Generic Negative: National Security – Not a Problem

By “Coach Vance” Trefethen

***Resolved: The United States federal government substantially reform the use of Artificial Intelligence technology***

Generic Use against any AFF case or NEG Disads that claim AI development is essential for US national security reasons. Increasing AI is not critical to US national security. We’ll get along just fine, and we might even be better off without it.

Generic Negative: National Security – not a problem 2

AI doesn’t contribute much to military power 2

Only rare situations where AI would replace humans in a military context. It can’t solve most military problems 2

Advances in AI will be met by our adversaries using devious counter-measures, so no net benefit 2

Military benefits of autonomous weapons are overstated. Human intervention doesn’t degrade our capabilities 2

Other factors block military/national defense use of AI 3

US Defense Dept adoption of AI is blocked by: 1) lack of skilled workforce 2) lack of technical infrastructure 3

Increasing AI is great, but useless while the federal government cuts infrastructure and digital capabilities 3

Before Defense Dept. can go all-in on AI, they have to resolve underlying infrastructure problems 3

Complicated / inefficient government budget and purchasing process blocks effective AI investment 4

Defense Dept. cultural/attitudinal barriers to adoption of AI have to be resolved before it can help national defense 4

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China’s AI research is inefficient, corrupt, has recruiting problems, and low quality output 6

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China’s AI policy is a vague political slogan. The real work is being done at the local level with no geopolitical impact 7

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Generic Negative: National Security – not a problem

AI doesn’t contribute much to military power

Only rare situations where AI would replace humans in a military context. It can’t solve most military problems

Avi Goldfarb & Jon Lindsay 2020 (Goldfarb - Rotman School of Management at the University of Toronto Professor of Marketing and Chief Data Scientist - Creative Destruction Lab. Lindsay - Assistant Professor - Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto Assistant Professor - Department of Political Science, University of Toronto) Nov 2020 “Artificial intelligence in war: Human judgment as an organizational strength and a strategic liability” <https://www.brookings.edu/research/artificial-intelligence-in-war-human-judgment-as-an-organizational-strength-and-a-strategic-liability/> (accessed 17 Sept 2021)

Artificial intelligence has the potential to change the conduct of war. Recent excitement about AI is driven by advances in the ability to infer predictions from data. Yet this does not necessarily mean that machines can replace human decisionmakers. The effectiveness of AI depends not only on the sophistication of the technology but also on the ways in which organizations use it for particular tasks. In cases where decision problems are well-defined and plentiful relevant data is available, it may indeed be possible for machines to replace humans. In the military context, however, such situations are rare. Military problems tend to be more ambiguous while reliable data is sparse. Therefore, we expect AI to enhance the need for military personnel to determine which data to collect, which predictions to make, and which decisions to take.

Advances in AI will be met by our adversaries using devious counter-measures, so no net benefit

Avi Goldfarb & Jon Lindsay 2020 (Goldfarb - Rotman School of Management at the University of Toronto Professor of Marketing and Chief Data Scientist - Creative Destruction Lab. Lindsay - Assistant Professor - Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto Assistant Professor - Department of Political Science, University of Toronto) Nov 2020 “Artificial intelligence in war: Human judgment as an organizational strength and a strategic liability” <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/fp_20201130_artificial_intelligence_in_war.pdf> (accessed 17 Sept 2021)

If prediction machines provide better information, then adversaries will produce more disinformation. If prediction enhances intelligence, adversaries will engage in more devious counterintelligence. If prediction enables more efficient targeting, then adversaries will present more controversial and morally fraught targets.23 If automated systems operate under tightly controlled rules of engagement, then adversaries will attempt to change the normative frameworks that legitimize the use of force. AI enabled conflicts have the potential to drag on with ambiguous results, embroiled in controversy and plagued by crises of legitimacy.

Military benefits of autonomous weapons are overstated. Human intervention doesn’t degrade our capabilities

Paul Scharre 2021 (multiple tours to Iran and Afghanistan as an Army Ranger; played a key role in establishing policies on emerging weapons technologies at the US Dept of Defense. Led the working group that drafted Directive 3000.09, the Pentagon’s 2012 policy on autonomy in weapon systems) April 2021 “What degree of human involvement should there be in the use of force?” https://metis.unibw.de/assets/pdf/metis-interview04-2021\_04-scharre-human\_machine\_interaction.pdf

The military benefits of fully autonomous weapons are probably overstated. I don’t think there’s zero benefit. But they get this hype and credence, as though they are this game changing “wonder weapon”, in part because there are debates about taking them away or prohibiting them. And as soon as you try to take away something from someone, they want it all the more. That’s just human nature. Compare a weapons system that has a high degree of automation but kept a human in the loop for actual target authorization, a semi-autonomous system, with one that is fully autonomous. There are some operational benefits of full autonomy. But it doesn’t take humans that much time to identify a target and verify it. In ground combat operations we have people, special operators, go into a room and make split-second decisions about “shoot” or “no shoot”.

Other factors block military/national defense use of AI

US Defense Dept adoption of AI is blocked by: 1) lack of skilled workforce 2) lack of technical infrastructure

Center for Strategic & International Studies, Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group 2018. (PROJECT DIRECTOR - ANDREW P. HUNTER. LEAD AUTHOR - LINDSEY R. SHEPPARD. CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS: ROBERT KARLÉN ANDREW P. HUNTER LEONARDO BALIEIRO. CSIS is a non-profit research organization; its president is former US Deputy Sec. of Defense John J. Hamre) ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AI ECOSYSTEM <https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/181102_AI_interior.pdf> (accessed 17 Sept 2021)

For many potential AI users, there are two outstanding debts to be paid before successful AI adoption is likely. The first is workforce debt—a past failure to attract and retain the technical and management talent within the organization to successfully develop and implement AI in its systems. The second is technical infrastructure debt—the weakness of the organization’s digital capability, i.e., its data and its computing and networking capabilities. Paying down these twin debts is critical to successful AI adoption. For the U.S. government, and particularly for the Department of Defense, these debts are major barriers to AI adoption.

Increasing AI is great, but useless while the federal government cuts infrastructure and digital capabilities

Center for Strategic & International Studies, Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group 2018. (PROJECT DIRECTOR - ANDREW P. HUNTER. LEAD AUTHOR - LINDSEY R. SHEPPARD. CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS: ROBERT KARLÉN ANDREW P. HUNTER LEONARDO BALIEIRO. CSIS is a non-profit research organization; its president is former US Deputy Sec. of Defense John J. Hamre) ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AI ECOSYSTEM <https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/181102_AI_interior.pdf> (accessed 17 Sept 2021)

Additional sourcing on investment in the AI ecosystem is available through the Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) Program, a group of U.S. federal agencies supporting the development of Information Technology (IT) capabilities in the federal government. It also includes both unclassified and classified R&D, with classified R&D generally being smaller than unclassified. However, given the importance of infrastructure and digital capability, NITRD funding trends are problematic in that IT spending is decreasing while AI spending is increasing. The success of AI applications depends in part on having the right infrastructure to support access to data and computing and the productivity of the workforce. AI is grounded in basic computer science, so it is problematic and unsustainable for investment in foundational digital capability spending to decrease while AI spending is increasing.

Before Defense Dept. can go all-in on AI, they have to resolve underlying infrastructure problems

Center for Strategic & International Studies, Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group 2018. (PROJECT DIRECTOR - ANDREW P. HUNTER. LEAD AUTHOR - LINDSEY R. SHEPPARD. CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS: ROBERT KARLÉN ANDREW P. HUNTER LEONARDO BALIEIRO. CSIS is a non-profit research organization; its president is former US Deputy Sec. of Defense John J. Hamre) ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AI ECOSYSTEM <https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/181102_AI_interior.pdf> (accessed 17 Sept 2021)

Investment is needed in things like network infrastructure, data collection, and data processing. Unfortunately, these investments are not glamorous, but strengthening the AI ecosystem in this way is critical to successful deployment of AI. There is a solid culture of experimentation, but this does not help if the underlying architecture cannot can translate the data from system to system. For example, the F-22 and F-35 fifth-generation fighter jets face interoperability challenges among themselves, let alone with fourth-generation fighters, as their underlying network architectures do not line up and the incoming data is not processed the same way. Before the Department of Defense goes all in with AI on its current path, the underlying architectures need to be assimilated.

Complicated / inefficient government budget and purchasing process blocks effective AI investment

Center for Strategic & International Studies, Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group 2018. (PROJECT DIRECTOR - ANDREW P. HUNTER. LEAD AUTHOR - LINDSEY R. SHEPPARD. CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS: ROBERT KARLÉN ANDREW P. HUNTER LEONARDO BALIEIRO. CSIS is a non-profit research organization; its president is former US Deputy Sec. of Defense John J. Hamre) ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AI ECOSYSTEM <https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/181102_AI_interior.pdf> (accessed 17 Sept 2021)

While the government has a successful history of investing in basic research related to software technologies, including AI, the record of transitioning these capabilities into acquisition and operational use is much less successful. One key issue to ensuring effective AI investment is addressing the challenges in government software acquisition. This complex topic requires a study all its own, and several such efforts are underway, including a recent Defense Science Board study, an ongoing study at the Defense Innovation Board, and an upcoming CSIS study on acquisition of software-defined hardware-based systems. A common theme of many of these efforts, and one raised by several experts the study team consulted for this study, is the need for greater flexibility in the government budget process for the development and acquisition of software.

Defense Dept. cultural/attitudinal barriers to adoption of AI have to be resolved before it can help national defense

Center for Strategic & International Studies, Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group 2018. (PROJECT DIRECTOR - ANDREW P. HUNTER. LEAD AUTHOR - LINDSEY R. SHEPPARD. CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS: ROBERT KARLÉN ANDREW P. HUNTER LEONARDO BALIEIRO. CSIS is a non-profit research organization; its president is former US Deputy Sec. of Defense John J. Hamre) ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AI ECOSYSTEM <https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/181102_AI_interior.pdf> (accessed 17 Sept 2021)

Developing the AI ecosystem means investing time and resources into growing the right talent. Change management is required to manage operational AI as the proficiencies and literacies are lacking throughout organizations in many application areas. A mix of cultural barriers and limited understanding of the technology itself present challenges in effectively managing AI. Non-digital natives and digital natives alike must all adapt to new technologies. Within the DoD, there is a significant cultural difference and barrier in how military personnel approach new technologies. Where younger personnel are willing to work through bugs and try to improve new technologies, older personnel may be tempted to cast aside new systems at the first indication of a problem. Further, many in the workforce harbor concerns of being replaced by new technologies, particularly technologies that serve an automating function. Addressing these human factors and cultural elements are necessary to AI efficacy.

No Rush / More Study Needed

Waiting to see how others are using AI may be more strategic than trying to be first

Center for Strategic & International Studies, Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group 2018. (PROJECT DIRECTOR - ANDREW P. HUNTER. LEAD AUTHOR - LINDSEY R. SHEPPARD. CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS: ROBERT KARLÉN ANDREW P. HUNTER LEONARDO BALIEIRO. CSIS is a non-profit research organization; its president is former US Deputy Sec. of Defense John J. Hamre) ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY THE IMPORTANCE OF THE AI ECOSYSTEM <https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/181102_AI_interior.pdf> (accessed 17 Sept 2021)

In recognition of the importance of clean data, the U.S. Department of Defense began prioritizing data quality over quantity in FY15. The discussions undertaken as part of this study suggest that strengthening the overall AI ecosystem of the U.S. government will be critical to ensuring that the United States does not cede an important advantage in AI. Presently, investment is in early stages with most investors still waiting for their bets on AI to pay off. Given the relevance of speed in the digital era, there has been substantial debate about the existence and magnitude of the first-mover advantage in AI. While the private sector may see advantage in being first to develop AI techniques, how much of an advantage comes to users who implement AI solutions first? In conflict and on tight timelines, first-mover advantage can be key. However, there are other advantages in moving second, especially given the problem-specific nature of AI. If AI techniques are challenging to transition from one problem to another, it may not be possible to gain much enduring advantage by being the first to solve a problem.

A/T “US/China AI arms race”

No AI arms race with China: US/Chinese AI ecosystems are entwined

Alison DeNisco Rayome 2020 (senior editor at CNET) 8 July 2020 “The US, China and the AI arms race: Cutting through the hype” <https://www.cnet.com/tech/services-and-software/the-us-china-and-the-ai-arms-race-cutting-through-the-hype/> (accessed 17 Sept 2021)

"Narratives of an 'arms race' are overblown and poor analogies for what is actually going on in the AI space," said Jeffrey Ding, the China lead for the Center for the Governance of AI at the [University of Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute](https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/). When you look at factors like research, talent and company alliances, you'll find that the US and Chinese AI ecosystems are still very entwined, Ding added.

Lots of US/China cooperation on AI

Alison DeNisco Rayome 2020 (senior editor at CNET) 8 July 2020 “The US, China and the AI arms race: Cutting through the hype” <https://www.cnet.com/tech/services-and-software/the-us-china-and-the-ai-arms-race-cutting-through-the-hype/> (accessed 17 Sept 2021)

Despite the competition, the two nations have long worked together. China has masses of data and far more lax regulations around using it, so it can often implement AI trials faster -- but the nation still largely relies on US semiconductors and open source software to power AI and machine learning algorithms.  And while the US has the edge when it comes to quality research, universities and engineering talent, top AI programs at schools like Stanford and MIT attract many Chinese students, who then often go on to work for Google, Microsoft, Apple and Facebook -- all of which have spent the last few years acquiring startups to bolster their AI work.

China’s AI research is inefficient, corrupt, has recruiting problems, and low quality output

Congressional Research Service 2020. (non partisan research agency of Congress) Artificial Intelligence and National Security, last updated 10 Nov 2020 <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45178.pdf> (accessed 15 June 2021)

While most analysts view China’s unified, whole-of-government effort to develop AI as having a distinct advantage over the United States’ AI efforts, many contend that it does have shortcomings. For example, some analysts characterize the Chinese government’s funding management as inefficient. They point out that the system is often corrupt, with favored research institutions receiving a disproportionate share of government funding, and that the government has a potential to overinvest in projects that produce surpluses that exceed market demand. In addition, China faces challenges in recruiting and retaining AI engineers and researchers. Over half of the data scientists in the United States have been working in the field for over 10 years, while roughly the same proportion of data scientists in China have less than 5 years of experience. Furthermore, fewer than 30 Chinese universities produce AI-focused experts and research products. Although China surpassed the United States in the quantity of research papers produced from 2011 to 2015, the quality of its published papers, as judged by peer citations, ranked 34th globally.

China’s central government isn’t directing AI development, and it’s about economic growth, not global hegemony

Prof. Jinghan Zeng 2021. (Professor of China and International Studies in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion at Lancaster University, United Kingdom) “China’s Artificial Intelligence Innovation: A Top-Down National Command Approach?” 23 Jan 2021 <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1758-5899.12914> (accessed 9 June 2021)

In this regard, the Chinese approach is summarized as a geopolitically driven national strategy reflecting the ambition of Beijing and Chinese leaders to pursue a China-centred AI order, assuming a concerted national effort to achieve a unified central objective. This article, however, argues that these views are mistaken. It argues that China’s AI strategy is a loose slogan rather than a concrete policy plan. In order to mobilize domestic actors, the slogan is kept deliberately vague and broad to accommodate the interests of domestic stakeholders. Instead of unfolding according to Beijing’s top-level design, China’s AI development is primarily driven by powerful domestic stakeholders with diverse and competing interests. As economic growth is the most important goal of China’s AI plans, the central state has restricted discretion, while local states have primary responsibility for boosting the AI economy in China.

China’s AI policy is a vague political slogan. The real work is being done at the local level with no geopolitical impact

Prof. Jinghan Zeng 2021. (Professor of China and International Studies in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion at Lancaster University, United Kingdom) “China’s Artificial Intelligence Innovation: A Top-Down National Command Approach?” 23 Jan 2021 <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1758-5899.12914> (accessed 9 June 2021)

As this article shows, ‘to develop AI’ is a broad and vague political slogan to mobilize Chinese domestic actors. Far from being a specific plan, the State Council’s ‘New Generation AI Development Plan’ is a ‘manifesto about the future’ (Laskai, [2017](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1758-5899.12914#gpol12914-bib-0041)) or a ‘wish list’ of AI technology that the central state would like to develop with little concrete ideas about how to get it done (Sheehan, [2018](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1758-5899.12914#gpol12914-bib-0060)). **[END QUOTE**] Its implementation heavily relies on local and subnational actors to interpret the AI slogan and find their own ways to motivate the private sector and accelerate AI activities in their respective jurisdictions. This process often supports local agendas and interests as the mechanism allows a high level of discretion for local actors to decide local AI activities. This slogan mobilization process means that local and subnational actors play an important role in shaping AI politics. In this regard, China’s AI innovation does not simply follow a top-down command approach, which makes it distinctly different from that in the US and Europe. While strategic thinking and national planning mindsets are clearly there backing the Chinese central state’s AI plans, these top-level grand masterplans are not completely unfolded into concrete practices at the local level. [**HE GOES ON LATER TO SAY QUOTE**:] The nature of China’s economic circumstances means that its AI industry is primarily driven by a range of local, subnational and non-state actors who have diverse – and sometimes competing – interests and little diplomatic and geopolitical awareness.[ **END QUOTE**] Their struggle for resources has shaped the development of China’s AI industry. Instead of a top-down command model, the development of China’s AI policies largely follows a bottom-up manner in that existing local AI initiatives successfully won recognition from Beijing and were upgraded to become a national focus. Rather than a concerted national effort to boost the AI industry, the Chinese approach faces the problems of coordination and manipulation. [**AND FINALLY HE CONCLUDES QUOTE**:] Similar to the US and Europe, China’s market forces and entrepreneurs play a key role in boosting the AI industry, and they are pursuing individual commercial interests not the country’s national interests.

China’s central government is so bureaucratic and conflicted that they can’t effectively run an AI policy

Prof. Jinghan Zeng 2021. (Professor of China and International Studies in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion at Lancaster University, United Kingdom) “China’s Artificial Intelligence Innovation: A Top-Down National Command Approach?” 23 Jan 2021 <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1758-5899.12914> (accessed 9 June 2021)

It may also be worth mentioning that, even for authoritarian regimes like China’s, coordination and central planning are not as straightforward as many would expect. Even within the central government in Beijing, bureaucratic politics is everywhere. As far as AI is concerned, jurisdiction among the central state’s different departments over China’s AI policy is anything but straightforward. Four central agencies, including the National Development Reform Commission, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and the Cyberspace Administration of China, fought to assert their power in deciding and managing China’s AI policy (Ding, [2018](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1758-5899.12914#gpol12914-bib-0014)). Different national AI policy papers indicate remarkably interesting conflicts over which agencies have the mandate to command China’s AI policy (Ding, [2018](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1758-5899.12914#gpol12914-bib-0014)). In other words, central agencies in Beijing are not pursing a single unified goal – let alone the whole national attempt to advance AI in China.

A/T “China threat”

Chinese AI weapons are untested and prone to failure

Elsa Kania 2020 (adjunct senior fellow with the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), and also a Ph.D. student in Harvard University's Department of Government) “AI WEAPONS” IN CHINA'S MILITARY INNOVATION Apr 2020 <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/FP_20200427_ai_weapons_kania_v2.pdf> (accessed 17 Sept 2021)

Given the emphasis of Chinese military leaders on pursuing innovation to catch up with and surpass more powerful militaries, namely that of the United States, there are reasons for concern the Chinese military may fail to dedicate adequate attention to issues of safety and testing in the process. The advent of greater autonomy in weapons systems introduces added complexity, and complex systems tend to be more prone to failures and accidents, particularly in contested environments.

More study needed. We don’t know enough about Chinese technology and trends

Elsa Kania 2020 (adjunct senior fellow with the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), and also a Ph.D. student in Harvard University's Department of Government) “AI WEAPONS” IN CHINA'S MILITARY INNOVATION Apr 2020 <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/FP_20200427_ai_weapons_kania_v2.pdf> (accessed 17 Sept 2021)

Scale up efforts to evaluate and translate Chinese military writings and technical literature. The available materials are insufficiently leveraged in U.S. research and intelligence relative to the scope and scale of Chinese collection and leveraging of open source technical materials and policy and strategic debates. This information gap can result in poor or incomplete understanding of trends in China. To this end, the U.S. government should scale up and support largescale initiatives in translation.

US/China rivalry isn’t a zero-sum game: China can gain influence without the U.S. being harmed

Minghao Zhao 2019 ( Senior Fellow at the Institute of International Studies, Fudan University) 26 Aug 2019 “Is a New Cold War Inevitable? Chinese Perspectives on US–China Strategic Competition “ CHINESE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/12/3/371/5544745

The United States cannot contain China in the region; nor can China exclude the United States from the Asia-Pacific. China needs to respect US interests and traditional influence in the Asia-Pacific and carefully manage the security implications of its expanding economic footprints. In the meantime, there is no need for the United States to see China’s rising influence in the region through a Cold-War lens and deem it a zero-sum game.

China isn’t interested in replacing US hegemony

World Economic Forum 2019 (international organization for public-private cooperation; non-profit foundation headquartered in Switzerland) Is a U.S. – China power transition inevitable? 15 Jan 2019 https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/01/is-a-us-china-power-transition-inevitable/

Perhaps most critically, though, China has evinced little desire to replace the United States in its present capacity. While increasingly global in scope, Beijing's foreign policy remains parochial in objectives, aimed more at sustaining its growth and cementing its centrality within the Asia-Pacific than at furnishing global public goods. The economist Charles Kindleberger [observed (TXT)](http://bev.berkeley.edu/fp/readings/WorldinDepression.txt) in 1973 that the Great Depression persisted “because the international economic system was rendered unstable by British inability and United States unwillingness to assume responsibility for stabilizing it.” We may witness a variant of this dynamic nine decades on, with neither the lone superpower nor its putative replacement able or willing to invest in the current order's modernization. Should that dynamic indeed prevail, China might continue to chip away at America's margin of pre-eminence without actually ascending to the commanding heights of geopolitics.

Neither China nor Russia are a threat to the US, just moving the world back into healthy balance of power

Vijay Prashad 2018 (Indian historian, editor and journalist. He is a writing fellow and chief correspondent at [Globetrotter](https://independentmediainstitute.org/globetrotter/), a project of the Independent Media Institute) A paranoid America is greatly exaggerating Russian power 22 Feb 2018 https://www.salon.com/2018/02/22/a-paranoid-america-is-greatly-exaggerating-russian-power\_partner/

But it remains a defensive statement. Neither China nor Russia is making a push to become the global powerhouse. They are merely seeking to rebalance a world order that has — since the end of the Cold War — tilted unhealthily towards the United States. So is Russia a threat? Is China a threat? The question really is, to whom? They are threats to any assertion of US dominance over the planet. But they are no threat to the United States as such. They are committed to a multi-polar planet: a sensible solution in our very unstable and dangerous times.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Hype

Link: Our opponents argue AI is a critical voting issue in the round because of its link to national security

It’s in their arguments

Link: Hyping AI link to military strength was already tried and failed. Doing it again sets back US national security when the inevitable disappointment occurs

[Julia Ciocca, Michael C. Horowitz, and Lauren Kahn](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-04-06/perils-overhyping-artificial-intelligence#author-info) 2021 (CIOCCA is a Research Fellow at Perry World House at Univ of Pennsylvania. HOROWITZ is Richard Perry Professor and Director of Perry World House at Univ of Pennsylvania. KAHN is a Research Fellow at Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania.) 6 Apr 2021 <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-04-06/perils-overhyping-artificial-intelligence> (accessed 17 Sept 2021)

In 1983, the U.S. military’s research and development arm began a ten-year, $1 billion [machine intelligence program](https://ondoc.logand.com/d/2721/pdf) aimed at keeping the United States ahead of its technological rivals. From the start, computer scientists criticized the project as unrealistic. It promised big and ultimately failed hard in the eyes of the Pentagon, ushering in a long artificial intelligence (AI) “winter” during which potential funders, including the U.S. military, shied away from big investments in the field and abandoned promising areas of research.   Today, AI is once again the darling of the national security services. And once again, it risks sliding backward as a result of a destructive “hype cycle” in which [overpromising](https://warontherocks.com/2020/05/cautionary-tale-on-ambitious-feats-of-ai-the-strategic-computing-program/) conspires with inevitable setbacks to undermine the long-term success of a transformative new technology.

Impact: Reduced US national security

Whatever impact our opponents were claiming for US national security, it gets worse if you vote for them.

2. AI can harm military power / national security

Reliance on AI can make conflict less decisive

Avi Goldfarb & Jon Lindsay 2020 (Goldfarb - Rotman School of Management at the University of Toronto Professor of Marketing and Chief Data Scientist - Creative Destruction Lab. Lindsay - Assistant Professor - Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto Assistant Professor - Department of Political Science, University of Toronto) Nov 2020 “Artificial intelligence in war: Human judgment as an organizational strength and a strategic liability” <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/fp_20201130_artificial_intelligence_in_war.pdf> (accessed 17 Sept 2021)

Prediction has been made easier and cheaper by advances in machine learning and an abundance of data, yet we suggest that the complementary component— human judgment—is becoming more valuable. Because friction and controversy are inevitable in national security, we expect the military use of AI to make human judgment even more crucial and challenging. Ironically, however, the same organizational capacity that enables judgment, and thereby makes war fighting more predictable and controllable, also has the potential to make conflict more ambiguous and less decisive. In short, the ability to automate aspects of decision-making can make it harder to come to a decision within an organization or on the battlefield.

AI-enabled conflict could become more prolonged and less decisive, making the entire military enterprise less certain

Avi Goldfarb & Jon Lindsay 2020 (Goldfarb - Rotman School of Management at the University of Toronto Professor of Marketing and Chief Data Scientist - Creative Destruction Lab. Lindsay - Assistant Professor - Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto Assistant Professor - Department of Political Science, University of Toronto) Nov 2020 “Artificial intelligence in war: Human judgment as an organizational strength and a strategic liability” <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/fp_20201130_artificial_intelligence_in_war.pdf> (accessed 17 Sept 2021)

War is ultimately a struggle of power and will between rival organizations and societies. Strategic adversaries have incentives to avoid playing to enemy strengths, and to undermine them if possible. In short, if judgment becomes a source of strength for an AI-enabled military organization, then an intelligent adversary will make judgment more difficult. Many commentators expect AI to make war faster and more volatile. This is possible, but our focus on strategic interaction suggests that AI-enabled conflict also has the potential to become more protracted and less decisive. We anticipate that making particular aspects of military operations more certain will make the entire enterprise less certain.

Reliance on AI diffuses responsibility, making it harder to understand what’s going on

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Reliance on AI could so diffuse responsibility for action that personal responsibility and accountability is undermined. As judgment becomes more distributed, everyone is responsible, and no one is. This can make it harder for the organization to develop a clear collective understanding of what it is doing, and why. Furthermore, judgment is likely to be distributed not only within a military organization but also across the civil-military divide. If judgment is more distributed, then the “unequal dialogue” of civil military relations will necessarily extend into more tactical and technical realms.

AI weakens decision-making in national security situations

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On one hand, civilians will have to develop a better understanding of the military consequences of the judgments that inform AI prediction. On the other, military personnel will have to become more involved in political conversations about goals and values to understand what judgments need to be made. Yet this is also a recipe for politicization from above and below. The distribution of judgment connects more veto players for any given decision. This could promote second-guessing and a reticence to take bold action (decision paralysis), or logrolling and manipulation to promote parochial organizational and political interests in the name of national security.