally, then at least involving its allies and partners because this crisis was both genuinely transnational and immediately affected U.S. interests as well those of its closest friends in Europe and Asia.

Link: US should be increasing its commitment to allies right now. It's essential to maintaining US hegemony

Ashley Tellis 2020 (Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs and a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is also a counselor at the National Bureau of Asian Research and the research director of the Strategic Asia Program) 4 May 2020 "COVID-19 Knocks on American Hegemony" [**https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/04/covid-19-knocks-on-american-hegemony-pub-81719**](https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/04/covid-19-knocks-on-american-hegemony-pub-81719) (accessed 17 July 2022)

But even as it attends to the business of internal regeneration, Washington must double down on its alliances and partnerships. Only this U.S.-led confederation contains the preponderance of the global product that will durably immunize the “strategic West” against any future challenges emanating from China or other rivals. Preserving American hegemony over the long term thus must begin with consolidating Washington’s leadership within the largest single bloc of material power in order that it may be effective beyond. Ensuring this outcome requires the United States to take seriously—and deepen meaningfully—the special geopolitical ties it has nurtured throughout the postwar period, which would among other things enable it to better shape the world’s engagement with China to advance its own interests.

Link: Sanctions create new alliances against the U.S.

Dr. Arta Moeini and Dr. Christopher Mott 2021. (Moeini - *Research Director of the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy; Research Fellow at the Center for the Study of Statesmanship in Washington D.C. ; elected member of the Academy of Philosophy and Letters. Mott - Research Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy and a former researcher and desk officer at U.S. Dept of State*) 16 Sept 2021 "Economic Sanctions: A Failed Approach" - The Institute for Peace and Diplomacy <https://peacediplomacy.org/2021/09/16/economic-sanctions-a-failed-approach/> (accessed 17 July 2022)

Even outside the specter of great power politics, international sanctions make for strange bedfellows amongst smaller nations. Iran and Venezuela, for instance, have very little in common other than being made pariahs of in the West, and yet they feel compelled to [band together](https://www.globalresearch.ca/alliance-between-venezuela-iran-evolves-military-sphere) in resistance to the U.S.-led blockades and sanctions. Hence, [new connections](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-13/iran-sends-ship-to-load-venezuela-oil-in-defiance-of-sanctions) are formed, where they likely would not otherwise, due to what the sanction-victim-states view as their shared struggles of resisting U.S.-driven economic warfare.

Link: Russia and China both would like to stop US hegemony

Marta Rodriguez Martinez 2015 (MA in journalism, globalism and media) Dec 2015 THE SINO-RUSSIAN AXIS AGAINST THE US HEGEMONY - An approach to the power political strategies and world order policies of China and Russia within a world in power transition https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316989287\_THE\_SINO-RUSSIAN\_AXIS\_AGAINST\_THE\_US\_HEGEMONY\_-\_An\_approach\_to\_the\_power\_political\_strategies\_and\_world\_order\_policies\_of\_China\_and\_Russia\_within\_a\_world\_in\_power\_transition/link/591c1b880f7e9b7727d9f00b/download (accessed 17 July 2022)

Russia and China share the strategic goal of challenging the US hegemony in favor of a more multipolar world in which they can hold the dominance of their regions. Although several challenges lie ahead, they have already started to forge financial, military and institutional strategic ties to balance the US hegemony and bring a multipolar world in the long run.

Link: Sanctions create or strengthen alliances that challenge US hegemony

Dr. Arta Moeini and Dr. Christopher Mott 2021. (Moeini - *Research Director of the Institute for Peace & Diplomacy; Research Fellow at the Center for the Study of Statesmanship in Washington D.C. ; elected member of the Academy of Philosophy and Letters. Mott - Research Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy and a former researcher and desk officer at U.S. Dept of State*) 16 Sept 2021 "Economic Sanctions: A Failed Approach" - The Institute for Peace and Diplomacy <https://peacediplomacy.org/2021/09/16/economic-sanctions-a-failed-approach/> (accessed 17 July 2022)

As the U.S.-led bloc attempts to besiege and cut off what it considers rogue states from international finance and trade networks, rival great powers such as China and Russia provide these sanction-ridden states with a lifeline and a workaround to the sanctions resulting in closer relations forged in solidarity against Western hegemony.   Not only would these new alliances likely harm the long-term interests of the North Atlantic countries, they could also evolve into a big-tent entente in the name of national sovereignty against what is perceived as Western overreach, interference, and imperialism. This was perfectly illustrated in 2014, when NATO allies and partners, led by the U.S., [coordinated to sanction Russia](https://www.cato.org/cato-handbook-policymakers/cato-handbook-policy-makers-8th-edition-2017/72-relations-russia) in the wake of its annexation of the Crimea and invasion of the Donbass region of Ukraine. While Moscow was already moving closer to Beijing, the West’s enactment and implementation of the more stringent sanctions regime against Russia [noticeably accelerated](https://www.worldfinance.com/special-reports/the-impact-of-economic-sanctions) this trend.

Brink: Global order is in crisis, the international system is fragile, and US leadership is in danger of retreat

Prof. [Alexander Cooley and Prof. Daniel H. Nexon](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/author) 2020. (COOLEY is Claire Tow Professor of Political Science at Barnard College and Director of Columbia University’s Harriman Institute.  NEXON is an Associate Professor in the Department of Government and at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University) July/Aug 2020 “How Hegemony Ends” [**https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/how-hegemony-ends**](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/how-hegemony-ends) (accessed 17 July 2022)

Multiple signs point to a crisis in global order. The uncoordinated international response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the resulting economic downturns, the resurgence of nationalist politics, and the hardening of state borders all seem to herald the emergence of a less cooperative and more fragile international system.

Impact: Apocalyptic consequences if we lose US hegemony

Brook Manville 2018 (principal of Brook Manville LLC, consulting on strategy and organization) 14 Oct 2018 “Why A Crumbling World Order Urgently Needs U.S. Leadership” FORBES [**https://www.forbes.com/sites/brookmanville/2018/10/14/why-a-crumbling-world-order-urgently-needs-u-s-leadership/#2bb8912f2e61**](about:blank#2bb8912f2e61) (brackets added) (accessed 17 July 2022)

The botanical metaphor in [Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Robert] Kagan’s book title began our recent conversation. “We’ve been living in a tranquil garden of largely peaceful practices and liberal expectations across much of the world, ignoring the dark forces of jungle multiplying under the rocks. If we don’t defend civilization’s cultivation—especially American’s guarantee of peace and economic integration across the world—the toxic creatures and weeds will roar back.” Thus [China’s determined military rise](about:blank), [Russia’s continuing aggressions](about:blank), [fiery authoritarians on the march in so many once democratic countries](about:blank). [**END QUOTE]** As [Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Robert] Kagan continued, “[Trump has been damaging the system](about:blank)—he too seems to have forgotten what good it has delivered—but actually America’s desire for maintaining the global order has been diminishing for years. After [the dissolution of the Soviet empire in the 1990s](about:blank), people talked about [‘the end of history”](about:blank)—that America didn’t have to worry anymore about war or aggression. History doesn’t end, it simply paused. [**He goes on later in the same context to say QUOTE:]** The ugliest aspects of human nature are surging again.”  
**Vanishing Leadership, Vanishing Peace**  
Kagan’s apocalyptic message, repeated [in other recent writings](about:blank), is lucid and terrifying, all the more devastating for its relentless use of history. It’s a footnoted plea that “we’ve seen this movie before.” He reminds us that Americans have frequently turned away from defending world order, with regrettably familiar outcomes: to be dragged in later at greater cost (e.g. [helping to stop Hitler earlier might have prevented World War II](about:blank)); or, simply hoping that “the problem would go away,” to watch it get ten times worse (e.g. [Obama’s policy in Syria](about:blank)). Kagan acknowledges that America has sometimes misstepped (e.g. Viet Nam, Iraq), but he still argues that overall our foreign engagement has produced more peace and prosperity than not. “History shows,” he summarized, “that world order has never been achieved without some constructive force to keep the peace. The relative harmony and fair play we’ve created in the modern world will vanish if the U.S. forsakes international leadership.”

Impact: World peace & prosperity at risk without US influence. US hegemony is key to global peace & prosperity

Capt. M. V. Prato 2009 (United States Marine Corps,Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Combat Development Command,Marine Corps University) “The Need for American Hegemony” <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA508040> (accessed 3 June 2021)

The world witnessed a vast shift in the polarity of geopolitics after the Cold War. The United States became the world’s greatest hegemon with an unequalled ability to globally project cultural, political, economic, and military power in a manner not seen since the days of the Roman Empire. **[END QUOTE]** Coined the “unipolar moment” by syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer, the disparity of power between the U.S. and all other nations allows the U.S. to influence the world for the mutual benefit of all responsible states. Unfortunately, the United States is increasingly forced to act unilaterally as a result of both foreign and domestic resentment to U.S. dominance and the rise of liberal internationalism. [**He goes on to conclude later in the same context QUOTE**:] The United States must exercise benevolent global hegemony, unilaterally if necessary, to ensure its security and maintain global peace and prosperity.