Negative: Internal Border Controls

By “Coach Vance” Trefethen

***Resolved: The European Union should substantially reform its immigration policy.***

The “Schengen Agreement” (1990’s) allowed (most) EU countries (and a few neighbors) to abolish permanent border control checkpoints internally within Europe. For example, you can travel from Spain to France to Belgium in a car or train and never have to stop and present a passport or be inspected at any borders (just like passing between states in the USA). The countries covered by this arrangement are called the “Schengen Area.” It greatly sped up travel, tourism, and trade by eliminating time consuming delays and costs of waiting at all the many borders of small European countries. Schengen already today allows countries to put back “temporary” border controls in cases of emergency or crisis (like terrorism or mass movement of migrants). Some EU countries have done just that, in response to immigration pressures and terrorism threats. The AFF plan would modify EU policy to allow Schengen countries to restore permanent internal border controls – effectively ending the Schengen Agreement. [Note: ‘internal’ controls are borders between countries within Europe. External controls already exist today and are the control points for initial entrance into Europe for people coming from outside places like Africa or America. For example, border controls between Greece and Turkey, or customs inspections required for international travelers landing at airports in Paris or Berlin.]  
The effect of ending Schengen would be about the same as the effect of the 50 states in the US putting up checkpoints at all the roads near their state borders and at their airports to screen and inspect the passports and cars of every person coming in. In other words, massive costs, delays, hassles and waste of time.

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NEG: Internal Border Controls – bad idea

DEFINITION

The “Schengen Agreement” is the Status Quo policy of “not” having permanent internal border controls

Genevieve Zingg 2016 (Master of Arts in Human Rights Studies, Columbia University) June 2016 “The Consequences of Schengen's Collapse: Populist Shortsightedness and the Future of European Security” <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328876479_The_Consequences_of_Schengen's_Collapse_Populist_Shortsightedness_and_the_Future_of_European_Security/link/5be8b7c24585150b2bb03f58/download>

The Schengen Agreement, signed by Belgium, France, West Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands on June 14 and supplemented by the 1990 Schengen Convention, cemented open borders and the freedom of movement as a defining feature of the European Union.

INHERENCY

1. “Temporary” controls functioning like permanent

Status Quo allows EU countries to do “temporary” controls and extend them – and multiple countries are doing it

Robert Schuman Foundation, Research & Studies Centre on Europe 2016. (Schuman Foundation was founded in 1991; has been approved by the French State for its services to the public; reference research centre develops studies on the European Union policies) The Schengen area in crisis - the temptation of reinstalling borders 17 May 2016 <https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/0392-the-schengen-area-in-crisis-the-temptation-of-reinstalling-borders>

Since 2015 the terrorist threat (in the case of France) and the arrival of refugees and asylum seekers (mainly in the direction of Germany and Austria) which led to the re-introduction of controls are now part of the long term, leading to an unprecedented implementation of rules pertaining to border controls. For the first time ever the Member States have used the possibility of extending border controls and combined procedures. In this case Germany and Austria are perfect illustrations of this new rationale. These Member States re-introduced "emergency" controls for an initial period of ten days and then extended them for a maximum of two months. After this period they maintained the border controls on the basis of another procedure which allowed them to continue thus for a further six month period maximum.

2. A/T “External border controls are weak – that’s why we need internal!”

Status Quo is solving: Frontex (EU border control & coast guard) has made a “quantum leap” in size and authority since 2016

Prof. Florin Coman-Kund 2020 (Assistant Professor in European Union Law at the Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam) 6 Feb 2020 “The Territorial Expansion of Frontex Operations to Third Countries: On the Recently Concluded Status Agreements in the Western Balkans and Beyond…” <https://verfassungsblog.de/the-territorial-expansion-of-frontex-operations-to-third-countries-on-the-recently-concluded-status-agreements-in-the-western-balkans-and-beyond/>

Since its inception, Frontex has been at the forefront of the Union’s policy in the field of external border management. In the wake of the 2015 ‘migratory crisis’, Frontex underwent a swift and unprecedented upgrade of its powers, resources, and capacities. The [2016](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2016.251.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2016:251:TOC) and [2019](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1573722151667&uri=CELEX:32019R1896) mandate revisions arguably mark a [‘quantum leap’ gradually transforming Frontex into a more integrated and hierarchical administrative body](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12027-016-0447-y). One of the most spectacular developments introduced by the recent reforms concerns the territorial extension of the agency’s operations. Henceforth, Frontex is mandated to carry out operational activities, including executive powers, in third countries.

MINOR REPAIR – Better security cooperation instead of closing borders

Instead of fragmenting security efforts behind borders, increase security cooperation. It would be more effective than each working alone

Wolfgang Lehmacher 2017 (Operating Partner, Industrial Innovation Partners, Anchor Group) 2 Jan 2017 “Why border controls won't protect Europe against terrorism” <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/border-controls-schengen-europe-terrorism/>

The current terrorist threat requires collaboration across all European countries, the use of advanced technology and a common European anti-terrorism strategy. Instead of investing time, money and energy in individual and isolated efforts to protect each country, Europe could be made much safer through consolidating budgets and other resources to better protect the outer borders of the EU and leverage advanced digital technology. The most effective way would be for all European countries to unite under one strategy – for example in a “homeland security alliance”. There is little chance that European countries with long and highly permeable coastal borders can manage the protection challenge alone.

Advocacy: Security cooperation would work better than internal border controls

Wolfgang Lehmacher 2017 (Operating Partner, Industrial Innovation Partners, Anchor Group) 2 Jan 2017 “Why border controls won't protect Europe against terrorism” <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/border-controls-schengen-europe-terrorism/>

Even the most secured borders have proven to be permeable. And borders cannot stop local-born and locally operating terrorists. Political leaders need to explain why digital and coordinated European measures are better suited to protect the lives of European citizens and visitors than the reinstallation of intra-European borders. The situation demands an act of solidarity across all governments in Europe. In its own interests, the private sector is required to support this effort. Leaders could leverage the current threat as a historic chance to unite Europe under an urgently needed common security vision and execution plan.

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE

1. No harm significant enough to justify internal border controls

No evidence migrant or terrorist problems are sufficient to justify internal controls

Prof. Sergio Carrera 2019 (Senior Research Fellow and Head of the Justice and Home Affairs unit at Centre for European Policy Studies. Professor at the Migration Policy Centre in the European University Institute in Florence, Italy ) The State of the Schengen Area in the Light of the 2019 European Parliament Election <https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/61595/RSCAS%20PP%202019_12.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

Other Schengen members, such as Denmark, Sweden and Norway, have alluded to potential linkages between ‘secondary movements’ of asylum seekers and criminality and terrorism. The evidence provided in these notifications has been non-existent. The Parliament’s Annual Report on the Functioning of the Schengen Area condemned the continued internal border checks, which in its view were “not in line with the existing rules as to their extension, necessity and proportionality, and are therefore unlawful.” It criticized the Schengen countries concerned for artificially changing the legal basis and not having “sufficiently justified such controls or provided enough information on their results, therefore hindering analysis by the Commission and scrutiny by Parliament” (emphasis added).  
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The “threat” is exaggerated perception. Existing police procedures can handle the situation without border controls

Prof. Sergio Carrera 2019 (Senior Research Fellow and Head of the Justice and Home Affairs unit at Centre for European Policy Studies. Professor at the Migration Policy Centre in the European University Institute in Florence, Italy) The State of the Schengen Area in the Light of the 2019 European Parliament Election <https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/61595/RSCAS%20PP%202019_12.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> (brackets in original)

In its Annual Report on the Implementation of the Schengen Area of May 2018, the Parliament recalled that member states have a number of tools at their disposal other than systematic internal border checks on persons, such as “targeted police controls” which do not have border control as their objective. The Annual Report underlined that the reintroduction of internal border checks was linked more to a perception of security threats “rather than sound evidence of [their] actual existence” (emphasis added).

2. A/T “Secondary movement of migrants”

**[This happens when an irregular immigrant or asylum seeker enters the EU and doesn’t stay in the first country of entry, like he’s supposed to, but starts moving around looking for the best deal. Countries not on the “front lines” of migration hate that and want to put up border controls to stop them.]**

“Secondary movement” isn’t a significant problem

Prof. Sergio Carrera 2019 (Senior Research Fellow and Head of the Justice and Home Affairs unit at Centre for European Policy Studies. Professor at the Migration Policy Centre in the European University Institute in Florence, Italy) The State of the Schengen Area in the Light of the 2019 European Parliament Election <https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/61595/RSCAS%20PP%202019_12.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

The secondary movement argument calls for an equally meticulous examination showing the exact scale and relevance of this issue at present. Current statistics say little about the actual scale of the phenomenon. The quantitative information available on how the EU Dublin system works only shows a small percentage of applications not based on legitimate grounds. These mainly include, for example, moving to another Schengen member because of personal links (including family unity) and escaping from inhuman and degrading treatment – such as destitution or lack of housing and access to basic social rights – which result from substandard reception conditions in the first country of entry.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Economic harm – from slowing down cross-border trade & travel

Permanent border controls = 5 to 18 billion euros per year in economic damage

European Parliament 2016. “The economic impact of suspending Schengen” March 2016 <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2016/579074/EPRS_ATA%282016%29579074_EN.pdf>

The suspension of the Schengen Agreement and re-establishment of permanent border controls would lead to a restriction of the four freedoms of the Single Market and have a negative economic impact. Estimates show that the costs of rolling back Schengen would – depending on region, sector and alternative trade channels – be between €5 billion and €18 billion per year.

Border controls = $124 billion over 10 years in economic losses + more to pay for increased border control enforcement

David Danelo 2016 (Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.) 22 Feb 2016 “The Bordering of Europe” <https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/02/the-bordering-of-europe/>

Over the next decade, if Schengen disappears, EU authorities estimate economic output would be reduced by $124 billion as a result of border control costs. This figure does not account for the costs that each of the Schengen Area’s 26 governments will incur for constructing, staffing, and maintaining border controls, or for the costs associated with detention and deportation programs.

Border controls risk costing Europe over 100 billion euros/year due to delayed shipments of goods

Sinan Ekim & Kemal Kirisci 2016 (Ekim - Senior Research Assistant - Center for the United States and Europe (CUSE). Kirisci - Nonresident Senior Fellow - [Foreign Policy](https://www.brookings.edu/program/foreign-policy/), [Center on the United States and Europe](https://www.brookings.edu/center/center-on-the-united-states-and-europe/), [The Turkey Project](https://www.brookings.edu/project/the-turkey-project/)) 16 Feb 2016 “Why we need to save Schengen from the anti-immigrant populists” <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/02/16/why-we-need-to-save-schengen-from-the-anti-immigrant-populists/>

Studies warn that reintroducing permanent border controls risks setting back the economies of Schengen countries by over 100 billion euros a year. Such measures would have the same impact as placing a 3 percent tax on the merchandise being transported. According to estimates by the European Commission, the cost of each additional hour of delay at an internal border would furthermore come to roughly [3 billion euros](https://global.handelsblatt.com/edition/352/ressort/politics/article/the-business-of-borders?ref=MTI5ODU1), and in the long run could amount to a [decline of 10 to 20 percent](http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/fluechtlingskrise-schengen-abkehr-wuerde-mehr-als-100-milliarden-euro-kosten/12915650.html) in intra-EU trade.

Multiple economic sectors would be harmed by border controls

European Parliamentary Research Service 2016 (Directorate-General for Internal Policies Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy) May 2016 Cost of non-Schengen: the impact of border controls within Schengen on the Single Market <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/578974/IPOL_STU(2016)578974_EN.pdf>

Travel and tourism within Schengen and from outside: Due to the loss of time arising from crossing borders, a decline in trips – especially short trips and day visits - is likely. If border controls lead to fragmentation in the EU’s common visa policy, the tourism and hospitality industries could face non-trivial losses. 3. Trade in goods and services: As waiting times for truck drivers could increase, businesses could be affected by the rise in personnel costs and other costs such as replenishment of their stocks since just-in-time delivery may be limited. The impact might go well beyond the transport sector, affecting the volume and costs of the trade of goods and the efficiency of the European logistics sector, potentially increasing prices. Higher import prices could in turn lead to a general increase in prices, and to a fall in consumption and investment. That could have an effect on the structure and the level of value chains, foreign direct investment, and location decisions of companies, as well as price competitiveness.

2. Sovereign debt & Euro currency crisis – from higher interest rates

Link: Suspension of open borders would raise bond yields and interest rates

European Parliamentary Research Service 2016 (Directorate-General for Internal Policies Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy) May 2016 Cost of non-Schengen: the impact of border controls within Schengen on the Single Market (“bond yields” are the interest rate paid by entities that borrow money by issuing bonds) <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/578974/IPOL_STU(2016)578974_EN.pdf>

Bond yields: The suspension of the Schengen Agreement in one or more countries might be interpreted by the financial markets as a signal that these countries are no longer committed to being part of the EU’s 'core'. These countries would face a greater redenomination risk. As a result, the yields for government bonds could increase, having implications for the price of other financial assets, for the interest rates faced by firms and households and, in turn, a negative impact on the real economy.

Link: Higher EU interest rates would create big problems for banks, pension funds, and governments in debt

Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life, Policies Directorate-General for Internal Policies 2020 (agency of the EU Parliament) November 2020 “Monetary-Fiscal Nexus After the Crisis” <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/658202/IPOL_STU(2020)658202_EN.pdf> (brackets added)

An increase in the interest rate level would reduce the present value – and therefore the market value – of financial assets considerably, in particular for assets with long duration. The valuation risk from a change in interest rates is particularly pronounced for longer-term government bonds issued at very low rates – for example, an increase of 1 percentage point in the reference interest rate will cut almost 10% from the market value of a recent bond with 10 years remaining maturityand near-zero coupon. Once markets expect a sustained normalisation of monetary policy, bond markets will probably come under significant pressure immediately. The surge in Treasury bond yield in 2013 known as “Taper tantrum”, when the Federal Reserve announced to reduce bond purchases initiated during the financial crisis, illustrates this point. The pressure on sovereign bonds would likely be aggravated if the ECB [European Central Bank] simultaneously tried to sell off assets on its balance sheet in order to withdraw liquidity from the monetary system. Overall, a substantial reduction in the market value of bonds and other assets would tear deep holes in the balance sheets of private market participants, including banks and pension funds, thereby potentially putting financial stability at risk. Yet also the central banks’ balance sheets would be strongly affected with negative equity as a possible result.

Link: European Central Bank will stop buying government bonds if interest rates go up

Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life, Policies Directorate-General for Internal Policies 2020 (agency of the EU Parliament) November 2020 “Monetary-Fiscal Nexus After the Crisis” <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/658202/IPOL_STU(2020)658202_EN.pdf> (brackets added)

According to forward guidance, the ECB [European Central Bank] intends to purchase assets as long as interest rates remain low, which implies that the Eurosystem will stop buying bonds with the first interest rate hike. Moreover, as there still is a huge amount of excess reserves in the monetary system, the ECB might also consider to withdraw this unused liquidity (Figure 2). In order to do that, the Eurosystem would probably have to sell government bonds, as this is the channel by which excessive liquidity was emitted in the first place. Governments would not only lose a big market player that currently purchases their bonds like a vacuum cleaner, but the big pile of government bonds currently on the Eurosystem balance sheet could be thrown back on the carpet. Most likely, this would have dire consequences for risk spreads and the ability of some governments to refinance.

Link: Sovereign debt crisis. Central Bank buying bonds is key to preventing another sovereign debt crisis

Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life, Policies Directorate-General for Internal Policies 2020 (agency of the EU Parliament) November 2020 “Monetary-Fiscal Nexus After the Crisis” <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/658202/IPOL_STU(2020)658202_EN.pdf>

In March, increasing spreads on returns of government bonds threatened to constrain the fiscal capacity of some Member States to mitigate the crisis, and a sovereign debt crisis was looming at the most inopportune time. The European Central Bank (ECB)was forced to act swiftly – much faster than a joint fiscal policy response could have been agreed upon – in order to prevent further repercussions from tensions and turmoil on financial markets. As central bank policy was already constrained at the zero lower bound, the ECB primarily relied on further large-scale asset purchases. Over the course of the crisis, there has been a strong complementarity between monetary and fiscal policy. Elevated borrowing needs of governments were accommodated by low interest rates and asset purchases of the ECB, guaranteeing favourable financing conditions.

Brink: Euro currency union on the brink of breakup over government debt and Italy is most vulnerable

Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life, Policies Directorate-General for Internal Policies 2020 (agency of the EU Parliament) November 2020 “Monetary-Fiscal Nexus After the Crisis” <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/658202/IPOL_STU(2020)658202_EN.pdf>

The COVID-19 crisis brought back fears of a possible breakup of the currency union. Italy, which was hit first and quite substantially by the first wave of the pandemic in late February, was soon considered a question mark in its ability to manage a crisis of this magnitude on its own. Moreover, for political considerations it appeared unlikely that Italy would request financial assistance from fellow governments via the rescue mechanism ESM and would agree on a macroeconomic adjustment programme linked to that. Against this backdrop there was a growing nervousness in financial markets, manifesting in soaring spreads on the returns of Italian government bonds in early March. Noteworthy, intra-euro area spreads generally increased at that time, not only for Italian bonds, but also for countries deemed invulnerable like France and the Netherlands (Figure 5). This points to a common risk factor among euro area Member States, which was absent for non-euro area EU members like Poland and Sweden. The common risk factor can be interpreted as breakup risk of the currency union.

Impact: Astronomical bailout costs and devastating economic impacts for the EU and global economy

[Max Bergmann](https://www.americanprogress.org/about/staff/bergmann-max/bio/), [Siena Cicarelli](https://www.americanprogress.org/about/staff/cicarelli-siena/bio/), and [James Lamond](https://www.americanprogress.org/about/staff/lamond-james/bio/) 2020 (*Max Bergmann is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. Siena Cicarelli is a research assistant at the Center. James Lamond is a senior policy adviser at the Center*) Coronavirus May Be the EU’s Hardest Test Yet 18 March 2020 <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2020/03/18/481862/coronavirus-may-eus-hardest-test-yet/>

A repeat of the drawn-out Greek debt crisis would be disastrous for all of the EU. Italy’s GDP is nearly 10 times bigger than Greece’s. Its economic collapse would threaten the survivability of the euro, as the cost for a bailout would be astronomical. The ramifications of such a collapse would be devastating for the entire EU and the global economy.

3. Loss of freedom

Return of internal borders would destroy freedom granted by Schengen

Robert Schuman Foundation, Research & Studies Centre on Europe 2016. (Schuman Foundation was founded in 1991; has been approved by the French State for its services to the public; reference research centre develops studies on the European Union policies) The Schengen area in crisis - the temptation of reinstalling borders 17 May 2016 <https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/0392-the-schengen-area-in-crisis-the-temptation-of-reinstalling-borders>

Beyond the medical metaphor the Schengen area is threatened by the temptation of a return to internal borders, which may deal it the final blow. It is therefore urgent to implement measures that will prevent its disappearance as a result of the unilateral re-introduction of internal border controls, without regard of the common rules. The question of losing Schengen is a serious one and deserves our close attention. Politically first of all, Schengen is the expression of the European project, i.e. the construction of a space in which the quest for more freedom plays a central role. If we backtrack over Schengen we shall bring this quest to an end, thereby directly indicating that we have acquired "too much" freedom.

BIG LINKS TO DISADVANTAGES 4-7 🡪 Plan leads to fracturing/dissolving the EU

Big Link: Advocating closing internal borders promotes the agenda of the far right and “Euroskeptics” (who oppose EU membership)

NEW YORK TIMES 2015 (journalist Steven Erlanger) 20 Nov 2015 “Paris Attacks Force European Union to Act on Border Controls” <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/21/world/europe/paris-attacks-force-european-union-to-act-on-border-controls.html>

While the difficulties with Schengen are largely technical and administrative, the politics around the subject have become nasty, feeding Europe’s far-right parties, especially France’s National Front and Sweden’s Democrats. Marine Le Pen, the leader of the National Front, said that “the absence of national borders is criminal madness.” Striking a familiar but trenchant theme, she said: “The French elites have given themselves over to this surreal myth of a country without borders. Open your eyes, now!” Euroskeptics and the far right, “those trying to benefit from the situation, are trying to redefine the entire Schengen debate in a way that makes Schengen look like the culprit here,” said Jan Techau, director of Carnegie Europe, a Brussels-based research institution.

Big Link: Permanent border controls = loss of confidence in the integrity of the EU and will cascade into more problems

David Danelo 2016 (Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.) 22 Feb 2016 “The Bordering of Europe” <https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/02/the-bordering-of-europe/>

At the beginning of 2015, a united Europe prided itself on the continental freedom of travel citizens of the Schengen Area enjoyed. By year’s end, terrorist attacks and asylum seekers had fractured the borderless treaty into chaos. Like toppling dominoes one after another, European nations have reasserted their sovereignty, effectively declaring a loss of confidence in the European Union’s political integrity. If permanent border controls are introduced and the Schengen Area is dissolved, a cascading series of political, economic, and cultural impacts will be felt throughout the region and the world.

Big Link: Border controls will break down both the economic integration and the European mindset of EU citizens

David Danelo 2016 (Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.) 22 Feb 2016 “The Bordering of Europe” <https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/02/the-bordering-of-europe/>

The addition of border controls, in whatever form they take, will affect an entire generation of economic agreements, trade routes, and supply chains long considered stable, not to mention young men and women accustomed to seeing themselves as liberal, cosmopolitan Europeans more than citizens of any individual nation.

Big Fracture Brink: EU is already on the brink of disintegration over immigration issues

Bodo Weber 2020 (senior associate of the Democratization Policy Council, based in Berlin) 9 March 2020 “Threat to EU on Greece-Turkey border is EU-made” <https://euobserver.com/opinion/147672> (the “Visegrad” countries are: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia)

The current narrative's complete avoidance of core questions is astounding. Reasoned, rational discussion seems to now be a collective pan-European taboo. EU leaders evidently fear that just by opening up such discussion, the Union would disintegrate. In September 2015, when some of the Visegrád countries declared they would not implement the EU's legally-binding relocation scheme, the Union collapsed as a legal entity in the area of asylum and migration.

Big Fracture Brink: EU is on the brink of dissolving due to consequences of Covid-19

[Max Bergmann](https://www.americanprogress.org/about/staff/bergmann-max/bio/), [Siena Cicarelli](https://www.americanprogress.org/about/staff/cicarelli-siena/bio/), and [James Lamond](https://www.americanprogress.org/about/staff/lamond-james/bio/) 2020 (*Max Bergmann is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. Siena Cicarelli is a research assistant at the Center. James Lamond is a senior policy adviser at the Center*) Coronavirus May Be the EU’s Hardest Test Yet 18 March 2020 <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2020/03/18/481862/coronavirus-may-eus-hardest-test-yet/>

Put simply, the 2008 crisis, along with the EU’s poor response, was [an existential threat to the EU](https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/09/17/the-real-cost-of-the-2008-financial-crisis)—and the union barely survived. Without a course correction, the COVID-19 outbreak and the EU’s current floundering response could pose an equally dangerous risk to the union. As American Enterprise Institute Resident Scholar Dalibor Rohac [argues](https://www.politico.eu/article/coronavirus-covid19-public-health-crisis-could-break-the-eu-european-union/), “The European Union may have survived Brexit, the refugee crisis and the financial meltdown of 2008—but don’t assume COVID-19 can’t destroy it.” As Rohac points out, populist reactionary parties and leaders are likely going to capitalize on any economic downturn in the next election. The EU may have thought that it had survived the populist challenge, as these parties have [started to fade](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/05/world/europe/populism-voters-global.html) in many, though not all, recent elections. But it should think again.

4. Reduced world stability from fracturing the EU

Example: Disagreement over immigration policy was a major reason Britain left the EU

Max Boot 2016 (leading military historian and foreign policy analyst. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York) July 2016 “Brexit: Isolationism or Atlanticism?” <https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/issues/resources/strategika_issue_33_web.pdf>

Britons might never have voted to leave the European Union had it not been for the refugee crisis that hit Europe as a result of the Syrian civil war. Even though Britain has accepted only some 5,000 Syrian refugees, German premier Angela Merkel agreed to take in 800,000, thus fueling fears across the continent of an influx of possible terrorists. Those fears were exploited by elements of the “Leave” campaign, principally Nigel Farage and the UK Independence Party, and no doubt contributed crucial momentum to the final outcome.

Brink: EU faces an uncertain future with multiple crises threatening unity and increasing division

Meagan Araki, Annie Chang, Troy Lindell, Alison Wendler 2017. (members of the “Challenges to European Unity Task Force” at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Univ. of Washington) March 2017 CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN UNITY: OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS <https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Task-Force-J-Report-2017_Lorenz.pdf>

Today, Europe faces an uncertain future. The migration crisis, rise in terrorism, economic downturn, mounting external pressures and a responsive populist movement, have threatened the basis of European stability. The major influx of refugees into Europe has placed immense pressure on the EU’s infrastructure and capacity to integrate refugees into the European identity. Europe has experienced a growing number of terrorist attacks, leading to nationalist and xenophobic policies. Additionally, Russia’s encroachment into Eastern Europe has strained Russia and Europe’s relationship. The Euro crisis has furthered the divide between the core and peripheral EU countries, revealing the inequality between European citizens and growing stagnant employment and growth opportunities.

Link: EU stability promotes US ability to maintain global security and stability

Meagan Araki, Annie Chang, Troy Lindell, Alison Wendler 2017. (members of the “Challenges to European Unity Task Force” at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Univ. of Washington) March 2017 CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN UNITY: OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS <https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Task-Force-J-Report-2017_Lorenz.pdf>

Policies that encourage the unity between EU member states should be strongly supported. It is significant that the United States demonstrate support in this ongoing migration crisis, as it will help relieve the pressures member states are experiencing, as well as help mend existing tensions. The cohesion, stability, and cooperation of European Union serve a key interests of the United States. With these aspects, a more unified European Union can strengthen its position as a global actor, as well as strengthen its existing relations with the United States. This can further United States’ objectives of security and stability throughout the international community.

Impact: World peace & prosperity at risk without US influence. US hegemony is key to global peace & prosperity

Capt. M. V. Prato 2009 (United States Marine Corps,Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Combat Development Command,Marine Corps University) “The Need for American Hegemony” Feb 2009 <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a508040.pdf>

The world witnessed a vast shift in the polarity of geopolitics after the Cold War. The United States became the world’s greatest hegemon with an unequalled ability to globally project cultural, political, economic, and military power in a manner not seen since the days of the Roman Empire. Coined the “unipolar moment” by syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer, the disparity of power between the U.S. and all other nations allows the U.S. to influence the world for the mutual benefit of all responsible states. Unfortunately, the United States is increasingly forced to act unilaterally as a result of both foreign and domestic resentment to U.S. dominance and the rise of liberal internationalism. The United States must exercise benevolent global hegemony, unilaterally if necessary, to ensure its security and maintain global peace and prosperity.

5. Populism and Authoritarian Government

Link: AFF plan weakens / fractures the EU

Cross apply the BIG LINK.

Link: Fear, anxiety and skepticism about the EU leads to the rise of populist authoritarian figures

Meagan Araki, Annie Chang, Troy Lindell, Alison Wendler 2017. (members of the “Challenges to European Unity Task Force” at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Univ. of Washington) March 2017 CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN UNITY: OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS <https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Task-Force-J-Report-2017_Lorenz.pdf>

Additionally, the complications surrounding EU accession and instability in Turkey and the Balkans present unique challenges to the dynamic of the EU. These real and perceived threats have induced fear and anxiety into the European public. As these security threats have worsened with little to no progress made, Euroscepticism has grown and enabled the populist movement. By capitalizing on this sentiment, populist parties have gained increasing support throughout Europe. Populists promise to take back power from the corrupt and inefficient political elite, and give it back to the general public. Europeans have increasingly turned to strongman figures who value strength and security over tolerance and unity.

Brink & Example: Hungary now has authoritarian government, putting EU at high risk right now

Philippe Dam 2020 (master’s degree in international administration; Human Rights Watch’s advocacy director for Europe and Central Asia) 1 Apr 2020 “Hungary’s Authoritarian Takeover Puts European Union at Risk” <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/01/hungarys-authoritarian-takeover-puts-european-union-risk>

On Monday, under the pretext of addressing the COVID-19 public health emergency, [Hungary's](https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/hungary) parliament gave [green light to the Orban-led government](https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/23/hungarys-orban-uses-pandemic-seize-unlimited-power) to rule with unlimited power for an indefinite time. Prime Minister Viktor Orban can now suspend any existing law and implement others by decree, without parliamentary or judicial scrutiny. Elections have been suspended. The law allows for new criminal penalties of five years in prison for publishing vaguely defined “false” or “distorted” facts – another blow to media freedom in the country. With this law, Hungary becomes the first country in the European Union to virtually abolish all democratic checks-and-balances. How has it come to this? In the past [10 years](https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/05/16/wrong-direction-rights/assessing-impact-hungarys-new-constitution-and-laws), the government has spared no efforts to [curb judicial independence](https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/hungary), restrict [civil society](https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/17/hungary-determined-silence-any-critics-left-standing) activities, and gain near full [control over the media](https://www.euronews.com/2019/06/12/don-t-be-fooled-hungary-s-government-remains-a-threat-to-european-values-view). Having repeatedly failed to appreciate the gravity of the situation, EU institutions risk making the same mistake again.

Link & Impact: Weak EU leads to rise of dictatorship and loss of freedom for millions more

Kenneth Roth 2020 (executive director of Human Rights Watch, one of the world's leading international human rights organizations; former federal prosecutor in New York; graduate of Yale Law School) 27 Apr 2020 “Stopping the Authoritarian Rot in Europe” <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/27/stopping-authoritarian-rot-europe#>

Rot tends to spread when it encounters no resistance. Dictator wannabes prey upon weakness. EU and member state leaders now need to ask themselves: is the EU only a trading bloc or also a club of democracies? The answer to that question used to be obvious. Sadly, it no longer is. Ten million EU citizens now live under authoritarian rule. How many millions more will have to suffer the loss of their freedoms before Europe’s leaders draw the line?

6. Economic recession (from weakening / fracturing the EU)

Link: AFF plan weakens / fractures the EU with greater division

Cross-apply the BIG LINK.

Link: EU unity is necessary for beneficial trade deals

Julian Bonte-Friedheim 2020 (head writer at The Perspective) “IS THE EU BETTER OFF DIVIDED OR TOGETHER?” (month not given in the published article) <https://www.theperspective.com/debates/businessandtechnology/is-the-eu-better-off-divided-or-together/>

Better trade deals can be negotiated from within the EU. For any European nation, negotiating trade deals with other countries is much more advantageous as part of the EU rather than as an independent economy. As one of the world’s [biggest economic unions](https://www.thebalance.com/world-s-largest-economy-3306044), the EU has a lot more leverage when brokering a deal with China or India. Being able to offer (or withhold) access to its many consumers is a strong bargaining tool. Additionally, there is [free trading](https://www.ft.com/content/1688d0e4-15ef-11e6-b197-a4af20d5575e) between members of the EU, as it is a customs union. Individual countries, while able to create their own terms, are unlikely to reach deals as beneficial as the EU does on its own.

Brink: Cracks already being seen in EU unity, and even partial non-cooperation will eventually bleed it to death

Hans Vollaard 2020 ( Lecturer in Dutch and European Politics at Utrecht University, the Netherlands.) “One down, many to go? European disintegration after Brexit” 23 March 2020 <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2020/03/23/one-down-many-to-go-european-disintegration-after-brexit/>

Even though there may not be other instances of European disintegration like Brexit, dissatisfaction may lead to other forms of disintegration. Not by countries leaving the EU entirely, but only partially. These partial exits involve member states not complying with the EU rules, for instance with respect to public finances in the Eurozone (Italy), or the Schengen rules, many member states have introduced “temporary” national border surveillance since the migration crisis of 2015. Another partial exit is the desire to pay less money to ‘Brussels’, such as expressed by the so-called Hanseatic group of EU member states led by the Netherlands. Disintegration can also occur involuntarily, when one member state wants to exclude another member state, such as the calls to push Greece out of the euro or the Schengen area. These partial forms of disintegration undermine the functioning of the EU. Its rules are less respected, and it gets fewer resources to function properly. In such a scenario, the EU would gradually ‘bleed to death’.

Impact: Devastating economic impact. Financial recession

Mauro Guillen 2016 (holder of the Zandman Endowed Professorship in International Management at the Wharton School. He served as Director of the Lauder Institute of Management & International Studies between 2007 and 2019. PhD in sociology from Yale University and a Doctorate in political economy from the University of Oviedo in Spain.) 13 June 2016 “On the Brink: How a Brexit Could Fracture a Fragile Europe” <https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/on-the-brink-how-brexit-could-fracture-a-fragile-europe/>

The European Union is the largest economy in the world. It’s not as rich as the U.S., but it is bigger in terms of gross domestic product if you combine those 28 countries. If there is a crisis of confidence that undermines consumer spending and business confidence, then you are going to get into maybe even a third recession. That would be devastating for Europe itself, but it would be really bad for everybody else in the world that has business with Europe, including the United States. Exporters to Europe and American companies that have investments in Europe are going to suffer. Companies such as GE or GM or Boeing, 20% to 30% of their business is in Europe, so it could have a large impact.

Past precedent: Brexit caused serious economic damage

Kimberly Amadeo 2020 (over 20 years of senior-level corporate experience in economic analysis and business strategy. She is a U.S. Economy expert for The Balance and president of WorldMoneyWatch, which produces publications about the global economy) “Brexit Consequences for the U.K., the EU, and the United States” last updated 14 Mar 2020 <https://www.thebalance.com/brexit-consequences-4062999>

The day after the Brexit vote, the currency markets were in turmoil. The [euro fell 2% to $1.11](https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-euro-to-dollar-conversion-its-history-3306091).﻿ The pound fell 8% to $1.36.﻿ Both increased the [value of the dollar](https://www.thebalance.com/value-of-us-dollar-3306268). That strength is not good for U.S. [stock markets](https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-stock-market-how-it-works-3305893). It makes American shares more expensive for foreign investors. A weak pound also makes U.S. exports to the U.K. more expensive. The United States has an $18.9 billion trade surplus with the U.K. In 2018, it exported $141 billion while importing $122 billion.﻿ Brexit could turn this surplus into a deficit if a weak pound makes U.K. imports more competitive. Brexit dampens business growth for companies that operate in Europe. U.S. companies invested $758 billion in the U.K. in 2018.﻿ Most of this was the finance sector with some manufacturing. These companies use the U.K. as the gateway to free trade with the EU nations. U.K. businesses invested $561 billion in the United States. Brexit puts at risk jobs in both countries. In addition, there were 716,000 U.K. immigrants in the United States and 215,000 U.S. immigrants in the U.K. in 2019.


7. Russia gains influence

Link: AFF divides / weakens the EU

Cross-apply the BIG LINK.

Link: Russia uses EU division to advance its agenda and gain influence to accomplish bad things

Ian Kearns 2018 (co-founder, former director and board member of the European Leadership Network, a pan-European group of senior political, military and diplomatic leaders. Former specialist advisor to the Joint House of Commons/House of Lords Committee on National Security Strategy. Former deputy chair and director of secretariat to former NATO Secretary General George Robertson) Collapse: Europe After The European Union (no month given in the published article) <https://books.google.com/books?id=ZVBSDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT223&lpg=PT223&dq=EU+immigration+reform+hopeless&source=bl&ots=79cHvPH2qu&sig=ACfU3U3diw6xbMj9V9bRAyJPoyV-5N1epA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjswYPI-ZrqAhWyneAKHfCQBCE4ChDoATAAegQIChAB#v=onepage&q=EU%20immigration%20reform%20hopeless&f=false>



Impact: Russian influence damages democracy, promotes authoritarian rule

Geir Hagen Karlsen 2019 (Lieutenant Colonel and Lecturer, Norwegian Defence University College) 8 Feb 2019 “Divide and rule: ten lessons about Russian political influence activities in Europe” <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0227-8>

Russia is an authoritarian and corrupt state that regards the EU and, more specifically, NATO, as a challenge, a competitor and a threat. Its influence activities are malicious, undermining alliances and creating distrust, weakening what Moscow sees as their opponents and thus ensuring the survival of this authoritarian regime. Their interference is worrisome at several levels. First, Russia is undermining core democratic processes, like elections, and trust in the political system and its institutions. Second, their disinformation and manipulation of media and social media is directly undermining the political discourse, essential to democracy. Third, this is further exacerbated by their malicious attacks on individuals, like the Finnish journalist Jessika Aro, who has been tracked and harassed systematically after exposing Russian trolling of social media (Aro, [2015](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0227-8#ref-CR3)). However, the overall Russian approach is simple, divide and rule.

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