Negative Brief: Carrier Sanctions Repeal – bad idea

By “Coach Vance” Trefethen

***Resolved: The European Union should substantially reform its immigration policy.***

If a commercial airliner brings a passenger into the EU from abroad who does not have valid travel documents, the airline is responsible for immediately at their own expense sending them back or paying for their lodging until they can pay to send them somewhere they can legally go. They may also be subject to fines. [If you’ve ever traveled internationally, you may have noticed how scrupulous the airlines are about checking your passport before they let you onto their planes. This is the reason they do that.] The sanction can also apply to boats, trains and buses that bring undocumented travelers. AFF argues that this forces migrants seeking asylum to choose dangerous routes (where they could easily die) rather than simply taking a plane, to come to the EU to claim asylum. NEG will argue that making illegal immigration easier isn’t in anyone’s best interests. Even if it doesn’t, just the “threat” of it will create a political backlash in Europe and cause a lot of disadvantages that way.

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Negative: Carrier Sanctions Repeal – bad idea

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE

1. More study needed

It’s impossible to know if there are significant impacts because the data on carrier sanctions simply doesn’t exist

Theodore Baird 2017. (law student at VU University, Amsterdam) 28 Sept 2017 “Carrier Sanctions in Europe: A Comparison of Trends in 10 Countries” EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF MIGRATION & LAW <https://brill.com/view/journals/emil/19/3/article-p307_307.xml?language=en>

First, there are no collated data available on trends in fines over time. Evidence for carrier sanction trends is severely limited, and researchers thus have limited understandings of how carrier sanctions are implemented over time. Collecting and analyzing such statistics gives insight into the implementation of migration control regulations and the privatization of control in Europe, an area hampered by limited transparency and accountability. Second, there are no EU or national systems in place that monitor or evaluate the enforcement of carrier sanctions legislation. Quantitative and/or qualitative assessments of the implementation and impacts of carrier sanctions legislation do not exist (with minor exceptions looking at the transposition of legislation into national law). Such data could prove useful in evaluating the human rights impacts of carrier sanctions.

2. Even the weak statistics we have show it’s insignificant

Link: Germany had “over 1200” (we don’t know how many over) in 2014

**The source of this evidence, Mr Baird, is sympathetic to the Affirmative position. If the number had been very much larger than 1200 (like 1300, or in the ten thousands, or millions, etc) he would have said so because it would have helped his argument.**

Theodore Baird 2017. (law student at VU University, Amsterdam) 28 Sept 2017 “Carrier Sanctions in Europe: A Comparison of Trends in 10 Countries” EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF MIGRATION & LAW <https://brill.com/view/journals/emil/19/3/article-p307_307.xml?language=en>

The German statistics reveal perhaps the most striking increase, with the number of fines increasing from 9 in 2007 to over 1200 in 2014. This rise occurs in the context of administrative restructuring within the police and new Memoranda of Understanding with airlines. Note that the coverage is unclear, but concerns primarily air carriers as discussed during communication with the Federal Police.

Link: Germany had a total of 363,000 asylum seekers immigrate in 2014

Reuters news service and EURActiv TV 2015. “Immigration to Germany in 2014 at highest level in two decades” 3 Sept 2015 https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/immigration-to-germany-in-2014-at-highest-level-in-two-decades/

Some 363,000 asylum seekers claimed benefits in 2014, with about 38 percent from Europe and the same amount from Asia, and 19 percent alone from the former states of Yugoslavia, such as Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro. There was also a more than doubling of the number of claimants from Syria, who made up 11 percent of the total. The biggest increase was claimants from Eritrea – three times the number compared with the previous year. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has described coping with the influx of asylum seekers as Europe’s biggest challenge.

Conclusion: Do the math. This is a miniscule part of EU immigration policy – only 0.36%

Let’s take the highest number it could possibly be, according to Mr Baird, and call it 1299. Divide that by the total number of asylum seekers 363,000, and you get 0.36%. We’re going to spend 2 hours today debating a 0.36% change in EU immigration policy. I’d suggest instead that you teach Affirmatives not to waste everyone’s time by casting a Negative ballot. No doubt that would motivate them to write a better case next time.

3. Fines can be suspended in case of asylum seekers

Example: Poland doesn’t apply the fine if the immigrant is applying for protection

Monika Szulecka 2019 (with Centre of Migration Research at University of Warsaw) Aug 2019 Border Management and Migration Controls in Poland https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1348294/FULLTEXT01.pdf

As far as the carrier sanctions are concerned, if the carrier brings to the border a person without valid documents allowing for entering Poland, an administrative fine equivalent to EUR 3 000-5 000 for each imported person may be imposed on the carrier. However, the sum of the fine for a single importation of a group of persons cannot exceed the equivalent of EUR 500,000. Importantly, the fine is not applied in case the foreigner brought to the border is an applicant for international protection or in case the carrier was not able to check the validity of documents possessed by the foreigner despite efforts to do so (article 462).

Example: Finland cancels the fine if the traveler is granted asylum

Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum & Refugees (IGC) 2012. (e IGC is an informal, non-decision making forum for inter-governmental information exchange and policy debate on issues of relevance to the management of international migratory fl ows. The IGC brings together 17 Participating States, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organization for Migration and the European Commission) Dec 2012 “Asylum Procedures Report on policies and practices in IGC Participating states 2012” https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/asylum\_procedures\_2012\_web\_may2015\_0.pdf

Obligations and financial penalties on carriers are laid down in Chapter 11 of the Aliens Act. Carriers violating the obligations (obligation to report and obligation to provide information) are subject to a fine. The financial penalty may be annulled if the foreign national is granted permission to remain in Finland on protection grounds.

Example: France doesn’t impose the sanction if it’s a legitimate asylum seeker

Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum & Refugees (IGC) 2012. (e IGC is an informal, non-decision making forum for inter-governmental information exchange and policy debate on issues of relevance to the management of international migratory fl ows. The IGC brings together 17 Participating States, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organization for Migration and the European Commission) Dec 2012 “Asylum Procedures Report on policies and practices in IGC Participating states 2012” https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/asylum\_procedures\_2012\_web\_may2015\_0.pdf

Carriers are liable to a maximum fine of €e 5,000 if they are found to have brought onto French territory an undocumented non-European Union (EU) national. This sanction is applicable in cases where France is the final destination as well as in instances of transit through the national territory. Sanctions do not apply in the following cases: • The foreign national has been admitted into the territory in order to make an asylum claim that is not deemed to be manifestly unfounded • The carrier is able to establish that the required travel documents were presented at boarding time and that these did not appear to be fraudulent

Example: Germany. Carrier sanctions don’t apply to refugees

Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum & Refugees (IGC) 2012. (e IGC is an informal, non-decision making forum for inter-governmental information exchange and policy debate on issues of relevance to the management of international migratory fl ows. The IGC brings together 17 Participating States, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Organization for Migration and the European Commission) Dec 2012 “Asylum Procedures Report on policies and practices in IGC Participating states 2012” https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/asylum\_procedures\_2012\_web\_may2015\_0.pdf

If a foreign national is refused entry, the carrier who transported him or her to the border will be required to transport him or her from Germany. This obligation applies for a period of three years with regard to foreign nationals without a passport, passport substitute or a residence permit. It does not apply to individuals who were allowed entry because they cited grounds for refugee status or subsidiary protection.

4. No EU responsibility to aid foreign job seekers

If they were genuine asylum seekers, they would have claimed asylum in the first safe country, rather than passing through several other countries so they could then go to Europe

NBC News 2019 (journalist Saphora Smith) 2 Feb 2019 “Europe grapples with distinction between refugees and economic migrants” <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/europe-grapples-distinction-between-refugees-economic-migrants-n965161> (brackets added)

“There is more and more emphasis that those who travel to Europe are economic migrants, as if they were real asylum-seekers they would have stayed in the conflict region and claimed asylum” in the first safe country they arrived in, [Univ. of Birmingham migration researcher Nando] Sigona said. According to the United Nations, a refugee is someone who is “unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a [well-founded fear of being persecuted](https://www.unhcr.org/uk/what-is-a-refugee.html)” and has the right to asylum in another country. An economic migrant is generally considered to be someone who leaves their country in search of work or a higher standard of living, not to flee persecution.

They’re coming to Europe looking for better jobs

Jesper Bjarnesen 2015 (Senior Researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute) Sept 2015 “Rethinking the Mediterranean crisis: Advice for policy makers facing a humanitarian catastrophe” https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/194142/FULLTEXT01.pdf

It is evident that a considerable number of those arriving as refugees begin their journeys as aspiring labour migrants in Sub-Saharan Africa. Most labour migrants travel from Africa to Europe by air and possess enough resources to settle. Those who cross the sea generally have fewer options, but it is not the poorest or least educated who leave home. A known labour migration strategy consists of a family or a group of families pooling their resources to finance one person, who is selected on the premise that he or she has the best capabilities for succeeding

No moral or legal duty: Job seekers don’t qualify for protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention, nor any who aren’t fleeing specific persecution

Ionel Zamfir 2015 (with European Parliamentary Research Service) 27 Oct 2015 “Refugee Status Under International Law” https://epthinktank.eu/2015/10/27/refugee-status-under-international-law/

Refugees are a special class of migrants who under international law deserve specific protection by their host state. According to Article 1 of the 1951 UN Convention, as modified by the 1967 Protocol, a refugee is defined as a person who ‘owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.’ This definition implies that several qualifying conditions apply to be considered a refugee: (1) **presence** **outside home country**; (2) **well-founded fear of persecution** (being at risk of harm is insufficient reason in the absence of discriminatory persecution); (3) **incapacity to enjoy the protection of one’s own state** from the persecution feared. The definition of refugees was actually **intended to exclude** internally displaced persons, economic migrants, victims of natural disasters, and persons fleeing violent conflict but not subject to discrimination amounting to persecution.

Most of them are economic migrants (not “refugees”)

**(And no, fleeing Boko Haram doesn’t qualify as “refugee” either. See the last sentence in the card above.)**

Louise Hunt 2019 (journalist) 30 July 2019 “Salvini’s Crackdown on Migrants in Italy Is Creating a Crisis, Not Solving One” https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/insights/28080/salvini-s-crackdown-on-migrants-in-italy-is-creating-a-crisis-not-solving-one

Grinding poverty is the main push factor for migration from West Africa, although some people are also fleeing conflicts, such as the fight against Boko Haram, a terrorist group active across the northern regions of Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon.

SOLVENCY

1. Doesn’t help the weak

Link: AFF plan is yet another scheme that tells migrants to come to Europe to apply for asylum

They do it when they get off the plane that they were allowed onto without a passport. The problem with that is…

Impact: Telling migrants to come to Europe to apply for asylum leaves behind the ones who actually need it most

Nick Timothy 2018 (former Chief of Staff to British Prime Minister Teresa May) 5 July 2018 “Liberals have lost the argument on the migrant crisis. Now Europe needs to get tough” https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2018/07/04/liberals-have-lost-argument-migrant-crisis-now-europe-needs/

And why should we continue an asylum model that favours the strong over the weak, the young over the old, and men over women? Three quarters of asylum seekers in Britain are men and the majority are in their early twenties. Too often, with today's system, the vulnerable get left behind. The immigration debate is changing. In Europe, mainstream politicians are advocating 'regional disembarkation platforms', where asylum claims are processed outside the EU. This is a model that has worked in Australia, but it will only succeed if migrants are barred from claiming asylum in Europe itself.

2. Same policy at higher cost, post-plan

Countries that want to check immigration status before someone gets on the plane can still do it, but it will cost a lot more

**[A country that wants to could station its government agents at airports overseas and check documents of incoming travelers – instead of telling the airlines to do it under threat of sanctions. Of course, a country that didn’t care about checking them would already not impose sanctions anyway. So, the same policies can be done post-plan, but they’ll just cost more.]**

Dr. Sophie Scholten 2015 (PhD from Radboud University Nijmegen, is a lecturer and researcher at the Dutch Police Academy) 20 Aug 2015 The Role of Private Transport Companies in Dutch and British Immigration Control https://books.google.com/books?id=g8dWCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1&source=gbs\_toc\_r&cad=4#v=onepage&q&f=false



DISADVANTAGES

1. Political backlash leads to worse treatment of migrants

Link: Carrier sanctions were enacted to help relieve political pressure to control immigration

Dr. Sophie Scholten 2015 (PhD from Radboud University Nijmegen, is a lecturer and researcher at the Dutch Police Academy) 20 Aug 2015 The Role of Private Transport Companies in Dutch and British Immigration Control https://books.google.com/books?id=g8dWCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1&source=gbs\_toc\_r&cad=4#v=onepage&q&f=false



Link: Threat of uncontrolled migrants will increase the power of right-wing anti-immigration parties

**[Note: Just the “threat” – even if it doesn’t happen – will trigger the political disadvantages here.]**

Jacob Kirkegaard 2020 (Senior Researcher at the Peterson Institute for International Economics) 5 March 2020 “The refugee crisis returns to Europe—or does it?” https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/refugee-crisis-returns-europe-or-does-it

A sudden renewed threat of uncontrolled large migrant inflows into the European Union is moreover not likely to make it easier to agree on common migration and especially asylum policies. Any proposals to redistribute migrants among EU countries will still be dead on arrival with most member states. Rather, the crystallization of the always latent threat of a neighboring country, in this case Turkey, strategically using the European Union’s porous external and open internal borders as a coercive lever against Europe, is likely to bolster the European Union’s focus on strengthening external borders as an immigration deterrent. The European Union has always had political aspirations to be a “normative power,” but it is clear that another migration crisis, which invariably in the short-term pushes it to adopt policies and measures favored by the far right, moves it in the opposite direction. Fortress Europe is coming a little closer.

Link: Anti-immigration parties, when elected, make social conflict worse

Dr. Francesco Campo , Dr. Sara Giunti , Dr. Mariapia Mendola 2020 (Campo – PhD economics. Giunti –PhD economics; **Postdoctoral research fellow** Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Milano-Bicocca. Mendola – PhD economics; Professor of Economics at University of Milano Bicocca ) 7 Dec 2020 “The Political Impact of Refugee Migration: Evidence from the Italian Dispersal Policy” https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=503093087027109095110074068119022007021074046013037037027007065122089089069020013094022030063118118055022124015029028096090022023061039092033029022113126097013023028050077045092027024078094125120018021098121084115110066028105118095113100006086091096020&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE

In fact, while far-right parties have gained significant electoral success in Europe in recent years, there is also evidence that they do not merely reflect, but also aggravate radicalization and social conflict – xenophobia in particular (see Bursztyn et al. 2019; Fletcher et al., 2020; Grosjean et al. 2020; Müller and Schwarz 2019; Romarri, 2020).

Impact: Turn the harms. Treatment o f migrants gets worse after an AFF ballot. More anti-immigrant policies will be enacted from the political backlash

Chris Horwood and William Powell 2019. (Horwood - senior adviser with the Mixed Migration Centre in Geneva. Powell (research consultant, Mixed Migration Center. Funded by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland) Mixed Migration Review 2019 (article doesn’t give an exact month of publication but references events in November 2019) https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Mixed-Migration-Review-2019.pdf

This disruption and distortion can be felt throughout the body politic. In Europe and Australia for example, right-wing parties have been so effective in exploiting the migration and refugee issue to beef up electoral support that mainstream parties adopted more restrictive and anti-migrant policies in order to compete.

2. Sovereign debt crisis #1: From higher migrant costs

Link: Law requires EU governments guaranteeing migrants an "adequate standard of living"

Mareike Hoffman 2017 (student of the LLM programmes International Human Rights Law and Global Criminal Law. She has also been a student research assistant at the University of Groningen since September 2017. She holds a LLB in ‘International and European Law’) 30 Oct 2017 “The Right to Housing and its Applicability to Asylum Seekers in Europe” https://grojil.org/2017/10/30/the-right-to-housing-and-its-applicability-to-asylum-seekers-in-europe/

Asylum seekers are especially at risk of having their right to housing restricted since they essentially rely on the state for the provision of housing. Following the influx of asylum seekers to Europe since 2015, the issue of accommodating them adequately persists to this day. Nevertheless, the right to adequate housing is part of the right to an adequate standard of living and thereby included in a wide array of international human rights instruments.

Link: Dilemma. If very few migrants would be affected, the plan is untopical (not substantial reform) and insignificant (not worth 2 hours of time to debate)

If they want to argue that very little would change after their plan, we'll be glad to drop this Disadvantage.

Link: If a lot of changes would be enacted, and a lot of people affected, the cost will skyrocket – because government providing an "adequate standard of living" is very expensive

Prof. Arturo C. Porzecanski 2017. (prof. of economics, American University) 1 May 2017 Human Rights and Sovereign Debts in the Context of Property and Creditor Rights http://auapps.american.edu/aporzeca/www/Human%20Rights%20and%20Sovereign%20Debts%20SIS%20Working%20Paper.pdf



Link & Brink: EU member governments can't afford it – they're already massively in debt. Euro currency union is on the brink of breakup over government debt

Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life, Policies Directorate-General for Internal Policies 2020 (agency of the EU Parliament) November 2020 “Monetary-Fiscal Nexus After the Crisis” [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/658202/IPOL\_STU(2020)658202\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/658202/IPOL_STU%282020%29658202_EN.pdf)

The COVID-19 crisis brought back fears of a possible breakup of the currency union. Italy, which was hit first and quite substantially by the first wave of the pandemic in late February, was soon considered a question mark in its ability to manage a crisis of this magnitude on its own. Moreover, for political considerations it appeared unlikely that Italy would request financial assistance from fellow governments via the rescue mechanism ESM and would agree on a macroeconomic adjustment programme linked to that. Against this backdrop there was a growing nervousness in financial markets, manifesting in soaring spreads on the returns of Italian government bonds in early March. Noteworthy, intra-euro area spreads generally increased at that time, not only for Italian bonds, but also for countries deemed invulnerable like France and the Netherlands (Figure 5). This points to a common risk factor among euro area Member States, which was absent for non-euro area EU members like Poland and Sweden. The common risk factor can be interpreted as breakup risk of the currency union.

Impact: Astronomical bailout costs and devastating economic impacts for the EU and global economy

[Max Bergmann](https://www.americanprogress.org/about/staff/bergmann-max/bio/), [Siena Cicarelli](https://www.americanprogress.org/about/staff/cicarelli-siena/bio/), and [James Lamond](https://www.americanprogress.org/about/staff/lamond-james/bio/) 2020 (*Max Bergmann is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. Siena Cicarelli is a research assistant at the Center. James Lamond is a senior policy adviser at the Center*) Coronavirus May Be the EU’s Hardest Test Yet 18 March 2020 https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2020/03/18/481862/coronavirus-may-eus-hardest-test-yet/

A repeat of the drawn-out Greek debt crisis would be disastrous for all of the EU. Italy’s GDP is nearly 10 times bigger than Greece’s. Its economic collapse would threaten the survivability of the euro, as the cost for a bailout would be astronomical. The ramifications of such a collapse would be devastating for the entire EU and the global economy.

3. Sovereign debt crisis #2: From Schengen collapse

Link: AFF’s goal is to weaken external border controls for getting into the EU

If not, their plan doesn’t do anything.

Link: But the existence of the Schengen Agreement (open borderless travel within the EU) depends on secure external controls coming into the EU

**[Note: in context Zago is talking about carrier sanctions, as seen by the title of the article.]**

Mariana Zanetti Zago 2018 (master’s degree candidate at Tilburg Univ., Netherlands) June 2018, Externalisation of border controls through carrier sanctions: effects on refugees’ rights and Member States’ responsibility http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=145761

On the scope of the EU, specifically, the Schengen Acquis and the establishment of an area of Freedom, Security and Justice have brought as one of their consequences the necessity of reinforcement of external borders. The Title V of the TFEU, specifically on article 67(2) indicates that the area of freedom, security and justice must be ensured by the absence of internal borders for persons and the setting of a common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control. In the sequence, Article 77(2)(b) provides for the adoption of measures concerning common visa policies, check on external borders and intracommunity movement of third country nationals. That provisions show how the notion of an internally borderless European Union required the adoption of compensatory measures. Those measures were designed aiming at regulating and limiting the free movement of third country nationals in order to secure the right of free movement of European Union’s citizens.

Link: Suspension of open borders would raise bond yields and interest rates

European Parliamentary Research Service 2016 (Directorate-General for Internal Policies Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy) May 2016 Cost of non-Schengen: the impact of border controls within Schengen on the Single Market (“bond yields” are the interest rate paid by entities that borrow money by issuing bonds) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/578974/IPOL\_STU(2016)578974\_EN.pdf

Bond yields: The suspension of the Schengen Agreement in one or more countries might be interpreted by the financial markets as a signal that these countries are no longer committed to being part of the EU’s 'core'. These countries would face a greater redenomination risk. As a result, the yields for government bonds could increase, having implications for the price of other financial assets, for the interest rates faced by firms and households and, in turn, a negative impact on the real economy.

Link: Higher EU interest rates would create big problems for banks, pension funds, and governments in debt

Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life, Policies Directorate-General for Internal Policies 2020 (agency of the EU Parliament) November 2020 “Monetary-Fiscal Nexus After the Crisis” [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/658202/IPOL\_STU(2020)658202\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/658202/IPOL_STU%282020%29658202_EN.pdf) (brackets added)

An increase in the interest rate level would reduce the present value – and therefore the market value – of financial assets considerably, in particular for assets with long duration. The valuation risk from a change in interest rates is particularly pronounced for longer-term government bonds issued at very low rates – for example, an increase of 1 percentage point in the reference interest rate will cut almost 10% from the market value of a recent bond with 10 years remaining maturityand near-zero coupon. Once markets expect a sustained normalisation of monetary policy, bond markets will probably come under significant pressure immediately. The surge in Treasury bond yield in 2013 known as “Taper tantrum”, when the Federal Reserve announced to reduce bond purchases initiated during the financial crisis, illustrates this point. The pressure on sovereign bonds would likely be aggravated if the ECB [European Central Bank] simultaneously tried to sell off assets on its balance sheet in order to withdraw liquidity from the monetary system. Overall, a substantial reduction in the market value of bonds and other assets would tear deep holes in the balance sheets of private market participants, including banks and pension funds, thereby potentially putting financial stability at risk. Yet also the central banks’ balance sheets would be strongly affected with negative equity as a possible result.

Link: European Central Bank will stop buying government bonds if interest rates go up

Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life, Policies Directorate-General for Internal Policies 2020 (agency of the EU Parliament) November 2020 “Monetary-Fiscal Nexus After the Crisis” [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/658202/IPOL\_STU(2020)658202\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/658202/IPOL_STU%282020%29658202_EN.pdf) (brackets added)

According to forward guidance, the ECB [European Central Bank] intends to purchase assets as long as interest rates remain low, which implies that the Eurosystem will stop buying bonds with the first interest rate hike. Moreover, as there still is a huge amount of excess reserves in the monetary system, the ECB might also consider to withdraw this unused liquidity (Figure 2). In order to do that, the Eurosystem would probably have to sell government bonds, as this is the channel by which excessive liquidity was emitted in the first place. Governments would not only lose a big market player that currently purchases their bonds like a vacuum cleaner, but the big pile of government bonds currently on the Eurosystem balance sheet could be thrown back on the carpet. Most likely, this would have dire consequences for risk spreads and the ability of some governments to refinance.

Link: Sovereign debt crisis. Central Bank buying bonds is key to preventing another sovereign debt crisis

Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life, Policies Directorate-General for Internal Policies 2020 (agency of the EU Parliament) November 2020 “Monetary-Fiscal Nexus After the Crisis” [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/658202/IPOL\_STU(2020)658202\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/658202/IPOL_STU%282020%29658202_EN.pdf)

In March, increasing spreads on returns of government bonds threatened to constrain the fiscal capacity of some Member States to mitigate the crisis, and a sovereign debt crisis was looming at the most inopportune time. The European Central Bank (ECB)was forced to act swiftly – much faster than a joint fiscal policy response could have been agreed upon – in order to prevent further repercussions from tensions and turmoil on financial markets. As central bank policy was already constrained at the zero lower bound, the ECB primarily relied on further large-scale asset purchases. Over the course of the crisis, there has been a strong complementarity between monetary and fiscal policy. Elevated borrowing needs of governments were accommodated by low interest rates and asset purchases of the ECB, guaranteeing favourable financing conditions.

Impact: Astronomical bailout costs and devastating economic impacts for the EU and global economy

Cross-apply DA 3 impact card.

4. Loss of freedom: From Schengen collapse

Link: Cross apply all the links in DA 3 about Schengen collapse

Schengen open borders within Europe can only exist if they have strong external borders, which AFF takes away.

Impact: Return of internal borders would destroy freedom granted by Schengen

Robert Schuman Foundation, Research & Studies Centre on Europe 2016. (Schuman Foundation was founded in 1991; has been approved by the French State for its services to the public; reference research centre develops studies on the European Union policies) The Schengen area in crisis - the temptation of reinstalling borders 17 May 2016 https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/0392-the-schengen-area-in-crisis-the-temptation-of-reinstalling-borders

Beyond the medical metaphor the Schengen area is threatened by the temptation of a return to internal borders, which may deal it the final blow. It is therefore urgent to implement measures that will prevent its disappearance as a result of the unilateral re-introduction of internal border controls, without regard of the common rules. The question of losing Schengen is a serious one and deserves our close attention. Politically first of all, Schengen is the expression of the European project, i.e. the construction of a space in which the quest for more freedom plays a central role. If we backtrack over Schengen we shall bring this quest to an end, thereby directly indicating that we have acquired "too much" freedom.

5. Hurts US/EU cooperation on anti-terrorism security

Link: Carrier sanctions are a key part of EU external border security that are needed for cooperation with the US on anti-terrorism policy

Dr. Michela Ceccorulli 2009. (PhD Researcher, Forum on the Problems of Peace and War, Florence ) Migration as a security threat: internal and external dynamics in the European Union1, Forum on the Problems of Peace and War, Florence GARNET Working Paper No: 65/09 April 2009 <https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/csgr/garnet/workingpapers/6509.pdf>

As Boswell recalls, two main directions have been undertaken since then to control and limit the inflows through external policies: the externationalization of traditional instruments of EU borders control -focussed on engaging third countries in controls on illegal flows, trafficking and smuggling and the draft of re-admission pacts and carriers sanctions- and a preventive approach focused on the reasons determining the abandonment of home countries and on foreseeing regional arrangements for the protection of displaced persons.Also in the latter case, the end objective was to reduce pressures on EU borders, “in the end our aims must be to achieve durable solutions on a regional basis. And that will help to reduce the flow of migrants to Europe”. The security threat posed by migration was underlined later on after the terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001. In this case, as in the cases of the terrorist attacks in London and Madrid, the emphasis on borders closure gained prominence. In the following Council meetings (Laeken 2001, Seville 2002), the necessity of hampering illegal immigration for security reasons was set as the first objective to be met. The security approach was confirmed by two other factors: the European Security Strategy and the Transatlantic Relation. From 2001 on, the idea was taking more ground within the European strategic planning that terrorism as a rather immaterial and non-identifiable threat could travel with persons and could menace directly the security of the Western world. More to that, the influence that the Transatlantic Relation has exerted on the strengthening of control measures at the borders after September 11th cannot be overlooked. The connection made principally but not exclusively between terrorism and migration was made clear at the meeting of the SCIFA (the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum) and a US Delegation: the US expected the European Union to cooperate on border control in transit areas, border information exchange, return of inadmissible persons, expulsion/extradition, border security, visa.As it is reported, “visa measures have been affected by the desire to obtain information about those crossing frontiers and ensure maximum security”.

Impact: Lives at stake. US/EU cooperation against terrorist movements and travel is essential to save lives.

Ambassador Anthony L. Gardner 2016 (US Ambassador to the European Union) “Why US, EU need to work together to defeat terrorism” 10 Nov 2016 https://useu.usmission.gov/us-eu-need-work-together-defeat-terrorism/

Terrorists are now working multilaterally. In response, we must do the same if we are to be successful in defeating them. This is why it is fortunate that the United States, the European Union, and other countries are engaging in multilateral efforts to combat terrorism at a location less than 180 kilometers from my office in Brussels. At Europol, the European Police Office, law enforcement and customs agencies from the 28 Member States of the European Union and 10 non-EU countries, including the United States, work side by side in task forces to restrict terrorist financing, combat smuggling of foreign terrorist fighters from conflict zones, and establish links between known and suspected terrorists. Ultimately, the work aims to disrupt attacks well before they occur by cross-checking information against multiple sources, some of which are only accessible to one government, but may be relevant to many others.
**END QUOTE. HE GOES ON LATER IN THE CONTEXT TO CONCLUDE QUOTE:**Failure to share information that could save innocent lives is simply not an option. And this coming year, I will continue my efforts to further this work. The United States and the European Union will be stronger and safer the more we pool our efforts in the name of upholding our values and our freedom.

BIG LINKS TO DISADVANTAGES 6-9 🡪 Plan leads to fracturing/dissolving the EU

Big Fracture Link: Plan would increase asylum seekers, but some countries absolutely refuse to accept more

Reuters news service 2017 (journalist Gabriela Baczynska) 18 May 2017 “Poland defies EU over taking in asylum-seekers” https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-eu-poland/poland-defies-eu-over-taking-in-asylum-seekers-idUSKCN18E2JN

Poland refused on Thursday to yield to pressure from the European Union to take in any asylum seekers under a relocation scheme despite an EU threat of legal action. Under a plan agreed in 2015, the European Commission wants EU member states to each admit a quota from a total of 160,000 asylum seekers stuck in Italy and Greece. Most have fled conflicts and poverty in the Middle East and Africa. Poland and Hungary alone have refused to admit any, citing security concerns following a spate of attacks by militant Islamists in several European countries.

Big Fracture Brink: EU is already on the brink of disintegration over immigration issues

Bodo Weber 2020 (senior associate of the [Democratization Policy Council](http://www.democratizationpolicy.org/), based in Berlin) 9 March 2020 “Threat to EU on Greece-Turkey border is EU-made” <https://euobserver.com/opinion/147672> (the “Visegrad” countries are: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia)

The current narrative's complete avoidance of core questions is astounding. Reasoned, rational discussion seems to now be a collective pan-European taboo. EU leaders evidently fear that just by opening up such discussion, the Union would disintegrate. In September 2015, when some of the Visegrád countries declared they would not implement the EU's legally-binding relocation scheme, the Union collapsed as a legal entity in the area of asylum and migration.

6. Reduced world stability from fracturing the EU

Example: Disagreement over immigration policy was a major reason Britain left the EU

Max Boot 2016 (leading military historian and foreign policy analyst. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York) July 2016 “Brexit: Isolationism or Atlanticism?”  <https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/issues/resources/strategika_issue_33_web.pdf>

Britons might never have voted to leave the European Union had it not been for the refugee crisis that hit Europe as a result of the Syrian civil war. Even though Britain has accepted only some 5,000 Syrian refugees, German premier Angela Merkel agreed to take in 800,000, thus fueling fears across the continent of an influx of possible terrorists. Those fears were exploited by elements of the “Leave” campaign, principally Nigel Farage and the UK Independence Party, and no doubt contributed crucial momentum to the final outcome.

Brink: EU faces an uncertain future with multiple crises threatening unity and increasing division

Meagan Araki, Annie Chang, Troy Lindell, Alison Wendler 2017. (members of the “Challenges to European Unity Task Force” at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Univ. of Washington) March 2017 CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN UNITY: OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS <https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Task-Force-J-Report-2017_Lorenz.pdf>

Today, Europe faces an uncertain future. The migration crisis, rise in terrorism, economic downturn, mounting external pressures and a responsive populist movement, have threatened the basis of European stability. The major influx of refugees into Europe has placed immense pressure on the EU’s infrastructure and capacity to integrate refugees into the European identity. Europe has experienced a growing number of terrorist attacks, leading to nationalist and xenophobic policies. Additionally, Russia’s encroachment into Eastern Europe has strained Russia and Europe’s relationship. The Euro crisis has furthered the divide between the core and peripheral EU countries, revealing the inequality between European citizens and growing stagnant employment and growth opportunities.

Link: EU stability promotes US ability to maintain global security and stability

Meagan Araki, Annie Chang, Troy Lindell, Alison Wendler 2017. (members of the “Challenges to European Unity Task Force” at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Univ. of Washington) March 2017 CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN UNITY: OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS <https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Task-Force-J-Report-2017_Lorenz.pdf>

Policies that encourage the unity between EU member states should be strongly supported. It is significant that the United States demonstrate support in this ongoing migration crisis, as it will help relieve the pressures member states are experiencing, as well as help mend existing tensions. The cohesion, stability, and cooperation of European Union serve a key interests of the United States. With these aspects, a more unified European Union can strengthen its position as a global actor, as well as strengthen its existing relations with the United States. This can further United States’ objectives of security and stability throughout the international community.

Impact: World peace & prosperity at risk without US influence. US hegemony is key to global peace & prosperity

Capt. M. V. Prato 2009 (United States Marine Corps,Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Combat Development Command,Marine Corps University) “The Need for American Hegemony” Feb 2009 http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a508040.pdf

The world witnessed a vast shift in the polarity of geopolitics after the Cold War. The United States became the world’s greatest hegemon with an unequalled ability to globally project cultural, political, economic, and military power in a manner not seen since the days of the Roman Empire. Coined the “unipolar moment” by syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer, the disparity of power between the U.S. and all other nations allows the U.S. to influence the world for the mutual benefit of all responsible states. Unfortunately, the United States is increasingly forced to act unilaterally as a result of both foreign and domestic resentment to U.S. dominance and the rise of liberal internationalism. The United States must exercise benevolent global hegemony, unilaterally if necessary, to ensure its security and maintain global peace and prosperity.

7. Populism and Authoritarian Government

Link: AFF plan weakens / fractures the EU

Cross apply the BIG LINK.

Link: Fear, anxiety and skepticism about the EU leads to the rise of populist authoritarian figures

Meagan Araki, Annie Chang, Troy Lindell, Alison Wendler 2017. (members of the “Challenges to European Unity Task Force” at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Univ. of Washington) March 2017 CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN UNITY: OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS <https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Task-Force-J-Report-2017_Lorenz.pdf>

Additionally, the complications surrounding EU accession and instability in Turkey and the Balkans present unique challenges to the dynamic of the EU. These real and perceived threats have induced fear and anxiety into the European public. As these security threats have worsened with little to no progress made, Euroscepticism has grown and enabled the populist movement. By capitalizing on this sentiment, populist parties have gained increasing support throughout Europe. Populists promise to take back power from the corrupt and inefficient political elite, and give it back to the general public. Europeans have increasingly turned to strongman figures who value strength and security over tolerance and unity.

Brink & Example: Hungary now has authoritarian government, putting EU at high risk right now

Philippe Dam 2020 (master’s degree in international administration; Human Rights Watch’s advocacy director for Europe and Central Asia) 1 Apr 2020 “Hungary’s Authoritarian Takeover Puts European Union at Risk” <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/01/hungarys-authoritarian-takeover-puts-european-union-risk>

On Monday, under the pretext of addressing the COVID-19 public health emergency, [Hungary's](https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/hungary) parliament gave [green light to the Orban-led government](https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/23/hungarys-orban-uses-pandemic-seize-unlimited-power) to rule with unlimited power for an indefinite time. Prime Minister Viktor Orban can now suspend any existing law and implement others by decree, without parliamentary or judicial scrutiny. Elections have been suspended. The law allows for new criminal penalties of five years in prison for publishing vaguely defined “false” or “distorted” facts – another blow to media freedom in the country. With this law, Hungary becomes the first country in the European Union to virtually abolish all democratic checks-and-balances. How has it come to this? In the past [10 years](https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/05/16/wrong-direction-rights/assessing-impact-hungarys-new-constitution-and-laws), the government has spared no efforts to [curb judicial independence](https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/hungary), restrict [civil society](https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/17/hungary-determined-silence-any-critics-left-standing) activities, and gain near full [control over the media](https://www.euronews.com/2019/06/12/don-t-be-fooled-hungary-s-government-remains-a-threat-to-european-values-view). Having repeatedly failed to appreciate the gravity of the situation, EU institutions risk making the same mistake again.

Link & Impact: Weak EU leads to rise of dictatorship and loss of freedom for millions more

Kenneth Roth 2020 (executive director of Human Rights Watch, one of the world's leading international human rights organizations; former federal prosecutor in New York; graduate of Yale Law School) 27 Apr 2020 “Stopping the Authoritarian Rot in Europe” [https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/27/stopping-authoritarian-rot-europe#](https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/27/stopping-authoritarian-rot-europe)

Rot tends to spread when it encounters no resistance. Dictator wannabes prey upon weakness. EU and member state leaders now need to ask themselves: is the EU only a trading bloc or also a club of democracies? The answer to that question used to be obvious. Sadly, it no longer is. Ten million EU citizens now live under authoritarian rule. How many millions more will have to suffer the loss of their freedoms before Europe’s leaders draw the line?

8. Economic recession (from weakening / fracturing the EU)

Link: AFF plan weakens / fractures the EU with greater division

Cross-apply the BIG LINK.

Link: EU unity is necessary for beneficial trade deals

Julian Bonte-Friedheim 2020 (head writer at The Perspective) “IS THE EU BETTER OFF DIVIDED OR TOGETHER?” (month not given in the published article)  <https://www.theperspective.com/debates/businessandtechnology/is-the-eu-better-off-divided-or-together/>

Better trade deals can be negotiated from within the EU. For any European nation, negotiating trade deals with other countries is much more advantageous as part of the EU rather than as an independent economy. As one of the world’s [biggest economic unions](https://www.thebalance.com/world-s-largest-economy-3306044), the EU has a lot more leverage when brokering a deal with China or India. Being able to offer (or withhold) access to its many consumers is a strong bargaining tool. Additionally, there is [free trading](https://www.ft.com/content/1688d0e4-15ef-11e6-b197-a4af20d5575e) between members of the EU, as it is a customs union. Individual countries, while able to create their own terms, are unlikely to reach deals as beneficial as the EU does on its own.

Brink: Cracks already being seen in EU unity, and even partial non-cooperation will eventually bleed it to death

Hans Vollaard 2020 ( Lecturer in Dutch and European Politics at Utrecht University, the Netherlands.) “One down, many to go? European disintegration after Brexit” 23 March 2020  <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2020/03/23/one-down-many-to-go-european-disintegration-after-brexit/>

Even though there may not be other instances of European disintegration like Brexit, dissatisfaction may lead to other forms of disintegration. Not by countries leaving the EU entirely, but only partially. These partial exits involve member states not complying with the EU rules, for instance with respect to public finances in the Eurozone (Italy), or the Schengen rules, many member states have introduced “temporary” national border surveillance since the migration crisis of 2015. Another partial exit is the desire to pay less money to ‘Brussels’, such as expressed by the so-called Hanseatic group of EU member states led by the Netherlands. Disintegration can also occur involuntarily, when one member state wants to exclude another member state, such as the calls to push Greece out of the euro or the Schengen area. These partial forms of disintegration undermine the functioning of the EU. Its rules are less respected, and it gets fewer resources to function properly. In such a scenario, the EU would gradually ‘bleed to death’.

Impact: Devastating economic impact. Financial recession

Mauro Guillen 2016 (holder of the Zandman Endowed Professorship in International Management at the Wharton School. He served as Director of the Lauder Institute of Management & International Studies between 2007 and 2019. PhD in sociology from Yale University and a Doctorate in political economy from the University of Oviedo in Spain.) 13 June 2016 “On the Brink: How a Brexit Could Fracture a Fragile Europe” <https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/on-the-brink-how-brexit-could-fracture-a-fragile-europe/>

The European Union is the largest economy in the world. It’s not as rich as the U.S., but it is bigger in terms of gross domestic product if you combine those 28 countries. If there is a crisis of confidence that undermines consumer spending and business confidence, then you are going to get into maybe even a third recession. That would be devastating for Europe itself, but it would be really bad for everybody else in the world that has business with Europe, including the United States. Exporters to Europe and American companies that have investments in Europe are going to suffer. Companies such as GE or GM or Boeing, 20% to 30% of their business is in Europe, so it could have a large impact.

Past precedent: Brexit caused serious economic damage

Kimberly Amadeo 2020 (over 20 years of senior-level corporate experience in economic analysis and business strategy. She is a U.S. Economy expert for The Balance and president of WorldMoneyWatch, which produces publications about the global economy) “Brexit Consequences for the U.K., the EU, and the United States”  last updated 14 Mar 2020 <https://www.thebalance.com/brexit-consequences-4062999>

The day after the Brexit vote, the currency markets were in turmoil. The [euro fell 2% to $1.11](https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-euro-to-dollar-conversion-its-history-3306091).﻿ The pound fell 8% to $1.36.﻿ Both increased the [value of the dollar](https://www.thebalance.com/value-of-us-dollar-3306268). That strength is not good for U.S. [stock markets](https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-stock-market-how-it-works-3305893). It makes American shares more expensive for foreign investors. A weak pound also makes U.S. exports to the U.K. more expensive. The United States has an $18.9 billion trade surplus with the U.K. In 2018, it exported $141 billion while importing $122 billion.﻿ Brexit could turn this surplus into a deficit if a weak pound makes U.K. imports more competitive. Brexit dampens business growth for companies that operate in Europe. U.S. companies invested $758 billion in the U.K. in 2018.﻿ Most of this was the finance sector with some manufacturing. These companies use the U.K. as the gateway to free trade with the EU nations. U.K. businesses invested $561 billion in the United States. Brexit puts at risk jobs in both countries. In addition, there were 716,000 U.K. immigrants in the United States and 215,000 U.S. immigrants in the U.K. in 2019.

9. Russia gains influence

Link: AFF divides / weakens the EU

Cross-apply the BIG LINK.

Link: Russia uses EU division to advance its agenda and gain influence to accomplish bad things

Ian Kearns 2018 (co-founder, former director and board member of the European Leadership Network, a pan-European group of senior political, military and diplomatic leaders. Former specialist advisor to the Joint House of Commons/House of Lords Committee on National Security Strategy. Former deputy chair and director of secretariat to former NATO Secretary General George Robertson) Collapse: Europe After The European Union (no month given in the published article) <https://books.google.com/books?id=ZVBSDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT223&lpg=PT223&dq=EU+immigration+reform+hopeless&source=bl&ots=79cHvPH2qu&sig=ACfU3U3diw6xbMj9V9bRAyJPoyV-5N1epA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjswYPI-ZrqAhWyneAKHfCQBCE4ChDoATAAegQIChAB#v=onepage&q=EU%20immigration%20reform%20hopeless&f=false>



Impact: Russian influence damages democracy, promotes authoritarian rule

Geir Hagen Karlsen 2019 (Lieutenant Colonel and Lecturer, Norwegian Defence University College) 8 Feb 2019 “Divide and rule: ten lessons about Russian political influence activities in Europe” <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0227-8>

Russia is an authoritarian and corrupt state that regards the EU and, more specifically, NATO, as a challenge, a competitor and a threat. Its influence activities are malicious, undermining alliances and creating distrust, weakening what Moscow sees as their opponents and thus ensuring the survival of this authoritarian regime. Their interference is worrisome at several levels. First, Russia is undermining core democratic processes, like elections, and trust in the political system and its institutions. Second, their disinformation and manipulation of media and social media is directly undermining the political discourse, essential to democracy. Third, this is further exacerbated by their malicious attacks on individuals, like the Finnish journalist Jessika Aro, who has been tracked and harassed systematically after exposing Russian trolling of social media (Aro, [2015](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0227-8#ref-CR3)). However, the overall Russian approach is simple, divide and rule.