Negative: China Research Withdrawal

By “Coach Vance” Trefethen

***Resolved: The United States federal government substantially reform the use of Artificial Intelligence technology***

Case Summary: The AFF plan stops all US entities from AI research in China. AFF perceives US national security (China military threat) and human rights issues (Chinese government oppression / lack of democracy) as reasons for the plan.

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Negative: China AI Research Withdrawal

EXTRA-TOPICALITY – if plan bans entire tech companies and not just their AI operations

1. Plan goes far beyond the “use of artificial intelligence” to achieve its advantages

Link: Entire companies

Plan bans entire companies from operating in China if they do anything with computers.

Violation: Plan contains extra-topical mandates because AI isn’t all these companies are doing

It’s hard to believe that Facebook, Google and IBM do 100% A.I. work in China and nothing else. When the Affirmative bans these companies from operating at all in China, they are going way beyond the “use of AI” to include all use of computers, internet search engines, social media, everything. But Affirmatives are supposed to do the resolution and nothing but the resolution. They have no power to enact mandates that exceed the use of Artificial Intelligence.

Impact: No Solvency

All the Affirmative can do is ban US companies from doing AI in China. This means all of their evidence about how their plan would solve or produce advantages doesn’t apply, because it isn’t talking about banning AI and only AI. All extra-topical actions must be dropped from the round, and the Affirmative must prove that banning ONLY AI would produce the benefits of their plan.

INHERENCY

1. A/T “Universities like MIT and Berkeley are helping oppression in China”

Actually they’re not, and they canceled their cooperation with China 2 years ago, just because of the accusations

Reuters news service 2019. (journalist Alexandra Harney) 12 June 2019 “Risky partner: Top U.S. universities took funds from Chinese firm tied to Xinjiang security” <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-mit-tech-insight/risky-partner-top-u-s-universities-took-funds-from-chinese-firm-tied-to-xinjiang-security-idUSKCN1TE04M> (accessed 22 Nov 2021)

Reuters found no evidence that any of the universities were directly involved in creating technology for iFlytek, or that their work was intended for use in Xinjiang, where Uighurs, a Muslim minority group, are kept under tight surveillance, including in “reeducation camps.” Still, some U.S. universities are taking a closer look at their collaborations with Chinese technology companies in light of the U.S.-China trade conflict, Washington’s scrutiny of telecommunications equipment maker Huawei and reports of human rights abuses in Xinjiang. MIT, for instance, announced in April that it would sever ties with Huawei and rival ZTE, which the U.S. government says are a security risk. Other institutions, including the University of California, Berkeley, have also halted funding from Huawei for all research partnerships.

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE

1. Harms/Risks of cooperation with China don’t justify the plan

Concerns about China aren’t enough to justify disengaging technological cooperation

Working Group on Science and Technology in U.S.-China Relations 2020 (chaired by Peter Cowhey, Dean of UC San Diego’s School of Global Policy and Strategy, and comprised of 28 China specialists and experts in science and technology from academia, industry, and think tanks, including several former government officials) 16 Nov 2020 “MEETING THE CHINA CHALLENGE: A New American Strategy for Technology Competition” <https://china.ucsd.edu/_files/meeting-the-china-challenge_2020_report.pdf> (accessed 19 Nov 2021)

Some American politicians have panicked over what they see as a Chinese technological juggernaut that is surpassing the United States. They see the United States as falling dangerously behind China, and believe that China’s technological advance was achieved solely through unfair competition and the pilfering of western technologies. They also believe that China’s erasure of boundaries between commercial and military innovation, including the absorption of U.S. technology through worldwide business deals, represents an existential threat to U.S. national security. They conclude that the United States must preserve its prosperity and security by decoupling from China. The United States, as the thinking goes, must reduce or eliminate scientific and business collaboration with China in order to block its access to the crown jewels of American technology (The White House 2020a). Our Working Group’s assessment differs from the conventional wisdom on several fronts. We find that the United States is in better shape than the pessimists believe, especially when long-term technological trends are taken into account. The United States holds a lead in all the dynamically evolving fields examined in this report. The best way to sustain this leadership is to adopt a strategy that builds on America’s asymmetric advantages, including our superior ability to operate and attract talent in an open global knowledge economy.

2. A/T “Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cells operating in corporations”

Little impact: CCP doesn’t know what it’s doing and they’re easily bypassed

Ann Listerud 2021 (Senior Analyst at Sayari Labs, an international corporate consulting firm) Chinese Communist Party Cells in Private Companies: Though Not Yet Universal, Increasingly Situated to Play Greater Roles in Corporate Governance 7 Apr 2021 https://sayari.com/resources/chinese-communist-party-cells-in-private-companies-though-not-yet-universal-increasingly-situated-to-play-greater-roles-in-corporate-governance/

While similar petitions are taking place across the country, the exact role and power of Party cells within each enterprise are highly dependent on individual circumstances. Some company CEOs are already Party members and may be able to formalize their company’s Party cell without much change. Other companies may have greater difficulty organically incorporating new stakeholders into the decision-making process. Moreover, the CCP has very little experience overseeing private companies, which are different places to manage than government offices. In addition to differences in day-to-day goals and constraints compared to government, China’s private sector has a highly mobile labor force. While government bureaucrats are dependent on long-term relationships within the Party to progress in their career, private sector employees have many options to switch companies and career paths. This flexibility disincentivizes close relationships with the CCP, especially in high-skill fields located in urban areas. If an individual is denied a promotion based on objections from their company’s Party cell, that individual would still be able to seek employment elsewhere or start their own business.

Communist “infiltration” of companies is hype. They aren’t common in Western firms and they don’t do anything anyway

James Palmer 2020 (deputy editor, FOREIGN POLICY) How a Chinese Communist Party Members List Became a Scare Story 16 Dec 2020 <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/16/chinese-communist-party-members-list-media-scare-story-xi-jinping-influence/> (accessed 22 Nov 2021)

The stories described a “state-sponsored spy ring,” called the presence of party members in foreign firms “infiltration,” and presented the list as a dramatic new development. None of this is true. The presence of CCP cells in Western companies operating branches in China is unremarkable. The party’s constitution [requires](https://www.chinabusinessreview.com/fact-sheet-communist-party-groups-in-foreign-companies-in-china/) companies with three or more members to form a cell. Cells are much less prevalent in foreign firms than in domestic firms. In the majority of cases, cell meetings are tedious box-ticking affairs, although they’ve [increasingly become](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/25/china-business-xi-jinping-communist-party-state-private-enterprise-huawei) a tool of direct influence inside private business under President Xi Jinping. Foreign firms have raised concerns about party cells influencing [business decisions](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2120423/german-firms-warn-chinese-communist-partys-drive-gain?utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=share_widget&utm_campaign=2120423) under the new regime, but their presence is well known.

“Party Membership” doesn’t mean much. It’s just a formality to boost the resume of professional class workers

James Palmer 2020 (deputy editor, FOREIGN POLICY) How a Chinese Communist Party Members List Became a Scare Story 16 Dec 2020 <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/16/chinese-communist-party-members-list-media-scare-story-xi-jinping-influence/> (accessed 22 Nov 2021)

Treating CCP membership as a sign of loyalty to the state is also dubious. People primarily join the party as a [resume booster](https://www.theatlantic.com/china/archive/2013/05/communist-party-membership-is-still-the-ultimate-resume-booster/276347/), often in university or soon after. There isn’t a way to leave, only to get kicked out. The English-speaking, upper-middle-class staff of foreign companies are probably more likely to be party members than most people, simply because of the strata of society they often come from.

3. No US national security threat from Chinese A.I.

China’s central government is so bureaucratic and conflicted that they can’t effectively run an AI policy

Prof. Jinghan Zeng 2021. (Professor of China and International Studies in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion at Lancaster University, United Kingdom) “China’s Artificial Intelligence Innovation: A Top-Down National Command Approach?” 23 Jan 2021 <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1758-5899.12914> (accessed 9 June 2021)

It may also be worth mentioning that, even for authoritarian regimes like China’s, coordination and central planning are not as straightforward as many would expect. Even within the central government in Beijing, bureaucratic politics is everywhere. As far as AI is concerned, jurisdiction among the central state’s different departments over China’s AI policy is anything but straightforward. Four central agencies, including the National Development Reform Commission, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and the Cyberspace Administration of China, fought to assert their power in deciding and managing China’s AI policy (Ding, [2018](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1758-5899.12914#gpol12914-bib-0014)). Different national AI policy papers indicate remarkably interesting conflicts over which agencies have the mandate to command China’s AI policy (Ding, [2018](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1758-5899.12914#gpol12914-bib-0014)). In other words, central agencies in Beijing are not pursing a single unified goal – let alone the whole national attempt to advance AI in China.

China is not a threat to the US national security

Vijay Prashad 2018 (Indian historian, editor and journalist. He is a writing fellow and chief correspondent at [Globetrotter](https://independentmediainstitute.org/globetrotter/), a project of the Independent Media Institute) A paranoid America is greatly exaggerating Russian power 22 Feb 2018 https://www.salon.com/2018/02/22/a-paranoid-america-is-greatly-exaggerating-russian-power\_partner/

But it remains a defensive statement. Neither China nor Russia is making a push to become the global powerhouse. They are merely seeking to rebalance a world order that has — since the end of the Cold War — tilted unhealthily towards the United States. So is Russia a threat? Is China a threat? The question really is, to whom? They are threats to any assertion of US dominance over the planet. But they are no threat to the United States as such. They are committed to a multi-polar planet: a sensible solution in our very unstable and dangerous times.

AI doesn’t contribute much to military power: It can’t solve most military problems

Avi Goldfarb & Jon Lindsay 2020 (Goldfarb - Rotman School of Management at the University of Toronto Professor of Marketing and Chief Data Scientist - Creative Destruction Lab. Lindsay - Assistant Professor - Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto Assistant Professor - Department of Political Science, University of Toronto) Nov 2020 “Artificial intelligence in war: Human judgment as an organizational strength and a strategic liability” <https://www.brookings.edu/research/artificial-intelligence-in-war-human-judgment-as-an-organizational-strength-and-a-strategic-liability/> (accessed 17 Sept 2021)

Artificial intelligence has the potential to change the conduct of war. Recent excitement about AI is driven by advances in the ability to infer predictions from data. Yet this does not necessarily mean that machines can replace human decisionmakers. The effectiveness of AI depends not only on the sophistication of the technology but also on the ways in which organizations use it for particular tasks. In cases where decision problems are well-defined and plentiful relevant data is available, it may indeed be possible for machines to replace humans. In the military context, however, such situations are rare. Military problems tend to be more ambiguous while reliable data is sparse. Therefore, we expect AI to enhance the need for military personnel to determine which data to collect, which predictions to make, and which decisions to take.

SOLVENCY

1. More study needed

Quick easy solutions to US/China cooperation/competition are a bad idea because we need a lot more study of the technologies and power dynamics

Working Group on Science and Technology in U.S.-China Relations 2020 (chaired by Peter Cowhey, Dean of UC San Diego’s School of Global Policy and Strategy, and comprised of 28 China specialists and experts in science and technology from academia, industry, and think tanks, inluding several former government officials) 16 Nov 2020 “MEETING THE CHINA CHALLENGE: A New American Strategy for Technology Competition” <https://china.ucsd.edu/_files/meeting-the-china-challenge_2020_report.pdf> (accessed 19 Nov 2021)

Permeating every facet of the U.S.-China relationship will be crucial capabilities in science and technology that will feature both intense rivalry and necessary cooperation. During our work together, the foreign policy experts discovered that a good deal of the conventional wisdom about these issues reflects a flawed understanding of deeper dynamics in science and technology. The technological experts came to realize that foreign policy problems don’t neatly yield to (theoretically) perfect, logical solutions, but reflect both internal political dynamics in China and the relative power positions of the U.S. and China. In short, the expert community has serious homework to do if it is to get right these foundational issues for the bilateral relationship, and thus for global well-being.

2. Diffusion of technology is inevitable

Technological innovation spreads globally regardless of whether we try to stop it. Better to benefit from the openness and grow our own instead of trying to stop theirs

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In the global knowledge economy, technological advancement—whether intended to tackle the risks associated with climate change or to advance new health technologies—depends on blending specialized capabilities from many sources. Once created, and regardless of where it is created, knowledge usually spreads despite government controls, allowing more countries to build on its foundation. Take biotechnology as an example: Biotech development promises to generate new scientific insights and tools to double the world’s food supply and manage health risks stemming from an increasingly urbanized and interconnected world. The creation and application of these tools are both inherently global tasks. The United States cannot meet its technological goals if it isolates itself from the growing innovation capabilities outside its borders. In such a complex environment, the only viable leadership strategy is to race faster by investing in American innovation and welcoming talented individuals from all countries.

3. Won’t help human rights

AI is the wrong tool to apply if we’re trying to improve human rights in China

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Effective policies require a clear definition of the problem to solve, and carefully matching means to ends. For example, sanctioning advanced AI technology exchange with China will not improve China’s human rights practices, as China can use pedestrian AI technologies to surveil its minorities and dissidents. Human rights is a values problem, not an AI problem, so AI is the wrong tool to apply.

4. Can’t solve without allies

US allies have as much technology as we do, so if we want to sanction China, we have to involve them [which AFF Plan doesn’t do]

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The United States used to be the largest market for new technologies. In those days, unilateral action by the United States to close off its market could cripple a new technology. But nowadays, major new technologies are being developed and finding markets outside the United States and other wealthy democracies. Collaboration on policies related to China is therefore critical for U.S. security and competitiveness. The necessary work includes licensing critical export technologies; cooperation to diversify supply chains; and assuring the cross-border flow of data used to develop AI. There is an urgent need to set common goals and create new mechanisms to coordinate policy with allies and like-minded countries.

Unilateral US human rights pressure on China is unlikely to succeed without allies

Lieutenant Colonel Ryan Sullivan 2021 (Army pilot; lived and studied at prestigious Fudan University in Shanghai, China, as an Olmsted Scholar) (article is undated but mentions events that occurred in April 2021) “The U.S., China, and Artificial Intelligence Competition Factors” <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Cyber/2021-10-04%20US%20China%20AI%20Competition%20Factors.pdf?ver=KBcxNomlMXM86FnIuuvNEw%3D%3D> (accessed 19 Nov 2021)

Regarding China, Graham Allison offers that “while U.S. planners must consider all reasonable contingencies, basing our strategy to meet the China challenge on the expectation that the Chinese economy or political system fails would be a mistake.” Finding ways to cooperate or collaborate would prove beneficial to the collective, but such choices on a state-to-state basis could very well lead to conflict. Attempting to challenge or contain China without allies seems unlikely to succeed in the long term.

5. No jurisdiction

Can’t solve for “Tencent” – it’s a Chinese company. They may be bad, but AFF has no power to change them

[Sarah Cook 2019 (](https://freedomhouse.org/expert/sarah-cook)Research Director for China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan at Freedom House, a human rights advocacy group) 29 March 2019 <https://freedomhouse.org/article/worried-about-huawei-take-closer-look-tencent> (accessed 22 Nov 2021)

It has long been understood that Tencent—the Chinese company that owns WeChat and QQ, two of the world’s most widely used social media applications—facilitates Chinese government censorship and surveillance. But over the past year, the scale and significance of this activity have increased and become more visible, both inside and outside China.

6. Can’t solve for surveillance technology

Already tried and failed: US policy tried to block exports of surveillance technology but they can’t write rules that define it [technology has multiple uses – commercial use and government use overlap]

[Dahlia Peterson](https://www.brookings.edu/author/dahlia-peterson/) 2021 (*research analyst at Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology*) 23 Sept 2021 [How China harnesses data fusion to make sense of surveillance data](https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-china-harnesses-data-fusion-to-make-sense-of-surveillance-data/) (accessed 22 Nov 2021) https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-china-harnesses-data-fusion-to-make-sense-of-surveillance-data/

Chinese surveillance systems are heavily reliant on U.S. firms to provide the gear that powers these digital operations. U.S. suppliers such as [Intel, NVIDIA](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/22/technology/china-intel-nvidia-xinjiang.html?campaign_id=2&emc=edit_th_20201123&instance_id=24386&nl=todaysheadlines&regi_id=59336975&segment_id=45224&user_id=e9cd3a1abfdb8be0ee7ff8d23f7999aa), [Cisco](https://theintercept.com/2021/02/18/oracle-china-police-surveillance/), [Seagate and Western Digital](https://www.routledge.com/Chinas-Quest-for-Foreign-Technology-Beyond-Espionage/Hannas-Tatlow/p/book/9780367473570) have all been linked to various aspects of Chinese surveillance systems, but the U.S. government has so far been unable to write rules effectively prohibiting the sales of such equipment. In 2020, the State Department [released](https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/DRL-Industry-Guidance-Project-FINAL-508.pdf) exhaustive guidance for companies’ export considerations, but the document is nonbinding. The difficulty of imposing binding rules against U.S. companies—along with the continued [synergy](https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/06/fight-digital-authoritarianism-giving-people-tools-counter-it/174579/) between the commercial sphere and surveillance states’ technical needs—makes it difficult to prevent the export of such technology.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Inflaming US/China discord

Link: AFF Plan hypes up US unilateral criticism of China on human rights

It’s one of the justifications for their case.

Link: US criticism turns the next generation of young Chinese against us

Lieutenant Colonel Ryan Sullivan 2021 (Army pilot; lived and studied at prestigious Fudan University in Shanghai, China, as an Olmsted Scholar) (article is undated but mentions events that occurred in April 2021) “The U.S., China, and Artificial Intelligence Competition Factors” <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Cyber/2021-10-04%20US%20China%20AI%20Competition%20Factors.pdf?ver=KBcxNomlMXM86FnIuuvNEw%3D%3D> (accessed 19 Nov 2021)

The U.S. should rely more on allies and international institutions, such as the UN, to deliver criticism and press the CCP on human rights issues. Such an approach requires not just shared values and desired end states but close coordination to synthesize and produce statements promptly. If the U.S. is always the loudest voice criticizing the regime and if every infraction meets with aggressive overtures, even our staunchest allies could grow weary and struggle to discern significant issues amongst the white noise. The delivery mechanism and the tone of delivery matter. Trusting our allies, those with shared values, to find their voice and offer broader criticism of China is another means of achieving the desired end of holding the regime accountable. The byproduct of such an approach is the perceived messaging to younger Chinese, as the “worldview they’re exposed to is one in which foreign criticism of the Chinese government is often reflexively thought to be backed by the U.S. government” and criticism of the CCP is viewed as anti-Chinese.

Link: Disengagement from China on AI leads to miscalculations and confirms China’s perception of the US as a threat

Lieutenant Colonel Ryan Sullivan 2021 (Army pilot; lived and studied at prestigious Fudan University in Shanghai, China, as an Olmsted Scholar) (article is undated but mentions events that occurred in April 2021) “The U.S., China, and Artificial Intelligence Competition Factors” <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Cyber/2021-10-04%20US%20China%20AI%20Competition%20Factors.pdf?ver=KBcxNomlMXM86FnIuuvNEw%3D%3D> (accessed 19 Nov 2021)

There are risks of disengagement with China, increasing the likelihood of misperceptions, miscalculation, and confirmation bias in formulating national security strategies. Relying on allies and partnerships to build out an international community to pursue AI global development and mitigate ethical concerns and risks involving data is the best means of competing with China and the way to promote U.S. national interests and build strength through networks of countries who share democratic values.

Link: Treating China as an enemy would be foolish and guarantee their hostility

Doug Bandow 2019 (Senior Fellow, Cato Institute; JD from Stanford Law School) 29 Sept 2019 “Is China or Fear of China the Greater Threat?” <https://www.cato.org/commentary/china-or-fear-china-greater-threat> (accessed 20 Nov 2021)

Beijing poses a serious challenge to American values and interests. However, it is not an enemy. It is not unbeatable. And its future is not certain. Isolation and confrontation would be a foolish response, ensuring the PRC’s hostility, and that of the Chinese people.

Impact: Increased risk of war with China

[Walter Clemens](https://www.chinausfocus.com/author/10442/walter-clemens.html) 2012. (Professor, Boston University) 17 May 2012 “Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in US-China Relations” <https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/self-fulfilling-prophecies-in-us-china-relations> (accessed 20 Nov 2021)

If Washington or Beijing acts as though both sides must collide, confrontation or even war will be more likely. There are sober personalities in each capital who look for ways to avoid the worst and promote mutual gain policies, but they can be swept aside by the proponents of fear and hostility.  
**[END QUOTE. HE GOES ON LATER IN THE SAME CONTEXT, WRITING QUOTE:]**

Washington risks becoming trapped in a self-fulfilling policy. Expecting and preparing for a confrontation with China, U.S. actions may push China to the very behaviors Washington would like to prevent and toward a collision that no sane person could welcome.

2. Hurts us more than them

Canceling Science & Technology (S&T) cooperation with China wouldn’t eliminate the risks and would backfire, making our economy and national security worse off

Working Group on Science and Technology in U.S.-China Relations 2020 (chaired by Peter Cowhey, Dean of UC San Diego’s School of Global Policy and Strategy, and comprised of 28 China specialists and experts in science and technology from academia, industry, and think tanks, including several former government officials) 16 Nov 2020 “MEETING THE CHINA CHALLENGE: A New American Strategy for Technology Competition” <https://china.ucsd.edu/_files/meeting-the-china-challenge_2020_report.pdf> (accessed 19 Nov 2021)

As long as China pursues its current strategy, the United States must address the security risks of S&T integration with China. But we reject the notion that an S&T divorce from China would eliminate most major risks. Policy action cannot reduce risk to zero, and a national security centered strategy aimed at eliminating all risk would be both unrealistic and destructive to our vibrant society, economy, and innovation ecosystem. In the end, America would be weaker—and therefore less secure.

Over-reacting to Chinese “threat” sacrifices openness needed to sustain US technological competitiveness and national security

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The United States has allowed the foundations for its technological leadership to erode. It faces formidable competition from the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—a country that has deployed full state power, and sometimes used illegal means, to build an innovation system to gain on the United States. And it has overreacted to the competition challenge from China, and in doing so, is poised to damage its own innovation ecosystem, which flourishes in an environment of global openness. To confront these challenges, the United States needs a clear-eyed strategy for S&T innovation that enhances our national competitiveness and protects our national security. We must do two things, now: make needed investments in and policy adjustments for our S&T base at home; and craft a new approach to global cooperation that minimizes the security risks China poses without unduly sacrificing the benefits of openness.

Even if China has problems: Barriers to the flow of research will end up hurting US national security and the global economy

Working Group on Science and Technology in U.S.-China Relations 2020 (chaired by Peter Cowhey, Dean of UC San Diego’s School of Global Policy and Strategy, and comprised of 28 China specialists and experts in science and technology from academia, industry, and think tanks, including several former government officials) 16 Nov 2020 “MEETING THE CHINA CHALLENGE: A New American Strategy for Technology Competition” <https://china.ucsd.edu/_files/meeting-the-china-challenge_2020_report.pdf> (accessed 19 Nov 2021)

Strengthening U.S. domestic regulation of data privacy and security is an essential first step toward establishing global norms that undergird international collaboration with like-minded countries and set guidelines for engagement with China. We recognize that as long as we face a peer competitor that seeks to undercut our comparative advantages and pursue goals we do not share, it will be necessary to impose some limits on openness. We warn, however, that, if not carefully conceived, U.S. barriers to flows of talent, technology, investment, and knowledge will harm American security and competitiveness, and damage the global knowledge economy that enormously benefits the United States and the rest of world.

Complete cutoff of research cooperation isn’t worth it because it harms the US and global economy

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While recognizing the challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China, trying to shut China off from the United States and the global economy ultimately harms the United States. To remain truly competitive, U.S. firms need to operate at scale throughout the world; localize R&D to meet the needs of diverse, fast-growing markets; and hire the best talent wherever it is available. Global operations, including those in China, should support economic activity and job creation in the United States. American policymakers can and should strive to balance these complicated realities to promote the public interest.

Bifurcating (=a hard split in two) US / China technology into hostile camps would make America weaker

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Permitting the global technology system to bifurcate into hostile camps led by the United States and China would be self-defeating and impracticable. Engaging in a race to the bottom with China by emulating its statist and protectionist policies is a recipe for a weaker and less secure America.

3. Chinese retaliation – withdrawal of Chinese research in the US

**China will do back to us what we’re doing to them.**

Link: 56% of Chinese AI researchers work in the US

Lieutenant Colonel Ryan Sullivan 2021 (Army pilot; lived and studied at prestigious Fudan University in Shanghai, China, as an Olmsted Scholar) (article is undated but mentions events that occurred in April 2021) “The U.S., China, and Artificial Intelligence Competition Factors” <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Cyber/2021-10-04%20US%20China%20AI%20Competition%20Factors.pdf?ver=KBcxNomlMXM86FnIuuvNEw%3D%3D> (accessed 19 Nov 2021)

China’s economic growth and rising middle class require a population with a higher education level and job opportunities upon graduation. China produces nearly one-third of the top-tier AI talent, but 56% of those researchers work in the U.S., while 34% remained in China.

Link: Retaliation likely. Last time the US sanctioned Chinese technology, they retaliated

Nova Daly, Lori Scheetz and John Shane 2021 (with Wiley Rein LLP law firm) China Retaliates Against U.S. Export Restrictions, Adopts New Blocking Rules 14 Jan 2021 <https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/china-retaliates-against-u-s-export-9612488/> (accessed 19 Nov 2021)

Separately, last month, Commerce [banned exports](https://www.wiley.law/alert-Commerce-Bans-Exports-to-Dozens-of-Companies-Including-Chinese-Semiconductor-Drone-Manufacturers) to dozens of Chinese companies, including semiconductor and drone manufacturers, by adding them to the Entity List. Additionally, in November 2020, the administration issued an Executive Order on “Addressing the Threat from Securities Investments that Finance Communist Chinese Military Companies;” and in [August 2020](https://www.wiley.law/alert-Commerce-Tightens-Huawei-Restrictions-Aims-to-Close-Loopholes), the administration ratcheted up export restrictions on Huawei and its affiliates. With Saturday’s move, the Chinese government followed through on its promise that it would retaliate against U.S. restrictions and take steps to safeguard the interests of [Chinese companies](http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/news/202012/20201203024666.shtml) (link in Chinese).

Link & Brink: Foreign talent is badly needed in the US – we lose American innovation without it, and we can’t compete… with China!

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U.S. openness also ensures a steady flow of badly needed global talent into the United States. America’s ability to attract top talent is essential to its strength while broad restrictions on cross-border collaboration and immigration undermine American innovation. The best way to compete with an ever more capable and increasingly ambitious China is to protect as much of this open order as possible, while devising effective ways to contain the risks.

Impact: We lose economic growth, higher wages and new jobs if we lose AI productivity

International Telecommunications Union 2018 (This research was conducted by Jacques Bughin, McKinsey Global Institute Director and Senior Partner of McKinsey & Company, Jeongmin Seong, Senior fellow, MGI, and MGI’s expert members ) Assessing the Economic Impact of Artificial Intelligence, Sept 2018 <https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/opb/gen/S-GEN-ISSUEPAPER-2018-1-PDF-E.pdf> (accessed 19 June 2021)

As AI contributes to the higher productivity of economies, the increased output from efficiency gains and innovations can be passed to workers in the form of wages and to entrepreneurs and firms in the form of profits. The generation of wealth induced by AI could create spillover effects that boost economic growth. As workers’ incomes rise and they spend more, and firms reinvest their profit into operations, the incremental output can be channeled back into the economy in the form of higher consumption or more productive investment as well as jobs growth.