Negative: Afghans Accept Them All

By “Coach Vance” Trefethen

***Resolved: The European Union should substantially reform its immigration policy.***

Afghans should be admitted unconditionally as refugees into the EU unless they have a criminal record or security threat.

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Negative: Afghan Acceptance

TOPICALITY

1. Not a substantial reform in policy

Affirmative’s policy is: Afghans should rarely be returned to Afghanistan

AFF will stop returning all of them, except for those that are a security risk or criminals.

Status Quo policy is: Afghans are very seldom returned to Afghanistan

Dr. Bernd Parusel 2018 (PhD; *adviser and secretary to a government-appointed, parliamentary commission of inquiry of Sweden’s future migration policy* ) 19 Feb 2018 Afghan asylum seekers and the deficits of the Common European Asylum System <https://blog.fluchtforschung.net/afghan-asylum-seekers-deficits-common-european-asylum-system/> (accessed 12 Feb 2021)

Although the EU and several of its Member States have concluded [readmission agreements with Afghanistan](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu_afghanistan_joint_way_forward_on_migration_issues.pdf), which should eliminate several of the practical obstacles mentioned, the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan is certainly a root cause for many problems. For example, several [German federal states have halted deportations to Afghanistan](https://www.bundestag.de/blob/508042/80f417bcff57bd3df331b76843a729b8/wd-3-074-17-pdf-data.pdf) due to security concerns, and in May 2017, deportations were stopped following a terror attack near the German embassy in Kabul. In early February 2018, [Sweden paused forced returns](http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=83&artikel=6878001) after another attack, which made it impossible for embassy staff to reach the airport in Kabul to meet returnees. A recent [survey by the European Migration Network](http://www.emnsweden.se/download/18.5bc6881815e14db67502576/1510911095580/SE-EMN_AHQ_Forced-returns-to-Afghanistan_SUMMARY_2017-11-08.pdf) showed that most EU Member States in practice very seldom carry out forced removals to Afghanistan, or none at all, or that they only deport single adult men – exempting, for example, unaccompanied minors, women, or other vulnerable persons.

Violation: Not much difference between Status Quo and Affirmative plan

When the Affirmative’s “considerable reform” sounds just like the Status Quo, it isn’t saying much for the resolution or their defense of it.

Impact: No Affirmative team means Negative ballot

If no one is affirming considerable reform, then there is no Affirmative team in the round, so no matter who wins, you should vote Negative.

INHERENCY

1. Status Quo reacts to Afghanistan security issues

Status Quo EU Member State governments react to security problems in Afghanistan by suspending returns

Dr. Bernd Parusel 2018 (PhD; *adviser and secretary to a government-appointed, parliamentary commission of inquiry of Sweden’s future migration policy* ) 19 Feb 2018 Afghan asylum seekers and the deficits of the Common European Asylum System <https://blog.fluchtforschung.net/afghan-asylum-seekers-deficits-common-european-asylum-system/> (accessed 12 Feb 2021)

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HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE

1. Afghans are rarely returned

The EU rarely returns migrants to Afghanistan in Status Quo

Dr. Bernd Parusel 2019 (PhD; *adviser and secretary to a government-appointed, parliamentary commission of inquiry of Sweden’s future migration policy* ) last updated 21 Aug 2019 “Neither fair nor realistic? How the EU deals with Afghan asylum seekers” <https://www.oxforcedmigration.com/post/neither-fair-nor-realistic-how-the-eu-deals-with-afghan-asylum-seekers> (accessed 12 Feb 2021)

Over the past ten years, almost 580,000 Afghan nationals have applied for asylum in the European Union. Afghanistan was the second most important country of origin among asylum seekers in the EU, after Syria. The way the EU Member States deal with them is subject to much controversy. Despite a worsening security situation in their country of origin, on average more than half of all asylum claims by Afghans are rejected. They are also confronted with severe injustices as their recognition rates vary greatly, depending on where in the EU their claims are examined. Among the many who are rejected, a majority risk ending up in protracted legal and social limbo situations as they are required to leave the EU, but are in reality rarely returned to their country of origin.

2. No harm returning to Afghanistan

Over 865 thousand returned in 2020

International Organization for Migration 2020. (intergovernmental organization that provides services and advice concerning migration to governments and migrants, including internally displaced persons, refugees, and migrant workers; it’s a related agency of the UN) RETURN OF UNDOCUMENTED AFGHANS WEEKLY SITUATION REPORT 20-31 DECEMBER 2020 <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/iom_afghanistan-return_of_undocumented_afghans_situation_report_20-31_december_2020.pdf> (accessed 12 Feb 2021)

**2020 Highlights**865,793 total returns from Iran and Pakistan since 01 January 2020
859,092 total returns from Iran in 2020
6,701 total returns from Pakistan in 2020
Over the past two weeks 27,396 undocumented Afghans returned from Iran with 3% of returnees from Iran (807 individuals) assisted
Over the past two weeks 205 undocumented Afghans returned from Pakistan with 95% of returnees from Pakistan (195 individuals) assisted

Trend is increasing: 2020 is the biggest year on record for return of Afghan migrants

International Organization for Migration 2020. (intergovernmental organization that provides services and advice concerning migration to governments and migrants, including internally displaced persons, refugees, and migrant workers; it’s a related agency of the UN) RETURN OF UNDOCUMENTED AFGHANS WEEKLY SITUATION REPORT 20-31 DECEMBER 2020 <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/iom_afghanistan-return_of_undocumented_afghans_situation_report_20-31_december_2020.pdf> (accessed 12 Feb 2021)

2020 is the largest ever return year on record for undocumented Afghan migrants with the total exceeding the 805,000 migrants that returned in 2018.

3. Afghans in the EU aren’t legitimate refugees #1: Based on reasons for leaving

International Law definition of “Refugee” excludes most of the harms claimed in the AFF case.

**For example, the fact that “Afghanistan is a dangerous place” doesn’t make anyone a refugee**

Ionel Zamfir 2015 (with European Parliamentary Research Service) 27 Oct 2015 “Refugee Status Under International Law” <https://epthinktank.eu/2015/10/27/refugee-status-under-international-law/> (accessed 12 Feb 2021)

Refugees are a special class of migrants who under international law deserve specific protection by their host state. According to Article 1 of the 1951 UN Convention, as modified by the 1967 Protocol, a refugee is defined as a person who ‘owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.’ This definition implies that several qualifying conditions apply to be considered a refugee: (1) **presence** **outside home country**; (2) **well-founded fear of persecution** (being at risk of harm is insufficient reason in the absence of discriminatory persecution); (3) **incapacity to enjoy the protection of one’s own state** from the persecution feared. The definition of refugees was actually **intended to exclude** internally displaced persons, economic migrants, victims of natural disasters, and persons fleeing violent conflict but not subject to discrimination amounting to persecution.

Not fleeing persecution: Migrants themselves admit they’re fleeing insecurity, corruption, unemployment and pessimism

Elizabeth Collett & Aliyyah Ahad 2017 (Collett – master’s degree in foreign service from Georgetown Univ.; Founding Director of Migration Policy Institute Europe. Ahad – Associate Policy Analyst with Migration Policy Institute Europe, master’s degree in migration studies, master’s degree in public policy from Oxford) Dec 2017 EU MIGRATION PARTNERSHIPS – A work in progress (accessed 12 Feb 2021) https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/TCM-EUMigrationPartnerships-FINAL.pdf



 **END QUOTE. And Judge, if corruption, bad governance, unemployment, and pessimism turn citizens into legitimate “refugees,” then most US citizens are now refugees too.**

4. Afghans in the EU aren’t legitimate refugees #2: They violated international law going to the EU

**When you’re fleeing for your life, you run to the first safe place where no one is shooting at you. When you’re looking for a better job or generous welfare benefits, you keep going until you find a country that has them, maybe passing through 4 other countries on the way. That’s exactly what Afghans in the EU did.**

If they were genuine asylum seekers, they would have claimed asylum in the first safe country, rather than passing through several other countries so they could then go to Europe

NBC News 2019 (journalist Saphora Smith) 2 Feb 2019 “Europe grapples with distinction between refugees and economic migrants” <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/europe-grapples-distinction-between-refugees-economic-migrants-n965161> (brackets added) (accessed 12 Feb 2021)

“There is more and more emphasis that those who travel to Europe are economic migrants, as if they were real asylum-seekers they would have stayed in the conflict region and claimed asylum” in the first safe country they arrived in, [Univ. of Birmingham migration researcher Nando] Sigona said. According to the United Nations, a refugee is someone who is “unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a [well-founded fear of being persecuted](https://www.unhcr.org/uk/what-is-a-refugee.html)” and has the right to asylum in another country. An economic migrant is generally considered to be someone who leaves their country in search of work or a higher standard of living, not to flee persecution.

Look at a map – they have to pass through lots of other countries to get to the EU

We’re not allowed to use visual displays in Policy Debate, so we can’t show it to you. But we can look at a map here on paper and describe it to you, and the Negative can look at it if they want and debate our interpretation of it if they wish. Afghanistan is bordered by Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and China. Every Afghan migrant fleeing for his life due to persecution (remember, that’s what makes him a legitimate refugee) had to pass through at least one of those countries. If he keeps on moving he comes to either Azerbaijan, Turkey, Kazakhstan, or Kyrgyzstan. If he keeps moving he comes to either Georgia, Armenia, Russia, or, if he goes west from Turkey instead of east, he might now make it to the EU by landing in Greece.



And that’s just to get to Greece. If an Afghan migrant shows up in Germany, then at a minimum it would be the 8th country he had entered. These putative asylum seekers are passing up at least two and possibly five opportunities to apply for asylum by continuing to travel hundreds of miles out of their way to get to the EU – long after escaping the threat to their lives. Judge, the EU doesn’t have to lift a finger to save the lives of these people. All the EU has to do is tell them to follow international law, as we see in our next piece of evidence…

Even the UN admits: You’re supposed to apply for asylum at the first country. There’s no right to pick and choose

UNHCR 1993. (the UN Refugee Agency) The State of the World's Refugees 1993 (no month given in the published article) <https://www.unhcr.org/afr/3eeedd4a4.pdf> (accessed 12 Feb 2021)

The designation of safe countries of asylum is intended to prevent people from submitting asylum applications in several countries simultaneously or moving from one country where they have already been granted refuge to another which they happen to prefer. Although people have the right to seek asylum, they do not have the right to pick and choose where they do so. It is not the prerogative of asylum-seekers to decide how the burdens of providing refuge will be shared. Refugees are supposed to apply for asylum in the first safe country they reach.

International law (the 1951 Refugee Convention) says: A legitimate “refugee” must be coming “directly” from a country where he was being persecuted

Article 31 Section 1 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the official treaty signed by EU members that defines what “refugees” are and countries’ legal obligations toward refugees) (accessed 16 Feb 2021) https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/convention-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html

1. The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence

**END QUOTE. And we know it’s easily possible for Afghans to do that because 2.4 million of them already have**

Afghans fearing for their lives go to Iran and Pakistan. The others are returning home to Afghanistan

Lisa Schlein 2020 (journalist with Voice of America News) 18 Nov 2020 “COVID-19, Insecurity Slow Afghan Refugee Returns From Pakistan and Iran” <https://www.voanews.com/covid-19-pandemic/covid-19-insecurity-slow-afghan-refugee-returns-pakistan-and-iran#:~:text=Currently%2C%20the%20UNHCR%20reports%202.4,lives%20if%20they%20return%20home>. (accessed 12 Feb 2021)

Unlike the significant drop in Afghan refugee returns, the International Organization for Migration reports more than 742,000 undocumented Afghan migrants, mostly in Iran, have returned home this year. Currently, the UNHCR reports 2.4 million Afghan refugees remain in Pakistan and Iran because they fear for their lives if they return home.  On the other hand, Afghan undocumented migrant workers, who went to Iran and Pakistan in search of work to support their families, have returned home in great numbers because there are no jobs available in the informal sector.

5. More study needed on refoulement harms

No studies exist measuring status of Afghan migrants who were returned

European Council on Refugees and Exiles 2017. (European network of 105 NGOs in 40 European countries) EU Migration Policy and Returns: Case Study on Afghanistan, November 2017 (ethical disclosure: Article is dated “2017”; “November” is derived from internal references within the text) <https://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Returns-Case-Study-on-Afghanistan.pdf> (accessed 12 Feb 2021)

Whilst there have been specific research projects as detailed above and there are attempts to harmonise reintegration support, for example, through the ERIN project, there is currently no common concept, tools, structures or indicators to measure the success of return or how reintegration programmes help. In terms of a more systematic approach in Afghanistan UNHCR and Samuel Hall Consultancy are working with the Afghan government as part of the reintegration working group to set up a Multi-dimensional Integration Index to provide baseline data for the first time on the integration of displaced and returnee groups to inform and measure the impact of programming.

Nobody’s collecting data on refoulement, so we really don’t know

Olivia Sundberg Diez 2019 (Junior Policy Analyst, European Migration and Diversity, European Policy Centre) 4 Oct 2019 Diminishing safeguards, increasing returns: Non-refoulement gaps in the EU return and readmission system programmehttp://aei.pitt.edu/101046/1/Diminishing\_safeguards.pdf (accessed 12 Feb 2021)

Third, no system is in place to track individuals following their expulsion, so member states cannot guarantee their safety. The lack of monitoring mechanisms prevents a comprehensive evaluation of readmission agreements’ compliance with nonrefoulement. It also hinders the inclusion of suspension clauses or conditions on returnees’ protection in readmission agreements.

Data on refoulement doesn’t exist, so we don’t know how significant the risk of refoulement is

Olivia Sundberg Diez 2019 (Junior Policy Analyst, European Migration and Diversity, European Policy Centre) 4 Oct 2019 Diminishing safeguards, increasing returns: Non-refoulement gaps in the EU return and readmission system programme <http://aei.pitt.edu/101046/1/Diminishing_safeguards.pdf> (accessed 12 Feb 2021)

There is a need for better public data on return practices from member states in order to monitor compliance with the Directive and non-refoulement obligations. The recast Return Directive proposal includes the establishment of national Return Management Systems. As part of these systems, member states should be expected to report basic parameters for each return decision, such as if voluntary departure was offered and accepted. In particular, there is a need for standardised public information on returns by country of destination that include the nationality of the returnee and whether the return was forced or voluntary. Current Eurostat data is incomplete and poorly adapted for a reality in which many individuals are not returned to their country of nationality, thereby preventing a full assessment of the risks involved.

DISADVANTAGES

1.  Encouraging long-distance migration harms refugees

Telling them it’s OK to make long voyages instead of claiming asylum at the first safe country harms refugees and encourages organized crime

United Kingdom Home Office 2020. (agency of the British government) 31 Dec 2020 “Inadmissibility: safe third country cases” <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/947897/inadmissibility-guidance-v5.0ext.pdf> (accessed 12 Feb 2021)

The UK is committed to providing protection to those who need it, in accordance with its international obligations. Those who fear persecution should claim asylum and stay in the first safe country they reach and not put their lives at risk by making unnecessary and dangerous onward journeys to the UK. Illegal migration from safe countries undermines our efforts to help those most in need. Controlled resettlement via safe and legal routes is the best way to protect refugees and disrupt the organised crime groups that exploit migrants and refugees.

2. Reduced rescue operations

Migrants are dying in the Mediterranean trying to get to Europe. It’s politically difficult to increase rescue operations to save them because of political bias against them among EU voters and far-right political parties. The key to increasing rescue is making it politically palatable by ensuring the EU has a solid “return” policy for ineligible migrants (those not qualifying for asylum or legal immigration into the EU). If EU voters (and far-right political parties) see that happening, they’ll be willing to support rescue operations. But AFF is doing exactly the opposite…

Link: AFF plan weakens return of migrants

That’s the whole point of their plan – keeping more migrants and not sending as many back. If they want to argue that it’s an insignificant number and no one will notice the difference, we’d welcome that argument. If they argue that, we’ll drop this Disadvantage and instead claim a Negative ballot on significance and topicality.

Link: Strengthening (not weakening) EU return policy would allow political cover for increased rescue operations in the Mediterranean

[This article is about “Mare Nostrum,” Latin for “our sea,” a reference to the Mediterranean and an EU maritime rescue program that was saving migrants from drowning during their voyage from Africa in leaky boats. The program was canceled several years ago.]

Emily Koller 2017 (MA student in European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Munk School of Global Affairs, Toronto) Mare Nostrum vs. Triton <https://munkschool.utoronto.ca/ceres/files/2017/10/Paper-Emily-Koller.pdf> (accessed 13 Feb 2021)

Secondly, there is currently a lack of return policies for migrant who do not meet refugee or subsidiary protection. For this policy option to work, the EU would first have to greatly improve its return policies prior to scaling up any type of processing. Although this option has flaws, it would be the most beneficial to all parties concerned, member states, EU institutions, and migrants. Member states, especially those situated in hotspots areas, are given both operational and economic support to process migrants. A strengthening of return policies would allow the EU and members states to present the appearance of having regained control of their borders, and would weaken the arguments of the far-right that the asylum process is being abused and proper processing is not occurring. Finally, it would allow the EU to pursue search and rescue operations because it would now be able to process and relocate refugees, resulting in the saving of migrant lives.

Impact: Tens of thousands of lives at lives at stake

[Paul Hockenos](https://foreignpolicy.com/author/paul-hockenos/) 2018 (Berlin-based journalist) Europe Has Criminalized Humanitarianism 1 Aug 2018 FOREIGN POLICY <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/01/europe-has-criminalized-humanitarianism/> (accessed 13 Feb 2021)

Hungary has even taken the step of formulating a law [making the aid](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/20/world/europe/hungary-stop-soros-law.html) of refugees in the country a punishable offense. But on no single issue has the prickly humanitarian quandary over the fate of migrants and refugees—and Europe’s responsibility for them—been as sharply formulated as in the raging debate about NGO-linked rescue ships that have been active in the Mediterranean, primarily between Italy and Libya. For the past three years, the vessels—as many as 12 in 2017, now just five—have picked up refugees largely in international waters and delivered them to European ports, where they can apply for asylum. The group SOS Méditerranée says that during its two years of emergency sea rescues, it alone has rescued more than [29,000](https://reliefweb.int/report/world/aquarius-returns-central-mediterranean-humanitarian-assistance-sea-desperately-needed) migrants.

3. Sovereign debt crisis

Link: EU believes immigrants have a “right” to an ever increasing standard of living at government expense

Caoimhe Sheridan 2015 (with the European Council on Refugees and Exiles) Reception and Detention Conditions of applicants for international protection in light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, Jan 2015 https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5506a3d44.pdf (accessed 9 Feb 2021) (brackets added)

The right to human dignity requires that the quality of life of an applicant for international protection must be one that is of a sufficient standard. Applicants must be placed in conditions that respect the personal sphere of an individual, which also links with the prohibition of over-crowding in terms of Article 3 ECHR. The essence of the right to human dignity is that you cannot treat a human as an object; you must respect their intrinsic worth. The ECtHR has also found that in certain instances (such as when a person is in state care) minimum materials need to be provided (food, access to adequate sanitary conditions, clothes and bedding) to meet the standard in Article 3.65 In addition, the onus cannot be placed on the applicant to ensure that their essential needs are met. In Saciri, the CJEU [Court of Justice of the European Union] looked at what level of support a Member State should provide when they opt to provide material support in the form of a financial allowance as per Article 13 (5) of that Directive. It found that the amount must be sufficient to ensure a dignified standard of living and adequate for the health of applicants and capable of ensuring their subsistence. It also linked it to the specific needs of individuals, and accordingly, ‘the financial allowances must be sufficient to preserve family unity and the best interests of the child which, pursuant to Article 18(1), are to be a primary consideration’. In terms of what is specifically meant by ‘adequate standard of living’ is open to interpretation. Guidance can however be found in other instruments, such as the European Social Charter; Article 31 thereof provides the right to housing. Article 11 of the International Covenant of Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) provides that everyone has the right to ‘an adequate standard of living for himself and his family including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions’. According to the travaux preparatoires, the provision is of broad scope and not limited to food, shelter and clothing alone and other factors should be taken into consideration

Link: Dilemma. If very few migrants would be affected, the plan is untopical (not substantial reform) and insignificant (not worth 2 hours of time to debate)

If they want to argue that very little would change after their plan, we'll be glad to drop this Disadvantage.

Link: If a lot of changes would be enacted, and a lot of people affected, the cost will skyrocket – because government providing an "adequate standard of living" is very expensive

Prof. Arturo C. Porzecanski 2017. (prof. of economics, American University) 1 May 2017 Human Rights and Sovereign Debts in the Context of Property and Creditor Rights <http://auapps.american.edu/aporzeca/www/Human%20Rights%20and%20Sovereign%20Debts%20SIS%20Working%20Paper.pdf> (accessed 13 Feb 2021)



Link & Brink: EU member governments can't afford it – they're already massively in debt. Euro currency union is on the brink of breakup over government debt

Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life, Policies Directorate-General for Internal Policies 2020 (agency of the EU Parliament) November 2020 “Monetary-Fiscal Nexus After the Crisis” [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/658202/IPOL\_STU(2020)658202\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/658202/IPOL_STU%282020%29658202_EN.pdf) (accessed 13 Feb 2021)

The COVID-19 crisis brought back fears of a possible breakup of the currency union. Italy, which was hit first and quite substantially by the first wave of the pandemic in late February, was soon considered a question mark in its ability to manage a crisis of this magnitude on its own. Moreover, for political considerations it appeared unlikely that Italy would request financial assistance from fellow governments via the rescue mechanism ESM and would agree on a macroeconomic adjustment programme linked to that. Against this backdrop there was a growing nervousness in financial markets, manifesting in soaring spreads on the returns of Italian government bonds in early March. Noteworthy, intra-euro area spreads generally increased at that time, not only for Italian bonds, but also for countries deemed invulnerable like France and the Netherlands (Figure 5). This points to a common risk factor among euro area Member States, which was absent for non-euro area EU members like Poland and Sweden. The common risk factor can be interpreted as breakup risk of the currency union.

Impact: Astronomical bailout costs and devastating economic impacts for the EU and global economy

[Max Bergmann](https://www.americanprogress.org/about/staff/bergmann-max/bio/), [Siena Cicarelli](https://www.americanprogress.org/about/staff/cicarelli-siena/bio/), and [James Lamond](https://www.americanprogress.org/about/staff/lamond-james/bio/) 2020 (*Max Bergmann is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. Siena Cicarelli is a research assistant at the Center. James Lamond is a senior policy adviser at the Center*) Coronavirus May Be the EU’s Hardest Test Yet 18 March 2020 <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2020/03/18/481862/coronavirus-may-eus-hardest-test-yet/> (accessed 13 Feb 2021)

A repeat of the drawn-out Greek debt crisis would be disastrous for all of the EU. Italy’s GDP is nearly 10 times bigger than Greece’s. Its economic collapse would threaten the survivability of the euro, as the cost for a bailout would be astronomical. The ramifications of such a collapse would be devastating for the entire EU and the global economy.

4. Political backlash

Link: If the plan works, it leads to a big increase in immigration into the EU.

Same offer: If it doesn’t significantly increase immigration to the EU, then it’s not worth 2 hours of debate time and it’s not topical.

Link: Threat of uncontrolled migrants will increase the power of right-wing anti-immigration parties

**[Note: Just the “threat” – even if it doesn’t happen – will trigger the political disadvantages here.]**

Jacob Kirkegaard 2020 (Senior Researcher at the Peterson Institute for International Economics) 5 March 2020 “The refugee crisis returns to Europe—or does it?” <https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/refugee-crisis-returns-europe-or-does-it> (accessed 13 Feb 2021)

A sudden renewed threat of uncontrolled large migrant inflows into the European Union is moreover not likely to make it easier to agree on common migration and especially asylum policies. Any proposals to redistribute migrants among EU countries will still be dead on arrival with most member states. Rather, the crystallization of the always latent threat of a neighboring country, in this case Turkey, strategically using the European Union’s porous external and open internal borders as a coercive lever against Europe, is likely to bolster the European Union’s focus on strengthening external borders as an immigration deterrent. The European Union has always had political aspirations to be a “normative power,” but it is clear that another migration crisis, which invariably in the short-term pushes it to adopt policies and measures favored by the far right, moves it in the opposite direction. Fortress Europe is coming a little closer.

Link: Anti-immigration parties, when elected, make social conflict worse

Dr. Francesco Campo , Dr. Sara Giunti , Dr. Mariapia Mendola 2020 (Campo – PhD economics. Giunti –PhD economics; **Postdoctoral research fellow** Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Milano-Bicocca. Mendola – PhD economics; Professor of Economics at University of Milano Bicocca ) 7 Dec 2020 “The Political Impact of Refugee Migration: Evidence from the Italian Dispersal Policy” <https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=503093087027109095110074068119022007021074046013037037027007065122089089069020013094022030063118118055022124015029028096090022023061039092033029022113126097013023028050077045092027024078094125120018021098121084115110066028105118095113100006086091096020&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE> (accessed 13 Feb 2021)

In fact, while far-right parties have gained significant electoral success in Europe in recent years, there is also evidence that they do not merely reflect, but also aggravate radicalization and social conflict – xenophobia in particular (see Bursztyn et al. 2019; Fletcher et al., 2020; Grosjean et al. 2020; Müller and Schwarz 2019; Romarri, 2020).

Impact: Turn the harms. Treatment of migrants gets worse after an AFF ballot. More anti-immigrant policies will be enacted from the political backlash

Chris Horwood and William Powell 2019. (Horwood - senior adviser with the Mixed Migration Centre in Geneva. Powell (research consultant, Mixed Migration Center. Funded by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland) Mixed Migration Review 2019 (article doesn’t give an exact month of publication but references events in November 2019) https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Mixed-Migration-Review-2019.pdf

This disruption and distortion can be felt throughout the body politic. In Europe and Australia for example, right-wing parties have been so effective in exploiting the migration and refugee issue to beef up electoral support that mainstream parties adopted more restrictive and anti-migrant policies in order to compete.

5. Masking DA – Plan distracts us from the right solution: Helping refugees overseas, rather than helping them come to Europe

Spending $135 on refugees coming to Europe for every $1 on those who stay in safe havens. That’s bad because it helps the privileged and ignores the needy

Prof. Paul Collier 2016. (Professor of Economics and Public Policy at the Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University) 8 Dec 2016 “Migration Cannot Be Cast In Terms Of Individual Rights” <https://www.socialeurope.eu/migration-cannot-cast-terms-individual-rights> (accessed 12 Feb 2021)

Germany’s been doing that, bringing jobs to Turkey for years and now we can scale that up.  That’s starting to happen in Jordan. It’s very exciting, it’s also starting to happen globally, that’s why Chancellor Merkel went to Ethiopia to see an industrial zone which is now scheduled to provide jobs both for refugees in Ethiopia and jobs for Ethiopians. We can make deals which work both for the haven governments and for the refugees. It is much more feasible to do that than to bring refugees to Germany or anywhere else. At the moment, if we look at global figures, we’re spending 135 dollars or Euros for every refugee who makes it to Europe for every Euro that we spend on the refugees who stay in the havens. This is a massively skewed distribution of assistance towards a privileged few and, of course, the refugees who reach Germany tend to be young, male and educated, very disproportionately. The least needy category of refugees.

BIG LINKS TO DISADVANTAGES 6-9 🡪 Plan leads to fracturing/dissolving the EU

Link: Numerous members of the EU will not accept any plan that has them taking more migrants

Voice of America News 2020 (journalist Jamie Dettmer; US government-funded news agency) 23 Sept 2020 “EU Migration Proposal Draws Ire of Central European States” <https://www.voanews.com/europe/eu-migration-proposal-draws-ire-central-european-states> (accessed 12 Feb 2021)

Numerous attempts to overhaul EU migration policy in the past have failed, largely because of resistance from a handful of member states mainly in central Europe to any compulsory distribution of asylum-seekers. EU Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson told reporters this week that she’s ready for tough resistance from Hungary, Poland and several rich northern European nations, but hopes to overcome opposition by providing the EU's 27 countries with “flexible options” for how to participate.
**[END QUOTE]
[THEY GO ON TO REPORT LATER IN THE SAME CONTEXT QUOTE:]**Hungarian leader Viktor Orban made clear this week that he has no intention of compromising and accepting relocated asylum-seekers. He doubled down on his disapproval in a combative essay for Magyar Nemzet, a right-wing Hungarian newspaper, in which he said there’s an impasse between conservative central and eastern Europe and the liberal western European states, one he can’t see can be overcome.  “Loopy liberals see no reason to fear even a flood of immigration,” he wrote. He added: “Central European countries have chosen a different future, free of immigration and migration.”

Big Fracture Brink: EU is already on the brink of disintegration over immigration issues

Bodo Weber 2020 (senior associate of the [Democratization Policy Council](http://www.democratizationpolicy.org/), based in Berlin) 9 March 2020 “Threat to EU on Greece-Turkey border is EU-made” <https://euobserver.com/opinion/147672> (the “Visegrad” countries are: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia) (accessed 12 Feb 2021)

The current narrative's complete avoidance of core questions is astounding. Reasoned, rational discussion seems to now be a collective pan-European taboo. EU leaders evidently fear that just by opening up such discussion, the Union would disintegrate. In September 2015, when some of the Visegrád countries declared they would not implement the EU's legally-binding relocation scheme, the Union collapsed as a legal entity in the area of asylum and migration.

6. Reduced world stability from fracturing the EU

Example: Disagreement over immigration policy was a major reason Britain left the EU

Max Boot 2016 (leading military historian and foreign policy analyst. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York) July 2016 “Brexit: Isolationism or Atlanticism?”  <https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/issues/resources/strategika_issue_33_web.pdf> (accessed 12 Feb 2021)

Britons might never have voted to leave the European Union had it not been for the refugee crisis that hit Europe as a result of the Syrian civil war. Even though Britain has accepted only some 5,000 Syrian refugees, German premier Angela Merkel agreed to take in 800,000, thus fueling fears across the continent of an influx of possible terrorists. Those fears were exploited by elements of the “Leave” campaign, principally Nigel Farage and the UK Independence Party, and no doubt contributed crucial momentum to the final outcome.

Brink: EU faces an uncertain future with multiple crises threatening unity and increasing division

Meagan Araki, Annie Chang, Troy Lindell, Alison Wendler 2017. (members of the “Challenges to European Unity Task Force” at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Univ. of Washington) March 2017 CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN UNITY: OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS (accessed 12 Feb 2021) <https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Task-Force-J-Report-2017_Lorenz.pdf>

Today, Europe faces an uncertain future. The migration crisis, rise in terrorism, economic downturn, mounting external pressures and a responsive populist movement, have threatened the basis of European stability. The major influx of refugees into Europe has placed immense pressure on the EU’s infrastructure and capacity to integrate refugees into the European identity. Europe has experienced a growing number of terrorist attacks, leading to nationalist and xenophobic policies. Additionally, Russia’s encroachment into Eastern Europe has strained Russia and Europe’s relationship. The Euro crisis has furthered the divide between the core and peripheral EU countries, revealing the inequality between European citizens and growing stagnant employment and growth opportunities.

Link: EU stability promotes US ability to maintain global security and stability

Meagan Araki, Annie Chang, Troy Lindell, Alison Wendler 2017. (members of the “Challenges to European Unity Task Force” at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Univ. of Washington) March 2017 CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN UNITY: OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS (accessed 12 Feb 2021) <https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Task-Force-J-Report-2017_Lorenz.pdf>

Policies that encourage the unity between EU member states should be strongly supported. It is significant that the United States demonstrate support in this ongoing migration crisis, as it will help relieve the pressures member states are experiencing, as well as help mend existing tensions. The cohesion, stability, and cooperation of European Union serve a key interests of the United States. With these aspects, a more unified European Union can strengthen its position as a global actor, as well as strengthen its existing relations with the United States. This can further United States’ objectives of security and stability throughout the international community.

Impact: World peace & prosperity at risk without US influence. US hegemony is key to global peace & prosperity

Capt. M. V. Prato 2009 (United States Marine Corps,Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Combat Development Command,Marine Corps University) “The Need for American Hegemony” Feb 2009 <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA508040> (accessed 13 Feb 2021)

The world witnessed a vast shift in the polarity of geopolitics after the Cold War. The United States became the world’s greatest hegemon with an unequalled ability to globally project cultural, political, economic, and military power in a manner not seen since the days of the Roman Empire. Coined the “unipolar moment” by syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer, the disparity of power between the U.S. and all other nations allows the U.S. to influence the world for the mutual benefit of all responsible states. Unfortunately, the United States is increasingly forced to act unilaterally as a result of both foreign and domestic resentment to U.S. dominance and the rise of liberal internationalism. The United States must exercise benevolent global hegemony, unilaterally if necessary, to ensure its security and maintain global peace and prosperity.

7. Populism and Authoritarian Government

Link: AFF plan weakens / fractures the EU

Cross apply the BIG LINK.

Link: Fear, anxiety and skepticism about the EU leads to the rise of populist authoritarian figures

Meagan Araki, Annie Chang, Troy Lindell, Alison Wendler 2017. (members of the “Challenges to European Unity Task Force” at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Univ. of Washington) March 2017 CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN UNITY: OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS <https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Task-Force-J-Report-2017_Lorenz.pdf>

Additionally, the complications surrounding EU accession and instability in Turkey and the Balkans present unique challenges to the dynamic of the EU. These real and perceived threats have induced fear and anxiety into the European public. As these security threats have worsened with little to no progress made, Euroscepticism has grown and enabled the populist movement. By capitalizing on this sentiment, populist parties have gained increasing support throughout Europe. Populists promise to take back power from the corrupt and inefficient political elite, and give it back to the general public. Europeans have increasingly turned to strongman figures who value strength and security over tolerance and unity.

Brink & Example: Hungary now has authoritarian government, putting EU at high risk right now

Philippe Dam 2020 (master’s degree in international administration; Human Rights Watch’s advocacy director for Europe and Central Asia) 1 Apr 2020 “Hungary’s Authoritarian Takeover Puts European Union at Risk” <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/01/hungarys-authoritarian-takeover-puts-european-union-risk>

On Monday, under the pretext of addressing the COVID-19 public health emergency, [Hungary's](https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/hungary) parliament gave [green light to the Orban-led government](https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/23/hungarys-orban-uses-pandemic-seize-unlimited-power) to rule with unlimited power for an indefinite time. Prime Minister Viktor Orban can now suspend any existing law and implement others by decree, without parliamentary or judicial scrutiny. Elections have been suspended. The law allows for new criminal penalties of five years in prison for publishing vaguely defined “false” or “distorted” facts – another blow to media freedom in the country. With this law, Hungary becomes the first country in the European Union to virtually abolish all democratic checks-and-balances. How has it come to this? In the past [10 years](https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/05/16/wrong-direction-rights/assessing-impact-hungarys-new-constitution-and-laws), the government has spared no efforts to [curb judicial independence](https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/hungary), restrict [civil society](https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/17/hungary-determined-silence-any-critics-left-standing) activities, and gain near full [control over the media](https://www.euronews.com/2019/06/12/don-t-be-fooled-hungary-s-government-remains-a-threat-to-european-values-view). Having repeatedly failed to appreciate the gravity of the situation, EU institutions risk making the same mistake again.

Link & Impact: Weak EU leads to rise of dictatorship and loss of freedom for millions more

Kenneth Roth 2020 (executive director of Human Rights Watch, one of the world's leading international human rights organizations; former federal prosecutor in New York; graduate of Yale Law School) 27 Apr 2020 “Stopping the Authoritarian Rot in Europe” [https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/27/stopping-authoritarian-rot-europe#](https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/27/stopping-authoritarian-rot-europe)

Rot tends to spread when it encounters no resistance. Dictator wannabes prey upon weakness. EU and member state leaders now need to ask themselves: is the EU only a trading bloc or also a club of democracies? The answer to that question used to be obvious. Sadly, it no longer is. Ten million EU citizens now live under authoritarian rule. How many millions more will have to suffer the loss of their freedoms before Europe’s leaders draw the line?

8. Economic recession (from weakening / fracturing the EU)

Link: AFF plan weakens / fractures the EU with greater division

Cross-apply the BIG LINK.

Link: EU unity is necessary for beneficial trade deals

Julian Bonte-Friedheim 2020 (head writer at The Perspective) “IS THE EU BETTER OFF DIVIDED OR TOGETHER?” (month not given in the published article)  <https://www.theperspective.com/debates/businessandtechnology/is-the-eu-better-off-divided-or-together/>

Better trade deals can be negotiated from within the EU. For any European nation, negotiating trade deals with other countries is much more advantageous as part of the EU rather than as an independent economy. As one of the world’s [biggest economic unions](https://www.thebalance.com/world-s-largest-economy-3306044), the EU has a lot more leverage when brokering a deal with China or India. Being able to offer (or withhold) access to its many consumers is a strong bargaining tool. Additionally, there is [free trading](https://www.ft.com/content/1688d0e4-15ef-11e6-b197-a4af20d5575e) between members of the EU, as it is a customs union. Individual countries, while able to create their own terms, are unlikely to reach deals as beneficial as the EU does on its own.

Brink: Cracks already being seen in EU unity, and even partial non-cooperation will eventually bleed it to death

Hans Vollaard 2020 ( Lecturer in Dutch and European Politics at Utrecht University, the Netherlands.) “One down, many to go? European disintegration after Brexit” 23 March 2020  <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2020/03/23/one-down-many-to-go-european-disintegration-after-brexit/>

Even though there may not be other instances of European disintegration like Brexit, dissatisfaction may lead to other forms of disintegration. Not by countries leaving the EU entirely, but only partially. These partial exits involve member states not complying with the EU rules, for instance with respect to public finances in the Eurozone (Italy), or the Schengen rules, many member states have introduced “temporary” national border surveillance since the migration crisis of 2015. Another partial exit is the desire to pay less money to ‘Brussels’, such as expressed by the so-called Hanseatic group of EU member states led by the Netherlands. Disintegration can also occur involuntarily, when one member state wants to exclude another member state, such as the calls to push Greece out of the euro or the Schengen area. These partial forms of disintegration undermine the functioning of the EU. Its rules are less respected, and it gets fewer resources to function properly. In such a scenario, the EU would gradually ‘bleed to death’.

Impact: Devastating economic impact. Financial recession

Mauro Guillen 2016 (holder of the Zandman Endowed Professorship in International Management at the Wharton School. He served as Director of the Lauder Institute of Management & International Studies between 2007 and 2019. PhD in sociology from Yale University and a Doctorate in political economy from the University of Oviedo in Spain.) 13 June 2016 “On the Brink: How a Brexit Could Fracture a Fragile Europe” <https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/on-the-brink-how-brexit-could-fracture-a-fragile-europe/>

The European Union is the largest economy in the world. It’s not as rich as the U.S., but it is bigger in terms of gross domestic product if you combine those 28 countries. If there is a crisis of confidence that undermines consumer spending and business confidence, then you are going to get into maybe even a third recession. That would be devastating for Europe itself, but it would be really bad for everybody else in the world that has business with Europe, including the United States. Exporters to Europe and American companies that have investments in Europe are going to suffer. Companies such as GE or GM or Boeing, 20% to 30% of their business is in Europe, so it could have a large impact.

Past precedent: Brexit caused serious economic damage

Kimberly Amadeo 2020 (over 20 years of senior-level corporate experience in economic analysis and business strategy. She is a U.S. Economy expert for The Balance and president of WorldMoneyWatch, which produces publications about the global economy) “Brexit Consequences for the U.K., the EU, and the United States”  last updated 14 Mar 2020 <https://www.thebalance.com/brexit-consequences-4062999>

The day after the Brexit vote, the currency markets were in turmoil. The [euro fell 2% to $1.11](https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-euro-to-dollar-conversion-its-history-3306091).﻿ The pound fell 8% to $1.36.﻿ Both increased the [value of the dollar](https://www.thebalance.com/value-of-us-dollar-3306268). That strength is not good for U.S. [stock markets](https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-stock-market-how-it-works-3305893). It makes American shares more expensive for foreign investors. A weak pound also makes U.S. exports to the U.K. more expensive. The United States has an $18.9 billion trade surplus with the U.K. In 2018, it exported $141 billion while importing $122 billion.﻿ Brexit could turn this surplus into a deficit if a weak pound makes U.K. imports more competitive. Brexit dampens business growth for companies that operate in Europe. U.S. companies invested $758 billion in the U.K. in 2018.﻿ Most of this was the finance sector with some manufacturing. These companies use the U.K. as the gateway to free trade with the EU nations. U.K. businesses invested $561 billion in the United States. Brexit puts at risk jobs in both countries. In addition, there were 716,000 U.K. immigrants in the United States and 215,000 U.S. immigrants in the U.K. in 2019.

9. Russia gains influence

Link: AFF divides / weakens the EU

Cross-apply the BIG LINK.

Link: Russia uses EU division to advance its agenda and gain influence to accomplish bad things

Ian Kearns 2018 (co-founder, former director and board member of the European Leadership Network, a pan-European group of senior political, military and diplomatic leaders. Former specialist advisor to the Joint House of Commons/House of Lords Committee on National Security Strategy. Former deputy chair and director of secretariat to former NATO Secretary General George Robertson) Collapse: Europe After The European Union (no month given in the published article) <https://books.google.com/books?id=ZVBSDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT223&lpg=PT223&dq=EU+immigration+reform+hopeless&source=bl&ots=79cHvPH2qu&sig=ACfU3U3diw6xbMj9V9bRAyJPoyV-5N1epA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjswYPI-ZrqAhWyneAKHfCQBCE4ChDoATAAegQIChAB#v=onepage&q=EU%20immigration%20reform%20hopeless&f=false>



Impact: Russian influence damages democracy, promotes authoritarian rule

Geir Hagen Karlsen 2019 (Lieutenant Colonel and Lecturer, Norwegian Defence University College) 8 Feb 2019 “Divide and rule: ten lessons about Russian political influence activities in Europe” <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0227-8>

Russia is an authoritarian and corrupt state that regards the EU and, more specifically, NATO, as a challenge, a competitor and a threat. Its influence activities are malicious, undermining alliances and creating distrust, weakening what Moscow sees as their opponents and thus ensuring the survival of this authoritarian regime. Their interference is worrisome at several levels. First, Russia is undermining core democratic processes, like elections, and trust in the political system and its institutions. Second, their disinformation and manipulation of media and social media is directly undermining the political discourse, essential to democracy. Third, this is further exacerbated by their malicious attacks on individuals, like the Finnish journalist Jessika Aro, who has been tracked and harassed systematically after exposing Russian trolling of social media (Aro, [2015](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0227-8#ref-CR3)). However, the overall Russian approach is simple, divide and rule.