Negative Brief: Close Foreign Bases

By “Coach Vance” Trefethen

**Resolved: The United States Federal Government should considerably decrease its military commitments.**

The AFF case closes all foreign military bases except Diego Garcia (small island in the Indian Ocean) and Guam (a US territory in the south Pacific), and brings all US forces home.

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US forces in Japan don’t commit disproportionate amount of crime 5

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Link: Consensual planning among the NATO countries is a key principle of its nuclear policy 22

Link: Germany disagrees with AFF Plan – they want to keep NATO nukes 22

Link: Agreement and joint decision-making on nuclear weapons is politically significant. It’s important to alliance trust 22

Link: Questioning nuclear sharing could damage NATO cohesion 22

Link: Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW), by just their presence, maintain alliance solidarity and strengthen unity 23

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Link: Without cohesion, NATO will fail 23

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7. Nuclear proliferation 25

Link: NATO nukes prevent nuclear proliferation 25

Link & Brink: US nukes in Europe are key to European countries NOT creating their own nuclear weapons 25

Removing nukes triggers Turkey and other countries to start their own nuclear weapons, increasing risk of war 25

Removing nukes would cause Turkey to develop their own, and could trigger Greece, Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia to do the same 26

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Impact: Nuclear proliferation = bigger risk of nuclear detonation. Terrorist theft, unauthorized launch, cyber hacking, regional rivalries 26

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A withdrawal could facilitate ISIS’ resurgence 28

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Link: Must have forces deployed over there for: short response times, joint training with allies, and deterring miscalculation by adversaries 33

Impact: High risk of war in East Asia if stability with China isn’t preserved 33

Impact: Net benefits to US national security. Benefits of forward-positioned troop commitments outweigh the cost 33

Impact: Peace and prosperity in East Asia depends on maintaining existing US defense posture and military presence 34

11. US loses hegemony to China 34

Link: Reducing US forces weakens US global power and emboldens bad guys 34

Link: US and China are in a struggle for international dominance. China threatens US hegemony 34

Link: China is growing its military, intends to become a challenger to American power, and not just in East Asia 35

Brink: US on the brink of losing East Asia hegemony to China 35

Link: China wants Asia hegemony, wants to replace U.S. in the region 35

Link: China gaining Asian regional hegemony leads to gaining global hegemony, replacing USA 35

Link: China wants Indo-Pacific hegemony, wants to replace U.S. in the region 36

Impact: Apocalyptic consequences if we lose US hegemony 36

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12. Nuclear proliferation 37

Link: Intensifying threat from N. Korea is influencing some in Japan to push for acquiring nukes 37

Link: Japan may consider developing nukes in response to N. Korea threat if they doubt US protection 37

Link: 2 things trigger doubts. 1) eliminating extended deterrence commitments; 2) removing US troops 37

Link: Weakening US security commitments would encourage Japan to build nukes 38

Link: Japan has the materials and technology to make a bomb. Stockpiling the materials in itself creates the nuclear threat 38

Link: Japan wants China and N. Korea to think they’re building a bomb, or will build it quickly if needed 38

Link: Telling Japan to “do more” for its own defense = encouraging it to develop its own nukes 39

Link: Japan developing nukes would encourage proliferation – other nations would consider doing the same 39

Link: Cascade of proliferation if list of Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) grows Impact: Nuclear terrorism 39

Impact: Peace and the inhabitability of the planet depend on opposing nuclear proliferation 39

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13. Re-militarization of Japan 40

Background: Japanese history and its renunciation of military power 40

Link: While Japan relies on US protection, even with it, threats from China and N. Korea motivate Japan to consider restoring its military power 40

Link: Even if Japanese remilitarization is justified, it will still be perceived as offensively threatening 40

Brink: Northeast Asia is extremely volatile and Japanese remilitarization makes it worse 41

Link: Weakening the US/Japan alliance is bad because Japan would remilitarize and be a danger to itself and the region 41

Impact: Remilitarization of Japan could trigger World War 3 with China 41

Works Cited 42

Negative: Close Foreign Bases

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE

1. A/T “Troops cause crime”

US forces in Japan don’t commit disproportionate amount of crime

Eric L. Robinson 2015 (Civilian with Department of the Army; master’s degree candidate at Naval Postgraduate School) LOST IN TRANSLATION: U.S. FORCES AND CRIME IN JAPAN (accessed 16 Mar 2021) <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a632337.pdf>

At the strategic level, the United States should take rapid and proactive versus reactive actions to mitigate damage to public opinion and ultimately U.S. foreign policy goals. It is well-documented that U.S. Forces Japan military and civilian personnel do not commit a disproportionate amount of crime in Japan.

Despite the hype, statistics show US troops in Japan commit crime at 1 / 2 the rate of Japanese citizens themselves

Eric L. Robinson 2015 (Civilian with Department of the Army; master’s degree candidate at Naval Postgraduate School) LOST IN TRANSLATION: U.S. FORCES AND CRIME IN JAPAN (brackets added; accessed 16 Mar 2021) <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a632337.pdf> (“SOFA” = “status of forces agreement,” it refers to US personnel whose behavior, if they commit crimes, is regulated by an agreement between Japan and the USA)

Despite the understandable notoriety of certain severe and politically significant crimes, though, SOFA [Status Of Forces Agreement]-related crime is comparatively low in Okinawa. This is true even when the comparison is to Japanese crime rates that are themselves low by international standards**.[END QUOTE**] Okinawa is home to approximately 75 percent of USFJ facilities. There was a population of 1.37 million people in 2006, of which 6,808 were non-SOFA status foreign residents. [**HE GOES ON TO SAY QUOTE**:] According to Hassett, 4,188 people were arrested for penal code offenses and 605 arrested for special law violations. Of that group, 44 non-SOFA foreigners were arrested for penal code offenses and an estimated 22 for special law violations. This equates to an arrest rate of 0.342 percent for Okinawa. Meanwhile, among the 42,570 USFJ SOFA-covered individuals in Okinawa, there were 63 SOFA personnel arrested for penal code offenses and approximately 11 arrested for special law violations (Hassett reported that onbase arrest data was not released). This represents a 0.174 percent arrest rate of USFJ individuals, or nearly half the rate of Japanese arrested in Okinawa (0.342) and the whole of Japan (0.351). Perhaps most important, “There were zero arrests in Japan of SOFA-sponsored personnel for rape or sexual assault during 2006 versus an average of 16 Japanese arrested daily for rape (1,094 persons) and sexual offenses (4,733).”

Japanese National Police Agency (NPA) statistics are inaccurate and Japanese media uses racist hype to exaggerate crime committed by “foreigners”

Eric L. Robinson 2015 (Civilian with Department of the Army; master’s degree candidate at Naval Postgraduate School) LOST IN TRANSLATION: U.S. FORCES AND CRIME IN JAPAN (brackets added; accessed 16 Mar 2021) <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a632337.pdf> (“SOFA” = “status of forces agreement,” it refers to US personnel whose behavior, if they commit crimes, is regulated by an agreement between Japan and the USA)

Based on this crime data, population discrepancies and clearance rate falsification, it appears that the accuracy of the NPA foreign crime reporting is questionable. Defining which type of foreigner (visitor, illegal immigrant, legal resident, temporary worker) actually committed the crime, and the yearly increase in the foreign population skews the results. For example, the two million foreign nationals registered by the MOJ in 2005 do not include visitors, illegal immigrants, and temporary workers. However, these categories are included in the “foreign-crime” statistics that the NPA published, as shown in Figure 16. Additionally, Kansai Time Out, when referring to the publication, Gaijin Hanzai Ura Fairu, or “The Secret Crime of Foreigners,” which focused on the crimes committed by foreigners and employed racist depictions and descriptions of those foreigners, claimed that 48,000 foreign nationals committed crimes in 2005. Burrows writes, “Hyperbolic reporting of this type is also quite common practice in mainstream media,” which tends to fixate on foreign crime regardless of more pressing issues (especially crimes committed by USFJ [US Forces, Japan] SOFA-status personnel, but not limited to them).

SOLVENCY

1. No cost savings

Transporting troops home from major overseas bases and closing them would be costly

Rick Berger 2019 (research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he works on the defense budget and other defense policy issues. He previously served as professional staff on the Senate Budget Committee, where he covered defense, foreign affairs, and veterans policy.) 15 March 2019 “‘COST PLUS 50’ AND BRINGING U.S. TROOPS HOME: A LOOK AT THE NUMBERS” <https://warontherocks.com/2019/03/cost-plus-50-and-bringing-u-s-troops-home-a-look-at-the-numbers/>

Summing up the new investments needed to replace the power projection capability that U.S. forces abroad provide is a massive task, beyond the scope of this article. Here I focus on what it would immediately cost to pull U.S. troops out of major overseas bases. Data from a 2004 Congressional Budget Office study and a 2013 RAND report makes possible a rough back-of-the-envelope calculation. The United States stations about 75,000 military personnel in Japan and South Korea and a little more than half that number in Germany and Italy. [**END QUOTE]** For the purposes of this analysis, the 75,000 personnel in Japan and South Korea will serve as a yardstick, so cut all the bills in half for Germany and Italy. [**HE GOES ON TO SAY QUOTE:]** First, simply paying to transport 75,000 personnel back to the United States costs roughly $500 million, excluding the bill for bringing all their equipment back. As seen in Afghanistan , the cost of returning equipment normally runs in the billions of dollars. [**END QUOTE]** RAND estimated that shutting down bases, issuing worker severance packages, and terminating existing contracts and leases for a portion of U.S. infrastructure in Europe would cost $410 million. [**HE GOES ON TO CONCLUDE QUOTE:]** Thus, a more expansive close-out could run up the tab to $1 to 2 billion. That does not include the very real potential for long-term environmental remediation work and preparations for redevelopment by private industry, which normally occur following base closures. Both types of expenditures routinely occur in domestic base closures.

Example: South Korea pays 50% of costs now. When they come home to the US, we pay 100%!

Josh Rogin 2018 (He is a Washington Post columnist who covers foreign policy and national security.) 15 June 2018 “Josh Rogin: U.S. faces too many risks to withdraw troops from South Korea” <https://www.pilotonline.com/opinion/columns/article_5f3f4955-abb6-5c91-8b8a-b849057c5867.html>

The Washington effort is heating up to convince Trump to abandon his drive to drastically pare down the number of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula. Sen. Dan Sullivan, R-Alaska, successfully added an amendment to next year's National Defense Authorization Act stating that drastic troop reductions would be disastrous.

[**END QUOTE. He goes on later in the article to say QUOTE**:]

The amendment points out that Seoul paid 93 percent of the $10.7 billion cost to expand the U.S. Army garrison Camp Humphreys. South Korea currently pays 50 percent of all operating costs for U.S. troops stationed there. If they came home, the United States would pay 100 percent.

Example: Withdrawal from S. Korea would be massively expensive.

Larry Niksch 2019 (former Specialist in Asian Affairs with the Congressional Research Service. He currently is a Fellow with the Institute for Korean-American Studies and a Senior Associate with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.) April 2019 “Special Report: Potential Sources of Opposition to a U.S. Troop Withdrawal from South Korea” <https://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/special-report-us-troop-withdrawal>

The NDAA’s prohibition of appropriated funds for removing troops from South Korea below a specified level is a powerful tool for opponents of a potential U.S. troop withdrawal. Any sizeable withdrawal of troops from South Korea would be hugely expensive, probably costing several billion dollars. The infrastructure, equipment, and weaponry of the 70-year American military presence in South Korea is vast. Some of this could be left with the South Koreans, but much of it would have to be removed and brought back to the United States or to U.S. bases in other countries. Without specific money appropriated for this purpose, the U.S. military could not do it.

Example: Relocating troops from Germany would be very expansive (and bad for national security)

Olivia Beavers and Rebecca Kheel, 2020 (Beavers: National Security, Congressional Reporter at The Hill\_\_Kheel: Staff writer for The Hill) “Trump's move to pull troops from Germany draws bipartisan warnings”. 06/16/20. https://thehill.com/policy/defense/503046-trumps-move-to-pull-troops-from-germany-draws-bipartisan-warnings

The conservative Heritage Foundation, meanwhile, blasted out a news release Tuesday labeling Trump’s planned drawdown as a “mistake” and calling on Congress to block any funding to reduce the number of U.S. troops in Europe.“ With all the security challenges along Europe’s periphery, and with a revisionist Russia threatening the U.S. and its NATO allies, American military capability in Europe should be increased, not reduced,” Heritage said in the release. “Closing bases and removing U.S. troops from Europe will not be cheap when considering the cost of building new infrastructure in the U.S. for any returning units and the up-front cost of closing down facilities in Europe.”

A/T “Just use excess domestic facilities” - Funding for new construction would be needed – “excess” facilities won’t work

Rick Berger 2019 (research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he works on the defense budget and other defense policy issues. He previously served as professional staff on the Senate Budget Committee) 15 March 2019 “‘COST PLUS 50’ AND BRINGING U.S. TROOPS HOME: A LOOK AT THE NUMBERS” <https://warontherocks.com/2019/03/cost-plus-50-and-bringing-u-s-troops-home-a-look-at-the-numbers/>

But by far the largest upfront cost to bring U.S. military units home is new construction once they get back on American soil. Where do you put 75,000 new personnel, in the case of a full withdrawal? According to RAND estimates, the new military construction to host these units and their families would easily cost $8 to $10 billion. Sure, there may be some extra room at certain large installations, such as Fort Hood or Fort Bliss. Optimists might also point out that in recent advocacy for a new base closure round, the Pentagon [determined](https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Potochney_04-12-16.pdf) that it has approximately 20 percent excess infrastructure. But there is reason to suspect this aspect of the withdrawal will be quite expensive for the U.S. government despite the presence of “excess” resources.

A/T “Just use excess domestic facilities” - Not enough space. It would require “massive new expenditures”

Rick Berger 2019 (research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute; previously served as professional staff on the Senate Budget Committee, where he covered defense, foreign affairs, and veterans policy.) 15 March 2019 “‘COST PLUS 50’ AND BRINGING U.S. TROOPS HOME: A LOOK AT THE NUMBERS” <https://warontherocks.com/2019/03/cost-plus-50-and-bringing-u-s-troops-home-a-look-at-the-numbers/>

Base closure skeptics, including current Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Jim Inhofe, often caution that infrastructure currently considered “excess” might one day be needed, should the U.S. military expand in size. However, it’s an open question whether the existing excess facilities are the types necessary to accommodate such growth. Indeed, after a decade of underfunding facilities maintenance that created a $116 billion backlog, many of these facilities likely suffer from significant degradation. Finding space for new units brought home from Germany, South Korea, or Japan would be exceedingly difficult, almost certainly requiring massive new expenditures for military construction.

A/T “Just use excess domestic facilities” – Not enough + wrong types

Rick Berger 2019 (research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he works on the defense budget and other defense policy issues. He previously served as professional staff on the Senate Budget Committee, where he covered defense, foreign affairs, and veterans policy.) 15 March 2019 “‘COST PLUS 50’ AND BRINGING U.S. TROOPS HOME: A LOOK AT THE NUMBERS” <https://warontherocks.com/2019/03/cost-plus-50-and-bringing-u-s-troops-home-a-look-at-the-numbers/>

While the Pentagon undoubtedly does have excess facilities at its disposal, these facilities probably don’t align exactly with what would be needed to host entire new units. The Army’s analysis, for instance, found that its major training ranges had only 2 percent excess capacity, and the Air Force analysis found a similar figure. Bringing new units home would require building new training ranges, expanding existing infrastructure, or paying allies and partners abroad for their own training spaces.

2. Basing everyone in the US doesn’t achieve the national security of Status Quo forward deployment

**[AFF Plan will argue that with modern transportation and technology, we can base everyone in the US and it’s just as good as being “forward deployed” – based overseas near wherever the crisis may break out. These cards show that forward deployment is key to upholding national security.]**

Pacific security requires forces in place, forward deployed, due to vast distance (too long to get there in a crisis)

Admiral HARRY B. HARRIS JR. 2018 (U.S. NAVY; COMMANDER of U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND) Statement BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE 14 FEBRUARY 2018 <https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20180214/106847/HHRG-115-AS00-Wstate-HarrisJrH-20180214.pdf> (brackets added)

USPACOM’s [U.S. Pacific Command] ability to execute national tasking and meet national objectives is reflected in military construction investments that support increased resiliency for the Joint Force via projects in Japan, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), and Australia. The vast distances associated with the Indo-Pacific, coupled with the 33 short timelines to respond to crises, require investment in infrastructure to properly preposition capabilities and capacity throughout the region. Military construction supports critical capabilities to include Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for increased intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (Republic of Korea), Cyber Mission Force teams (Hawaii), Special Operations Forces (Japan), increased critical munitions storage capacity in Washington State, and quality of life investments for the Joint Force and their families in Guam, Republic of Korea, Japan, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands.

Need troops in Germany to maintain readiness of our allies, and for rapid deployment around the world

Leo Shane III, 2020 (Leo covers Congress, Veterans Affairs and the White House for Military Times. He has covered Washington, D.C. since 2004, focusing on military personnel and veterans policies. His work has earned numerous honors, including a 2009 Polk award, a 2010 National Headliner Award, the IAVA Leadership in Journalism award and the VFW News Media award.) “Withdrawal of US troops from Germany would hurt military, Republican lawmakers warn”. June 9, 2020. <https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2020/06/09/withdrawal-of-us-troops-from-germany-would-hurt-military-republican-lawmakers-warn/> (accessed 16 Mar 2021)

But the rumored withdrawal drew criticism from both Republicans and Democrats on Capitol Hill. Rep. Liz Cheney, R-Wyo., and third-ranking Republican in the House, called the idea “a dangerously misguided policy” from the president. **[END QUOTE]
[LATER IN THE SAME CONTEXT]**: “The overall limit on troops would prevent us from conducting the exercises that are necessary for the training and readiness of our forces and those of our allies,” the group wrote. “The troop limit would also significantly reduce the number of U.S. forces that can flow through Germany for deployment to bases around the world, causing serious logistical challenges.”

Can’t send troops directly into a combat zone. You have to have a staging area like Germany for US military movement in Europe and NATO

Michael O'Hanlon, 2020 (Director of Research - Foreign Policy Co-Director, Security and Strategy Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence The Sydney Stein, Jr. Chair.) “Why cutting American forces in Germany will harm this alliance”. 06/11/20. https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/502215-why-cutting-american-forces-in-germany-will-harm-this-alliance

American forces in Germany are mostly Army and Air Force units. They include an armored brigade and a fighter wing, then logistics, supports, and headquarters capabilities that facilitate any massive reinforcements that could be needed to defend the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in war. If there were a crisis in the Baltic region, the United States would be unlikely to send most of its forces directly to Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania. These small exposed countries have only a few major ports and airfields between them, and are all dangerously close to Russian firepower. **[END QUOTE]**
**[CONTINUING LATER IN THE NEXT PARAGRAPH]** So any deployment of American reinforcements in a serious crisis would most likely travel by boat or plane to ports and airfields in Germany, then move by rail and road into Poland and beyond if necessary. **[END QUOTE]**

DISADVANTAGES

DISADVANTAGES 1, 2 and 3 LINK TO WITHDRAWAL OF US FORCES FROM SOUTH KOREA

1. Korean War II (North Korean aggression)

Link: We still need troops in S. Korea to deter NK aggression

David Axe 2019 (Defense Editor of the National Interest) 20 November 2019 “Does South Korea Still Need U.S. Troops? In Short, Yes” <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/does-south-korea-still-need-us-troops-short-yes-97817>

In a concession to North Korea, Trump ordered U.S. forces in South Korea to suspend major training exercises with their South Korean counterparts. With the six-decade U.S.-South Korean alliance seemingly on the verge of collapse, it’s worth asking just how much South Korea, the world’s 12th-largest economy, needs U.S. troops. The answer, in short, is that American forces still are vital to South Korea’s defense and, by extension, to deterring North Korean aggression. At the end of the Korean War in 1953, the United States and South Korea signed a mutual-defense pact that remains in effect.

Link: U.S. physical presence acts as a deterrent

William Lucier 2018 (graduated from Fordham University with a BA in International Studies; wrote his senior thesis on North Korea.) 3 October 2018 “U.S Troops: The Backbone of Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula” <https://www.americansecurityproject.org/u-s-troops-in-south-korea/>

U.S forces in Korea deter a North Korean attack as they provide both the credibility and operational capacity to ensure that North Korea does not view an invasion of South Korea as having a high probability of success. The troops provide credibility to the United States’ commitment to defend South Korea as their physical presence virtually insures that they would be involved in defending South Korea if a conflict were to break out. Additionally, American troops provide the operational capacity needed to deter a North Korean attack, because their advanced weaponry could change the North Korean calculus against an invasion of the South.

Link: South Korea has no anti-ballistic missile capability

Bruce Klingner 2019 (He specializes in Korean and Japanese affairs as the senior research fellow for Northeast Asia; Heritage Foundation) 3 October 2019 “North Korea’s Latest Missile Test Is Dangerous Escalation” <https://www.heritage.org/missile-defense/commentary/north-koreas-latest-missile-test-dangerous-escalation>

South Korea currently has no defenses against North Korean submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which are assessed as being capable of carrying nuclear warheads. South Korean naval ships are equipped with the Standard Missile-2 missile, which has no anti-ballistic missile capability.

Link: A nuclear N. Korea could easily bully S. Korea into a dangerous position

**Michael Heng 2018 (He is a retired professor who has held academic appointments in Australia, the Netherlands, and at six universities in Asia) 20 June 2018 “If the US military withdraws from Korea, China will be a big loser”** <https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2151584/if-us-military-withdraws-korea-china-will-be>

The biggest loser in the new situation would be South Korea. A nuclear-armed North Korea would easily impose demands on a South Korea without American military protection. The demands could range from reunification on Pyongyang’s terms to generous economic assistance from Seoul. A US departure from South Korea would weaken South Korea to the extent that it might have to give in to the terms dictated by North Korea on reunification. A reunified Korea may well turn out to be a second reunified Vietnam, but with nuclear warheads. Taking either a short or long view of history, there is very little reason to believe that such a Korea would prove to be a friendly neighbour to China.

Link: NK dictator Kim can play the long game and invade SK a few years after US troop withdrawal

Prof. Tom Campbell 2018 (He is a professor at Chapman University. He was Chairman of the World Affairs Council of Northern California, and a five-term U.S. Congressman serving on the International Relations Committee.) 14 May 2018 “Without US troops, would the North invade South Korea?” <https://www.ocregister.com/2018/05/14/without-u-s-troops-would-the-north-invade-south-korea/>

Five or 10 years after the U.S. troops are gone, Kim could threaten a conventional invasion. Kim is a dictator; no term limits apply; he can play the long game. How long Trump has is subject to domestic considerations, including Robert Mueller, and, in no event, longer than six and a half more years. Further, Trump might be eager for a diplomatic victory for domestic reasons. As the Watergate scandal began to close in around President Nixon, he sought success in foreign relations, especially the growing détente with the Soviet Union.

Impact: Korean War II = 10 million SK citizens in Seoul taken hostage

David Axe 2019 (Defense Editor of the National Interest) 20 November 2019 “Does South Korea Still Need U.S. Troops? In Short, Yes” <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/does-south-korea-still-need-us-troops-short-yes-97817>

Military journalist Kyle Mizokami in 2013 tested that proposition. Playing the realistic tabletop war game Next War: Korea, Mizokami discovered that North Korea’s million-person army with its thousands of old tanks and warplanes could simply overwhelm the better-equipped U.S. and South Korean troops along the Demilitarized Zone. After just a few days of fighting, North Korea could capture Seoul and take hostage its 10 million residents.

Impact: Conventional Korean War II would be devastating: Economic, human and environmental disaster

[*Jeremy Beaven*](https://twitter.com/jeremy_beaven) 2018 (*Marine Corps officer and a student at the U.S. Naval War College.) 17 May 2018 “North Korea: Time for a "Normal" Strategy?”* <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/5/17/north-korea-time-for-a-normal-strategy>

This bellicosity only inflames global tension, unnecessarily disquiets allies, and threatens the potential success of on-going diplomatic efforts. The sophomoric approach to foreign policy also belies the enormous tragedy that would result should violence erupt on the peninsula. Estimates of a conventional war include almost one million military and civilian casualties, $1 trillion in military operations and reconstruction, and potentially devastating environmental effects caused by damage to North Korea’s nuclear complex or South Korea’s nuclear reactors.  These numbers are irrespective of the human and economic costs associated with the refugee crisis sure to unfold.

Impact: North Korea could hit Seoul in minutes

Yochi Dreazen 2018 (American journalist whose area of expertise is military affairs and national security.) 8 February 2018 “Here’s what war with North Korea would look like” <https://www.vox.com/world/2018/2/7/16974772/north-korea-war-trump-kim-nuclear-weapon>

The experts I spoke to all stressed that Kim could devastate Seoul without even needing to use his weapons of mass destruction. The North Korean military has an enormous number of rocket launchers and artillery pieces within range of Seoul. The nonpartisan Congressional Research Service estimates that Kim could hammer the South Korean capital with an astonishing 10,000 rockets per minute — and that such a barrage could kill more than 300,000 South Koreans in the opening days of the conflict. That’s all without using a single nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon.

Impact: NK dictator Kim has a massive arsenal of biological weapons, which could kill 2.5 million

Yochi Dreazen 2018 (American journalist whose area of expertise is military affairs and national security.) 8 February 2018 “Here’s what war with North Korea would look like” <https://www.vox.com/world/2018/2/7/16974772/north-korea-war-trump-kim-nuclear-weapon>

The consensus view is that Kim would try to level the playing field by using his vast arsenal of chemical weapons, which is believed to be the biggest and most technologically advanced in the world. (Kim is estimated to have between [2,500 and 5,000 metric tons of deadly nerve agents](http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/chemical/) like [sarin](http://healthland.time.com/2012/12/06/assads-chemical-weapons-what-does-sarin-do/), which can cause paralysis and, ultimately, death.) With so many artillery pieces and rocket launchers trained on Seoul, Kim has the ability to quickly blanket the densely packed city with huge amounts of nerve agents. The human toll would be staggeringly high: The military historian Reid Kirby [estimated](https://thebulletin.org/sea-sarin-north-korea%E2%80%99s-chemical-deterrent10856) last June that a sustained sarin attack could kill up to 2.5 million people in Seoul alone, while injuring nearly 7 million more. Men, women, and children would very literally choke to death in the streets of one of the world’s wealthiest and most vibrant cities. It would be mass murder on a scale rarely seen in human history.

****A/T “SK can win a war with NK”- NK doesn’t need to win: With a massive arsenal of non-nuclear weapons, firing them off puts 25 million at risk****

**Major Peter Murphy 2019 (***has experience working in Iraq, the Philippines, South Korea, and the Pentagon; Master of International Relations from Bond Univ. in Australia, Master of Global Affairs and Policy from Yonsei Graduate School of International Studies in Korea.) 17 October 2019 “Why North Korea Can, and Should Give Up Their Nukes”* <https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/10/17/why_north_korea_can_and_should_give_up_their_nukes_114795.html>

Estimates aside, the fact of the matter is that North Korea in a single volley could launch hundreds of tons of explosives at the greater Seoul area, a densely populated area of more than 25 million people. There currently exists no means to intercept such a barrage, and no amount of sheltering or attempted evacuation from such a congested area could prevent a massive amount of casualties from such an attack. North Korea further augments this deterrence by punishment with ever increasing capabilities in cyber warfare, special operations infiltrators capable of wreaking havoc, and conventional intermediate-range missiles that can strike Japan or U.S. bases in the Pacific.

A/T “South Korea’s military is sufficient” – Not without US forces.

David Axe 2019 (He serves as Defense Editor of the National Interest. He is the author of the graphic novels War Fix, War Is Boring and Machete Squad.) 20 November 2019 “Does South Korea Still Need U.S. Troops? In Short, Yes” <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/does-south-korea-still-need-us-troops-short-yes-97817>

But it’s unclear whether the world’s 12th-largest economy can afford to replace forces contributed by the world’s number-one economy. Trump’s demand for a few billion dollars could achieve what decades of military posturing by North Korea have failed to do: deeply undermine South Korea’s defenses.

2. Loss of U.S. geopolitical strength

Link: Pullout from S. Korea reduces US influence, leaves vacuum for China to fill, reduces deterrence of aggression

Jacqueline Feldscher and Wesley Morgan 2018 (Feldscher is national security reporter at POLITICO. Prior to joining POLITICO, she covered defense from Capitol Hill and the Pentagon for the Washington Times and the Washington Examiner. Morgan is a military affairs reporter at POLITICO. Before joining POLITICO, he worked as a freelance journalist in Washington, DC, Iraq and Afghanistan) 13 June 2018 “Republicans buck Trump on Korea troop pullout talk” (brackets in original) <https://www.politico.com/story/2018/06/13/trump-korea-pullout-asia-troops-623328>

“The fear is if we were going to draw down our presence [in Korea], the only place we would still have permanent troops in northeast Asia is Japan,” said Hass, who previously served as the director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia on former President Barack Obama’s National Security Council. “I can imagine a situation where Japanese voters start asking, ‘Why are we the only suckers in Asia stuck with American troops?’” The fear: Withdrawing from the region entirely would diminish U.S. influence in the Asia-Pacific, leaving a vacuum for China to fill. Having U.S. troops in South Korea also demonstrates a clear commitment to American alliances and provides a forward presence to deter aggression

Link: U.S. presence counters China’s sphere of influence

Frances Tilney Burke 2018 (PhD candidate at Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and a non-resident fellow at the Modern War Institute at West Point. Previously worked as a special assistant to two Deputy Secretaries of Defense during the George W. Bush administration, as a counterterrorism analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency) 21 May 2018 “U.S. Forces in South Korea: A seven-decade commitment” <https://theconversation.com/u-s-forces-in-south-korea-a-seven-decade-commitment-96877>

In a broader strategic sense, large military exercises in the Pacific demonstrate U.S. power to the region. Beijing can practically sip a Tsingtao on the patio while watching Uncle Sam gambol about its backyard — the Korean peninsula. That reminds the potential adversary that the U.S. supports the democracies of South Korea and Japan, and opposes what Princeton international affairs scholar G. John Ikenberry calls a “closed, illiberal Chinese sphere of influence.”

Link: US forces in SK are a hedge against rising China

William Lucier 2018 (graduated from Fordham Univ with a BA in International Studies; wrote his senior thesis on North Korea) 3 October 2018 “U.S Troops: The Backbone of Peace and Stability on the Korean Peninsula” <https://www.americansecurityproject.org/u-s-troops-in-south-korea/>

Finally, U.S. forces in South Korea allow the U.S. to hedge against a rising China. The two air bases that the U.S. maintains in South Korea, Osan and Kusan, ensure that the United States will always have a platform to launch its aircraft in the region. This is particularly important as China has developed a new class of anti-ship missiles, which are specifically designed to impede U.S. carrier operations in the region.

Link: Undermines other U.S. commitments

Prof. Benjamin R. Young 2019 (assistant professor of cyber leadership and intelligence at Dakota State University.) 8 August 2019 “If Trump wins in 2020, he will pull US troops out of South Korea” <https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/If-Trump-wins-in-2020-he-will-pull-US-troops-out-of-South-Korea>

However, it should not be laughed at. The unreasonableness of $5 billion is the entire point: the Trump administration understands that Seoul will not pay, especially after it funded the $10.7 billion upgrade of the U.S. garrison, Camp Humphreys. Washington wants to use it as leverage to curb and eventually pull U.S. troops out of South Korea. This would not only be a massive boon for North Korea, China and Russia -- all South Korea's rivals -- but would also signal to U.S. allies around the world that its military presence abroad is based on tit-for-tat economic exchange, not mutual security.

Link: Loss of stability and North Korean aggression + Increased pressure from China & Russia

Prof. Benjamin R. Young 2019 (He is assistant professor of cyber leadership and intelligence at Dakota State University.) 8 August 2019 “If Trump wins in 2020, he will pull US troops out of South Korea” (brackets added) <https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/If-Trump-wins-in-2020-he-will-pull-US-troops-out-of-South-Korea>

Combined with the innovation of the Korean people and investment from the state, the continued U.S. military presence has helped the peninsula remain in a relative state of peace and thus contributed to the remarkable economic prosperity of South Korea. If USFK [US Forces Korea] leaves South Korea, North Korea may feel emboldened to launch an attack on South Korean territory. China and Russia will exert pressure on Seoul and pull the smaller nation into its economic orbit. South Korea needs USFK more than ever.

Link: South Korea turns to China

Capt. Sukjoon Yoon 2020 (Captain, ROK Navy, retired; senior fellow at the Korea Institute for Military Affairs.) 29 January 2020 “US Interests Are Not Served by Making a Scapegoat of South Korea” <https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/us-interests-are-not-served-by-making-a-scapegoat-of-south-korea/>

South Korea and the United States have never needed one another more, and they should be working toward narrowing their differences and expanding their mutual understanding. Is this the moment for Washington to insist on increasing South Korea’s annual contribution to support USFK from $870 million to $5 billion? Trump is likely ignorant of South Korea’s own domestic politics. There is growing support among younger South Koreans for a more autonomous defense policy: if the United States wants to withdraw its troops from the Korean Peninsula, then that is fine by them. How would the United States benefit from Seoul reaching out to China for a security alliance? At present this possibility seems remote, but South Korea is undeniably going through a transitional period of rebalancing its strategic stance between the two great powers.

Link: China wants Asia hegemony, wants to replace U.S. in the region

Prof. Oriana Mastro 2019 (Assistant Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown Univ) “The Stealth Superpower” <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/china-plan-rule-asia> Jan/Feb 2019

China has no interest in establishing a web of global alliances, sustaining a far-flung global military presence, sending troops thousands of miles from its borders, leading international institutions that would constrain its own behavior, or spreading its system of government abroad. But to focus on this reluctance, and the reassuring Chinese statements reflecting it, [is a mistake](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-02-13/china-reckoning). Although China does not want to usurp the United States’ position as the leader of a global order, its actual aim is nearly as consequential. In the Indo-Pacific region, China wants complete dominance; it wants to force the United States out and become the region’s unchallenged political, economic, and military hegemon. And globally, even though it is happy to leave the United States in the driver’s seat, it wants to be powerful enough to counter Washington when needed.

Link: China gaining Asian regional hegemony leads to gaining global hegemony, replacing USA

Min-Hyung Kim 2019. (Department of Political Science and International Relations, Kyung Hee University, Seoul, South Korea) 4 Feb 2019 A real driver of US–China trade conflict: The Sino–US competition for global hegemony and its implications for the future <https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/ITPD-02-2019-003/full/html>

Although China repeatedly claims that it does not seek to replace US hegemony in the world, its behavior revealed by the initiatives of the BRI, the AIIB and Made in China 2015 illustrates that its ultimate goal is to be a global hegemon. This is not surprising because all the rising powers in history invariably sought to first dominate the region they are situated ([Mearsheimer, 2011, 2014](https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/ITPD-02-2019-003/full/html#ref031%20ref032)) and expand their power globally ([Gilpin, 1981](https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/ITPD-02-2019-003/full/html#ref012)).

Impact: Apocalyptic consequences without US hegemony. Loss of peace, prosperity, democracy, world order

Brook Manville 2018 (principal of Brook Manville LLC, consulting on strategy and organization) 14 Oct 2018 “Why A Crumbling World Order Urgently Needs U.S. Leadership” FORBES https://www.forbes.com/sites/brookmanville/2018/10/14/why-a-crumbling-world-order-urgently-needs-u-s-leadership/#2bb8912f2e61 (brackets added)

The botanical metaphor in [Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Robert] Kagan’s book title began our recent conversation. “We’ve been living in a tranquil garden of largely peaceful practices and liberal expectations across much of the world, ignoring the dark forces of jungle multiplying under the rocks. If we don’t defend civilization’s cultivation—especially American’s guarantee of peace and economic integration across the world—the toxic creatures and weeds will roar back.” Thus China’s determined military rise, Russia’s continuing aggressions, fiery authoritarians on the march in so many once democratic countries. As [Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Robert] Kagan continued, “Trump has been damaging the system—he too seems to have forgotten what good it has delivered—but actually America’s desire for maintaining the global order has been diminishing for years. After the dissolution of the Soviet empire in the 1990s, people talked about ‘the end of history”—that America didn’t have to worry anymore about war or aggression. History doesn’t end, it simply paused. The ugliest aspects of human nature are surging again.”
**Vanishing Leadership, Vanishing Peace**
Kagan’s apocalyptic message, repeated in other recent writings, is lucid and terrifying, all the more devastating for its relentless use of history. It’s a footnoted plea that “we’ve seen this movie before.” He reminds us that Americans have frequently turned away from defending world order, with regrettably familiar outcomes: to be dragged in later at greater cost (e.g. helping to stop Hitler earlier might have prevented World War II); or, simply hoping that “the problem would go away,” to watch it get ten times worse (e.g. Obama’s policy in Syria). Kagan acknowledges that America has sometimes misstepped (e.g. Viet Nam, Iraq), but he still argues that overall our foreign engagement has produced more peace and prosperity than not. “History shows,” he summarized, “that world order has never been achieved without some constructive force to keep the peace. The relative harmony and fair play we’ve created in the modern world will vanish if the U.S. forsakes international leadership.”

3. Nuclear proliferation

Link: Withdrawal of US forces increases motivation for SK to develop its own nuclear weapons

NEW YORK TIMES 2018 (journalists Choe Sang-Hun and Motoko Rich) 4 May 2018 “Trump’s Talk of U.S. Troop Cuts Unnerves South Korea and Japan” <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/04/world/asia/south-korea-troop-withdrawal-united-states.html>

Conservatives in South Korea bristle at the possibility of a troop withdrawal, arguing that it would expose their country to potential foes far stronger than North Korea, like China and Japan, which have invaded numerous times over the centuries. South Koreans reacted to Washington’s past efforts to pull out troops with calls for arming the country with nuclear weapons of its own.

Link: U.S. leadership counters nuclear proliferation and Chinese hegemony

Daniel DePetris 2019 (a fellow at Defense Priorities and a foreign policy columnist at The National Interest) 21 November 2019 “Troops for Nukes: Should the US Trade Its Forces in South Korea for North Korean Denuclearization?” <https://www.38north.org/2019/11/ddepetris112119/>

Resistance would be equally fierce in the executive branch, particularly from the US Department of Defense, and the uniformed military leadership, which believe that the US presence on the Korean Peninsula is critical to preventing Chinese hegemony in Northeast Asia and maintaining a credible deterrent against North Korean aggression. And while it may not matter to Trump, the US Department of State and his key national security advisors in the White House would worry about the detrimental effects of a US troop withdrawal on America’s system of global alliances as well as the potential for nuclear proliferation in the region.

Link: Withdrawing U.S. troops could cause S. Korea and Japan to build nukes

Daniel DePetris 2019 (fellow at Defense Priorities and a foreign policy columnist at The National Interest.) 21 November 2019 “Troops for Nukes: Should the US Trade Its Forces in South Korea for North Korean Denuclearization?” <https://www.38north.org/2019/11/ddepetris112119/>

There would also be strong and nearly universal opposition in Seoul and Tokyo. For both countries, the US commitment to their security is an integral component of their national defense strategies. The removal of US troops from South Korea could prompt Seoul and Tokyo to reconsider their status as non-nuclear weapons states. While this may not bother Trump, it would be the cause of intense concern across the national security apparatus and practically eliminate the president’s flexibility to actually implement a US drawdown.

Link: Japan could easily get nukes

**Prof. Michael Heng 2018 (retired professor who has held academic appointments in Australia, the Netherlands, and at six universities in Asia) 20 June 2018 “If the US military withdraws from Korea, China will be a big loser”** <https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2151584/if-us-military-withdraws-korea-china-will-be>

Added to this is the possibility of the emergence of Japan as a nuclear power in the wake of a US military withdrawal from South Korea. Japan, with its remarkable technological base, can rebuild its military to beyond its proclaimed self-defence needs and produce more deadly warheads and powerful delivery systems than North Korea within a short period

Internal link: Troop withdrawal encourages nuclear proliferation. Past experience with SK proves US presence motivates SK to “not” do nukes

Prof. Jonathan Markowitz, Prof. Paul Avey, and Prof. Robert Reardon 2018 (**Markowitz** is Assistant Professor in the International Relations and Political Science Department at the Univ of Southern California.  **Avey** is an assistant professor of political science at Virginia Tech. **Reardon** is Assistant Professor of Political Science in the School of Public and International Affairs at N.C. State Univ) 11 January 2018 “Do U.S. Troop Withdrawals Cause Instability? Evidence from Two Exogenous Shocks on the Korean Peninsula” <https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=509005100118099008025115110002091101062011084076070069105104085101120111072089010104001126060041109056096073065102013087087007029022075093060103010014003073085078106055026013085102083068000025107005103077029004100024120029126069090013022089118089025069&EXT=pdf>

The relationship with nuclear proliferation was more complex. U.S. troop withdrawals had no obvious effect on North Korea’s proliferation decisions. Troop withdrawal more clearly influenced South Korea’s nuclear decisions in the 1970s, but there was no similar effect in the 2000s. The ROK weapons program in the 1970s was instigated more by concerns about longterm U.S. retrenchment than by the immediate effect of the troop withdrawals on the local balance of power. American assurances that it remained committed to Seoul’s defense contributed to the successful effort to terminate the program. This suggests withdrawals are a permissive condition for proliferation, which is consistent with proliferation scholarship arguing strategic vulnerability alone is insufficient to explain the historical infrequency of proliferation (Hymans 2006, Solingen 2007, Rublee 2009).

Impact: More bombs and more proliferation = bigger risk of nuclear detonation through: Terrorist theft, unauthorized launch, cyber hacking, regional rivalries

Nuclear Threat Initiative 2015. (non-profit, non-partisan advocacy group) 31 Dec 2015 “THE NUCLEAR THREAT” <https://www.nti.org/learn/nuclear/>

We know that terrorists are seeking nuclear weapons. Today, there are more than 1,800 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials-highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium—stored in hundreds of sites across 25 countries, some of them poorly secured. To build a bomb, terrorists won't necessarily look to the biggest stockpiles; they'll go where nuclear materials are the most vulnerable. That makes global nuclear security only as strong as the weakest link in the chain.
Systems Vulnerabilities
Command and control systems are not perfect. People make mistakes. Sabotage can happen. Technology has flaws and systems fail. The possibility of an unauthorized launch—or even an authorized launch without time for due consideration—is simply too high.
Nuclear Proliferation
Nuclear technology and the know-how to build a bomb is no longer a monopoly controlled by states. The threat of cyber-terrorism looms large, and experts are working furiously to keep up with cyber vulnerabilities that could be exploited by hackers to initiate a catastrophe.
Regional Dangers
Bitter regional rivalries in the Middle East, Northeast Asia, South Asia and elsewhere pose clear and present nuclear dangers to global security. These rivalries raise the risk that a nuclear weapon might be used in a deliberate attack, and the consequences of a regional nuclear exchange would reverberate across the globe.

Impact: Nuclear proliferation undermines democracy

Prof. Gary Bass 2020 (professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton Univ.) 28 April 2020 “Proliferated Nuclear Ethics” <https://www.lawfareblog.com/proliferated-nuclear-ethics>

Yet nuclear weapons undercut many of the institutional advantages of democracy. This weaponry forces fast decisions about retaliatory strikes, which in turn forces swift decisions about preemptive strikes. If a democracy fights a nuclear war, it could hardly do so with the transparency, deliberative procedures, and public accountability ordinarily required in the moral justification of a just war. Anyway, even in conflicts not involving nuclear weapons, Congress has often retreated from restraining war-making U.S. presidents. Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith [recount](https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/41426677) dozens of instances of Congress authorizing the use of force going back to the 1790s, while Harold Koh [warned](https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300044935/national-security-constitution) that the executive has been avoiding legislative constraints in foreign policy since Vietnam. When wielding the most lethal weapons in history, Donald Trump or Narendra Modi could be almost as unchecked as Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping.

BIG LINKS TO DISADVANTAGES 4, 5, 6, and 7 – WITHDRAWAL OF NATO TACTICAL NUKES

Big Link: AFF withdraws all US forces from Europe

That’s in their plan.

Big Link: NATO Nukes in Europe are owned by the US, under custody of US personnel

**[…would therefore have to be withdrawn by AFF Plan]**

Ottavia Credi 2019 (Junior Researcher in [Istituto Affari Internazional](https://www.iai.it/en/persone/ottavia-credi) Defence and Security Programmes) 1 July 2019 “US Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Necessary or Obsolete?” https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19821?seq=5#metadata\_info\_tab\_contents



Big Link: US Air Force personnel guard and maintain Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (NSNW) in Europe.

Ottavia Credi 2019 (Junior Researcher in [Istituto Affari Internazional](https://www.iai.it/en/persone/ottavia-credi) Defence and Security Programmes) 1 July 2019 “US Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Necessary or Obsolete?” https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19821?seq=5#metadata\_info\_tab\_contents



4. Lose deterrence against Russian threat

Link: Russia is a big aggressive conventional and nuclear threat and NATO nukes are key to deterring them

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg 2020. “Germany’s support for nuclear sharing is vital to protect peace and freedom” 11 May 2020 <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_175663.htm>

The Coronavirus is among the greatest threats the world has faced since the Second World War. However, that does not mean that others have gone away. We face the most difficult security environment for a generation. Around the world, terrorism continues, authoritarian regimes challenge liberal democracies, and we see the proliferation of nuclear weapons to countries like North Korea, as well as the continuing aggressive actions by Russia. In recent years, Russia has invested significantly in its military capabilities, and especially in its nuclear arsenal. While NATO views its own nuclear deterrent primarily as a political tool, Russia has firmly integrated its nuclear arsenal into its military strategy.  It has placed nuclear-capable missiles in Kaliningrad, just 500km from Berlin. It has threatened Allies such as Denmark, Poland and Romania with nuclear strikes. Russia also forcibly and illegally annexed part of Ukraine, a country whose borders it had previously committed to respect in return for Ukraine giving up its own nuclear protection.

Link: Nuclear weapons are better at deterrence than conventional

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change - NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2011/managing_change_lr.pdf>

For both physical and psychological reasons, conventional weapons do not have the same deterrent power as nuclear ones. Conventional deterrence has a long record of failure – in fact, as long as civilization itself. The threat of conventional bombing is not enough to make an adversary desist when the stakes become extreme or vital, or even when they are more limited: the crises of the past twenty years have shown that it does not always lead the adversary to change its strategic calculus. There is still a large difference today – at least one order of magnitude – between conventional and nuclear yields. For this reason, conventional weapons cost much more for an equivalent effect.

Link: NATO nukes deter by making the risk of attack on NATO far outweigh any possible gain

Franklin Miller, George Robertson & Kori Schake 2010. (Franklin Miller is former senior career policy official in the Pentagon and the White House, George Robertson is former NATO secretary-general and former UK defence secretary, and Kori Schake is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution in the US.) Centre for European Reform, GERMANY OPENS PANDORA’S BOX, 8 Feb 2010 <http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/bn_pandora_final_8feb10-245.pdf>

Their presence in Europe, however, affirms the coupling of US nuclear forces – including US strategic forces – to the defence of NATO’s territory. Bluntly put, the nuclear arsenal in Europe serves to put the US homeland at risk to nuclear attack if NATO is forced to resort to using Europe-based nuclear bombs to defend its borders. This in turn signals to any potential aggressor that the risks of an attack against NATO far outweigh any possible gains.

Link: European allies agree Russia is a threat

Rose Gottemoeller, 2020 (nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.) 29 Jan 2020 “Russia Is Updating Their Nuclear Weapons: What Does That Mean for the Rest of Us?” https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/01/29/russia-is-updating-their-nuclear-weapons-what-does-that-mean-for-rest-of-us-pub-80895

The Europeans, most prominently the NATO allies, are very concerned about Russia’s nuclear modernization programs. Their concerns revolve more around new nuclear missiles to be deployed on European soil than the intercontinental systems that threaten the United States. Poland and Lithuania, for example, are NATO countries bordering Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave in the heart of NATO territory. Russia has put increasingly capable missiles there, including the Iskander, a highly accurate modern missile that is capable of launching either nuclear or conventional warheads. Likewise, the Europeans are of one mind about the threat posed by a missile known as the 9M729 (SSC-8 in NATO parlance), which is an intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile that the Russians developed and deployed in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The allies all agree that this missile poses a threat to NATO. Although it has not been deployed forward in Kaliningrad, its range is sufficient to threaten all of NATO Europe when deployed in European Russia. It too is said to support both nuclear and conventional weapons.

Link: Withdrawal of US nukes would send a signal of weakness to Russia

Simon Lunn 2010. (Associate Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies; former Secretary General of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly) Nato’s Tactical Nuclear Dilemma, A Crucial Decision: NATO’s Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century 2010 https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201003\_op\_natos\_tactical\_nuclear\_dilemma.pdf

“Other new members made similar comments and leave little room for doubt as to the importance they attach to the presence of American nuclear warheads on European territory. The new members see no reason, therefore, to change existing arrangements. As one said: ‘Why do it? No one will thank you, certainly not the Russians. We may get our weapons out but the Russians never will. So will we be safer or less safe?’ Furthermore, a withdrawal of the warheads would send all the wrong signals. Russia, another ambassador noted, is about power. ‘If you draw down it is a sign of weakening’”

Link & Impact: US weakness increases risk of war. Example: Russian invasion of Georgia

Daniel Benjamin, 2008. (was confirmed by the Senate as the U.S. State Dept's coordinator for counter-terrorism in ‘09; at the time this article was written, he was Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution ) 20 Aug 2008 “The Russians Moved Because They Know You Are Weak” (brackets in original) https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-russians-moved-because-they-know-you-are-weak/

“And we are very far from the foreign policy envisioned by Condoleezza Rice in her 2000 Foreign Affairs manifesto for candidate Bush's foreign policy, which promised a new focus on "comprehensive relationships with the big powers, particularly Russia and China, that can and will mold the character of the international political system." As Rice wrote then but quickly seems to have forgotten, "These states are capable of disruption on a grand scale, and their fits of anger or acts of beneficence affect hundreds of millions of people." There is another aspect of the current crisis that is made in America. It was summed up by a European diplomat who told me last week, "The Russians moved because they know you are weak." He hardly needed to explain. With the U.S. military overstretched and publicly complaining about not having enough troops for Afghanistan, Moscow knew it had a propitious moment. Had we not been so bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, the White House—which has been watching this crisis build for months—might have left a thousand or so troops in Georgia after our last joint exercise or sent more warships for a visit to the Black Sea. Few would argue that we should get into a shooting match with the Russians over Georgia. But the presence of U.S. forces on the ground, or even the knowledge that there was a significant reserve available in Europe, might have given the Russians pause or at least a healthy fear of miscalculation. As it was, they had a perfect set of circumstances for their strike. Chalk it up as another indirect cost of the U.S. engagement in Iraq—of the fact that for most of Bush's tenure in office, we have had an Iraq policy, not a foreign policy. Dick Cheney often repeats the platitude that "[t]errorist attacks are not caused by the use of strength. They are invited by the perception of weakness." Too bad that Cheney and the administration could only think about terrorists—of whom there were virtually none in Iraq—and not all the other American interests that would be undermined by palpable evidence of our weakness.”

Impact: Net benefits. Reverse Plan Advocacy - Deterrence value of NATO nukes justifies keeping Status Quo

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change - NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2011/managing_change_lr.pdf>

An end to NATO nuclear arrangements would diminish transatlantic burden-sharing and solidarity, and weaken deterrence at a time when threats to NATO’s collective security are increasing. These arrangements should thus be maintained.

Impact: Need NATO nukes to deter threats from Russia and Iran

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change - NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2011/managing_change_lr.pdf>

The current trajectory of Russia’s policies is leading Moscow towards increasing friction with NATO in Europe and with the Western world in general. Likewise, the radicalization of the Iranian leadership and Tehran’s arrival at the nuclear threshold places it on a collision course with Western interests. Of course, the threat is far from being as grave and immediate as it was during the Cold War. But it is a credible hypothesis that by 2015 NATO, for the first time in its history, will face two revisionist nuclear-armed countries along its borders. This is not the right time to let down the nuclear guard.

5. Increased tensions with Russia

Link: Withdrawal of European nuclear weapons would require more military exercises, which would escalate tensions with Russia

Franklin Miller, George Robertson & Kori Schake 2010. (Miller is former senior career policy official in the Pentagon and the White House. Robertson is former NATO secretary-general and former UK defence secretary. Schake is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution.) Centre for European Reform, GERMANY OPENS PANDORA’S BOX, 8 Feb 2010 <http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/bn_pandora_final_8feb10-245.pdf>

As a practical matter, the withdrawal of Europe-based weapons to the US would make it difficult for the allies to keep those portions of their forces tasked with deploying the weapons in top fighting shape. They would have to compensate by increasing exercises, which is also likely to raise tensions with Russia and cause concern among domestic critics of nuclear weapons.

Link & Brink: US and Russia are on the brink of losing vital nuclear treaties because of bad relations now

Henry Foy, Ben Hall and Katrina Manson 2018 (journalists) US-Russia tensions threaten nuclear arms curbs, says Moscow, FINANCIAL TIMES 10 Oct 2018 https://www.kyivpost.com/russia/financial-times-moscow-warns-us-russia-tensions-put-nuclear-arms-curbs-at-risk.html

Critical elements of the arms control regime intended to prevent nuclear war between Russia and the US risk falling apart because of poor relations between the two countries, Moscow has warned. As US and Russian officials begin talks in Geneva on Wednesday to try to shore up a largely cold war-era system for limiting nuclear weapons, Sergei Ryabkov, Russia’s deputy foreign minister, said a “complete malfunction of the American system” meant vital treaties could lapse and leave nuclear powers without constraint in the event of a conflict. “We could lose several elements on arms control infrastructure,” Mr Ryabkov said in an interview. “The building is shaky.”

Brink & Impact: Must reduce tensions now, or else we risk catastrophic war between NATO and Russia

Alexandr Khramchikhin 2018. (deputy director of the Institute for Political and Military Analysis in Moscow) Rethinking the Danger of Escalation: The Russia-NATO Military Balance, 25 Jan 2018 https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/01/25/rethinking-danger-of-escalation-russia-nato-military-balance-pub-75346

In an atmosphere of crisis permeated by mutual recriminations and suspicions, both sides—NATO and Russia—have engaged in a series of military activities along the line of contact. These maneuvers in turn have triggered multiple warnings from both sides of a sharp deterioration in European security, a growing threat of a military confrontation between Russia and NATO, and an urgent need to deescalate the situation in order to avoid a catastrophic war with disastrous consequences for all. An emerging conventional wisdom maintains that the new Cold War in Europe, if allowed to continue unchecked, runs the risk of escalating into a hot war unless steps to reduce tensions are taken swiftly.

Impact: Increased risk of “Unmanageable escalation” between US & Russia

Henry Foy, Ben Hall and Katrina Manson 2018 (journalists) US-Russia tensions threaten nuclear arms curbs, says Moscow, FINANCIAL TIMES 10 Oct 2018 https://www.kyivpost.com/russia/financial-times-moscow-warns-us-russia-tensions-put-nuclear-arms-curbs-at-risk.html

The breakdown of the relationship posed a real threat to progress on buttressing nuclear arms controls treaties, since the Trump administration had refused to engage in substantive talks, he said. Security experts say the mutual mistrust has left the two nuclear superpowers at risk of an unmanageable escalation in the event of a crisis, while a new generation of weapons and cyber warfare capabilities could leave existing arms-control treaties in tatters.

6. Weakens NATO alliance

Link: AFF doesn’t consult the allies before doing their plan

The plan is simply US unilateral action. They don’t wait for other NATO countries to discuss it an d agree.

Link: Consensual planning among the NATO countries is a key principle of its nuclear policy

NATO official web site 2020. “NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy and forces” last updated 16 Apr 2020 <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50068.htm>

The key principles of NATO’s nuclear policy are established by the Heads of State and Government of the 30 members of the Alliance. The development and implementation of NATO’s nuclear policy are the responsibility of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). The NPG provides the forum for consultation on all issues that relate to NATO nuclear deterrence.  All Allies, with the exception of France, which has decided not to participate, are members of the NPG.

Link: Germany disagrees with AFF Plan – they want to keep NATO nukes

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg 2020. “Germany’s support for nuclear sharing is vital to protect peace and freedom” 11 May 2020 <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_175663.htm>

We will maintain an effective deterrence and defence, including through our existing nuclear deterrent. Therefore, I welcome Germany’s clear commitment to NATO and our nuclear deterrent. This is even more significant since we have just marked the 75th anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Europe. Our Alliance was built on the ruins of that devastating war, to ensure peace and freedom for future generations. Germany joined our Alliance just 10 years after the war ended, on May 6 1955. Since then, you have been a valued member of the NATO family, with all the benefits and responsibilities that implies. Our nuclear deterrence remains a vital part of keeping our peace and freedom. It is for the security of the whole alliance, for Germany, its neighbours, friends and Allies, who all have legitimate security concerns and who are all protected by NATO’s nuclear deterrent.

Link: Agreement and joint decision-making on nuclear weapons is politically significant. It’s important to alliance trust

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg 2020. “Germany’s support for nuclear sharing is vital to protect peace and freedom” 11 May 2020 <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_175663.htm>

An important part of our nuclear deterrence strategy is nuclear sharing. NATO’s nuclear sharing is a multilateral arrangement that ensures the benefits, responsibilities and risks of nuclear deterrence are shared among Allies. Politically, this is significant. It means that participating Allies, like Germany, make joint decisions on nuclear policy and planning, and maintain appropriate equipment.  It has also always been an important trust-building measure for Germany’s neighbours. Our common procedures, doctrine and exercises give Allies a voice on nuclear matters that they would not otherwise have.

Link: Questioning nuclear sharing could damage NATO cohesion

Lt Col. Aaron Bazin and Dominika Kunertova 2018. (Bazin – US Army lieutenant colonel. Kunertova - PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Université de Montréal, Quebec, Canada.) “An Alliance Divided? Five Factors That Could Fracture NATO” Jan/Feb 2018 MILITARY REVIEW https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2018/An-Alliance-Divided-Five-Factors-That-Could-Fracture-NATO/

Furthermore, the Alliance’s institutional structures allow for information exchange among allies that can raise the level of alliance cohesion independently from external factors. Additionally, the transatlantic bond has depended on credible signaling (i.e., an ally’s trust in another’s assurances). Especially in the context of nuclear sharing, “weak signals” of U.S. commitment to Europe could damage NATO’s cohesion.

Link: Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW), by just their presence, maintain alliance solidarity and strengthen unity

Dr. Paolo Foradori 2012 (PhD; Assistant Professor in International Politics at Univ of Trento (Italy). From 2009 to 2011, was Marie Curie Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, and at the Managing the Atom Project, Harvard Kennedy School ) “EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES” Chapter 12 TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NATO https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=706112

In the third section, I argue that, despite the prevailing post-Cold War thinking in most of NATO Europe, different security threat perceptions exist among the allies, and some of the new members in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) continue to attribute residual political and symbolic importance to the physical presence of TNWs on European soil. However, the status quo position of these members does not seem entirely intransigent, especially when balanced by a NATO/U.S. commitment to their defense by other (i.e., non-nuclear) means. Indeed, the issue of TNW forward deployment in Europe is, to a great extent, a proxy for lack of confidence in the future of the U.S. commitment and the diminished solidarity within the Alliance that these countries have experienced. NATO leaders are well aware of this complex dialectic within the Alliance and of the risk that decisions that are not unanimous may weaken the solidarity and indivisibility of Atlantic security.n:

Link: AFF plan doesn’t replace NATO TNW with any other strategy. That’s bad because we need a strategy in place for alliance cohesion first before we eliminate the TNW

Dr. Paolo Foradori 2012 (PhD; Assistant Professor in International Politics at Univ of Trento (Italy). From 2009 to 2011, was Marie Curie Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, and at the Managing the Atom Project, Harvard Kennedy School ) “EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES” Chapter 12 TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NATO https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=706112

If the wider concerns of those countries regarding the allied commitment to their defense can be suitably addressed, progress on further reduction in the numbers of TNWs and on softening NATO’s nuclear posture might be possible. In the final analysis, one cannot exclude the possibility that a properly tailored and strengthened “Asian model” of extended deterrence, whereby the U.S. nuclear umbrella can continue to function credibly without forward basing, could, in principle, be applicable to the European context.

Link: Without cohesion, NATO will fail

Lt Col. Aaron Bazin and Dominika Kunertova 2018. (Bazin – US Army lieutenant colonel. Kunertova - PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Université de Montréal, Quebec, Canada.) “An Alliance Divided? Five Factors That Could Fracture NATO” Jan/Feb 2018 MILITARY REVIEW https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2018/An-Alliance-Divided-Five-Factors-That-Could-Fracture-NATO/

For almost seventy years, NATO has positively influenced the world. The Alliance’s many credits include acting as a major factor in deterrence of nuclear war, contributing to the erosion of the communist ideology of the Soviet Union, and projecting stability in difficult places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Although these measures of past performance indicate that NATO could continue to succeed in the future, there are no guarantees. In fact, if the complex and adaptive security environment continues to evolve on its present course, it will become increasingly difficult to maintain cohesion of the Alliance. Arguably, it is one of the most successful alliances in human history, but without cohesion, NATO can and will fail.

Impact: WMD’s and Terrorism. Europe without NATO would be more vulnerable to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and terrorism

Dr. Hans Binnendijk & Dr. Richard Kugler in 2003. (Binnendijk - PhD in international relations; Vice President for Research at National Defense University, Director and Roosevelt Chair, Center for Technology and National Security Policy . Kugler - PhD, Distinguished Research Professor in the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University ) Nov 2003, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Dual-Track Transformation for the Atlantic Alliance," DEFENSE HORIZONS, https://archive.org/stream/DTIC\_ADA496472/DTIC\_ADA496472\_djvu.txt (WMD = weapons of mass destruction)

“Even if bigger budgets were forthcoming, European militaries no longer would enjoy U.S. help in developing new-era doctrines, structures, and technologies. In the military transformation arena, they would be left on the outside looking in. Without U.S. contributions, they could be hard-pressed to muster the wherewithal to deploy missile defenses to shield Europe from WMD attacks. Developing serious forces for power-projection outside Europe also would be difficult, without American help in such critical areas as C4ISR, strategic lift, and logistic support. Overall, the collapse of NATO could leave Europe more vulnerable to threats across the spectrum from terrorism to WMD proliferation and less able to exert influence in the regions that produce these threats.”

Impact: NATO is essential to world peace, saving lives

Admiral James Stavridis 2019 (US Navy Admiral; former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO) 4 Apr 2019 “Why NATO Is Essential For World Peace, According to Its Former Commander https://time.com/5564171/why-nato-is-essential-world-peace/

Moreover, despite all the frustrations of coalition warfare, most observers would agree with Winston Churchill that “there is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.” The greatest single advantage the U.S. has on the global stage is our network of allies, partners and friends. That network is under deliberate pressure: from China, with its “One Belt, One Road” competitive strategy, and from Russia, with its relentless attacks on coalition unity. A strong NATO means not only having allies in a fight, should it come to that, but also a powerful deterrent to the aggression of ambitious adversaries. Perhaps NATO’s greatest accomplishment is not even its unblemished record of deterring attack against its members but rather the fact that no alliance nation has ever attacked another. NATO’s most fundamental deliverable has been peace among Europe’s major powers for 70 years after two millennia of unhesitating slaughter on the continent. The disasters of the 20th century alone pulled the U.S. into two world wars that killed more than half a million Americans. History provides few achievements that compare to those seven decades of peace.

7. Nuclear proliferation

Link: NATO nukes prevent nuclear proliferation

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg 2020. “Germany’s support for nuclear sharing is vital to protect peace and freedom” 11 May 2020 <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_175663.htm>

NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements also directly support non-proliferation. For many decades, it has provided European Allies with an effective nuclear umbrella. This was essential for the development of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which prevents the spread of nuclear weapons, as it removed the incentive for nations to develop their own nuclear capability. If our nuclear sharing arrangements came to an end, more countries may again seek their own nuclear weapons.  This would result in a world this is less safe, not more.

Link & Brink: US nukes in Europe are key to European countries NOT creating their own nuclear weapons

Ottavia Credi 2019 (Junior Researcher in [Istituto Affari Internazional](https://www.iai.it/en/persone/ottavia-credi) Defence and Security Programmes) 1 July 2019 “US Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Necessary or Obsolete?” (brackets in original; NSNW=non-strategic nuclear weapons = tactical nuclear weapons) <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep19821?seq=5#metadata_info_tab_contents> (accessed 16 Mar 2021)

The most threatening and, unfortunately, most realistic scenario following a complete removal of American NSNWs from the European theater would be a new wave of nuclear arms race. Security pressures are, indeed, “the primary driver of proliferation decisions[.]” The threat of the US potentially withdrawing its NSNWs made several European countries consider the possibility of building their own nuclear arsenal. Polish leader of the Law and Justice party Jaroslaw Kaczynski is among the most outspoken representatives of such a proposition. In Germany, some critics and academics have been arguing the country should leave the NPT, stating that “Germany needs nuclear weapons.” Failing to do so would, in their view, leave the country exposed to possible Russian aggression. In Turkey, 54% of the population questioned on the matter declared they’d be favorable to the creation of a Turkish nuclear arsenal, should Iran make one of its own. [**END QUOTE**] Withdrawal from the NPT is technically not illegal. However, if all or even just some European countries decide to pull out from the treaty, this would likely lead to a total collapse of the NPT, and the rise of many new nuclear countries – a truly “horrific scenario.” Hosting an ally’s nuclear weapons makes a country less likely to feel the need to protect itself with by building its nukes. **[LATER HE CONCLUDES QUOTE**:] As long as the US maintains its NSNWs in Europe, its overseas allies won’t have reasons to seek the creation of their own arsenals.

Removing nukes triggers Turkey and other countries to start their own nuclear weapons, increasing risk of war

Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd S. Sechser, 2019 (Matthew Fuhrmann (@mcfuhrmann) is professor of political science at Texas A&M University. Todd S. Sechser is the Pamela Feinour Edmonds and Franklin S. Edmonds Jr. Discovery Professor of Politics and Public Policy at the University of Virginia and Senior Fellow at the Miller Center of Public Affairs.) 18 Oct 2019 “Can the U.S. protect its nuclear weapons in Turkey?” https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/18/can-us-protect-its-nuclear-weapons-turkey/

There is also a security challenge with withdrawing the weapons in the short term. Removing them from their storage vaults during a period of intense hostility could invite an act of sabotage. In the long term, the larger risk is that removing the weapons will prompt Turkey to try to acquire its own nuclear weapons. After all, Erdogan reportedly is exploring this option. But as relations with Turkey deteriorate, it is by no means certain that the presence of a few U.S. weapons will prevent this outcome. And there are other political and diplomatic tools for dissuading Turkey from venturing down the nuclear path if the United States pulls out its nuclear forces.

Removing nukes would cause Turkey to develop their own, and could trigger Greece, Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia to do the same

Joseph V. Micallef, 2019 (Joseph V. Micallef is a best-selling military history and world affairs author, and keynote speaker.) “Is It Time to Withdraw US Nuclear Weapons from Incirlik?” 14 Nov 2019 https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/11/14/it-time-withdraw-us-nuclear-weapons-incirlik.html

Removing the bombs will likely trigger renewed Turkish rhetoric about the desirability of obtaining atomic weapons. Turkish plans to do so, even if they never come to fruition, will have a direct impact on Iran's nuclear weapons program and on the U.S. and Europe's attempts to curb it. It may also trigger other countries in the region, especially Greece, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to consider starting their own development programs.

Impact: Proliferation = increased risk of nuclear war

GEORGE P. SHULTZ, WILLIAM J. PERRY, HENRY A. KISSINGER AND SAM NUNN 2011 (Mr. Shultz was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989. Mr. Perry was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997. Mr. Kissinger was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977. Mr. Nunn is former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.) March 7, 2011 “Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Proliferation” THE WALL STREET JOURNAL<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703300904576178760530169414.html>

Today, the Cold War is almost 20 years behind us, but many leaders and publics cannot conceive of deterrence without a strategy of mutual assured destruction. We have written previously that reliance on this strategy is becoming increasingly hazardous. With the spread of nuclear weapons, technology, materials and know-how, there is an increasing risk that nuclear weapons will be used. It is not possible to replicate the high-risk stability that prevailed between the two nuclear superpowers during the Cold War in such an environment. The growing number of nations with nuclear arms and differing motives, aims and ambitions poses very high and unpredictable risks and increased instability.

Impact: Nuclear proliferation = bigger risk of nuclear detonation. Terrorist theft, unauthorized launch, cyber hacking, regional rivalries

Nuclear Threat Initiative 2015. (non-profit, non-partisan advocacy group) 31 Dec 2015 “THE NUCLEAR THREAT” <https://www.nti.org/learn/nuclear/>

We know that terrorists are seeking nuclear weapons. Today, there are more than 1,800 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials-highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium—stored in hundreds of sites across 25 countries, some of them poorly secured. To build a bomb, terrorists won't necessarily look to the biggest stockpiles; they'll go where nuclear materials are the most vulnerable. That makes global nuclear security only as strong as the weakest link in the chain.
Systems Vulnerabilities
Command and control systems are not perfect. People make mistakes. Sabotage can happen. Technology has flaws and systems fail. The possibility of an unauthorized launch—or even an authorized launch without time for due consideration—is simply too high.
Nuclear Proliferation
Nuclear technology and the know-how to build a bomb is no longer a monopoly controlled by states. The threat of cyber-terrorism looms large, and experts are working furiously to keep up with cyber vulnerabilities that could be exploited by hackers to initiate a catastrophe.
Regional Dangers
Bitter regional rivalries in the Middle East, Northeast Asia, South Asia and elsewhere pose clear and present nuclear dangers to global security. These rivalries raise the risk that a nuclear weapon might be used in a deliberate attack, and the consequences of a regional nuclear exchange would reverberate across the globe.

BIG LINK TO DISADVANTAGES 8 and 9: US TROOPS IN IRAQ

Big link: US has 2500 troops in Iraq [that would be removed by AFF Plan]

Jim Garamone 2021. (authorized spokesperson for the US Defense Dept.) U.S. Completes Troop-Level Drawdown in Afghanistan, Iraq 15 Jan 2021 https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2473884/us-completes-troop-level-drawdown-in-afghanistan-iraq/

There are now 2,500 U.S. service members in Iraq and 2,500 in Afghanistan. It is the lowest number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan since operations started there in 2001.

8. Resurgence of ISIS

Link: US forces are key to building Iraqi capacity in the anti-ISIS effort

Jim Garamone 2021. (authorized spokesperson for the US Defense Dept.) U.S. Completes Troop-Level Drawdown in Afghanistan, Iraq 15 Jan 2021 <https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2473884/us-completes-troop-level-drawdown-in-afghanistan-iraq/> (brackets added; accessed 16 Mar 2021)

The acting secretary stressed the reduction of American force strength does not mean a change in U.S. policy in the country or region. U.S. forces will continue to work with Iraqi security forces and forces from the anti-ISIS coalition to ensure the enduring defeat of the terrorist group.  Iraqi government officials know that ISIS remains a threat, and the presence of U.S. and coalition forces helps build Iraqi forces and deters the reconstitution of the terror network in the country, [Acting Defense Secretary Chris] Miller said.

Link: U.S. forces in Iraq are critical for the anti-ISIS effort

Deutsche Welle Jan 10, 2020 (German international media organization) “US rejects Iraqi parliament's call to withdraw troops” <https://www.dw.com/en/us-rejects-iraqi-parliaments-call-to-withdraw-troops/a-51958747>

The US, which invaded Iraq and toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003, currently has some 5,200 soldiers on Iraqi soil. The troops are training and assisting Iraqi forces in the fight against the remnants of the defeated "Islamic State" (IS) militia. On Friday, the State Department said the US forces were crucial for the anti-IS effort and would not discuss removing them. Instead, the two sides should talk about "our right, appropriate force posture in the Middle East," the US said.

Link: Eliminating U.S. presence in Iraq hinders the fight against ISIS and other terrorist organizations

Khairuldeen Al Makhzoomi and Minatullah Alobaidi 2020 (**Al Makhzoomi**—bachelor's degree in political science and Near Eastern Languages and Literatures from the University of California, Berkeley, as well as a master's degree in contemporary Arab Studies from Georgetown Univ. **Alobaidi**— master's degree in contemporary Arab studies from Georgetown University's Walsh School of Foreign Service; also worked with international organizations, such as Heartland Alliance International and the World Bank) “The Dangerous Consequences of U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq,” 3 Feb 2020 <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/the-dangerous-consequences-of-u.s.-withdrawal-from-iraq>

Eliminating the U.S. presence in Iraq will not guarantee the security and stability of the country. In early January, the U.S. central command reported that it halted the training of Iraqi forces to assist them in fighting the Islamic State and other extremist organizations. Expelling U.S. troops from Iraq could potentially bolster the Islamic States’ residual presence and hinder the fight against terrorist organizations such as the Iranian-funded Shia military and political organization, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH).

Brink: A pullout of U.S. troops could cripple the fight against ISIS

Qassim Abdul-Zahra and Zeina Karam, Jan 6, 2020 (**Abdul**-**Zahra**—Baghdad-based reporter for the Associated Press. **Karam**–journalist for Associated Press; has a degree in political science and public administration from the American University of Beirut) “Push to oust US troops from Iraq a risky undertaking,” <https://apnews.com/6b7a59ff52aca0e5469fec1699f44823>

A pullout of U.S. troops could cripple the fight against Islamic State militants and allow the extremists to make a comeback. Militants affiliated with IS routinely carry out attacks in northern and western Iraq, hiding out in rugged desert and mountainous areas. Iraqi forces rely on the U.S. for logistics and weapons in pursuing them.

A withdrawal could facilitate ISIS’ resurgence

Alissa J. Rubin, Ben Hubbard, Farnaz Fassihi, and Steven Erlanger Jan. 2020 (**Rubin**–Baghdad Bureau chief for The NY Times. She won the 2016 Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting; **Hubbard**–Beirut bureau chief for The NY Times; **Fassihi**–writes about Iran for the New York Times. Previously, she was a senior writer for the Wall Street Journal for 17 years, based in the Middle East and at the UN in New York. She’s been honored with more than a dozen national journalism awards; **Erlanger**–chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times) “Iran Ends Nuclear Limits as Killing of Iranian General Upends Mideast” <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/05/world/middleeast/iran-general-soleimani-iraq.html>

On Sunday, the American-led coalition in Iraq and Syria said it would pause its yearslong mission of fighting the Islamic State and training local forces in both countries. A pullout of the estimated 5,200 American troops in Iraq could cripple the fight against the Islamic State, or ISIS, possibly facilitating its resurgence. A smaller contingent of about 1,000 United States troops are in eastern Syria.

Impact: ISIS = kidnapping, extortion, attacks and murder

International Crisis Group 2019. (independent organisationproviding independent analysis and advice on how to prevent, resolve or better manage deadly conflict; does expert field research, analysis and engagement with policymakers) “Averting an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria“ 11 Oct 2019 <https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/207-averting-isis-resurgence-iraq-and-syria>

In Iraq, the group operates as small, largely autonomous guerrilla units spread across the country’s most inhospitable terrain, including its mountains and deserts. From these hideouts, ISIS militants emerge to prey on rural areas, kidnapping and extorting residents and killing state representatives.

Impact: A resurgence of ISIS could lead to insecurity there and greater terrorism

Alex Ward and Zack Beauchamp Jan 13, 2020 (**Ward**–staff writer covering international security and defense issues for Vox; **Beauchamp**–senior correspondent at Vox, where he covers global politics and ideology. He has an MSc from the London School of Economics in International Relations) “9 questions about the US-Iran crisis you were too embarrassed to ask” <https://www.vox.com/world/2020/1/13/21051794/us-iran-soleimani-ukraine-airline-questions> [brackets in original]

Trump has long wanted US troops out of Iraq, saying that America has already spent enough money and lost enough lives since the 2003 invasion. But a precipitous force withdrawal could hurt the US strategically in the Middle East. “The near-term second- and third-order effects of [killing Soleimani] were not well thought out, nor were they appropriately planned for,” Becca Wasser, an Iran expert at the Rand Corporation, told me. “The long-term implications of how this could play out — for example, the revocation of US military access in Iraq could end the counter-ISIS mission, which could result in the group’s resurgence in Iraq and Syria, which in turn could lead to insecurity there and greater terrorism worldwide — are worse.”

A/T: “it’ll be Iran’s problem” — this ignores recent history

Daniel Benaim 2020 (fellow at The Century Foundation. He is also a nonresident senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and part-time faculty in the Program in International Relations at New York University Previously served as Middle East policy adviser and foreign policy speechwriter at the White House, the Department of State, and the U.S. Senate; former international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. MA in law and diplomacy from The Fletcher School) “Trump Hurts an Ally and Helps the Terrorists” 5 Jan 2020 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/05/opinion/iraq-iran-trump.html

Some may argue that by leaving, the United States will make Iraq and the jihadists there into Iran’s problem. But that ignores recent history, including the global chaos wreaked by the Islamic State just five years ago after American troops had left.

A/T: “if ISIS re-emerges, the U.S. will be invited back” — an unlikely and risky bet

Daniel Benaim 2020 (fellow at The Century Foundation. He is also a nonresident senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and part-time faculty in the Program in International Relations at New York University Previously served as Middle East policy adviser and foreign policy speechwriter at the White House, the Department of State, and the U.S. Senate; former international affairs fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. MA in law and diplomacy from The Fletcher School) “Trump Hurts an Ally and Helps the Terrorists” 5 Jan 2020 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/05/opinion/iraq-iran-trump.html

Some may argue that by leaving, the United States will make Iraq and the jihadists there into Iran’s problem. But that ignores recent history, including the global chaos wreaked by the Islamic State just five years ago after American troops had left. Others suggest that, should the Islamic State re-emerge to threaten the world, America would be invited back. That is a risky bet given the nature of America’s departure.

9. Iran gains influence & power

Link: A complete withdrawal from Iraq would strengthen Iran’s expansionist agenda

Khairuldeen Al Makhzoomi and Minatullah Alobaidi 2020 (**Al Makhzoomi**—bachelor's degree in political science and Near Eastern Languages and Literatures from the University of California, Berkeley, as well as a master's degree in contemporary Arab Studies from Georgetown Univ. **Alobaidi**— master's degree in contemporary Arab studies from Georgetown University's Walsh School of Foreign Service; also worked with international organizations, such as Heartland Alliance International and the World Bank) “The Dangerous Consequences of U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq,” 3 Feb 2020 <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/the-dangerous-consequences-of-u.s.-withdrawal-from-iraq>

A complete U.S. withdrawal will only embolden Shia loyalists in Iraq, further alienate the Sunni community from the Iraqi government, and strengthen Iran's expansionist agenda in Iraq as well as the rest of the Middle East. Iran has demonstrated its capabilities to do so by maintaining the upper hand in the Iraqi political, security, and economic sectors—even while U.S. troops remained on the ground.

Brink: Iraqis are already unhappy with the level of Iran’s influence

Khairuldeen Al Makhzoomi and Minatullah Alobaidi 2020 (**Al Makhzoomi**—bachelor's degree in political science and Near Eastern Languages and Literatures from the University of California, Berkeley, as well as a master's degree in contemporary Arab Studies from Georgetown Univ. **Alobaidi**— master's degree in contemporary Arab studies from Georgetown University's Walsh School of Foreign Service; also worked with international organizations, such as Heartland Alliance International and the World Bank) “The Dangerous Consequences of U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq,” 3 Feb 2020 <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/the-dangerous-consequences-of-u.s.-withdrawal-from-iraq>

Over the past three months, Iraqis took to the street to voice their anger towards Iran's continued presence, which the public connects to the ongoing destabilization, deteriorating economic conditions, and pervasive corruption. The overwhelming discontent felt by the Iraqi people, demonstrates how Iran’s regional influence campaign is facing widespread backlash. Iraq must handle this situation with caution, as the expulsion of U.S. troops will only deepen Iran’s hold on Iraq, intensify the existing economic crisis, increase external and internal strain, and diminish Iraq’s security posture.

Link: The push for the U.S. to leave is by pro-Iranian factions

Qassim Abdul-Zahra and Zeina Karam, Jan 6, 2020 (**Abdul**-**Zahra**—Baghdad-based reporter for the Associated Press; **Karam**–joined the Associated Press in Beirut in 1996. She has a degree in political science and public administration from the American University of Beirut) “Push to oust US troops from Iraq a risky undertaking,” <https://apnews.com/6b7a59ff52aca0e5469fec1699f44823>

A push led by pro-Iran factions to oust U.S. troops from Iraq following the U.S. airstrike that killed a top Iranian general is gaining momentum, bolstered by a Parliament vote calling on the government to remove them. But the path forward is unclear, and in Iraq’s deeply divided terrain, with a resigned prime minister and raging proxy war between Iran and the U.S., ending America’s 17-year military presence in Iraq is a risky undertaking.

Brink: Iran already has a lot of influence on Iraq

Martin Chulov Nov 18, 2019 (Middle East journalist for The Guardian) “Leaked cables reveal scale of Iran's influence in Iraq,” <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/18/leaked-cables-reveal-scale-of-irans-influence-in-iraq>

So prevalent is Iran in Iraq’s affairs that Iranian officers effectively have free rein across key institutions of state and are central to much of the country’s decision-making, according to the cables, which were passed to the Intercept and jointly published with the New York Times.

Link: Withdrawal would enable further Iranian influence

Qassim Abdul-Zahra and Zeina Karam, Jan 6, 2020 (**Abdul**-**Zahra**—Baghdad-based reporter for the Associated Press; **Karam**–journalist for Associated Press. She has a degree in political science and public administration from the American University of Beirut) “Push to oust US troops from Iraq a risky undertaking,” <https://apnews.com/6b7a59ff52aca0e5469fec1699f44823> [ellipses in original]

An American withdrawal could also enable Iran to deepen its influence in Iraq, which like Iran is a majority Shiite country. “It is not that simple,” Lebanese political analyst Ibrahim Bayram said of any withdrawal. “This will increase the complications inside Iraq, the conflicts and contradictions ... and the clash, both political and non-political, between the Iranians and Americans.”

Impact: Expansion of Iranian influence in Iraq / Reduction of US influence = Increased risk of war.

Dr. Munquith Dagher, Dr. Karl Kaltenthaler, Cordesman 2020 (Dagher is the CEO and founder of IIACSS research group (Al Mustakillah), public opinion research company in Iraq. Kaltenthaler is Professor of Political Science and Director of Security Studies at the University of Akron and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Case Western Reserve University. Cordesman - Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic & International Studies) 20 Mar 2020 “Iraq is the Prize: A Warning About Iraq’s Future Stability, Iran, and the Role of the United States” <https://www.csis.org/analysis/iraq-prize-warning-about-iraqs-future-stability-iran-and-role-united-states>

The United States has an incentive to stay engaged in Iraq because as it now stands, it is a country that is dominated and exploited by the Iranians, destabilizing the country and the region. An unstable Iraq that is dominated by Iran is a threat to US interests. The expansion of Iranian power in the region has drawn countries located there closer to war.

Impact: More internal conflicts and friction

Khairuldeen Al Makhzoomi and Minatullah Alobaidi 2020 (**Al Makhzoomi**—bachelor's degree in political science and Near Eastern Languages and Literatures from the University of California, Berkeley, as well as a master's degree in contemporary Arab Studies from Georgetown Univ. **Alobaidi**— master's degree in contemporary Arab studies from Georgetown University's Walsh School of Foreign Service; also worked with international organizations, such as Heartland Alliance International and the World Bank) “The Dangerous Consequences of U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq,” 3 Feb 2020 <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/the-dangerous-consequences-of-u.s.-withdrawal-from-iraq>

Additionally, Iran was able to extend its influence while acting as a shadow government throughout Shia dominated regions of Iraq. If left unchecked this trend could influence internal conflicts within Saudi Arabia, as witnessed previously by the Saudi-Shi’a uprising of 1979. Similarly, this friction will likely spread to other Gulf countries—such as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Kuwait—because of these countries’ large Shia populations.

BIG LINK TO DISADVANTAGES 10, 11, 12, 13 – US FORCES IN JAPAN

Big Link: US has 55,000 troops in Japan [would be withdrawn by AFF Plan]

US State Dept., Bureau of Political-Military Affairs 2020. U.S. Security Cooperation With Japan, 9 July 2020 https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-japan/

The depth of the U.S. commitment to the U.S.-Japan Alliance is evidenced by the approximately 55,000 U.S. military personnel stationed in Japan, and the thousands of Department of Defense civilians and family members who live and work alongside them.

10. East Asia instability / risk of war

Link: US military forces in Japan are key to maintaining peace and stability in east Asia

Bruce Klingner 2019 (specializes in Korean and Japanese affairs as the senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at Heritage Foundation) 26 Nov 2019 Don’t break alliances over money https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/dont-break-alliances-over-money

Attaining and defending American national interests in Asia requires U.S. bases and access, sufficient forward-deployed military forces to deter aggression, robust follow-on forces, and strong alliances and security relationships with South Korea, Japan and other countries in that part of the world. The U.S. military presence in Asia is also an indisputable signal of Washington’s commitment to defend its allies and maintain peace and stability in the region.

Brink: US/Japan defense relationship is the linchpin of US alliances in the Western Pacific

https://www.heritage.org/military-strength/assessing-the-global-operating-environment/asia

The U.S.–Japan defense relationship is the linchpin of the American network of relations in the Western Pacific. The U.S.–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, signed in 1960, provided for a deep alliance between two of the world’s largest economies and most sophisticated military establishments, and changes in Japanese defense policies are now enabling an even greater level of cooperation on security issues, both between the two allies and with other countries in the region.

Link & Brink: US presence in Japan deters aggression

JIM GARAMONE 2019 (spokesperson for the US Dept of Defense) 10 Jan 2019 Japan Alliance Remains Cornerstone of Peace in Asia, Commander Says
<https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1729086/us-japan-alliance-remains-cornerstone-of-peace-in-asia-commander-says/> (brackets added)

 “Our presence in Japan and the region is a deterrent against those countries who leverage coercion and intimidation to influence other nations economic, diplomatic and security decisions,” he [Air Force Lt. Gen. Jerry Martinez] said. “We must remain ready to serve as a credible deterrent to fight and win if others close the path of aggression.” Readiness requires training to be prepared for any contingency, the general said. “If we are going to send our sons and daughters into harm’s way, they must be the very best at what they do,” he added. They need to train in all types of weather, at all hours, and in all conditions and circumstances, “so they can be as prepared as possible to the nations’ business,” Martinez said. “When it comes to our mutual defense, there is no room for second place.”

Link: Must have forces deployed over there for: short response times, joint training with allies, and deterring miscalculation by adversaries

Admiral HARRY B. HARRIS JR. 2018 (U.S. NAVY; COMMANDER of U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND) Statement BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE 14 FEBRUARY 2018 <https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20180214/106847/HHRG-115-AS00-Wstate-HarrisJrH-20180214.pdf> (brackets added)

USPACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] is a “fight tonight” theater with short response timelines across vast spaces. Threats as discussed earlier require U.S. military forces in the region maintain a high level of readiness to respond rapidly to crisis. USPACOM’s readiness is evaluated against its ability to execute operational and contingency plans, which place a premium on forward stationed, ready forces that can exercise, train, and operate with our partner nations’ militaries and follow-on forces to respond to operational contingencies. Forward-stationed forces west of the International Date Line increase decision space and decrease response times, bolster the 36 confidence of allies and partners, and reduce the chance of miscalculation by potential adversaries.

Impact: High risk of war in East Asia if stability with China isn’t preserved

Prof. Øystein Tunsjø 2014. (Professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies) The Cold War as a Guide to the Risk of War in East Asia, Sept 2014 https://www.globalasia.org/v9no3/cover/the-cold-war-as-a-guide-to-the-risk-of-war-in-east-asia\_%C3%98ystein-tunsj%C3%B8

It is difficult to predict whether these developments will lead to war. The origins of the Cold War in Europe were driven by fear of the Soviet Union's land power and its ambitions to establish spheres of influence and regional hegemony. Contemporary China remains a dominating land power, but the emerging US-China security dynamics are driven by China's sea power ambitions and its emphasis on establishing a sphere of influence in maritime East Asia, not by the fear of a land invasion by China's army. A major war between two great powers possessing nuclear weapons remains unlikely. Nonetheless, it is more likely that there will be war in East Asia than was the case in Europe during the previous bipolar system. The land-sea regional geopolitics of East Asia are more dynamic and unstable than the static European geostrategic politics of the Cold War. If the militaries of either the Warsaw Pact countries or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had crossed the East-West divide in Europe during the Cold War, this would likely have triggered a major war, posed an existential threat and risked a nuclear war. In contrast, the contested areas in East Asia today are in the maritime domain, where a battle at sea could largely be confined to East Asian waters and not pose a direct existential threat in the form of a land invasion. The use of nuclear weapons is, therefore, less likely, and this might paradoxically increase the risk of war or a battle at sea.

Impact: Net benefits to US national security. Benefits of forward-positioned troop commitments outweigh the cost

**[In context, this card is talking about S. Korea and Japan – note the title of the article]**

Troy Stangarone 2016 (Senior Director and Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute) Is Trump Right to Suggest that South Korea and Japan Should Go Nuclear? April 2016 (ethical disclosure: Article is undated but refers to the recently completed Wisconsin primary, which occurred in April 2016) http://keia.org/trump-right-suggest-south-korea-and-japan-should-go-nuclear

This brings us to the last of Trump’s arguments, that the United States does not benefit enough from its commitments abroad. Is this the case? As previously noted, U.S. commitments to our allies have helped constrain nuclear proliferation, but the United States benefits in other ways as well. U.S. commitments abroad provide necessary stability around the world to maintain the peace and order that helps to enable the international commerce necessary for U.S. prosperity. U.S. bases abroad also provide forward positioning to allow the United States to deal with military threats abroad before they endanger the homeland.

Impact: Peace and prosperity in East Asia depends on maintaining existing US defense posture and military presence

Admiral HARRY B. HARRIS JR. 2018 (U.S. NAVY; COMMANDER of U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND) Statement BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE 14 FEBRUARY 2018 https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20180214/106847/HHRG-115-AS00-Wstate-HarrisJrH-20180214.pdf

Following the upheaval of World War II, the rules-based international order – or what the 2018 National Defense Strategy described as a free and open international order – flourished to keep the Indo-Pacific largely peaceful, creating the stability necessary for economic prosperity in the U.S. and countries throughout the region. Ironically, the country that has benefitted the most from regional stability is China. The collective respect for, and adherence to, international law and standards have produced the longest era of peace and prosperity in modern times. This was not happenstance. This was made possible by seven decades of robust and persistent U.S. military presence and credible combat power. America’s security treaties with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Philippines, and Thailand have buttressed this security order, which is consequently strengthened even further by growing partnerships with India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam.

11. US loses hegemony to China

Link: Reducing US forces weakens US global power and emboldens bad guys

[in context, Klingner mentions US forces in Japan and S. Korea]

Bruce Klingner 2019 (specializes in Korean and Japanese affairs as the senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at Heritage Foundation) 26 Nov 2019 Don’t break alliances over money https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/dont-break-alliances-over-money

Reducing U.S. forces deployed overseas would: make America weaker on the world stage; drive a wedge between Washington and its allies in Asia and Europe; risk triggering stronger actions by North Korea, China, and Russia; and exacerbate already growing concerns in Seoul and Tokyo about the continued viability of the United States as an ally.

Link: US and China are in a struggle for international dominance. China threatens US hegemony

Ashley Tellis 2020 (Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs and a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is also a counselor at the National Bureau of Asian Research and the research director of the Strategic Asia Program) 4 May 2020 "COVID-19 Knocks on American Hegemony" https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/04/covid-19-knocks-on-american-hegemony-pub-81719

After almost two decades of conflicted hesitancy, the United States finally acknowledged that it is involved in a long-term strategic competition with China. This rivalry, almost by definition, is not merely a wrangle between two major states. Rather, it involves a struggle for dominance in the international system, even if China as the rising power disavows any such ambition. China’s very ascendancy—if sustained—could over time threaten the U.S. hegemony that has been in place since the end of World War II. It is this reality of unequal growth—which has nourished China’s expanding influence and military capabilities—that lies at the root of the evolving rivalry.

Link: China is growing its military, intends to become a challenger to American power, and not just in East Asia

Dr. Kim R. Holmes 2015 (PhD in history from Georgetown Univ.; formerly worked for the Defense Policy Board, the U.S. defense secretary’s primary resource for expert outside advice; and public member of the U.S. delegation to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) 3 June 2015 China prepping for regional hegemonyhttps://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/china-prepping-regional-hegemony

The Chinese government is putting its money where its mouth is. It announced a 10 percent increase of the military budget for 2015. That would make China the second-largest military spender in the world. Increases in defense spending have been outpacing GDP growth rates for years, and although China’s defense spending is still far below America’s, it is growing while the U.S. is cutting its defense expenditures. All of this adds up to a bold new role for China’s armed forces. Long thought to be content with the mere defense of its mainland territory, China is clearly staking a larger claim for itself. It is striving to become the dominant military power in East Asia for sure, but also, in the long run, a rival challenger to American military power.

Brink: US on the brink of losing East Asia hegemony to China

Prof. Jennifer Lind 2018 (associate professor of government at Dartmouth Univ.) “Life in China’s Asia What Regional Hegemony Would Look Like” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-02-13/life-chinas-asia

For now, the United States remains the dominant power in East Asia, but China is quickly closing the gap. Although an economic crisis or domestic political turmoil could derail China’s rise, if current trends continue, China will before long supplant the United States as the region’s economic, military, and political hegemon.

Link: China wants Asia hegemony, wants to replace U.S. in the region

Prof. Oriana Mastro 2019 (Assistant Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown Univ) “The Stealth Superpower” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/china-plan-rule-asia Jan/Feb 2019

China has no interest in establishing a web of global alliances, sustaining a far-flung global military presence, sending troops thousands of miles from its borders, leading international institutions that would constrain its own behavior, or spreading its system of government abroad. But to focus on this reluctance, and the reassuring Chinese statements reflecting it, is a mistake. Although China does not want to usurp the United States’ position as the leader of a global order, its actual aim is nearly as consequential. In the Indo-Pacific region, China wants complete dominance; it wants to force the United States out and become the region’s unchallenged political, economic, and military hegemon. And globally, even though it is happy to leave the United States in the driver’s seat, it wants to be powerful enough to counter Washington when needed.

Link: China gaining Asian regional hegemony leads to gaining global hegemony, replacing USA

Min-Hyung Kim 2019 (Department of Political Science and International Relations, Kyung Hee University, South Korea) 4 Feb 2019 “A real driver of US–China trade conflict: The Sino–US competition for global hegemony and its implications for the future” https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/ITPD-02-2019-003/full/html

Although China repeatedly claims that it does not seek to replace US hegemony in the world, its behavior revealed by the initiatives of the BRI, the AIIB and Made in China 2015 illustrates that its ultimate goal is to be a global hegemon. This is not surprising because all the rising powers in history invariably sought to first dominate the region they are situated (Mearsheimer, 2011, 2014) and expand their power globally (Gilpin, 1981).

Link: China wants Indo-Pacific hegemony, wants to replace U.S. in the region

Prof. Oriana Mastro 2019 (Assistant Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown Univ) “The Stealth Superpower” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/china-plan-rule-asia Jan/Feb 2019

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Impact: Apocalyptic consequences if we lose US hegemony

Brook Manville 2018 (principal of Brook Manville LLC, consulting on strategy and organization) 14 Oct 2018 “Why A Crumbling World Order Urgently Needs U.S. Leadership” FORBES https://www.forbes.com/sites/brookmanville/2018/10/14/why-a-crumbling-world-order-urgently-needs-u-s-leadership/#2bb8912f2e61 (brackets added)

The botanical metaphor in [Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Robert] Kagan’s book title began our recent conversation. “We’ve been living in a tranquil garden of largely peaceful practices and liberal expectations across much of the world, ignoring the dark forces of jungle multiplying under the rocks. If we don’t defend civilization’s cultivation—especially American’s guarantee of peace and economic integration across the world—the toxic creatures and weeds will roar back.” Thus China’s determined military rise, Russia’s continuing aggressions, fiery authoritarians on the march in so many once democratic countries. [**END QUOTE]** As [Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Robert] Kagan continued, “Trump has been damaging the system—he too seems to have forgotten what good it has delivered—but actually America’s desire for maintaining the global order has been diminishing for years. After the dissolution of the Soviet empire in the 1990s, people talked about ‘the end of history”—that America didn’t have to worry anymore about war or aggression. History doesn’t end, it simply paused. [**He goes on later in the same context to say QUOTE:]** The ugliest aspects of human nature are surging again.”
**Vanishing Leadership, Vanishing Peace**
Kagan’s apocalyptic message, repeated in other recent writings, is lucid and terrifying, all the more devastating for its relentless use of history. It’s a footnoted plea that “we’ve seen this movie before.” He reminds us that Americans have frequently turned away from defending world order, with regrettably familiar outcomes: to be dragged in later at greater cost (e.g. helping to stop Hitler earlier might have prevented World War II); or, simply hoping that “the problem would go away,” to watch it get ten times worse (e.g. Obama’s policy in Syria). Kagan acknowledges that America has sometimes misstepped (e.g. Viet Nam, Iraq), but he still argues that overall our foreign engagement has produced more peace and prosperity than not. “History shows,” he summarized, “that world order has never been achieved without some constructive force to keep the peace. The relative harmony and fair play we’ve created in the modern world will vanish if the U.S. forsakes international leadership.”

Impact: World peace & prosperity at risk without US influence. US hegemony is key to global peace & prosperity

Capt. M. V. Prato 2009 (United States Marine Corps,Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Combat Development Command,Marine Corps University) “The Need for American Hegemony” <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA508040> (accessed 16 Mar 2021)

The world witnessed a vast shift in the polarity of geopolitics after the Cold War. The United States became the world’s greatest hegemon with an unequalled ability to globally project cultural, political, economic, and military power in a manner not seen since the days of the Roman Empire. **[END QUOTE]** Coined the “unipolar moment” by syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer, the disparity of power between the U.S. and all other nations allows the U.S. to influence the world for the mutual benefit of all responsible states. Unfortunately, the United States is increasingly forced to act unilaterally as a result of both foreign and domestic resentment to U.S. dominance and the rise of liberal internationalism. [**He goes on to conclude later in the same context QUOTE**:] The United States must exercise benevolent global hegemony, unilaterally if necessary, to ensure its security and maintain global peace and prosperity.

12. Nuclear proliferation

Link: Intensifying threat from N. Korea is influencing some in Japan to push for acquiring nukes

[Lindsay Maizland](https://www.cfr.org/bio/lindsay-maizland) and [Beina Xu](https://www.cfr.org/bio/beina-xu) 2019. (Maizland – staff writer for the Council on Foreign Relations. Xu - journalist ) 22 Aug 2019 “The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance” https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-japan-security-alliance

Tokyo and Washington started working more closely on missile defense after North Korea fired another missile over Japan in 1998. Since then, North Korea has launched dozens of missiles over Japan and claims it can [mass-produce medium-range missiles](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/21/world/asia/north-korea-missile.html). The intensifying threat has led some in Japan to push for acquiring nuclear weapons for self-defense and missiles for preemptive strikes.

Link: Japan may consider developing nukes in response to N. Korea threat if they doubt US protection

Mark Fitzpatrick 2019 ( Associate Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies) 3 Oct 2019 FOREIGN AFFAIR S “How Japan Could Go Nuclear It Has the Smarts and the Resources, but Does Tokyo Have the Will?” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2019-10-03/how-japan-could-go-nuclear

In a speech on September 6, the U.S. special representative for North Korea, Stephen Biegun, warned that Japan might respond to the growing nuclear threat from North Korea by developing nuclear weapons of its own. Japan has long had the means to go nuclear, thanks to its sophisticated nuclear power industry. But since agreeing to a security treaty in 1951, Japan has relied on Washington’s “extended deterrence”—the promise that any attack on Japan will trigger a retaliatory attack from the United States. The Japanese government’s confidence in that commitment has fluctuated over the last half century, and Biegun is not the first U.S. official to fret that Tokyo will lose faith in it altogether.

Link: 2 things trigger doubts. 1) eliminating extended deterrence commitments; 2) removing US troops

**[“Extended Deterrence” is the Status Quo’s guarantee of US nuclear retaliation against any country using nukes against Japan]**

Troy Stangarone 2016 (Senior Director and Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute) Is Trump Right to Suggest that South Korea and Japan Should Go Nuclear? April 2016 (ethical disclosure: Article is undated but refers to the recently completed Wisconsin primary, which occurred in April 2016) http://keia.org/trump-right-suggest-south-korea-and-japan-should-go-nuclear

Eliminating U.S. extended deterrence commitments to South Korea and Japan, along with Trump’s previous suggestions that he would withdraw U.S. troops if both countries did not pay more for their stationing, raises questions about how the United States would fulfill its obligations on the mutual defense treaties it has with both nations.

Link: Weakening US security commitments would encourage Japan to build nukes

Troy Stangarone 2016 (Senior Director and Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute) Is Trump Right to Suggest that South Korea and Japan Should Go Nuclear? April 2016 (ethical disclosure: Article is undated but refers to the recently completed Wisconsin primary, which occurred in April 2016) http://keia.org/trump-right-suggest-south-korea-and-japan-should-go-nuclear

Is it inevitable that South Korea and Japan will develop nuclear weapons? As [Mark Fitzpatrick](http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/adelphi/by%20year/2015-9b13/asias-latent-nuclear-powers-7b8a) of the Institute for International Security Studies points out, the United States’ nuclear umbrella and policy of extended deterrence have provided reassurances to Seoul and Tokyo about their security posture. Both countries would likely pursue a nuclear option if they believed that the security assurances of the United States were in doubt.
At the same time, both South Korea and Japan have refrained from developing nuclear weapons despite North Korea’s continued pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. If the possession of nuclear weapons by a neighboring state were an indicator of a country’s likelihood of developing nuclear weapons, one would have expected South Korea and Japan to already have done so. Ultimately, a Trump administration policy of weakening U.S. security commitments to Seoul and Tokyo would likely do more to encourage them to develop a nuclear weapons program than anything North Korea has done to date.

Link: Japan has the materials and technology to make a bomb. Stockpiling the materials in itself creates the nuclear threat

Robert Windrem 2014 (journalist with NBC News) 11 Mar 2014 “Japan Has Nuclear 'Bomb in the Basement,' and China Isn't Happy” https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/fukushima-anniversary/japan-has-nuclear-bomb-basement-china-isn-t-happy-n48976

Japan now has 9 tons of plutonium stockpiled at several locations in Japan and another 35 tons stored in France and the U.K. The material is enough to create 5,000 nuclear bombs. The country also has 1.2 tons of enriched uranium. Technical ability doesn’t equate to a bomb, but experts suggest getting from raw plutonium to a nuclear weapon could take as little as six months after the political decision to go forward. A senior U.S. official familiar with Japanese nuclear strategy said the six-month figure for a country with Japan’s advanced nuclear engineering infrastructure was not out of the ballpark, and no expert gave an estimate of more than two years. In fact, many of Japan’s conservative politicians have long supported Japan’s nuclear power program because of its military potential. “The hawks love nuclear weapons, so they like the nuclear power program as the best they can do,” said Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Non-Proliferation Program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California. “They don’t want to give up the idea they have, to use it as a deterrent.” Many experts now see statements by Japanese politicians about the potential military use of the nation’s nuclear stores as part of the “bomb in the basement” strategy, at least as much about celebrating Japan’s abilities and keeping its neighbors guessing as actually building weapons.

Link: Japan wants China and N. Korea to think they’re building a bomb, or will build it quickly if needed

Robert Windrem 2014 (journalist with NBC News) 11 Mar 2014 “Japan Has Nuclear 'Bomb in the Basement,' and China Isn't Happy” https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/fukushima-anniversary/japan-has-nuclear-bomb-basement-china-isn-t-happy-n48976

But government officials and proliferation experts say Japan is happy to let neighbors like China and North Korea believe it is part of the nuclear club, because it has a “bomb in the basement” -– the material and the means to produce nuclear weapons within six months, according to some estimates. And with tensions rising in the region, China’s belief in the “bomb in the basement” is strong enough that it has demanded Japan get rid of its massive stockpile of plutonium and drop plans to open a new breeder reactor this fall.

Link: Telling Japan to “do more” for its own defense = encouraging it to develop its own nukes

James L. Schoff 2009 (Associate Director of Asia-Pacific Studies at Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis) March 2009 “Realigning Priorities The U.S.-Japan Alliance & the Future of Extended Deterrence” http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/RealignPriorities.pdf

More broadly, there is an increasingly widespread belief in the U.S. government (and within the Defense Department in particular) that Japan can and should become a fuller partner in preserving global order and contributing more tangibly to the protection of democracy and free-market economies around the world. To some extent, Japan is already playing a more active role as a U.S. ally in and beyond the Asia-Pacific area, though Washington has higher hopes. This is not to say that the U.S. government advocates or expects Japan to develop nuclear weapons as a result, but if Japan’s military does eventually operate abroad more frequently and robustly, Tokyo could determine that it needs its own nuclear deterrent to compensate for dispersing its forces around the world. In this hypothetical scenario, the U.S. government would be hard pressed to argue against such an approach, having pushed for it in the first place.

Link: Japan developing nukes would encourage proliferation – other nations would consider doing the same

Emma Chanlett-Avery, Mary Beth Nikitin 2009. (Chanlett-Avery – Specialist in Asian Affairs. Nikitin – Analys in Nonproliferation. Both are with Congressional Research Service) 19 Feb 2009 “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and US Interests” https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf

Japan’s development of its own nuclear arsenal could also have damaging impact on U.S. nonproliferation policy. It would be more difficult for the United States to convince non-nuclear weapon states to keep their non-nuclear status or to persuade countries such as North Korea to give up their weapons programs. The damage to the NPT as a guarantor of nuclear power for peaceful use and the IAEA as an inspection regime could be irreparable if Japan were to leave or violate the treaty. If a close ally under its nuclear umbrella chose to acquire the bomb, perhaps other countries enjoying a strong bilateral relationship with the United States would be less inhibited in pursuing their own option.

Link: Cascade of proliferation if list of Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) grows Impact: Nuclear terrorism

James L. Schoff 2009 (Associate Director of Asia-Pacific Studies at Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis) March 2009 “Realigning Priorities The U.S.-Japan Alliance & the Future of Extended Deterrence” http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/RealignPriorities.pdf

A common theme in many of these reports is the overriding concern about nuclear proliferation and the potential negative consequences such as nuclear terrorism or a possible cascade of proliferation if the list of NWS begins to grow

Impact: Peace and the inhabitability of the planet depend on opposing nuclear proliferation

Prof. Gary J. Bass 2020 (Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University ) ETHICS April 2020 “Just and Unjust Proliferation” https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gjbass/files/bass\_ethics.pdf

In March 1963, not long after the Cuban missile crisis, John F. Kennedy worried that without nuclear arms control, “I see the possibility in the 1970s of the President of the United States having to face a world in which fifteen or twenty or twenty-five nations may have these weapons. I regard this as the greatest possible danger and hazard.”1 With nine nuclear-armed states today, he was wrong about the numbers but prescient about the dawning challenge. What once primarily preoccupied Americans and Soviets is now a problem for a host of nations from China to Israel—as well as everyone living in a common environment, and future generations entitled to an inhabitable planet. The ongoing spread of nuclear weaponry poses moral issues of the highest importance, in addition to the more obvious, if no less terrifying, problems of maintaining the peace.

Impacts to Nuc. Proliferation: Terrorists get nukes, massive deaths, increased poverty, lives lived in fear, oppression of human rights

Prof. Gary J. Bass 2020 (Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University ) ETHICS April 2020 “Just and Unjust Proliferation” https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gjbass/files/bass\_ethics.pdf

Nuclear proliferation today sparks a series of serious moral objections, even beyond those voiced in the Cold War. Some of these nuclear-armed states could provide nuclear technology to terrorist groups, which would result in the deaths of vast numbers of innocent civilians. Nuclear arms races cost money, which poor countries—and rich ones too—could better spend on providing public services for their people. (Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto said in 1965 that if India got the bomb, then so would Pakistan “even if we have to feed on grass and leaves.”) The more nuclear states there are on a hair-trigger, the higher the chances are of an accidental launch or a blunder into an unwanted apocalypse. There is some harm done to citizens of neighboring states by forcing them to live in fear of extermination and the potential for vastly worse harm should the weapons ever be used. Proliferation tends to beget proliferation, with newly armed states providing help to other newly armed states or to unarmed states. The taboo against nuclear weaponry is eroded, arguably to the detriment of all. And acquisition of nuclear weapons by repressive governments renders them immune to foreign pressure to respect the human rights of their citizens.

13. Re-militarization of Japan

Background: Japanese history and its renunciation of military power

David L. Prosser 2017 (Master’s thesis at the US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif.) ANALYSIS OF KEY FACTORS DRIVING JAPAN’S MILITARY NORMALIZATION https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1046911.pdf

When the United States defeated Japan in World War II, members of General MacArthur’s staff wrote a new constitution for Japan. While the world has changed in unimaginable ways since the end of World War II, the Japanese constitution has not. Its Article 9 abolished Japan’s right to maintain a military or wage war.

Link: While Japan relies on US protection, even with it, threats from China and N. Korea motivate Japan to consider restoring its military power

David L. Prosser 2017 (Master’s thesis at the US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif.) ANALYSIS OF KEY FACTORS DRIVING JAPAN’S MILITARY NORMALIZATION https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1046911.pdf

Japanese prime ministers’ reactions to it vary, but the regional security threat is menacing and increasing, and it significantly influences national policy and normalization. The continuing military growth of China and the nuclear and missile advancements of North Korea provide constant pressure on Japan to counter regional security issues. Though the United States provides a security umbrella, the rise of China and increased volatility of North Korea offer sufficient impetus to normalize the Japanese military.

Link: Even if Japanese remilitarization is justified, it will still be perceived as offensively threatening

David L. Prosser 2017 (Master’s thesis at the US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif.) ANALYSIS OF KEY FACTORS DRIVING JAPAN’S MILITARY NORMALIZATION https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1046911.pdf

The artillery and missiles fielded by North Korea, and pointed at both South Korea and Japan, are a devastating current driver for improving defenses and normalizing the Japanese military. North Korea’s perception of Japan is also influenced by negative memories from World War II, and the two countries’ standoff has been exacerbated by lack of economic reliance, poor diplomatic ties, and a series of abductions in the 1970s and 1980s. North Korean missile testing aimed at Japan is a direct stimulus for Japan to improve its missile defense capability. Due to the unpredictability of North Korea, Japan’s behavior must be characterized as defensive and reactionary, but increased defenses can be perceived as offensively threatening.

Brink: Northeast Asia is extremely volatile and Japanese remilitarization makes it worse

David L. Prosser 2017 (Master’s thesis at the US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif.) ANALYSIS OF KEY FACTORS DRIVING JAPAN’S MILITARY NORMALIZATION https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1046911.pdf

There are a myriad number of complicated relationships in the region, and Japanese military normalization further adds complexity. Only the notorious international relations situation in the Middle East compares to the volatility of Northeast Asia. North Korea is the most daunting outlier, but South Korea, Russia, and especially China must be considered as potent factors influencing the tempo of Japan’s normalization.

Link: Weakening the US/Japan alliance is bad because Japan would remilitarize and be a danger to itself and the region

Robert Kaplan 2019. (Senior Fellow at the [Center for a New American Security](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Center_for_a_New_American_Security) ) WALL STREET JOURNAL 22 Feb 2019 Japan grows nervous about the US https://www.eurasiagroup.net/live-post/japan-grows-nervous-about-the-us

Neoisolationists believe Japan, like other US allies, should stand on its own two feet. But thanks to its deepening military insecurity, the Japanese are already toughening their armed forces. Unlike the Europeans, the Japanese don't need lectures. Japan's leadership wants to escape the shackles of its pacifist constitution, get its various armed services to work better together, and acquire amphibious assault vehicles, tanker aircraft, and much more. That should be troubling. A Japan unbounded by a dependable US alliance system is a danger to itself and the region. Japan is the universal joint of American power in Asia; any weakening of the US-Japan alliance would signal the final eclipse of the American-led world.

Impact: Remilitarization of Japan could trigger World War 3 with China

Alex Ward 2019. (journalist) 30 Apr 2019 “The rise of Japanese militarism” (brackets in original) https://www.vox.com/2019/4/30/18100066/japan-shinzo-abe-sdf-emperor-china

Having new and upgraded weaponry will help defend against and deter a possible attack. But with an eye to the future, it may also allow Japan to ably protect itself should a war with Beijing break out. Japanese officials balk at any suggestion that the country would ever get into a shooting war with China. “China has been our neighbor for thousands of years, and it’s going to be for thousands more,” the top diplomat said, reassuring me that Tokyo has no designs to use force against its regional foe despite Japan’s “more and more active” military. A top Japanese defense official made the same point in starker terms: “We can’t provoke China. That would be suicide for us.” But convincing China of Japan’s harmless intentions is proving to be a bit harder. “Such [a] move by the Japanese side is not conducive to the improvement and development of China-Japan ties or the peace and stability in the region,” [Hua Chunying](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1623094.shtml), a spokesperson for China’s foreign ministry, said at a news conference in December. “We urge Japan to keep its commitment to the ‘purely defensive defense’ strategy, stay committed to the path of peaceful development and act cautiously in the area of military security,” she continued. It again highlights the problem Japan has breaking out of its postwar hangover without angering China. Should Tokyo develop too slowly, it could fall further behind Beijing in military strength. But if it arms too quickly, China and other adversaries may miscalculate and believe it’s laying the foundations for war. That, of course, would be the worst outcome. A war between China and Japan would almost certainly be the catalyst for a third world war, some experts say.