Negative Brief: SPRAR

By “Coach Vance” Trefethen

***Resolved: The European Union should substantially reform its immigration policy.***

SPRAR (Italian acronym for “**Protection System for Refugees and Asylum Seekers”)** is a 16-year old Italian policy that helps integrate migration flow but was changed in 2018. (AFF will say it was changed due to lack of funding, but this brief will show it was for other reasons.) SPRAR provides housing and other social services to immigrants whose asylum applications have been accepted, giving them time to learn the language, find employment, etc. It is sometimes referred to as “second line” reception or accommodation. (First line is initial processing and holding of the migrant before their case is processed and before their claim is approved or rejected. It might be under harsher conditions, since they immigrated illegally and may have to be deported. In Italy, the first-line programs are “CAS” and “CARA.” Once an immigrant goes through one of those, and submits his asylum application, he could go to SPRAR, when it was active.)  In 2018, the Italian “hard line” anti-immigration Interior Minister Matteo Salvini changed SPRAR and it transitioned into a new program (known as SIPROIMI) with tighter eligibility rules, with the result that fewer immigrants qualified for the services (a lot of them were supposed to be either sent back to CAS or CARA, or else deported if they don’t qualify for asylum). The AFF’s (unfounded) fear is that without good second-line reception, the immigrant is just thrown into society and becomes homeless and destitute, without any kind of transition plan to good integration. AFF plan wants the EU to give funding to Italy and tell Italy to restore the SPRAR program. AFF may not know that the Italian government has changed since Salvini was in power, and in Oct. 2020 the policy was mostly reversed.

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Negative: SPRAR

TOPICALITY

1. The word “its”

A. Italian policy, not an EU policy.

The Italian government is not synonymous with the European Union. Even the Affirmative will admit that the policy they’re describing in this debate was a policy enacted and paid for by the government of Italy. Their plan is for the EU to tell Italy to change Italy’s immigration policy.

B. Violation: The word “its” in the resolution refers to the EU

The resolution says the EU has to change “its” immigration policy. SPRAR has never been an EU immigration policy and still won’t be after this plan takes effect. It’s an immigration policy operated by the Italian government and applying only within the borders of Italy. The EU will be funding Italy’s immigration policy, not substantially reforming its own immigration policy. The EU cannot reform SPRAR because the EU has never had SPRAR, and still won’t after this plan is implemented.

C. Impact: Negative ballot because there’s no Affirmative team

No one showed up in the debate to actually affirm what the resolution says. We advocate the status quo. The other team advocates that the EU should tell Italy to change its immigration policies. But if no one is advocating that the EU should change “its” immigration policies, then there is no Affirmative team. No matter who wins the round, you should vote Negative.

MINOR REPAIR – Italy simply funds it themselves by cutting other programs

**And we’ll link this up later with our Disadvantages showing why this Minor Repair is a lot better than the Affirmative’s Plan.**

If funding for migrant reception is inadequate in Status Quo, Italy can cut the “Green New Deal” in their national budget. 4.24 billion euros over 3 years

Business Times 2019. “Italy adopts 2020 budget, government gets confidence vote” 24 Dec 2019 https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/government-economy/italy-adopts-2020-budget-government-gets-confidence-vote

In 2019, the public debt is expected to reach 135.7 per cent of GDP, up from 134.8 in 2018. Italy's GDP rose just 0.1 percent in the third quarter. Environment measures figured prominently in the budget, with a plan for public investment in a "Green New Deal," worth 4.24 billion euros (S$6.37 billion) over three years. Not less than 150 million euros annually from 2020-2022 will go towards reducing greenhouse gas emissions, as part of the new plan. The budget also calls for a freeze in VAT tax next year, representing about 23 billion in lost funds for the state.

INHERENCY

1. Italian government changed the system back

Italian government (Oct. 2020) undid Salvini’s controversial 2018 reforms and created a new system of reception and integration

ANSA news service 2020. (Agenzia Nazionale Stampa Associata is the leading wire service in *Italy*) 7 Oct 2020 “Italian cabinet approves new security decree, removing Salvini rules” https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/27783/italian-cabinet-approves-new-security-decree-removing-salvini-rules

The Italian cabinet, on Monday, approved a new decree on migration and security in the country. It is in distinct contrast to the two previous decrees by former interior minister Matteo Salvini. The new decree is intended to return to a “system of reception and integration.” The Italian cabinet on Monday evening approved a new security and migration decree that rewrites the security decrees by former interior minister Matteo Salvini. The cabinet confirmed the draft decree, which was worked out via a majority agreement in July. The new decree does away with million-euro fines of NGOs and reforms the migrant reception system, introducing, among other things, a special protection mechanism. The decree was approved in less than an hour after the start of the cabinet meeting on Monday evening. In addition to changes in the area of migration, the decree also makes some alterations in the area of security; including two regulations to tighten restrictions on the Daspo law, which bans violent people from attending sporting events; as well as toughening the general penalties for violence and drug dealing.
New system of welcoming and integration
The new decree on migration and security reforms the reception system destined for international protection seekers and protection holders by creating a new "system of reception and integration." Initial assistance activities will continue to be carried out in ordinary and special government centers. Thereafter, the system will divide into two levels of service, the first dedicated to international protection seekers, and the second for those who are already international protection holders, with added services aimed at integration.

2. A/T “SPRAR ended because Italy ran out of money”

No, Salvini ended it because of allegations of corruption in the program!

Tim Peace 2018. (investigator with Governance & the Local Integration of Migrants and Europe’s Refugees (GLIMER) ) 28 Oct 2018 Our visit to SPRAR projects in Calabria – now at risk due to the ‘Salvini decree’ https://www.glimer.eu/sprar-visit-blog/

The financing for SPRAR projects depends largely on the Ministry of the Interior, but their everyday running is delegated to locally-based organisations, often in the non-profit sector, and local authorities. As in many of the cases we are studying for the GLIMER project, it is left to the third sector to provide many services for displaced migrants in Italy. Despite funding from the national government, many of these organisations depend on the generosity of volunteers who offer their time and expertise to facilitate the integration of asylum seekers and refugees. In recent years, and particularly since the ‘refugee crisis’, there have been allegations of public money, destined for the reception of those seeking international protection, being either misused or even siphoned off. As a result, those working in refugee reception have become a political target, notably by politicians such as Matteo Salvini, who have pledged to end what they refer to as the business dell’accoglienza i.e. profiting from the reception of migrants.

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE

1. A/T “Backlog of asylum seekers in Italy”

Not any more! Nowadays they deny almost all applicants. So they won’t be needing that SPRAR housing…

Simona Varella 2020 (researcher for Statista, a market and consumer data company) 10 Dec 2020 “Number of immigrants who arrived in Italy 2016-2020” https://www.statista.com/statistics/765537/number-of-migrants-landed-in-italy/

In 2019, a total of 44 thousand [asylum applications](https://www.statista.com/statistics/574130/asylum-applications-in-italy/) were registered in Italy. However, data on the examined requests show that asylum was denied in most of the cases. For instance, in 81 percent of the cases examined over 2019, applicants were [not given the asylum status](https://www.statista.com/statistics/625397/share-of-responses-to-asylum-applications-italy/). Only 11 percent of migrants received the refugee status during that year, whilst seven percent of people were assigned a subsidiary protection.

2. Nobody thrown on the streets

When SPRAR was changed in 2018, they phased it out gradually, preserved protection for those already in the system, and provided other housing instead

Gennaro Santoro 2019. (Italian lawyer working with the non-governmental organization the Italian Coalition for Civil Liberties and Rights) 26 March 2019 “The ‘Salvini decree’: Your questions answered”   https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/15881/the-salvini-decree-your-questions-answered

The SPRAR system (Sistema di protezione per richiedenti asilo e rifugiati – System for the protection of asylum-seekers and refugees) which was designed by previous governments to facilitate integration, will be modified. In the future, the system will only look after those who have already received refugee status or some form of subsidiary protection and unaccompanied minors. Asylum seekers will be sent to first-welcome centers run by the government. The changes will be phased in slowly, so those already present in SPRAR projects will be allowed to stay until the current financing for those projects comes to an end. Those who received humanitarian protection status before October 5th, 2018 will be allowed to stay in the centers and SPRAR projects until the end of their current permit, unless the project ends its finance before that.

3. Nothing wrong with Italy’s refugee handling

[Commenting in context about changes following SPRAR reform in 2018] Human rights advocate says: Italy is just as good as other EU countries

Gennaro Santoro 2019. (Italian lawyer working with the non-governmental organization the Italian Coalition for Civil Liberties and Rights) 26 March 2019 “The ‘Salvini decree’: Your questions answered”   <https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/15881/the-salvini-decree-your-questions-answered> (brackets added)

[Question asked by migrant:] I want to know why those who receive refugee status in Italy do not get the same benefits as those in other European countries? I have been a recognized refugee for four years and it is difficult for me to find anywhere to live. I feel like I am going to have to leave Italy to search for a better situation in another country?
[Answer from Mr Santoro:] I don’t agree that Italy offers worse conditions than other European countries. If you are a recognized refugee you come under the same convention as any other signatory to the treaty.

4. No EU moral responsibility to aid foreign job seekers

If they were genuine asylum seekers, they would have claimed asylum in the first safe country, rather than passing through several other countries so they could then go to Europe

NBC News 2019 (journalist Saphora Smith) 2 Feb 2019 “Europe grapples with distinction between refugees and economic migrants” <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/europe-grapples-distinction-between-refugees-economic-migrants-n965161> (brackets added)

“There is more and more emphasis that those who travel to Europe are economic migrants, as if they were real asylum-seekers they would have stayed in the conflict region and claimed asylum” in the first safe country they arrived in, [Univ. of Birmingham migration researcher Nando] Sigona said. According to the United Nations, a refugee is someone who is “unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a [well-founded fear of being persecuted](https://www.unhcr.org/uk/what-is-a-refugee.html)” and has the right to asylum in another country. An economic migrant is generally considered to be someone who leaves their country in search of work or a higher standard of living, not to flee persecution.

They’re coming to Europe looking for better jobs

Jesper Bjarnesen 2015 (Senior Researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute) Sept 2015 “Rethinking the Mediterranean crisis: Advice for policy makers facing a humanitarian catastrophe” https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/194142/FULLTEXT01.pdf

It is evident that a considerable number of those arriving as refugees begin their journeys as aspiring labour migrants in Sub-Saharan Africa. Most labour migrants travel from Africa to Europe by air and possess enough resources to settle. Those who cross the sea generally have fewer options, but it is not the poorest or least educated who leave home. A known labour migration strategy consists of a family or a group of families pooling their resources to finance one person, who is selected on the premise that he or she has the best capabilities for succeeding

No moral or legal duty: Job seekers don’t qualify for protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention, nor any who aren’t fleeing specific persecution

Ionel Zamfir 2015 (with European Parliamentary Research Service) 27 Oct 2015 “Refugee Status Under International Law” https://epthinktank.eu/2015/10/27/refugee-status-under-international-law/

Refugees are a special class of migrants who under international law deserve specific protection by their host state. According to Article 1 of the 1951 UN Convention, as modified by the 1967 Protocol, a refugee is defined as a person who ‘owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.’ This definition implies that several qualifying conditions apply to be considered a refugee: (1) **presence** **outside home country**; (2) **well-founded fear of persecution** (being at risk of harm is insufficient reason in the absence of discriminatory persecution); (3) **incapacity to enjoy the protection of one’s own state** from the persecution feared. The definition of refugees was actually **intended to exclude** internally displaced persons, economic migrants, victims of natural disasters, and persons fleeing violent conflict but not subject to discrimination amounting to persecution.

Most of them are economic migrants (not “refugees”)

**(And no, fleeing Boko Haram doesn’t qualify as “refugee” either. See the last sentence in the card above.)**

Louise Hunt 2019 (journalist) 30 July 2019 “Salvini’s Crackdown on Migrants in Italy Is Creating a Crisis, Not Solving One” https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/insights/28080/salvini-s-crackdown-on-migrants-in-italy-is-creating-a-crisis-not-solving-one

Grinding poverty is the main push factor for migration from West Africa, although some people are also fleeing conflicts, such as the fight against Boko Haram, a terrorist group active across the northern regions of Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon.

SOLVENCY

1. SPRAR didn’t work very well, when it was active

In 2017, when SPRAR was still active, a study found Italy compared poorly with other EU nations on integration of refugees into their society and economy

Regina Konle-Seidl, 2017 (MA in economics; Senior Researcher at the Institute for Employment Research, Department for International Comparison and European Integration, in Nuremberg, Germany) published by the European Commission, the legislative branch of EU government; Sept 2017 “PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT SERVICES (PES) INITIATIVES AROUND SKILLS, COMPETENCIES AND QUALIFICATIONS OF REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS” https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=18319&langId=en

On average, in the EU it took between five and six years to integrate (into the workplace) more than 50 % of people seeking international protection and as much as 15 years to reach a 70 % employment rate converging towards the outcomes for labour migrants (ESDE, 2016). How quickly labour market integration is done will be determined mainly by the length of asylum procedures, language promotion, investment in education and training, integration support and the willingness of the companies to hire refugees. Past experience also shows that the overall labour market conditions upon arrival are an important factor for the integration of refugees. From this perspective, the outlook for integration in Germany or Sweden is quite favourable compared to Italy, Spain, Greece or Bulgaria.

2. SPRAR had small impact

Only 30% covered. Restoring SPRAR back to what it was in 2018 would still not cover 70% of asylum-seekers

**[“CAS” and “CARA” are where immigrants are placed initially on an emergency basis upon first arriving in Italy before they can become eligible for SPRAR.]**

ARCO 2019. (ARCO is an agency of Polo University, Italy, offering research, consulting, and training services) “**Evaluation of the SPRAR projects managed by ARCI Toscana** “ (Italian text of the study indicates the study was concluded in April 2019, although it does not indicate when the study results on this web page were published after that.) <https://www.arcolab.org/en/portfolio/valutazione-dei-progetti-sprar-gestiti-da-arci-toscana/> (brackets added)

There are today a total of 875 SPRAR projects, with the ownership of 746 local authorities and the involvement of more than 1,800 municipalities that received funds from the Ministry of the Interior to deal directly with reception. In 2018, the reception places in the SPRAR system were 35,881 for 31,647 asylum seekers and holders of international protection, 3,500 unaccompanied minors and 734 people with mental problems. However, 70% of the people who submitted asylum requests are still housed in CAS [Extraordinary Reception Centers], thus distributed in apartments, hotels, warehouses and former barracks, or in CARAs [Reception Centers for Asylum Seekers].

Few Italian municipalities chose to participate in SPRAR (700 out of 8000 = 8.75%)

Dr. Francesco Campo , Dr. Sara Giunti , Dr. Mariapia Mendola 2020 (Campo – PhD economics. Giunti –PhD economics; **Postdoctoral research fellow** Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Milano-Bicocca. Mendola – PhD economics; Professor of Economics at University of Milano Bicocca ) 7 Dec 2020 “The Political Impact of Refugee Migration: Evidence from the Italian Dispersal Policy” https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=503093087027109095110074068119022007021074046013037037027007065122089089069020013094022030063118118055022124015029028096090022023061039092033029022113126097013023028050077045092027024078094125120018021098121084115110066028105118095113100006086091096020&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE

Secondary reception is carried out by the System for the Protection of Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR), which was put in place in 2002 following the first refugee inflows. A main feature of this system is that it is set up and managed upon the decision of municipality administrations (LAU–2 administrative units). Thus, the SPRAR system is run by local authorities on a voluntary basis and is not for profit. It is funded by the national government through money channelled to local municipalities and provides reception services such as language courses, psychological care, training and labor market integration programs. The SPRAR system is often singled out for its small scale organization, aimed at refugee integration at the local level. Yet, since municipalities’ political orientation and administrators capacity determine the presence and distribution of SPRAR reception centeres across the country, at the height of the Refugee Crisis (2014–2015) in December 2014, only 433 out of around 8,000 municipalities were hosting a SPRAR project (and only 700 in 2017).

3. No power to fiat Italy’s compliance

Link: EU law says member states retain power to set reception details as long as they meet certain minimum standards

Dr. Tiziana Caponio, Dr. Irene Ponzo, Leila Giannetto 2019 (Camponio - PhD in Political Science at the University Cesare Alfieri of Florence, Italy. Ponzo – Deputy Director of International and European Forum of Research on Migration. Ph.D. in Comparative Sociological Research at the University of Turin, Italy. Giannetto – researcher at  International and European Forum of Research on Migration) 30 March 2019 “Comparative report on the multilevel governance of the national asylum reception system” https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/documents/downloadPublic?documentIds=080166e5c2e3c244&appId=PPGMS

According to the Reception Directive of 2003 (2003/9/EC) and the recast Directive of 2013 (2013/33/EU), minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers should ‘ensure them a dignified standard of living and comparable living conditions in all Member States’ (par. 7). More specifically, the Directives specify that ‘material reception conditions’ should include measures such as housing, food and clothing provided in kind, or as financial allowances or in vouchers, or a combination of the three, and a daily expenses allowance’ (par. g article 2). However, the Directives do not preclude the possibility for the states to introduce or retain more favorable conditions for the applicants and their close relatives (art. 4). The exact definition of what is reception is therefore up to member states. It follows that in principle measures such as language courses or vocational training, which are often understood as integration measures, are not ruled out a priori, since states can include/provide such types of more favorable treatments.

Link: That’s exactly what SPRAR was – an Italian initiative

It was a special program the Italian government set up on its own initiative that wasn’t required by the EU minimum standards. If it had been, all the other EU governments would have been forced to do the same thing.

Solvency Failure: If Italy doesn’t want to do the plan, they can ignore it

If Italy doesn’t want to do the plan, they can ignore it and the Affirmative loses on Solvency. If Italy does want to do the plan, they can do it in the Status Quo and the Affirmative loses on Inherency, since there would be no need to affirm the resolution to achieve the goals of the Plan in that case.

A/T “But Italy can’t afford it!” – EU just gave them 209 billion euros in free money, so stop complaining

Clare Speak 2020 (journalist) 17 Sept 2020 “How Italy plans to spend €209 billion of EU money“ https://www.thelocal.it/20200917/more-growth-lower-tax-for-families-italy-sets-out-plan-for-spending-eu-recovery-fund

Italy's prime minister on Wednesday set out plans for spending the country's 28 percent share of the €750 billion EU recovery fund aimed at helping countries re-emerge from the coronavirus crisis. Italy, which pushed hard for more EU support at the height of the crisis, is set to receive the largest share: 209 billion euros, or 28 percent of the entire rescue fund.

A/T “But Italy can’t afford it!” – They raised their spending in 2020. It’s a question of what they choose to spend it on

Reuters news service 2020. (journalist [Giuseppe Fonte](https://www.reuters.com/journalists/giuseppe-fonte)) Italy to hike 2020 budget deficit to around 11.6% of GDP: source, 30 June 2020 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-budget/italy-to-hike-2020-budget-deficit-to-around-11-6-of-gdp-source-idUSKBN2412XE

Italy will raise its 2020 budget deficit to around 11.6% of gross domestic product from the current 10.4% goal, a senior government official told Reuters, as Rome readies new measures to soften the impact of the coronavirus crisis. A new spending package of 20 billion euros ($22.41 billion) will be approved in July, the source said, asking not to be named because of the sensitivity of the matter.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Anti-immigrant backlash

Link: Expanding SPRAR = anti-immigrant backlash in Italy

Dr. Flavia Pesce 2017. (Sociologist and Director of the Training and Labour Policies at Institute of Social Research (Italy). PhD in Sociology from the Political Science and Sociology Department at the Università di Firenze, Italy) December 2017 (requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Employment and Social Affairs ) Integration of Refugees in Greece, Hungary and Italy Annex 3: Country Case Study Italy https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/614194/IPOL\_STU(2017)614194(ANN03)\_EN.pdf

To address this extraordinary situation Italy decided to continue to adopt the same approach as in previous years, increasing the number of beneficiaries that could be attended by the national System for the Protection of Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR). Indeed, since 2011 the SPRAR increased in a progressive way both the number of places and the number of beneficiaries who could benefit from integration projects. However, this approach increased the level of conflict between the national government and the municipalities (who are in charge of the implementation of the SPRAR) and exacerbated public opinion against migrants and refugees. Indeed, the higher number of migrants and refugees who were settled in the different first-line reception centres were strongly contrasted by certain political parties (in particular Lega Nord) and increased a negative debate on these issues. The hostility also had consequences on the fair distribution of migrants along the entire country, as many mayors of Lega Nord were opposed to the decisions taken at national level.

Link: Anti-immigrant backlash over refugee reception = increasing power of anti-immigration political parties

Dr. Francesco Campo , Dr. Sara Giunti , Dr. Mariapia Mendola 2020 (Campo – PhD economics. Giunti –PhD economics; **Postdoctoral research fellow** Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Milano-Bicocca. Mendola – PhD economics; Professor of Economics at University of Milano Bicocca ) 7 Dec 2020 “The Political Impact of Refugee Migration: Evidence from the Italian Dispersal Policy” https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=503093087027109095110074068119022007021074046013037037027007065122089089069020013094022030063118118055022124015029028096090022023061039092033029022113126097013023028050077045092027024078094125120018021098121084115110066028105118095113100006086091096020&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE

This debate was particularly heated in Italy at the height of the crisis, but little has been done by policy–makers in order to better respond to the ’refugee emergency’ and move forward a more integrated management of immigration. Even though refugee reception does not impose economic costs on hosting communities, our study suggests potential political costs of hosting asylum seekers in ’temporary’ reception centeres that do not provide proper integration services or do not involve local institutions in their management. The increased support for anti-immigration populist parties results in less open and less welcoming societies, with long term consequences for both natives and immigrants.

Link: Anti-immigration parties, when elected, make social conflict worse

Dr. Francesco Campo , Dr. Sara Giunti , Dr. Mariapia Mendola 2020 (Campo – PhD economics. Giunti –PhD economics; **Postdoctoral research fellow** Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Milano-Bicocca. Mendola – PhD economics; Professor of Economics at University of Milano Bicocca ) 7 Dec 2020 “The Political Impact of Refugee Migration: Evidence from the Italian Dispersal Policy” https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=503093087027109095110074068119022007021074046013037037027007065122089089069020013094022030063118118055022124015029028096090022023061039092033029022113126097013023028050077045092027024078094125120018021098121084115110066028105118095113100006086091096020&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE

In fact, while far-right parties have gained significant electoral success in Europe in recent years, there is also evidence that they do not merely reflect, but also aggravate radicalization and social conflict – xenophobia in particular (see Bursztyn et al. 2019; Fletcher et al., 2020; Grosjean et al. 2020; Müller and Schwarz 2019; Romarri, 2020).

Brink: Italy is trying to turn away from anti-immigration politics with new leadership since 2019

Chris Horwood and William Powell 2019. (Horwood - senior adviser with the Mixed Migration Centre in Geneva. Powell (research consultant, Mixed Migration Center. Funded by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland) Mixed Migration Review 2019 (article doesn’t give an exact month of publication but references events in November 2019) https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Mixed-Migration-Review-2019.pdf

There are some indications that Italy’s stance on immigration is moving towards a more cooperative approach, following the formation of a new government in September 2019, and the replacement of Interior Minister Matteo Salvini by Luciana Lamorgese.

Impact: Worse treatment of migrants.

Chris Horwood and William Powell 2019. (Horwood - senior adviser with the Mixed Migration Centre in Geneva. Powell (research consultant, Mixed Migration Center. Funded by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland) Mixed Migration Review 2019 (article doesn’t give an exact month of publication but references events in November 2019) https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Mixed-Migration-Review-2019.pdf

This disruption and distortion can be felt throughout the body politic. In Europe and Australia for example, right-wing parties have been so effective in exploiting the migration and refugee issue to beef up electoral support that mainstream parties adopted more restrictive and anti-migrant policies in order to compete.

BIG LINKS TO DISADVANTAGES 2-5 of European Union fracture

Big Fracture Link: Poorer EU countries are upset about paying for EU immigration initiatives [Our Minor Repair would avoid this!]

FAISAL AL YAFAI 2019 (award-winning journalist and commentator) The EU’s new migration policy is a gift to the far-right 10 April 2019 <https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/opinion/the-eus-new-migration-policy-is-a-gift-to-the-far-right/>

That will infuriate the eastern bloc, which sees migration as an issue of identity and sovereignty. For them, it is more straightforward: they do not want African and Middle Eastern migrants. They do not believe in the liberal values that offer refuge to such large numbers of them. Not only that, they feel that they, the poorer nations of the EU, are being forced to pay for the liberalism they do not espouse. And if Paris and Rome won’t take the migrants in, why should Budapest or Warsaw?

Big Fracture Brink: EU is on the brink of disintegration over immigration

Bodo Weber 2020 (senior associate of the [Democratization Policy Council](http://www.democratizationpolicy.org/), based in Berlin) 9 March 2020 “Threat to EU on Greece-Turkey border is EU-made” <https://euobserver.com/opinion/147672> (the “Visegrad” countries are: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia)

The current narrative's complete avoidance of core questions is astounding. Reasoned, rational discussion seems to now be a collective pan-European taboo. EU leaders evidently fear that just by opening up such discussion, the Union would disintegrate. In September 2015, when some of the Visegrád countries declared they would not implement the EU's legally-binding relocation scheme, the Union collapsed as a legal entity in the area of asylum and migration.

2. Reduced world stability from fracturing the EU

Example: Disagreement over immigration policy was a major reason Britain left the EU

Max Boot 2016 (leading military historian and foreign policy analyst. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York) July 2016 “Brexit: Isolationism or Atlanticism?”  <https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/issues/resources/strategika_issue_33_web.pdf>

Britons might never have voted to leave the European Union had it not been for the refugee crisis that hit Europe as a result of the Syrian civil war. Even though Britain has accepted only some 5,000 Syrian refugees, German premier Angela Merkel agreed to take in 800,000, thus fueling fears across the continent of an influx of possible terrorists. Those fears were exploited by elements of the “Leave” campaign, principally Nigel Farage and the UK Independence Party, and no doubt contributed crucial momentum to the final outcome.

Brink: EU faces an uncertain future with multiple crises threatening unity and increasing division

Meagan Araki, Annie Chang, Troy Lindell, Alison Wendler 2017. (members of the “Challenges to European Unity Task Force” at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Univ. of Washington) March 2017 CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN UNITY: OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS <https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Task-Force-J-Report-2017_Lorenz.pdf>

Today, Europe faces an uncertain future. The migration crisis, rise in terrorism, economic downturn, mounting external pressures and a responsive populist movement, have threatened the basis of European stability. The major influx of refugees into Europe has placed immense pressure on the EU’s infrastructure and capacity to integrate refugees into the European identity. Europe has experienced a growing number of terrorist attacks, leading to nationalist and xenophobic policies. Additionally, Russia’s encroachment into Eastern Europe has strained Russia and Europe’s relationship. The Euro crisis has furthered the divide between the core and peripheral EU countries, revealing the inequality between European citizens and growing stagnant employment and growth opportunities.

Link: EU stability promotes US ability to maintain global security and stability

Meagan Araki, Annie Chang, Troy Lindell, Alison Wendler 2017. (members of the “Challenges to European Unity Task Force” at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Univ. of Washington) March 2017 CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN UNITY: OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS <https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Task-Force-J-Report-2017_Lorenz.pdf>

Policies that encourage the unity between EU member states should be strongly supported. It is significant that the United States demonstrate support in this ongoing migration crisis, as it will help relieve the pressures member states are experiencing, as well as help mend existing tensions. The cohesion, stability, and cooperation of European Union serve a key interests of the United States. With these aspects, a more unified European Union can strengthen its position as a global actor, as well as strengthen its existing relations with the United States. This can further United States’ objectives of security and stability throughout the international community.

Impact: World peace & prosperity at risk without US influence. US hegemony is key to global peace & prosperity

Capt. M. V. Prato 2009 (United States Marine Corps,Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Combat Development Command,Marine Corps University) “The Need for American Hegemony” Feb 2009 http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a508040.pdf

The world witnessed a vast shift in the polarity of geopolitics after the Cold War. The United States became the world’s greatest hegemon with an unequalled ability to globally project cultural, political, economic, and military power in a manner not seen since the days of the Roman Empire. Coined the “unipolar moment” by syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer, the disparity of power between the U.S. and all other nations allows the U.S. to influence the world for the mutual benefit of all responsible states. Unfortunately, the United States is increasingly forced to act unilaterally as a result of both foreign and domestic resentment to U.S. dominance and the rise of liberal internationalism. The United States must exercise benevolent global hegemony, unilaterally if necessary, to ensure its security and maintain global peace and prosperity.

3. Populism and Authoritarian Government

Link: AFF plan weakens / fractures the EU

Cross apply the BIG LINK.

Link: Fear, anxiety and skepticism about the EU leads to the rise of populist authoritarian figures

Meagan Araki, Annie Chang, Troy Lindell, Alison Wendler 2017. (members of the “Challenges to European Unity Task Force” at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Univ. of Washington) March 2017 CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN UNITY: OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS <https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Task-Force-J-Report-2017_Lorenz.pdf>

Additionally, the complications surrounding EU accession and instability in Turkey and the Balkans present unique challenges to the dynamic of the EU. These real and perceived threats have induced fear and anxiety into the European public. As these security threats have worsened with little to no progress made, Euroscepticism has grown and enabled the populist movement. By capitalizing on this sentiment, populist parties have gained increasing support throughout Europe. Populists promise to take back power from the corrupt and inefficient political elite, and give it back to the general public. Europeans have increasingly turned to strongman figures who value strength and security over tolerance and unity.

Brink & Example: Hungary now has authoritarian government, putting EU at high risk right now

Philippe Dam 2020 (master’s degree in international administration; Human Rights Watch’s advocacy director for Europe and Central Asia) 1 Apr 2020 “Hungary’s Authoritarian Takeover Puts European Union at Risk” <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/01/hungarys-authoritarian-takeover-puts-european-union-risk>

On Monday, under the pretext of addressing the COVID-19 public health emergency, [Hungary's](https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/hungary) parliament gave [green light to the Orban-led government](https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/23/hungarys-orban-uses-pandemic-seize-unlimited-power) to rule with unlimited power for an indefinite time. Prime Minister Viktor Orban can now suspend any existing law and implement others by decree, without parliamentary or judicial scrutiny. Elections have been suspended. The law allows for new criminal penalties of five years in prison for publishing vaguely defined “false” or “distorted” facts – another blow to media freedom in the country. With this law, Hungary becomes the first country in the European Union to virtually abolish all democratic checks-and-balances. How has it come to this? In the past [10 years](https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/05/16/wrong-direction-rights/assessing-impact-hungarys-new-constitution-and-laws), the government has spared no efforts to [curb judicial independence](https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/hungary), restrict [civil society](https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/17/hungary-determined-silence-any-critics-left-standing) activities, and gain near full [control over the media](https://www.euronews.com/2019/06/12/don-t-be-fooled-hungary-s-government-remains-a-threat-to-european-values-view). Having repeatedly failed to appreciate the gravity of the situation, EU institutions risk making the same mistake again.

Link & Impact: Weak EU leads to rise of dictatorship and loss of freedom for millions more

Kenneth Roth 2020 (executive director of Human Rights Watch, one of the world's leading international human rights organizations; former federal prosecutor in New York; graduate of Yale Law School) 27 Apr 2020 “Stopping the Authoritarian Rot in Europe” [https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/27/stopping-authoritarian-rot-europe#](https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/27/stopping-authoritarian-rot-europe)

Rot tends to spread when it encounters no resistance. Dictator wannabes prey upon weakness. EU and member state leaders now need to ask themselves: is the EU only a trading bloc or also a club of democracies? The answer to that question used to be obvious. Sadly, it no longer is. Ten million EU citizens now live under authoritarian rule. How many millions more will have to suffer the loss of their freedoms before Europe’s leaders draw the line?

4. Economic recession (from weakening / fracturing the EU)

Link: AFF plan weakens / fractures the EU with greater division

Cross-apply the BIG LINK.

Link: EU unity is necessary for beneficial trade deals

Julian Bonte-Friedheim 2020 (head writer at The Perspective) “IS THE EU BETTER OFF DIVIDED OR TOGETHER?” (month not given in the published article)  <https://www.theperspective.com/debates/businessandtechnology/is-the-eu-better-off-divided-or-together/>

Better trade deals can be negotiated from within the EU. For any European nation, negotiating trade deals with other countries is much more advantageous as part of the EU rather than as an independent economy. As one of the world’s [biggest economic unions](https://www.thebalance.com/world-s-largest-economy-3306044), the EU has a lot more leverage when brokering a deal with China or India. Being able to offer (or withhold) access to its many consumers is a strong bargaining tool. Additionally, there is [free trading](https://www.ft.com/content/1688d0e4-15ef-11e6-b197-a4af20d5575e) between members of the EU, as it is a customs union. Individual countries, while able to create their own terms, are unlikely to reach deals as beneficial as the EU does on its own.

Brink: Cracks already being seen in EU unity, and even partial non-cooperation will eventually bleed it to death

Hans Vollaard 2020 ( Lecturer in Dutch and European Politics at Utrecht University, the Netherlands.) “One down, many to go? European disintegration after Brexit” 23 March 2020  <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2020/03/23/one-down-many-to-go-european-disintegration-after-brexit/>

Even though there may not be other instances of European disintegration like Brexit, dissatisfaction may lead to other forms of disintegration. Not by countries leaving the EU entirely, but only partially. These partial exits involve member states not complying with the EU rules, for instance with respect to public finances in the Eurozone (Italy), or the Schengen rules, many member states have introduced “temporary” national border surveillance since the migration crisis of 2015. Another partial exit is the desire to pay less money to ‘Brussels’, such as expressed by the so-called Hanseatic group of EU member states led by the Netherlands. Disintegration can also occur involuntarily, when one member state wants to exclude another member state, such as the calls to push Greece out of the euro or the Schengen area. These partial forms of disintegration undermine the functioning of the EU. Its rules are less respected, and it gets fewer resources to function properly. In such a scenario, the EU would gradually ‘bleed to death’.

Impact: Devastating economic impact. Financial recession

Mauro Guillen 2016 (holder of the Zandman Endowed Professorship in International Management at the Wharton School. He served as Director of the Lauder Institute of Management & International Studies between 2007 and 2019. PhD in sociology from Yale University and a Doctorate in political economy from the University of Oviedo in Spain.) 13 June 2016 “On the Brink: How a Brexit Could Fracture a Fragile Europe” <https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/on-the-brink-how-brexit-could-fracture-a-fragile-europe/>

The European Union is the largest economy in the world. It’s not as rich as the U.S., but it is bigger in terms of gross domestic product if you combine those 28 countries. If there is a crisis of confidence that undermines consumer spending and business confidence, then you are going to get into maybe even a third recession. That would be devastating for Europe itself, but it would be really bad for everybody else in the world that has business with Europe, including the United States. Exporters to Europe and American companies that have investments in Europe are going to suffer. Companies such as GE or GM or Boeing, 20% to 30% of their business is in Europe, so it could have a large impact.

Past precedent: Brexit caused serious economic damage

Kimberly Amadeo 2020 (over 20 years of senior-level corporate experience in economic analysis and business strategy. She is a U.S. Economy expert for The Balance and president of WorldMoneyWatch, which produces publications about the global economy) “Brexit Consequences for the U.K., the EU, and the United States”  last updated 14 Mar 2020 <https://www.thebalance.com/brexit-consequences-4062999>

The day after the Brexit vote, the currency markets were in turmoil. The [euro fell 2% to $1.11](https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-euro-to-dollar-conversion-its-history-3306091).﻿ The pound fell 8% to $1.36.﻿ Both increased the [value of the dollar](https://www.thebalance.com/value-of-us-dollar-3306268). That strength is not good for U.S. [stock markets](https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-stock-market-how-it-works-3305893). It makes American shares more expensive for foreign investors. A weak pound also makes U.S. exports to the U.K. more expensive. The United States has an $18.9 billion trade surplus with the U.K. In 2018, it exported $141 billion while importing $122 billion.﻿ Brexit could turn this surplus into a deficit if a weak pound makes U.K. imports more competitive. Brexit dampens business growth for companies that operate in Europe. U.S. companies invested $758 billion in the U.K. in 2018.﻿ Most of this was the finance sector with some manufacturing. These companies use the U.K. as the gateway to free trade with the EU nations. U.K. businesses invested $561 billion in the United States. Brexit puts at risk jobs in both countries. In addition, there were 716,000 U.K. immigrants in the United States and 215,000 U.S. immigrants in the U.K. in 2019.

5. Russia gains influence

Link: AFF divides / weakens the EU

Cross-apply the BIG LINK.

Link: Russia uses EU division to advance its agenda and gain influence to accomplish bad things

Ian Kearns 2018 (co-founder, former director and board member of the European Leadership Network, a pan-European group of senior political, military and diplomatic leaders. Former specialist advisor to the Joint House of Commons/House of Lords Committee on National Security Strategy. Former deputy chair and director of secretariat to former NATO Secretary General George Robertson) Collapse: Europe After The European Union (no month given in the published article) <https://books.google.com/books?id=ZVBSDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT223&lpg=PT223&dq=EU+immigration+reform+hopeless&source=bl&ots=79cHvPH2qu&sig=ACfU3U3diw6xbMj9V9bRAyJPoyV-5N1epA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjswYPI-ZrqAhWyneAKHfCQBCE4ChDoATAAegQIChAB#v=onepage&q=EU%20immigration%20reform%20hopeless&f=false>



Impact: Russian influence damages democracy, promotes authoritarian rule

Geir Hagen Karlsen 2019 (Lieutenant Colonel and Lecturer, Norwegian Defence University College) 8 Feb 2019 “Divide and rule: ten lessons about Russian political influence activities in Europe” <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0227-8>

Russia is an authoritarian and corrupt state that regards the EU and, more specifically, NATO, as a challenge, a competitor and a threat. Its influence activities are malicious, undermining alliances and creating distrust, weakening what Moscow sees as their opponents and thus ensuring the survival of this authoritarian regime. Their interference is worrisome at several levels. First, Russia is undermining core democratic processes, like elections, and trust in the political system and its institutions. Second, their disinformation and manipulation of media and social media is directly undermining the political discourse, essential to democracy. Third, this is further exacerbated by their malicious attacks on individuals, like the Finnish journalist Jessika Aro, who has been tracked and harassed systematically after exposing Russian trolling of social media (Aro, [2015](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0227-8#ref-CR3)). However, the overall Russian approach is simple, divide and rule.