Negative Brief: Joint Processing Centers – bad idea

By “Coach Vance” Trefethen

***Resolved: The European Union should substantially reform its immigration policy.***

Dublin Rule right now requires the first country to which an asylum seeker arrives to process his asylum claim. “Frontline” states like Italy and Greece get overwhelmed just because of their geographical location. This plan creates teams of asylum processing case managers who come in from other EU countries to processing centers created in the “frontline” states (Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Malta) to help them manage the case load. It’s based on a study done in 2013 and a pilot project in 2014. The 2013 study came up with 4 possible ways (known as Options A through D) to implement the centers, and settled on Option A as the most feasible. AFF’s 1AC solvency evidence from the study is quoting the results of Option A, so that’s what we quote here from that study in critiquing it. The reason the experts in the study advocated Option A was because it was an insignificant change that would hardly be noticed, and the study also listed disadvantages and problems that might block its effectiveness. Be careful with letting the AFF quote from any other sections of the study, because once they quote solvency evidence from Option A, they’re committed to that as the methodology of their plan.

The other problem with their solvency studies is that some new developments have occurred since those studies were written. Greece and Italy tried joint processing centers (known as “hot spots”) in 2015 and it was a failure. The EU also “Asylum Support Teams,” (AST) in which the Status Quo pretty much does what the AFF plan is trying to do. These are teams that come in whenever there’s a crisis or the member nation requests help and they provide additional manpower to process asylum claims faster.

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
Negative: Joint Processing Centers – bad idea

TOPICALITY

1. Not substantial reform – according to their own evidence

A. Details of Affirmative’s solvency/advocacy evidence: It’s about “Option A” of the 2013 EU Commission Study

AFFIRMATIVE’S SOLVENCY EVIDENCE SOURCE. European Commission’s Study on the Feasibility and legal and practical implications of establishing a mechanism for the joint processing of asylum applications on the territory of the EU, 2013. (written by Helene Urth, Mathilde Heegaard Bausager, Hanna-Maija Kuhn, Joanne Van Selm ) 13 Feb 2013 <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/policies/asylum/common-procedures/docs/jp_final_report__final_en.pdf> (marginal notes added)



B. Why it matters

This means that AFF must do what Option A in that Study recommended regarding Joint Processing. The study had 4 options (Options A, B, C and D) the EU could take for reforms involving joint processing of asylum claims. And it gives the benefits and disadvantages of all 4, and they are not identical. If AFF cites the advantages of Option A, by definition they are committed to the mandates of Option A as their plan. Otherwise they will have an ethical problem by misrepresenting their Advantage evidence, if it’s referring to something different from their plan. If they cite evidence from Option A about the Advantages of their Plan, then Option A MUST be their Plan and they cannot change it later in the round.

**This matters because Option A has topicality problems.**

C. Not a substantial reform of immigration policy, according to Affirmative’s 2013 Study. One of the reasons Option A was advocated by EU officials was that it doesn’t do much

AFFIRMATIVE’S SOLVENCY EVIDENCE SOURCE. European Commission’s Study on the Feasibility and legal and practical implications of establishing a mechanism for the joint processing of asylum applications on the territory of the EU, 2013. (written by Helene Urth, Mathilde Heegaard Bausager, Hanna-Maija Kuhn, Joanne Van Selm ) 13 Feb 2013 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/policies/asylum/common-procedures/docs/jp\_final\_report\_\_final\_en.pdf

Arguments against Option A came primarily from NGOs and UNHCR staff interviewed. The major criticism from these actors reflected the major benefit viewed by government officials: it is the least ambitious option, not adding much that is new, or simply strengthening Dublin to some degree.

D. Impact: No one affirming the resolution means a Negative ballot.

Since one team is affirming a change that doesn’t add much that is new to the Status Quo, and the other team is advocating the Status Quo, you essentially have a debate between 2 Negative teams. Nobody’s advocating the resolution, so no matter who wins you should vote Negative.

INHERENCY

1. AST (Asylum Support Teams) in Status Quo

AST’s are already doing joint processing in Italy, Greece, Bulgaria and Cyprus

Statewatch 2015. (non-profit civil rights advocacy group researching civil liberties in Europe) 15 July 2015 “Explanatory note on the hotspot approach” <https://www.statewatch.org/media/documents/news/2015/jul/eu-com-hotsposts.pdf> (brackets added)

EASO [European Asylum Support Office] provides or coordinates the provision of operational support, inter alia through the deployment of asylum support teams to support Member States in particular with expert knowhow in the different steps of the asylum process and to facilitate the analysis of asylum applications under examination by the competent national authorities, for example, through joint processing. Currently a number of Member States receive assistance coordinated by EASO through Operational Support Plans (Italy, Greece, Bulgaria and Cyprus).

AST is deployed whenever there’s a big influx of migration. Example: Italy

Statewatch 2015. (non-profit civil rights advocacy group researching civil liberties in Europe) 15 July 2015 “Explanatory note on the hotspot approach” <https://www.statewatch.org/media/documents/news/2015/jul/eu-com-hotsposts.pdf> (brackets added)

The EURTF [EU Regional Task Force] is the organisational entity to implement the “Hotspot” approach in administrative and operational terms in Italy. However, the operational activities do not take place in the actual premises of the EURTF but are implemented by the expert teams on the ground. The teams of experts consisting of Frontex guest officers (screening and debriefing experts) are working along with the Italian authorities at the ports of disembarkation. The EURTF can include the asylum support teams deployed by EASO with the aim to assist with the registration of asylum seekers and subsequent preparation of case files.

Definition & Details about Asylum Support Teams

EASO (European Asylum Support Office) 2020. (EU agency assisting EU member states with asylum issues) December 2020 “2021 OPERATING PLAN AGREED BY EASO AND MALTA” <https://easo.europa.eu/file/41831/download?token=iB6hyHgh> (brackets in original, and no idea why there’s a bracket at the end of the quote – it’s probably a typo)

The Asylum Support Teams may consist of the following resources, being members of the Asylum Support Teams: (a) Member States experts, i.e. experts made available through contributions to the Asylum Intervention Pool by EU Member States via national expert pools on the basis of defined profiles, in accordance with Article 15 of the EASO Founding Regulation; (b) Associate Countries experts, i.e. experts made available through contributions to the Asylum Intervention Pool by associate countries referred to in Article 49 of the EASO Founding Regulation, with which the European Union has an arrangement in place on the modalities of its participation in EASO’s work. Currently such arrangements have been concluded with the Kingdom of Norway, the Principality of Liechtenstein, the Swiss Confederation, and the Republic of Iceland; (c) Individual experts, i.e. experts made available through contributions to the Asylum Intervention Pool by EU Member States via national expert pools on the basis of defined profiles, in accordance with Article 15 of the EASO Founding Regulation, but whereby the Member State does not have an employment relationship with the individual expert; (d) EASO staff members, i.e. statutory staff employed by the Agency (temporary and contract staff) subject to the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union6 . (e) Seconded National Experts (SNEs), i.e. experts employed by a national, regional or local public administration of an EU Member State or an associate country or by a public inter-governmental organisation and seconded to the Agency for the provision of support to its operational activities; (f) Experts on contract, i.e. individuals providing services in relation to the Plan upon conclusion of a public contract between the Agency and the legal entity with which these individuals have an employment and/or contractual relationship, including temporary agency workers.]

2. Status Quo policy is: Ask and they shall receive

All a country has to do to get Asylum Support Team assistance with a rush of migrants is ask EASO. Example: Spain in August, 2020

EASO (European Asylum Support Office) 2020. (EU agency assisting EU member states with asylum issues) December 2020 “OPERATING PLAN SPECIAL SUPPORT ON RECEPTION AGREED BY EASO AND SPAIN” https://easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/O\_%202021\_Spain\_final\_version.pdf

In a letter sent on 5 August 2020 in reply to an initial request from State Secretary for Migrations Hana Jalloul Muro, EASO Executive Director Nina Gregori offered further collaboration and potential EASO support to the Secretary of State for Migrations, in relation to reception. In the course of subsequent technical meetings, the proposal for a Joint Rapid Needs Assessment (JRNA) and the identification of possible areas of support were further discussed and analysed. A rapid needs assessment was conducted jointly by EASO and the Spanish Secretary of State’s services throughout September-October 2020. The exercise resulted in a Joint Rapid Needs Assessment report followed by a draft Operating Plan for special support on reception which was then concluded in this document as the Operating Plan Special Support on Reception. The Plan addresses the operational needs of Member States under pressure that have requested support from EASO. Such a Plan gives direction on the delivery of EASO’s technical and operational assistance and the deployment of Asylum Support Teams.

Example: Malta got approved for AST assistance in December 2020, to begin in 2021

EASO (European Asylum Support Office) 2020. (EU agency assisting EU member states with asylum issues) December 2020 “2021 OPERATING PLAN AGREED BY EASO AND MALTA” <https://easo.europa.eu/file/41831/download?token=iB6hyHgh>

The Plan addresses the operational needs of Member States under particular pressure that have requested support from EASO. Such Plan gives directions on the delivery of EASO’s technical and operational assistance and the deployment of Asylum Support Teams. This Plan is formally agreed with the authorities of Malta (hereinafter ‘Host Member State’).

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE

1. No EU responsibility to aid foreign job seekers

If they were genuine asylum seekers, they would have claimed asylum in the first safe country, rather than passing through several other countries so they could then go to Europe

NBC News 2019 (journalist Saphora Smith) 2 Feb 2019 “Europe grapples with distinction between refugees and economic migrants” <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/europe-grapples-distinction-between-refugees-economic-migrants-n965161> (brackets added)

“There is more and more emphasis that those who travel to Europe are economic migrants, as if they were real asylum-seekers they would have stayed in the conflict region and claimed asylum” in the first safe country they arrived in, [Univ. of Birmingham migration researcher Nando] Sigona said. According to the United Nations, a refugee is someone who is “unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a [well-founded fear of being persecuted](https://www.unhcr.org/uk/what-is-a-refugee.html)” and has the right to asylum in another country. An economic migrant is generally considered to be someone who leaves their country in search of work or a higher standard of living, not to flee persecution.

They’re coming to Europe looking for better jobs

Jesper Bjarnesen 2015 (Senior Researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute) Sept 2015 “Rethinking the Mediterranean crisis: Advice for policy makers facing a humanitarian catastrophe” https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/194142/FULLTEXT01.pdf

It is evident that a considerable number of those arriving as refugees begin their journeys as aspiring labour migrants in Sub-Saharan Africa. Most labour migrants travel from Africa to Europe by air and possess enough resources to settle. Those who cross the sea generally have fewer options, but it is not the poorest or least educated who leave home. A known labour migration strategy consists of a family or a group of families pooling their resources to finance one person, who is selected on the premise that he or she has the best capabilities for succeeding

No moral or legal duty: Job seekers don’t qualify for protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention, nor any who aren’t fleeing specific persecution

Ionel Zamfir 2015 (with European Parliamentary Research Service) 27 Oct 2015 “Refugee Status Under International Law” https://epthinktank.eu/2015/10/27/refugee-status-under-international-law/

Refugees are a special class of migrants who under international law deserve specific protection by their host state. According to Article 1 of the 1951 UN Convention, as modified by the 1967 Protocol, a refugee is defined as a person who ‘owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.’ This definition implies that several qualifying conditions apply to be considered a refugee: (1) **presence** **outside home country**; (2) **well-founded fear of persecution** (being at risk of harm is insufficient reason in the absence of discriminatory persecution); (3) **incapacity to enjoy the protection of one’s own state** from the persecution feared. The definition of refugees was actually **intended to exclude** internally displaced persons, economic migrants, victims of natural disasters, and persons fleeing violent conflict but not subject to discrimination amounting to persecution.

Most of them are economic migrants (not “refugees”)

**(And no, fleeing Boko Haram doesn’t qualify as “refugee” either. See the last sentence in the card above.)**

Louise Hunt 2019 (journalist) 30 July 2019 “Salvini’s Crackdown on Migrants in Italy Is Creating a Crisis, Not Solving One” https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/insights/28080/salvini-s-crackdown-on-migrants-in-italy-is-creating-a-crisis-not-solving-one

Grinding poverty is the main push factor for migration from West Africa, although some people are also fleeing conflicts, such as the fight against Boko Haram, a terrorist group active across the northern regions of Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon.

SOLVENCY

1. Circumstances may not allow reduction in time & cost

Affirmative’s advocacy study admits: In countries with high percentage of appeals, faster initial processing doesn’t save much time or money, because it just moves the backlog into the secondary appeal system

**Analysis: It’s AFF’s burden to prove what percentage of cases are decided on appeal (instead of being resolved at the first hearing, the hearing to be held at the Joint Processing Center after the Plan) today in Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Malta. AFF has to prove these countries don’t today have a high appeal percentage in order for their plan to achieve significant reduction in time & cost.**

AFFIRMATIVE’S SOLVENCY EVIDENCE SOURCE. European Commission’s Study on the Feasibility and legal and practical implications of establishing a mechanism for the joint processing of asylum applications on the territory of the EU, 2013. (written by Helene Urth, Mathilde Heegaard Bausager, Hanna-Maija Kuhn, Joanne Van Selm ) 13 Feb 2013 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/policies/asylum/common-procedures/docs/jp\_final\_report\_\_final\_en.pdf

Due to legal concerns and challenges, as described in the previous chapter, the appeal process remains a national responsibility of the Member State in crisis. The numbers of asylum claims that go to appeal vary among the countries, with 6.7 % of the final decisions made in second instance in one country and 33% in another out of those Member States providing financial data for the study. In yet another Member State, it was mentioned in interviews that up to 80% of the asylum decisions are appealed. In countries with high numbers of appeals, there is a risk that the backlog in the asylum system, which the processing support for the first instance decisions will help remove, will simply be pushed forward to the appeal phase, to some degree. This implies that in some Member States – those with larger percentages of cases going into appeal – the potential benefit of reduced processing time in the first instance, as a result of supported processing, would be relatively smaller. Insofar as the asylum seekers remain in the reception facilities while awaiting the appeal decision, the costs of accommodation will remain high in these Member States, as the appeal process is often more lengthy than the first instance processing: 22.6 man-hours per case for the first instance decision versus 239 man-hours per case in the appeal phase in one Member State, as outlined in the above. However, in those Member States with relatively low numbers of cases in appeal, the positive effect on the cost of accommodation from removing the backlog in the first instance processing will of course be more significant.

AFF Plan takes place in Greece, Italy, Malta and Cyprus

Verify in their mandates.

2. No ringing endorsement

AFF’s 2013 study that “endorsed” their plan … actually did not produce the ringing endorsement they hoped for. They offered Member States 4 options and told them to pick one, without having the option to say “none of the above”

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It will be seen that there is a very mixed view of joint processing both across Member States and across actors, and indeed within Member States. Part of the mixed picture might come down to definitional issues, and the relative newness of thinking about joint processing within the EU as a real policy option. The mixed view might also be, in part at least, a result of the methodology of the study. All interviewees were asked to make choices between the four options: it is possible that some felt there was a need to point to one, even if it was not preferred but ‘least bad’. That may be the reason for the broad range of adaptations suggested for each option.

3. Won’t accomplish much

Reviewers outside the EU say it wouldn’t accomplish much and would be too late to solve a crisis


AFFIRMATIVE’S SOLVENCY EVIDENCE SOURCE. European Commission’s Study on the Feasibility and legal and practical implications of establishing a mechanism for the joint processing of asylum applications on the territory of the EU, 2013. (written by Helene Urth, Mathilde Heegaard Bausager, Hanna-Maija Kuhn, Joanne Van Selm ) 13 Feb 2013 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/policies/asylum/common-procedures/docs/jp\_final\_report\_\_final\_en.pdf

Arguments against Option A came primarily from NGOs and UNHCR staff interviewed. The major criticism from these actors reflected the major benefit viewed by government officials: it is the least ambitious option, not adding much that is new, or simply strengthening Dublin to some degree. Similarly, NGOs criticized the fact that it would be employed only in crisis situations, which could be too late, and it was suggested that more detail would be needed on what constituted the trigger – ‘crisis’ is too open to interpretation.

4. Translation costs

“Savings” of time and money offset by translation costs, when you bring in outside asylum claim managers from other parts of Europe into the countries named in the Plan (they probably can’t speak Italian or Greek)

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5. Reworking the documents

Time & cost of reviewing and reworking the documents offsets potential savings. Countries aren’t going to blindly accept an asylum review handled by a foreign reviewer. They’ll insist on reviewing and rewriting it themselves, so everything will have to be done twice

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6. Already tried and failed

A. Already tried. The EU did joint processing centers in 2015. The policy was known as “hotspots”

Aspasia Papadopoulou 2016 (with the European Council on Refugees & Exiles) The implementation of the hotspots in Italy and Greece - A study, December 2016 https://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/HOTSPOTS-Report-5.12.2016..pdf

The European Agenda on Migration introduced the “hotspot approach” as the model of operational support to Member States faced with disproportionate migratory pressure. In particular, according to the Agenda, the European Asylum Support Office, Frontex and Europol will support frontline Member States to swiftly identify, register and fingerprint incoming migrants. The work of the agencies should be complementary to one another and supportive towards the Member States. Those claiming asylum will be channelled into the asylum procedure where EASO support teams will help process asylum cases.

B. Failed miserably. Didn’t resolve asylum backlog, and didn’t uphold human rights. Actually made things worse

Aspasia Papadopoulou 2016 (with the European Council on Refugees & Exiles) The implementation of the hotspots in Italy and Greece - A study, December 2016 https://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/HOTSPOTS-Report-5.12.2016..pdf

In terms of accessing the asylum procedure, the research shows that, while for some individuals this may have been the case, for many others it was not; many newly arrived migrants have been trapped in prolonged detention without access to asylum, have not received the right information in order to do so, or have been swiftly returned as a result of the hotspots approach. The hotspots have certainly not helped in relieving the pressure from Italy and Greece as was their stated objective: instead, they have led to an increase in the number of asylum applicants waiting in Italy and Greece, consolidating the challenges and shortcomings already inherent in the Dublin system. The hotspots approach has also led to more repressive measures, often disrespecting fundamental rights, which are applied by national authorities as a result of EU pressure to control the arrivals; yet despite EU pressure, it is the Member States that are held ultimately responsible for this implementation.

Joint Processing doesn’t uphold human rights. Italy & Greece already tried it

Aspasia Papadopoulou 2016 (with the European Council on Refugees & Exiles) The implementation of the hotspots in Italy and Greece - A study, December 2016 https://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/HOTSPOTS-Report-5.12.2016..pdf

The implementation of hotspots includes an important element of ‘joint processing of asylum applications’ through a pooling of national and EU agency resources. A number of conclusions can be drawn from this experience which are related to the discussions on the future functioning of the EU Asylum Agency (EUAA) and the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG), the revision of the Dublin Regulation (DRIV) and the Regulation establishing a common procedure for international protection and the envisaged increased use of fast track inadmissibility and border procedures. The asylum package proposed by the Commission in May and July 2016 strengthens and consolidates the hotspot model as the method of registration and identification of asylum seekers arriving at the EU’s external borders. However, the study demonstrates that the hotspot approach as currently implemented in Italy and Greece carries important risks from a human rights perspective and requires additional safeguards and rigorous monitoring in order to ensure its full compliance with obligations under international human rights law and the EU asylum acquis.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Political backlash leads to worse treatment of migrants

Link: The reason Status Quo hasn’t done their Plan yet is because insecure voters will think they are losing national control over immigration (by letting outsiders from the EU make decisions for them)

**Note: The key here is appearances. Even if AFF insists they aren’t losing control, that’s not what matters. It’s what voters think that determines what will happen in the political backlash.**

Minos Mouzourakis 2014 (Refugee Studies Centre Oxford Department of International Development University of Oxford ) Dec 2014 ‘We Need to Talk about Dublin’ Responsibility under the Dublin System as a blockage to asylum burden-sharing in the European Union https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/files-1/wp105-we-need-to-talk-about-dublin.pdf

Accordingly, Dublin may be a performative instrument primarily intended to reassure EU citizens by equipping a Member State with powers – even if only in theory – to alleviate its nationals’ insecurities through demonstrations of its ability to swiftly remove asylum applicants for whom it is not responsible under the Regulation’s criteria. For those reasons, the individualistic approach to asylum processing responsibility adopted by Dublin is a central element to Member States’ embedded interests in asserting national control over immigration. For a government to reassure its citizens that they wield the democratic power to decide who enters the country to seek protection, as Walzer (1983: 31) would suggest, a model of responsibility based on burden-sharing would not do. Regardless of their practical potential for the Union, collective solutions such as relocation of asylum seekers, joint processing of applications or even mutual recognition of positive asylum decisions would shift the onus of entry decisions from the domestic level to Brussels. Similarly, a model allocating responsibility on the basis of the applicant’s free choice would place the admission decision in her control rather than the hands of the host country. For those reasons, Member States specifically support the Dublin system’s reading of responsibility which recognises the Member State as the sole legitimate entity to exercise control over entry in its territory. Dublin could therefore act as a symbol of Member States’ preserved sovereignty by appearing to safeguard ‘national prerogatives as far as protection granting is concerned’ (Council of the European Union 2014: 4).

Link: Threat of uncontrolled migrants will increase the power of right-wing anti-immigration parties

**[Note: Just the “threat” – even if it doesn’t happen – will trigger the political disadvantages here.]**

Jacob Kirkegaard 2020 (Senior Researcher at the Peterson Institute for International Economics) 5 March 2020 “The refugee crisis returns to Europe—or does it?” https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/refugee-crisis-returns-europe-or-does-it

A sudden renewed threat of uncontrolled large migrant inflows into the European Union is moreover not likely to make it easier to agree on common migration and especially asylum policies. Any proposals to redistribute migrants among EU countries will still be dead on arrival with most member states. Rather, the crystallization of the always latent threat of a neighboring country, in this case Turkey, strategically using the European Union’s porous external and open internal borders as a coercive lever against Europe, is likely to bolster the European Union’s focus on strengthening external borders as an immigration deterrent. The European Union has always had political aspirations to be a “normative power,” but it is clear that another migration crisis, which invariably in the short-term pushes it to adopt policies and measures favored by the far right, moves it in the opposite direction. Fortress Europe is coming a little closer.

Link: Anti-immigration parties, when elected, make social conflict worse

Dr. Francesco Campo , Dr. Sara Giunti , Dr. Mariapia Mendola 2020 (Campo – PhD economics. Giunti –PhD economics; **Postdoctoral research fellow** Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Milano-Bicocca. Mendola – PhD economics; Professor of Economics at University of Milano Bicocca ) 7 Dec 2020 “The Political Impact of Refugee Migration: Evidence from the Italian Dispersal Policy” https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=503093087027109095110074068119022007021074046013037037027007065122089089069020013094022030063118118055022124015029028096090022023061039092033029022113126097013023028050077045092027024078094125120018021098121084115110066028105118095113100006086091096020&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE

In fact, while far-right parties have gained significant electoral success in Europe in recent years, there is also evidence that they do not merely reflect, but also aggravate radicalization and social conflict – xenophobia in particular (see Bursztyn et al. 2019; Fletcher et al., 2020; Grosjean et al. 2020; Müller and Schwarz 2019; Romarri, 2020).

Impact: Turn the harms. Treatment o f migrants gets worse after an AFF ballot. More anti-immigrant policies will be enacted from the political backlash

Chris Horwood and William Powell 2019. (Horwood - senior adviser with the Mixed Migration Centre in Geneva. Powell (research consultant, Mixed Migration Center. Funded by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland) Mixed Migration Review 2019 (article doesn’t give an exact month of publication but references events in November 2019) https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Mixed-Migration-Review-2019.pdf

This disruption and distortion can be felt throughout the body politic. In Europe and Australia for example, right-wing parties have been so effective in exploiting the migration and refugee issue to beef up electoral support that mainstream parties adopted more restrictive and anti-migrant policies in order to compete.

BIG LINKS TO DISADVANTAGES 2-5 🡪 Plan leads to fracturing/dissolving the EU

Big Fracture Link: Affirmative’s own 2013 study admits the reason why they haven’t done it yet: because it will provoke tension and controversy over reforming the Dublin Rule if it isn’t done as part of a broader responsibility sharing scheme (which the AFF plan does not have)

AFFIRMATIVE’S SOLVENCY EVIDENCE SOURCE. European Commission’s Study on the Feasibility and legal and practical implications of establishing a mechanism for the joint processing of asylum applications on the territory of the EU, 2013. (written by Helene Urth, Mathilde Heegaard Bausager, Hanna-Maija Kuhn, Joanne Van Selm ) 13 Feb 2013 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/policies/asylum/common-procedures/docs/jp\_final\_report\_\_final\_en.pdf

Qualifications on support for joint processing include that it has to be part of a broader responsibility sharing scheme, and requires harmonisation and a common system (particularly on standards and procedures). However, some suggest that in fact joint processing could be a step towards CEAS, not a result of it. Other reservations expressed even by those who are in favour of joint processing, at least in the longer term, include the lack of political will; tensions, in incentive terms, with the Dublin approach, as ‘joint processing’ could be seen as relieving certain Member States of their responsibilities to handle asylum claims and play their role in the international protection system and CEAS; and that it will be a long process.

Big Fracture Link: Disagreements over the Dublin Rule drive EU members further apart

John Psaropoulos 2018 (independent journalist based in Athens, with two decades of experience covering Greece, Cyprus and southeast Europe; freelance correspondent for Al Jazeera International, NPR, the Daily Beast and others. Worked for CNN Headline News and CNN International in Atlanta. BA and MA in Ancient Greek from King's College London) “Europe stumbles forward in search for migration policy” (brackets and ellipses in original) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/europe-stumbles-search-migration-policy-180109190142662.html>

The spat over the bloc's Relocation Programme has now opened up a gulf between EU members over how to reshape a future asylum policy. "The idea of institutionalising relocation has become part of the Dublin reform discussion, and it has become deeply contentious within that," Elizabeth Collett, director of the Migration Policy Institute, Europe, told Al Jazeera. "[It] is one of the reasons why the Dublin reform discussion has largely stalled." [Greek Migration Minister Yannis] Mouzalas said that the dispute has weakened, rather than strengthened, the prospect of a common EU migration policy. "The EU, through its institutions, tried to create a common treatment," he told Al Jazeera. "I think that in the first phase … this failed … Xenophobic parties are playing en ever-larger role in the formation of the political agenda. There is a turning. One cannot say whether this will win in the end," he said. Collett agreed that EU members had "moved further apart", arguing that the problem lay in mistaken assumptions as Europe expanded eastwards. "The events of the last three years raised a question that had conveniently been sidestepped," she said. "When Europe went through its major enlargement in 2004 [with the accession of 10 new countries], the question was never put, 'Are you willing to host large numbers of refugees?' I think it was assumed by existing member states that acceding member states understood this, and by acceding member states that it would never be required of them. "What happened in 2015 or 2016 [at the height of the refugee crisis] was that the question was asked and the answer came back, 'No, we're not ready to do that.' That placed a fundamental political question on the table: on what basis is Europe collectively prepared to do protection? That question has yet to be resolved, and we seem to be moving further apart with each passing month."

Big Fracture Brink: EU is already on the brink of disintegration over immigration issues

Bodo Weber 2020 (senior associate of the [Democratization Policy Council](http://www.democratizationpolicy.org/), based in Berlin) 9 March 2020 “Threat to EU on Greece-Turkey border is EU-made” <https://euobserver.com/opinion/147672> (the “Visegrad” countries are: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia)

The current narrative's complete avoidance of core questions is astounding. Reasoned, rational discussion seems to now be a collective pan-European taboo. EU leaders evidently fear that just by opening up such discussion, the Union would disintegrate. In September 2015, when some of the Visegrád countries declared they would not implement the EU's legally-binding relocation scheme, the Union collapsed as a legal entity in the area of asylum and migration.

2. Reduced world stability from fracturing the EU

Example: Disagreement over immigration policy was a major reason Britain left the EU

Max Boot 2016 (leading military historian and foreign policy analyst. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York) July 2016 “Brexit: Isolationism or Atlanticism?”  <https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/issues/resources/strategika_issue_33_web.pdf>

Britons might never have voted to leave the European Union had it not been for the refugee crisis that hit Europe as a result of the Syrian civil war. Even though Britain has accepted only some 5,000 Syrian refugees, German premier Angela Merkel agreed to take in 800,000, thus fueling fears across the continent of an influx of possible terrorists. Those fears were exploited by elements of the “Leave” campaign, principally Nigel Farage and the UK Independence Party, and no doubt contributed crucial momentum to the final outcome.

Brink: EU faces an uncertain future with multiple crises threatening unity and increasing division

Meagan Araki, Annie Chang, Troy Lindell, Alison Wendler 2017. (members of the “Challenges to European Unity Task Force” at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Univ. of Washington) March 2017 CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN UNITY: OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS <https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Task-Force-J-Report-2017_Lorenz.pdf>

Today, Europe faces an uncertain future. The migration crisis, rise in terrorism, economic downturn, mounting external pressures and a responsive populist movement, have threatened the basis of European stability. The major influx of refugees into Europe has placed immense pressure on the EU’s infrastructure and capacity to integrate refugees into the European identity. Europe has experienced a growing number of terrorist attacks, leading to nationalist and xenophobic policies. Additionally, Russia’s encroachment into Eastern Europe has strained Russia and Europe’s relationship. The Euro crisis has furthered the divide between the core and peripheral EU countries, revealing the inequality between European citizens and growing stagnant employment and growth opportunities.

Link: EU stability promotes US ability to maintain global security and stability

Meagan Araki, Annie Chang, Troy Lindell, Alison Wendler 2017. (members of the “Challenges to European Unity Task Force” at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Univ. of Washington) March 2017 CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN UNITY: OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS <https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Task-Force-J-Report-2017_Lorenz.pdf>

Policies that encourage the unity between EU member states should be strongly supported. It is significant that the United States demonstrate support in this ongoing migration crisis, as it will help relieve the pressures member states are experiencing, as well as help mend existing tensions. The cohesion, stability, and cooperation of European Union serve a key interests of the United States. With these aspects, a more unified European Union can strengthen its position as a global actor, as well as strengthen its existing relations with the United States. This can further United States’ objectives of security and stability throughout the international community.

Impact: World peace & prosperity at risk without US influence. US hegemony is key to global peace & prosperity

Capt. M. V. Prato 2009 (United States Marine Corps,Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Combat Development Command,Marine Corps University) “The Need for American Hegemony” Feb 2009 http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a508040.pdf

The world witnessed a vast shift in the polarity of geopolitics after the Cold War. The United States became the world’s greatest hegemon with an unequalled ability to globally project cultural, political, economic, and military power in a manner not seen since the days of the Roman Empire. Coined the “unipolar moment” by syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer, the disparity of power between the U.S. and all other nations allows the U.S. to influence the world for the mutual benefit of all responsible states. Unfortunately, the United States is increasingly forced to act unilaterally as a result of both foreign and domestic resentment to U.S. dominance and the rise of liberal internationalism. The United States must exercise benevolent global hegemony, unilaterally if necessary, to ensure its security and maintain global peace and prosperity.

3. Populism and Authoritarian Government

Link: AFF plan weakens / fractures the EU

Cross apply the BIG LINK.

Link: Fear, anxiety and skepticism about the EU leads to the rise of populist authoritarian figures

Meagan Araki, Annie Chang, Troy Lindell, Alison Wendler 2017. (members of the “Challenges to European Unity Task Force” at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Univ. of Washington) March 2017 CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN UNITY: OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS <https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Task-Force-J-Report-2017_Lorenz.pdf>

Additionally, the complications surrounding EU accession and instability in Turkey and the Balkans present unique challenges to the dynamic of the EU. These real and perceived threats have induced fear and anxiety into the European public. As these security threats have worsened with little to no progress made, Euroscepticism has grown and enabled the populist movement. By capitalizing on this sentiment, populist parties have gained increasing support throughout Europe. Populists promise to take back power from the corrupt and inefficient political elite, and give it back to the general public. Europeans have increasingly turned to strongman figures who value strength and security over tolerance and unity.

Brink & Example: Hungary now has authoritarian government, putting EU at high risk right now

Philippe Dam 2020 (master’s degree in international administration; Human Rights Watch’s advocacy director for Europe and Central Asia) 1 Apr 2020 “Hungary’s Authoritarian Takeover Puts European Union at Risk” <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/01/hungarys-authoritarian-takeover-puts-european-union-risk>

On Monday, under the pretext of addressing the COVID-19 public health emergency, [Hungary's](https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/hungary) parliament gave [green light to the Orban-led government](https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/23/hungarys-orban-uses-pandemic-seize-unlimited-power) to rule with unlimited power for an indefinite time. Prime Minister Viktor Orban can now suspend any existing law and implement others by decree, without parliamentary or judicial scrutiny. Elections have been suspended. The law allows for new criminal penalties of five years in prison for publishing vaguely defined “false” or “distorted” facts – another blow to media freedom in the country. With this law, Hungary becomes the first country in the European Union to virtually abolish all democratic checks-and-balances. How has it come to this? In the past [10 years](https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/05/16/wrong-direction-rights/assessing-impact-hungarys-new-constitution-and-laws), the government has spared no efforts to [curb judicial independence](https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/hungary), restrict [civil society](https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/17/hungary-determined-silence-any-critics-left-standing) activities, and gain near full [control over the media](https://www.euronews.com/2019/06/12/don-t-be-fooled-hungary-s-government-remains-a-threat-to-european-values-view). Having repeatedly failed to appreciate the gravity of the situation, EU institutions risk making the same mistake again.

Link & Impact: Weak EU leads to rise of dictatorship and loss of freedom for millions more

Kenneth Roth 2020 (executive director of Human Rights Watch, one of the world's leading international human rights organizations; former federal prosecutor in New York; graduate of Yale Law School) 27 Apr 2020 “Stopping the Authoritarian Rot in Europe” [https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/27/stopping-authoritarian-rot-europe#](https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/27/stopping-authoritarian-rot-europe)

Rot tends to spread when it encounters no resistance. Dictator wannabes prey upon weakness. EU and member state leaders now need to ask themselves: is the EU only a trading bloc or also a club of democracies? The answer to that question used to be obvious. Sadly, it no longer is. Ten million EU citizens now live under authoritarian rule. How many millions more will have to suffer the loss of their freedoms before Europe’s leaders draw the line?

4. Economic recession (from weakening / fracturing the EU)

Link: AFF plan weakens / fractures the EU with greater division

Cross-apply the BIG LINK.

Link: EU unity is necessary for beneficial trade deals

Julian Bonte-Friedheim 2020 (head writer at The Perspective) “IS THE EU BETTER OFF DIVIDED OR TOGETHER?” (month not given in the published article)  <https://www.theperspective.com/debates/businessandtechnology/is-the-eu-better-off-divided-or-together/>

Better trade deals can be negotiated from within the EU. For any European nation, negotiating trade deals with other countries is much more advantageous as part of the EU rather than as an independent economy. As one of the world’s [biggest economic unions](https://www.thebalance.com/world-s-largest-economy-3306044), the EU has a lot more leverage when brokering a deal with China or India. Being able to offer (or withhold) access to its many consumers is a strong bargaining tool. Additionally, there is [free trading](https://www.ft.com/content/1688d0e4-15ef-11e6-b197-a4af20d5575e) between members of the EU, as it is a customs union. Individual countries, while able to create their own terms, are unlikely to reach deals as beneficial as the EU does on its own.

Brink: Cracks already being seen in EU unity, and even partial non-cooperation will eventually bleed it to death

Hans Vollaard 2020 ( Lecturer in Dutch and European Politics at Utrecht University, the Netherlands.) “One down, many to go? European disintegration after Brexit” 23 March 2020  <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2020/03/23/one-down-many-to-go-european-disintegration-after-brexit/>

Even though there may not be other instances of European disintegration like Brexit, dissatisfaction may lead to other forms of disintegration. Not by countries leaving the EU entirely, but only partially. These partial exits involve member states not complying with the EU rules, for instance with respect to public finances in the Eurozone (Italy), or the Schengen rules, many member states have introduced “temporary” national border surveillance since the migration crisis of 2015. Another partial exit is the desire to pay less money to ‘Brussels’, such as expressed by the so-called Hanseatic group of EU member states led by the Netherlands. Disintegration can also occur involuntarily, when one member state wants to exclude another member state, such as the calls to push Greece out of the euro or the Schengen area. These partial forms of disintegration undermine the functioning of the EU. Its rules are less respected, and it gets fewer resources to function properly. In such a scenario, the EU would gradually ‘bleed to death’.

Impact: Devastating economic impact. Financial recession

Mauro Guillen 2016 (holder of the Zandman Endowed Professorship in International Management at the Wharton School. He served as Director of the Lauder Institute of Management & International Studies between 2007 and 2019. PhD in sociology from Yale University and a Doctorate in political economy from the University of Oviedo in Spain.) 13 June 2016 “On the Brink: How a Brexit Could Fracture a Fragile Europe” <https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/on-the-brink-how-brexit-could-fracture-a-fragile-europe/>

The European Union is the largest economy in the world. It’s not as rich as the U.S., but it is bigger in terms of gross domestic product if you combine those 28 countries. If there is a crisis of confidence that undermines consumer spending and business confidence, then you are going to get into maybe even a third recession. That would be devastating for Europe itself, but it would be really bad for everybody else in the world that has business with Europe, including the United States. Exporters to Europe and American companies that have investments in Europe are going to suffer. Companies such as GE or GM or Boeing, 20% to 30% of their business is in Europe, so it could have a large impact.

Past precedent: Brexit caused serious economic damage

Kimberly Amadeo 2020 (over 20 years of senior-level corporate experience in economic analysis and business strategy. She is a U.S. Economy expert for The Balance and president of WorldMoneyWatch, which produces publications about the global economy) “Brexit Consequences for the U.K., the EU, and the United States”  last updated 14 Mar 2020 <https://www.thebalance.com/brexit-consequences-4062999>

The day after the Brexit vote, the currency markets were in turmoil. The [euro fell 2% to $1.11](https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-euro-to-dollar-conversion-its-history-3306091).﻿ The pound fell 8% to $1.36.﻿ Both increased the [value of the dollar](https://www.thebalance.com/value-of-us-dollar-3306268). That strength is not good for U.S. [stock markets](https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-stock-market-how-it-works-3305893). It makes American shares more expensive for foreign investors. A weak pound also makes U.S. exports to the U.K. more expensive. The United States has an $18.9 billion trade surplus with the U.K. In 2018, it exported $141 billion while importing $122 billion.﻿ Brexit could turn this surplus into a deficit if a weak pound makes U.K. imports more competitive. Brexit dampens business growth for companies that operate in Europe. U.S. companies invested $758 billion in the U.K. in 2018.﻿ Most of this was the finance sector with some manufacturing. These companies use the U.K. as the gateway to free trade with the EU nations. U.K. businesses invested $561 billion in the United States. Brexit puts at risk jobs in both countries. In addition, there were 716,000 U.K. immigrants in the United States and 215,000 U.S. immigrants in the U.K. in 2019.


5. Russia gains influence

Link: AFF divides / weakens the EU

Cross-apply the BIG LINK.

Link: Russia uses EU division to advance its agenda and gain influence to accomplish bad things

Ian Kearns 2018 (co-founder, former director and board member of the European Leadership Network, a pan-European group of senior political, military and diplomatic leaders. Former specialist advisor to the Joint House of Commons/House of Lords Committee on National Security Strategy. Former deputy chair and director of secretariat to former NATO Secretary General George Robertson) Collapse: Europe After The European Union (no month given in the published article) <https://books.google.com/books?id=ZVBSDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT223&lpg=PT223&dq=EU+immigration+reform+hopeless&source=bl&ots=79cHvPH2qu&sig=ACfU3U3diw6xbMj9V9bRAyJPoyV-5N1epA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjswYPI-ZrqAhWyneAKHfCQBCE4ChDoATAAegQIChAB#v=onepage&q=EU%20immigration%20reform%20hopeless&f=false>



Impact: Russian influence damages democracy, promotes authoritarian rule

Geir Hagen Karlsen 2019 (Lieutenant Colonel and Lecturer, Norwegian Defence University College) 8 Feb 2019 “Divide and rule: ten lessons about Russian political influence activities in Europe” <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0227-8>

Russia is an authoritarian and corrupt state that regards the EU and, more specifically, NATO, as a challenge, a competitor and a threat. Its influence activities are malicious, undermining alliances and creating distrust, weakening what Moscow sees as their opponents and thus ensuring the survival of this authoritarian regime. Their interference is worrisome at several levels. First, Russia is undermining core democratic processes, like elections, and trust in the political system and its institutions. Second, their disinformation and manipulation of media and social media is directly undermining the political discourse, essential to democracy. Third, this is further exacerbated by their malicious attacks on individuals, like the Finnish journalist Jessika Aro, who has been tracked and harassed systematically after exposing Russian trolling of social media (Aro, [2015](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0227-8#ref-CR3)). However, the overall Russian approach is simple, divide and rule.