Negative: Election Integrity

By “Coach Vance” Trefethen

***Resolved: The United States federal government substantially reform the use of Artificial Intelligence technology***

Case Summary: The AFF plan does “something” to ensure election integrity (avoiding fraud or tampering with ballots? Block fake news from influencing voters?). SEE ALSO NEGATIVE BRIEF ON “DEEPFAKES”.

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Negative: Election Integrity

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE

1. No election fraud

Election officials across the country in both parties agree: No evidence of fraud in the 2020 election

NEW YORK TIMES 2020. (journalists [Nick Corasaniti](https://www.nytimes.com/by/nick-corasaniti), [Reid J. Epstein](https://www.nytimes.com/by/reid-j-epstein) and [Jim Rutenberg](https://www.nytimes.com/by/jim-rutenberg)) published 10 Nov 2020 updated 6 Nov 2021 The Times Called Officials in Every State: No Evidence of Voter Fraud“ <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/10/us/politics/voting-fraud.html> (accessed 31 Dec 2021)

Election officials in dozens of states representing both political parties said that there was no evidence that fraud or other irregularities played a role in the outcome of the presidential race, amounting to a forceful rebuke of [President Trump’s portrait of a fraudulent election](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/06/us/politics/trump-election-interference-investigation.html). Over the last several days, the president, members of his administration, congressional Republicans and right wing allies have put forth the false claim that the election was stolen from Mr. Trump and have refused to accept results that showed Joseph R. Biden Jr. as the winner. But top election officials across the country said in interviews and statements that the process had been a remarkable success despite record turnout and the complications of a dangerous pandemic.

MITRE / Bald Eagle Study: No evidence of fraud or compromise was found in 2020 elections

MITRE Corp. 2021 (written by Hyeyon Y. Bastian, Emily Frye, Caroline T. Gary, Drew Houck, Marc I. Schneider, Frank Thomason, Brandon T. Werner – all are with MITRE Corporation, a non-profit corporation that runs federally-funded research centers) DATA ANALYTICS TO ENHANCE ELECTION TRANSPARENCY, Feb 2021 https://www.mitre.org/publications/technical-papers/data-analytics-to-enhance-election-transparency

The 2020 United States presidential election occurred during a time when public opinion about election integrity involved levels of concern that were not customary in the nation. To help ensure public trust and confidence by providing some additional transparency, MITRE’s National Election Security Lab gathered and analyzed a wide range of relevant data. The team, dubbed “Bald Eagle,” operated between October 2020 and early January 2021. Bald Eagle researched several topics and data sources related to the 2020 presidential election in eight swing states. Throughout the period of analysis, evidence of fraud or compromise was not found.

Election officials in 49 states were contacted: None found any major election integrity issues

NEW YORK TIMES 2020. (journalists [Nick Corasaniti](https://www.nytimes.com/by/nick-corasaniti), [Reid J. Epstein](https://www.nytimes.com/by/reid-j-epstein) and [Jim Rutenberg](https://www.nytimes.com/by/jim-rutenberg)) published 10 Nov 2020 updated 6 Nov 2021 The Times Called Officials in Every State: No Evidence of Voter Fraud“ <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/10/us/politics/voting-fraud.html> (accessed 31 Dec 2021)

The New York Times contacted the offices of the top election officials in every state on Monday and Tuesday to ask whether they suspected or had evidence of illegal voting. Officials in 45 states responded directly to The Times. For four of the remaining states, The Times spoke to other statewide officials or found public comments from secretaries of state; none reported any major voting issues.

State election officials in both parties couldn’t find any election fraud in 2020

NEW YORK TIMES 2020. (journalists [Nick Corasaniti](https://www.nytimes.com/by/nick-corasaniti), [Reid J. Epstein](https://www.nytimes.com/by/reid-j-epstein) and [Jim Rutenberg](https://www.nytimes.com/by/jim-rutenberg)) published 10 Nov 2020 updated 6 Nov 2021 The Times Called Officials in Every State: No Evidence of Voter Fraud“ <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/10/us/politics/voting-fraud.html> (accessed 31 Dec 2021)

 “There’s a great human capacity for inventing things that aren’t true about elections,” said Frank LaRose, a Republican who serves as Ohio’s secretary of state. “The conspiracy theories and rumors and all those things run rampant. For some reason, elections breed that type of mythology.” Steve Simon, a Democrat who is Minnesota’s secretary of state, said: “I don’t know of a single case where someone argued that a vote counted when it shouldn’t have or didn’t count when it should. There was no fraud.” “Kansas did not experience any widespread, systematic issues with [voter fraud](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/16/us/politics/voter-fraud-claims.html), intimidation, irregularities or voting problems,” a spokeswoman for Scott Schwab, the Republican secretary of state in Kansas, said in an email Tuesday. “We are very pleased with how the election has gone up to this point.”

Experts and election officials (not bloggers or politicians) agree: 2020 election was among the most secure in US history

Daniel Funke 2020 (journalist) TAMPA BAY TIMES “Dozens of claims about election fraud, debunked | PolitiFact” 20 Nov 2020 <https://www.tampabay.com/news/florida-politics/elections/2020/11/20/dozens-of-claims-about-election-fraud-debunked-politifact/> (accessed 31 Dec 2021)

Since Election Day, PolitiFact [has fact-checked](https://www.politifact.com/elections/) more than 80 misleading or false claims about voter fraud in the 2020 election. Federal agencies, state election officials and technology experts have all said this year’s election was among the most secure in American history.

2. No problems with the election process

2020 Elections were well run and secure. Only problem was all the whining and misinformation afterwards

Defending Digital Democracy Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University 2021. “Beyond 2020 Policy Recommendations for the Future of Election Security” Feb 2021 <https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/D3PPolicyRecs.pdf> (accessed 31 Dec 2021) (brackets in original)

The 2020 election presents a paradox. Despite dramatic changes to the election process due to the COVID-19 pandemic and increasingly complex threats since the 2016 election, 2020 is widely regarded as “the most secure [election] in American history.” Operationally, it was also one of the smoothest. State and local election officials overcame unprecedented challenges and scarce resources to administer an election with fewer incidents of cyber compromises, technical failures or long lines than anticipated. After Election Day, recount procedures functioned as designed. Yet, amidst these successes, officials from both parties faced a barrage of mis- and disinformation about the election process that served to undermine confidence in the result.

3. No AI fake news threat

Payoff for fake news generators isn’t enough to justify the expense to create them

Cooper Raterink 2021 (recently graduated from the MSCS program at Stanford University, where he studied human-centered artificial intelligence and analyzed misinformation with [Stanford Internet Observatory](https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/io) and the [Election Integrity Partnership](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/the-long-fuse-eip-report-read/). He currently researches large language model safety and responsibility at [Cohere](https://cohere.ai/), a Toronto-based start-up) “Assessing the risks of language model “deepfakes” to democracy” 21 May 2021 <https://techpolicy.press/assessing-the-risks-of-language-model-deepfakes-to-democracy/> (accessed 31 Dec 2021)

Even if researchers develop remarkable fake news generators using advanced language models, and disinformants gain access to them, it might not be worth it to deploy them in practice. Bad actors would need to make expensive and risky investments to build systems to maintain fake accounts amplifying synthetically generated messages. Given, as the Election Integrity Partnership reported, the accounts of verified political influencers and media figures contributed the vast majority of misleading content around the 2020 election, malicious actors’ money might be better spent on talking heads than on talking bots.

Too many barriers for AI disinformation to successfully influence elections. No impact on the 2020 election

Cooper Raterink 2021 (recently graduated from the MSCS program at Stanford University, where he studied human-centered artificial intelligence and analyzed misinformation with [Stanford Internet Observatory](https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/io) and the [Election Integrity Partnership](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/the-long-fuse-eip-report-read/). He currently researches large language model safety and responsibility at [Cohere](https://cohere.ai/), a Toronto-based start-up) “Assessing the risks of language model “deepfakes” to democracy” 21 May 2021 <https://techpolicy.press/assessing-the-risks-of-language-model-deepfakes-to-democracy/> (accessed 31 Dec 2021)

Disinformants likely need automated text-generation methods to be scalable to hundreds or thousands of messages per minute, imperceptible to human users and platform detection systems, and targeted to specific narratives. Text deepfakes were not a consideration during the 2020 US Presidential election likely because language models cannot yet meet disinformants’ needs.Several factors around access, detectability, and generation quality continue to limit how useful contemporary language models are to bad actors:
1. **There are significant barriers to accessing state-of-the-art models or creating them from scratch.** In their [decision to release GPT-2 in stages](https://cdn.openai.com/GPT_2_August_Report.pdf), OpenAI stated “analyses indicate minimal immediate risk of a fully-integrated malicious application” due to technical challenges. They describe state-backed operations and other organized, well-funded efforts as the most significant threat. In an effort to minimize risks, OpenAI made the more powerful models available only after observing how the smaller models were used. The University of Washington researchers behind [GROVER](https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.12616), a language model trained specifically to generate fake news, [explain](https://thegradient.pub/why-we-released-grover/) that they released GROVER to help researchers model and address the threat of “Neural Fake News.” Although GPT-2 and GROVER were indeed made public, researchers and security consultants took proactive measures and encouraged adversarial research, making it difficult for disinformants to use these models to their advantage. As an alternative to using pre-trained models, the disinformant could train one from scratch, but the [large costs](https://syncedreview.com/2020/04/30/ai21-labs-asks-how-much-does-it-cost-to-train-nlp-models/) and advanced technical experience required to do so are prohibitive.

SOLVENCY

1. Many necessary election elements missing

Not just AI: We also need (but don’t have) multi-step verification, nationally uniform IDs, and coordination between federal, state and local government

Mark Minevich 2020 (Global Digital Cognitive Strategist ,  Digital Visionary, Artificial Intelligence expert, Venture Capitalist, Innovation CTO,  author & AI contributor to Forbes) 7 Ways AI Could Solve All Of Our Election Woes: Out With The Polls, In With The AI Models 2 Nov 2020 FORBES magazine <https://www.forbes.com/sites/markminevich/2020/11/02/7-ways-ai-could-solve-all-of-our-election-woes-out-with-the-polls-in-with-the-ai-models/?sh=20f5e572622c> (accessed 31 Dec 2021)

In a year like 2020 with a pandemic raging from coast to coast many of us are asking, “Why are we still using antiquated paper ballots, standing in long lines for hours and mailing in our vote?” With technologies such as the ones above, we should be able to securely and safely vote from anywhere. However, these are not all of the solutions we need for virtual voting. We would need things like multi-step verification, valid state or federal IDs that can be scanned on our phone into a government approved app and then verified and approved on the backend. Then there is the task of coordination between the federal, state and local governments. Yes, it is a long road ahead.

2. Federal incompetence

Security concerns require governmentally-designed and hosted apps, which don’t exist yet

Mark Minevich 2020 (Global Digital Cognitive Strategist ,  Digital Visionary, Artificial Intelligence expert, Venture Capitalist, Innovation CTO,  author & AI contributor to Forbes) 7 Ways AI Could Solve All Of Our Election Woes: Out With The Polls, In With The AI Models 2 Nov 2020 FORBES magazine <https://www.forbes.com/sites/markminevich/2020/11/02/7-ways-ai-could-solve-all-of-our-election-woes-out-with-the-polls-in-with-the-ai-models/?sh=20f5e572622c> (accessed 31 Dec 2021)

Democracy Live boasts that it “has been deployed in over 2,000 U.S. jurisdictions since 2008 delivering online and polling place balloting technologies to over 10 million voters.” In January of this year they were used by King County, WA to perform a mobile only election. They were able to take and tabulate over one million votes. **How this can be leveraged for elections:**The use here is obvious, voting from your smartphone or a device. The convenience is great, but can also give pause as there will be security concerns. Apps would have to be governmentally designed, regulated, monitored and hosted. How will this cascade from federal all the way to local municipalities? Many questions still need to be answered.

Government has trouble ramping up expertise needed to manage the deep technology of AI

Prof. Ryan Calo 2017. (Associate Professor, University of Washington School of Law; hosted the first White House workshop on artificial intelligence policy, organized AI workshops for the National Science Foundation) Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap <https://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/51/2/Symposium/51-2_Calo.pdf> (accessed 8 Aug 2021)

The better-grounded observation is that government lacks the requisite expertise to manage society in such a deeply technically-mediated world. Government bodies are slow to hire up and face steep competition from industry. When the state does not have its own experts, it must either rely on the self-interested word of private firms (or their proxies) or experience a paralysis of decision and action that ill-serves innovation. Thus, one overarching policy challenge is how best to introduce expertise about AI and robotics into all branches and levels of government so they can make better decisions with greater confidence. [**END QUOTE**] The solution could involve new advisory bodies, such as an official Federal Advisory Committee on Artificial Intelligence with an existing department or even a standalone Federal Robotics Commission.143 Or it could involve resuscitating the Office of Technology Assessment, building out the Congressional Research Service, or growing the Office of Science and Technology Policy. Yet another approach involves each branch hiring its own technical staff at every level. [**HE GOES ON TO CONCLUDE IN THE SAME CONTEXT QUOTE:]** The technical knowledge and affordances of the government — from the ability to test claims in a laboratory to a working understanding of AI in lawmakers and the judiciary — will ultimately affect the government’s capacity to generate wise AI policy.

US Government has massive human talent deficit in AI

National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence 2021 (bipartisan commission of 15 technologists, national security professionals, business executives, and academic leaders) March 2021 “Final Report” <https://www.nscai.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-Digital-1.pdf> (accessed 17 June 2021)

The human talent deficit is the government’s most conspicuous AI deficit and the single greatest inhibitor to buying, building, and fielding AI-enabled technologies for national security purposes. This is not a time to add a few new positions in national security departments and agencies for Silicon Valley technologists and call it a day. We need to build entirely new talent pipelines from scratch.

Professionals in AI are in short supply and the shortage is getting worse

Jair Ribeiro 2021 (AI specialist with Kimberly-Clark; former AI project manager at IBM) 31 May 2021 This is a great moment to look for a new job in Artificial Intelligence <https://towardsdatascience.com/this-is-a-great-moment-to-look-for-a-new-job-in-artificial-intelligence-c34df6efb9c3> (accessed 20 Nov 2021)

The recent explosion in data volume has created an ideal environment for Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning solutions to find their way. Professionals with the skills to develop AI solutions, on the other hand, are still in short supply, and the trend is for this gap to widen.

 Demand for AI professionals exceeds supply even before the AFF plan kicks in and creates new demand

Jair Ribeiro 2021 (AI specialist with Kimberly-Clark; former AI project manager at IBM) 31 May 2021 This is a great moment to look for a new job in Artificial Intelligence <https://towardsdatascience.com/this-is-a-great-moment-to-look-for-a-new-job-in-artificial-intelligence-c34df6efb9c3> (accessed 20 Nov 2021)

To be considered an AI professional, in general, is required to master a variety of practical activities like analysis and forecasting, detection of anomalous events, such as fraud in bank transactions, image processing to detect objects/people, analysis of feelings from texts, and simulation of scenarios using AI to help in decision making and chatbots, for example. [**END QUOTE**] AI Professionals should also learn how to use popular tools such as TensorFlow, Sciki-Learn, Keras, Spark, Hadoop, Hive, BigQuery, Tableau, and PowerBi. Python is considered the primary programming language for AI development.
Conclusion
Companies need to train personnel and attract talents to face the enormous challenge represented by a talent shortage. At the same time, the more companies in all segments adopt AI and robotics technologies, the more they see benefits and realize how much their functions can be redesigned. [**HE GOES TO WRITE QUOTE**:] The demand for AI talent is increasing. There is a gap between supply and demand, with several functions available to each truly trained AI professional, the ones who can help companies capitalize on AI’s potential.

3. State incompetence

States don’t have coherent information technology (IT) policies, infrastructure or security for election systems

Defending Digital Democracy Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University 2021. “Beyond 2020 Policy Recommendations for the Future of Election Security” Feb 2021 <https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/D3PPolicyRecs.pdf> (accessed 31 Dec 2021) (brackets in original)

Many states do not have a coherent or consistent policy to protect local IT infrastructure and election systems, and lack the necessary funding to make needed improvements. The devolved nature of election administration—which many states delegate to counties, cities, and localities—is ultimately a strength, because it makes the election ecosystem more robust against attacks. However, decentralized information technology (IT) infrastructure can be a weakness if states lack clear standards and local jurisdictions don’t have the expertise and resources needed to properly secure systems. While some states have chosen to centralize their IT infrastructure, others have yet to decide on any clear policy at all—leaving localities in limbo and their systems unsecured. In addition, insufficient and inconsistent funding for local security enhancements and operational needs remains a challenge. After one-off, ad hoc appropriations from the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) ran out, many state and local election officials relied on hundreds of millions of dollars in private funding to support the logistics of mail and in-person voting in 2020. Although election officials received $400 million in federal appropriations to cope with adjustments due to COVID-19, most states still lack a dedicated funding stream to continue updating and enhancing election technology on an ongoing basis.

State rules govern elections but they’re not well funded

Defending Digital Democracy Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University 2021. “Beyond 2020 Policy Recommendations for the Future of Election Security” Feb 2021 <https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/D3PPolicyRecs.pdf> (accessed 31 Dec 2021) (brackets in original)

Local election offices are constrained to operate under state rules, and yet in most states, there is no well-defined way of allocating the cost of operating local elections. Meanwhile, the federal government’s role in helping to pay for elections remains unclear—leaving states to reckon with chronic under-funding.

AFF can’t solve for State-level failures: Federal government cannot command state officials to carry out federal directives

Scott Bomboy 2021 (*editor in chilef of the National Constitution Center*) 13 Aug 2021 “The constitutional issues related to Covid-19 mask mandates” <https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/the-constitutional-issues-related-to-covid-19-mask-mandates> (accessed 23 Nov 2021)

In August 2020, the [Congressional Research Service also wrote](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10530) that federal constitutional precedents made it unlikely that the federal government could issue a national mask wearing mandate that applies to the states. The 10th Amendment’s anti-commandeering provision bars “the federal government from commandeering or requiring state officers to carry out federal directives.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Harmful effects of false election integrity challenges

Link: AFF claims that US elections so lack integrity to the extent that a substantial plan is needed to fix them

To justify their plan, they have to claim a significant problem needs to be solved. If election integrity isn’t a significant problem then AFF loses on that alone.

Link: The claims are false

Cross apply our Harms/Significance evidence about no election fraud. And why is it bad to promote unsubstantiated theories of election fraud? We see that in our impacts…

Impact #1: Violent insurrection. Unsubstantiated assertions of fraud spark violent insurrection

JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL POLITICAL SCIENCE 2021 (written by [Nicolas Berlinski](https://www.cambridge.org/core/search?filters%5BauthorTerms%5D=Nicolas%20Berlinski&eventCode=SE-AU), [Margaret Doyle](https://www.cambridge.org/core/search?filters%5BauthorTerms%5D=Margaret%20Doyle&eventCode=SE-AU), [Andrew M. Guess](https://www.cambridge.org/core/search?filters%5BauthorTerms%5D=Andrew%20M.%20Guess&eventCode=SE-AU), [Gabrielle Levy](https://www.cambridge.org/core/search?filters%5BauthorTerms%5D=Gabrielle%20Levy&eventCode=SE-AU), [Benjamin Lyons](https://www.cambridge.org/core/search?filters%5BauthorTerms%5D=Benjamin%20Lyons&eventCode=SE-AU), [Jacob M. Montgomery](https://www.cambridge.org/core/search?filters%5BauthorTerms%5D=Jacob%20M.%20Montgomery&eventCode=SE-AU),[Brendan Nyhan](https://www.cambridge.org/core/search?filters%5BauthorTerms%5D=Brendan%20Nyhan&eventCode=SE-AU) and [Jason Reifler](https://www.cambridge.org/core/search?filters%5BauthorTerms%5D=Jason%20Reifler&eventCode=SE-AU)) 28 June 2021 published by Cambridge University Press “The Effects of Unsubstantiated Claims of Voter Fraud on Confidence in Elections” <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-experimental-political-science/article/effects-of-unsubstantiated-claims-of-voter-fraud-on-confidence-in-elections/9B4CE6DF2F573955071948B9F649DF7A> (accessed 31 Dec 2021)

After Donald Trump lost the 2020 US presidential election, he and his allies made sweeping and unsupported claims that the election had been stolen. These unsubstantiated assertions ranged from familiar voter-fraud tropes (claims that illegitimate ballots were submitted by dead people) to the fanciful (voting machines were part of a complicated conspiracy involving the late Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez). Amid increasingly heated rhetoric, a January 6, 2021 “Stop the Steal” rally was followed by a violent insurrection at the US Capitol that sought to disrupt the certification of President-elect Biden’s victory, a tragic event many observers partially attributed to the false claims of fraud made by President Trump and his allies.

Impact #2: Democracy gets defeated and replaced with violence

JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL POLITICAL SCIENCE 2021 (written by [Nicolas Berlinski](https://www.cambridge.org/core/search?filters%5BauthorTerms%5D=Nicolas%20Berlinski&eventCode=SE-AU), [Margaret Doyle](https://www.cambridge.org/core/search?filters%5BauthorTerms%5D=Margaret%20Doyle&eventCode=SE-AU), [Andrew M. Guess](https://www.cambridge.org/core/search?filters%5BauthorTerms%5D=Andrew%20M.%20Guess&eventCode=SE-AU), [Gabrielle Levy](https://www.cambridge.org/core/search?filters%5BauthorTerms%5D=Gabrielle%20Levy&eventCode=SE-AU), [Benjamin Lyons](https://www.cambridge.org/core/search?filters%5BauthorTerms%5D=Benjamin%20Lyons&eventCode=SE-AU), [Jacob M. Montgomery](https://www.cambridge.org/core/search?filters%5BauthorTerms%5D=Jacob%20M.%20Montgomery&eventCode=SE-AU),[Brendan Nyhan](https://www.cambridge.org/core/search?filters%5BauthorTerms%5D=Brendan%20Nyhan&eventCode=SE-AU) and [Jason Reifler](https://www.cambridge.org/core/search?filters%5BauthorTerms%5D=Jason%20Reifler&eventCode=SE-AU)) 28 June 2021 published by Cambridge University Press “The Effects of Unsubstantiated Claims of Voter Fraud on Confidence in Elections” <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-experimental-political-science/article/effects-of-unsubstantiated-claims-of-voter-fraud-on-confidence-in-elections/9B4CE6DF2F573955071948B9F649DF7A> (accessed 31 Dec 2021)

From this perspective, unfounded claims of voter fraud represent a dangerous attack on the legitimacy of democratic processes. Even when based on no evidence and countered by non-partisan experts, such claims can significantly diminish the legitimacy of election outcomes among allied partisans. As the Capitol insurrection suggests, diminished respect for electoral outcomes presents real dangers for democracy (e.g., Minnite [Reference Minnite 2010](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-experimental-political-science/article/effects-of-unsubstantiated-claims-of-voter-fraud-on-confidence-in-elections/9B4CE6DF2F573955071948B9F649DF7A#r47)). If electoral results are not respected, democracies cannot function (Anderson et al. [Reference Anderson, Blais, Bowler, Donovan and Listhaug2005](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-experimental-political-science/article/effects-of-unsubstantiated-claims-of-voter-fraud-on-confidence-in-elections/9B4CE6DF2F573955071948B9F649DF7A#r5)). And even if losers step down, belief in widespread voter fraud threatens to undermine public trust in elections, delegitimize election results, and promote violence or other forms of unrest.

Impact #3: Government overthrow. Claims of voter fraud can be used to justify overthrowing the government

JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL POLITICAL SCIENCE 2021 (written by [Nicolas Berlinski](https://www.cambridge.org/core/search?filters%5BauthorTerms%5D=Nicolas%20Berlinski&eventCode=SE-AU), [Margaret Doyle](https://www.cambridge.org/core/search?filters%5BauthorTerms%5D=Margaret%20Doyle&eventCode=SE-AU), [Andrew M. Guess](https://www.cambridge.org/core/search?filters%5BauthorTerms%5D=Andrew%20M.%20Guess&eventCode=SE-AU), [Gabrielle Levy](https://www.cambridge.org/core/search?filters%5BauthorTerms%5D=Gabrielle%20Levy&eventCode=SE-AU), [Benjamin Lyons](https://www.cambridge.org/core/search?filters%5BauthorTerms%5D=Benjamin%20Lyons&eventCode=SE-AU), [Jacob M. Montgomery](https://www.cambridge.org/core/search?filters%5BauthorTerms%5D=Jacob%20M.%20Montgomery&eventCode=SE-AU),[Brendan Nyhan](https://www.cambridge.org/core/search?filters%5BauthorTerms%5D=Brendan%20Nyhan&eventCode=SE-AU) and [Jason Reifler](https://www.cambridge.org/core/search?filters%5BauthorTerms%5D=Jason%20Reifler&eventCode=SE-AU)) 28 June 2021 published by Cambridge University Press “The Effects of Unsubstantiated Claims of Voter Fraud on Confidence in Elections” <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-experimental-political-science/article/effects-of-unsubstantiated-claims-of-voter-fraud-on-confidence-in-elections/9B4CE6DF2F573955071948B9F649DF7A> (accessed 31 Dec 2021)

Claims of voter fraud like this are not uncommon, especially outside the USA. In early February 2021, the Myanmar military justified its coup against the civilian government by alleging voter fraud in the most recent election (Goodman [Reference Goodman2021](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-experimental-political-science/article/effects-of-unsubstantiated-claims-of-voter-fraud-on-confidence-in-elections/9B4CE6DF2F573955071948B9F649DF7A#r27)).