Affirmative: EU Immigration Problems – Reform Can Work

By “Coach Vance” Trefethen

***Resolved: The European Union should substantially reform its immigration policy.***

NEG’s may run a generic NEG brief giving numerous reasons why there are substantial barriers to reform of EU immigration policies that will probably block any reform from succeeding. They’ll argue it’s hopeless to try to fix EU immigration policies, so we shouldn’t waste time trying to reform them or even debating it. This is a generic AFF brief to respond to those arguments.

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Negative: EU Immigration Problems - Too Big to Solve

SOLVENCY – The resolution says what we “should” do, not what the EU “would” do. That’s all we have to prove

A/T “EU can’t agree”

We can debate hypothetically what the EU ought to do to create the best possible world

Mario Gatti 2018 (faculty of Law, Economics and Finance at Univ. of Luxembourg) Too Much Unity in the European Union’s External Migration Policy? 20 July 2018 <http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/too-much-unity-in-the-european-unions-external-migration-policy/>

In the best of all possible worlds, the Union would forge a common external policy on migration, centered on the human rights of migrants, and respectful of democratic procedures and the rule of law. Several recent initiatives of the Union and its Members were truly “common”, though they might have been less than respectful of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.

Team Policy Debate would become impossible: There is no form of migration that pleases everybody

Camino Mortera-Martinez and Beth Oppenheim 2018 (**Camino Mortera-Martinez is a senior research fellow and Beth Oppenheim is a researcher at the Centre for European Reform** ) 20 Dec 2018 “WHY EUROPE NEEDS LEGAL MIGRATION AND HOW TO SELL IT” <https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/policy-brief/2018/why-europe-needs-legal-migration-and-how-sell-it>

There is no form of migration that pleases everybody. Low-skilled migration makes developed countries uncomfortable; and high-skilled migration is uncomfortable for developing countries, because they lose more productive workers. To be modestly successful, legal migration pathways need to take into account these concerns. This will require finding mutually beneficial arrangements that also give migrants the right incentives to use them. Such schemes have already been designed, but they have their costs and benefits.

A/T “Need more foreign aid”

We got it: EU is increasing foreign aid, including 9 billion euros specifically for migration issues

Benjamin Fox 2018 (journalist) EU unveils increased foreign aid budget for 2021-27, 14 June 2018 <https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/eu-unveils-increased-foreign-aid-budget-for-2021-27/> (note: the quote below ends without a period because it is quoting the original article exactly as it appeared; a new sentence starts after “migration-related spending” in the original article.)

Presenting its Neighbourhood and the World proposal to reporters on Thursday (14 June), EU High Representative on Foreign Affairs, Federica Mogherini, said that it was “first and foremost a political statement in favour of a stronger European Union in international affairs.” The Commission plans to allocate €123 billion to overseas spending in the next seven year EU budget between 2021 and 2027, an increase of close to 30%. However, that includes incorporating the €30 billion European Development Fund, which had previously been overseen by governments, into the budget. The text will form part of the multi-annual financial framework that will be debated by government’s and the European Parliament in the coming months. The Commission’s focus on migration has prompted a number of development NGOs and MEPs to complain that the EU wants to downgrade its development priorities in favour of migration control. But Mogherini defended the proposal, under which around €9 billion will be assigned to migration-related spending

DISAD RESPONSES

A/T “Fracturing the EU because debate over immigration is too controversial”

EU is surprisingly “not” divided on migration

Mario Gatti 2018 (faculty of Law, Economics and Finance at Univ. of Luxembourg) Too Much Unity in the European Union’s External Migration Policy? 20 July 2018 <http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/too-much-unity-in-the-european-unions-external-migration-policy/>

The acrimonious debate on refugee quotas or the [Aquarius](http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/in-search-of-a-safe-harbour-for-the-aquarius-the-troubled-waters-of-international-and-eu-law/) and [Lifeline](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2018/06/malta-responsible-lifeline-boat-denied-italy-180622154705983.html) affairs may suggest that Europe is irremediably divided on the issue of migration. Despite the apparent alliance between far-right leaders in Italy, Austria, and Hungary, the interests of EU Members seem to be at odds. While some seek European solidarity, others reject any mutual support and pursue purely national solutions. Considering the fragmentation of internal policies, the EU’s external unity may come as a surprise.

EU is finding ways to negotiate / compromise on differences over refugees, migration management, and Dublin Rule

Nikita Konopaltsev 2018 (graduated from the Philosophy Faculty of the Moscow State Lomonosov University. Having worked for the World Public Forum 'Dialogue of Civilizations' for over a decade, his research interests concern the philosophy of the dialogue of civilizations, global inclusive development policies and institutions, and contemporary political theory and practice ) 13 July 2018 “Migration and the challenge to maintain European unity” <https://doc-research.org/2018/07/migration-challenge-maintain-european-unity/>

Responding to concerns of Italy being left alone with arriving migrants, EU leaders agreed that this was a challenge not only for a single EU country, but for Europe as a whole. EU leaders also agreed to share responsibility for migrants rescued at sea, a key point insisted upon by Italy’s new prime minister, Giuseppe Conte. EU leaders in particular supported the development of ‘regional disembarkation platforms’ for people saved at sea. Such platforms, which were proposed by UNHCR and IOM, should allow officials to rapidly and safely distinguish between economic migrants and asylum seekers. Another development in overcoming the present migration crisis was the newly dedicated external migration management facility, which was called for by EU leaders to be included under the next long-term budget. A similar idea of screening for asylum admission in the vicinity of refugee-generating countries, rather than in the country of destination, was put forward at the Rhodes Forum 2017 panel ‘Social mobility and migration: Through the prism of values and cultures’ moderated by former director-general of the International Organization for Migration Brunson McKinley in October 2017. European Council spokesperson, Preben Aamann, [stated](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/06/29/20180628-euco-conclusions-final/) on 29 June that “The European Council reconfirms that a precondition for a functioning EU policy relies on a comprehensive approach to migration which combines more effective control of the EU’s external borders, increased external action and the internal aspects, in line with our principles and values”. Another significant step, reflected in the Aamann’s statement, was made about building a consensus on the [Dublin Regulation](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/;jsessionid=jHNlTp3HLjqw8mqGbQSpZh1VWpjCyVQq14Hgcztw4pbfSQZffnrn!557467765?uri=CELEX:32013R0604), to reform it following a balance of responsibility and solidarity. This is one of a few documents aside from the [1951 Refugee Convention](http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10) that defines and regulates the status of refugees and asylum seekers. These documents seem outdated and need thorough revision to allow new legislative definitions and procedures to meet the challenges of ongoing migration crisis.

Numerous joint initiatives show EU can work together on immigration. Examples: Tunisia partnership, Malta Declaration, and EU-Turkey Statement

Mario Gatti 2018 (faculty of Law, Economics and Finance at Univ. of Luxembourg) Too Much Unity in the European Union’s External Migration Policy? 20 July 2018 <http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/too-much-unity-in-the-european-unions-external-migration-policy/>

Such unity is not unprecedented in the EU’s external migration policy. EU institutions and Member States demonstrated a great degree of convergence through numerous recent initiatives, to the point that they often adopted joint initiatives. Mobility Partnerships constitute an obvious example: the Union and some interested Member States have entered into informal arrangements with neighbouring countries, committing inter alia to implement projects in the territory of third states – projects managed by the Union or the Member States (see e.g. the Mobility Partnership with [Tunisia](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/international-affairs/general/docs/declaration_conjointe_tunisia_eu_mobility_fr.pdf)). Another example is the Italy-Libya [memorandum of understanding](https://www.google.de/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=https://www.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ITALY-LIBYA-MEMORANDUM-02.02.2017.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwiyhan0pOjbAhWCLewKHbE1BJEQFjAEegQIBBAB&usg=AOvVaw3VoKjx6tzqYAQG0dzOoVWa) signed on 2 February 2017. Italy had uncharacteristically pledged EU funds in favour of Libyan authorities, in exchange for Libyan support “to stem the illegal migrants’ fluxes” (see also [Palm](http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/the-italy-libya-memorandum-of-understanding-the-baseline-of-a-policy-approach-aimed-at-closing-all-doors-to-europe/)). The following day, the Union endorsed Italy’s commitments through the [Malta Declaration](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/02/03/malta-declaration/), affirming that it was “ready to support Italy in its implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding” with Libya. A third example is provided by the famous [EU-Turkey Statement](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/), an informal arrangement that commits EU funds for the benefit of Turkey, but which – according to the EU [General Court](http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=0&part=1&mode=lst&docid=188483&occ=first&dir=&cid=1071014) – was jointly adopted by the Member States, not by the Union, knowing however that [an appeal is pending](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/PDF/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.C_.2017.231.01.0012.01.ENG) in this controversial case commented on our [blog by Paula Garcia Andrade](http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/external-competence-and-representation-of-the-eu-and-its-member-states-in-the-area-of-migration-and-asylum/) to introduce a [workshop](https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCEGEgHlG9Lyv1CMwgdUx9FQ/videos) devoted to this case.

EU has already survived other crises, including migration. The real threat is economic fallout of Covid-19

Dalibor Rohac 2020 (resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington) 16 March 2020 “Coronavirus could break the EU” <https://www.politico.eu/article/coronavirus-covid19-public-health-crisis-could-break-the-eu-european-union/>

The European Union may have survived Brexit, the refugee crisis and the financial meltdown of 2008 — but [don’t assume COVID-19 can’t destroy it](https://www.politico.eu/article/coronavirus-europe-crisis/). For better and for worse, crises create opportunities for extraordinary politics. European leaders, including the eurozone’s top central banker, Christine Lagarde, would be foolish to think that the ongoing pandemic is different just because it is a [public health crisis](https://www.politico.eu/article/how-europe-is-responding-to-the-coronavirus-pandemic/) — and not a political or financial one.
**[END QUOTE. LATER IN THE ARTICLE THEY GO ON TO CONCLUDE QUOTE:]**The EU’s leaders and the European Central Bank’s president in particular face a similar choice today. Either they move boldly to help the periphery, or the periphery is going to help itself in whatever way it can — even if it means the unraveling of the eurozone and the EU.

A/T “Need EU to maintain/assist US hegemony”

EU is weak and doesn’t help US hegemony – it tries to oppose it (though it can’t do much)

Tom McTague 2019 (London-based staff writer at *The Atlantic* ) 25 June 2019 “What the Iran Crisis Reveals About European Power” <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/06/us-iran-sanctions-eu/592489/>

Donald Trump is forcing Europe to confront its own weakness. The U.S. president’s bellicose policy toward Iran has, until now, been met with an unusual unity of opposition from Europe’s big three powers, the U.K., France, and Germany, as well as from the European Union itself. And yet, despite their combined economic weight and presence on the world stage, Europe’s principal players have proved largely powerless to do anything in the face of raw American hegemony. The brute reality, as things stand, is that Europe does not yet have the tools—or the will—to project its power. The euro cannot be a credible alternative to the dollar as a reserve currency until it is radically reformed, and without a credible reserve currency, Europe’s financial might cannot match that of the United States. Even more fundamentally, there remain deep divisions within Europe over whether it should even seek to be a power, with or without Britain.

Europe no longer agrees to support US hegemony

Tom McTague 2019 (London-based staff writer at *The Atlantic* ) 25 June 2019 “What the Iran Crisis Reveals About European Power” <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/06/us-iran-sanctions-eu/592489/> (brackets in original)

Tocci says the agreement that has held since World War II—that the U.S. would provide for Europe’s security in return for accepting American leadership of the alliance—is collapsing. “The movement we’re seeing toward recognizing Europeans ought to develop a greater autonomy is an extremely painful process, because it starts from the recognition that [the] social contract between the United States and Europe no longer holds,” she says. “This is something which goes way beyond Trump. We can no longer take for granted [that] Americans are going to provide for our security. We’re obviously not there yet. We’re only at the very, very early stages of this recognition.”

A/T “Russian influence / hegemony”

Turn: Worrying about exaggerated Russian “threat” makes the US less secure by distracting us from real threats

Prof. R. Craig Nation 2017 (professor of strategic studies, Dickinson College) THE CASE FOR 'RUSSIA IS A DISTRACTION' 10 Oct 2017 <https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/the-debate-papers-is-russia-a-threat-or-a-distraction-to-the-united-states>

The Russian Federation confronts major domestic challenges. Positive association with a Western security community that is more prosperous, more stable, and considerably stronger is in its best interests. Accommodation can make this possible. Preoccupation with an exaggerated Russian threat, often manipulated for narrow advantage, distorts US strategic priorities. Truly vital US interests are as a consequence neglected or undervalued. These include managing relations with a rising China, addressing the challenge of climate change, combatting global terrorism, reinforcing the non-proliferation regime, overcoming the economic and social consequences of burgeoning debt and income disparity, promoting development, and adjusting to a new, multipolar and transnational international security environment. The Russian Federation could be a useful partner in all of these regards. In the larger picture, a ballyhooed Russian threat has become a major, and unnecessary, distraction. It deflects attention, resources, and energy away from initiatives that can contribute more usefully and substantially to augmenting global stability and national wellbeing in the years, and decades, ahead.

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