Negative: Kosovo

By “Coach Vance” Trefethen

***Resolved: The European Union should substantially reform its immigration policy.***

Kosovo is (was) a province in what used to be the country of Yugoslavia. (People from there are known as “Kosovars.”) It is now a self-declared, though not officially recognized by everyone, independent country. It is recognized by about half the member nations of the UN, but its independence is officially disputed by Serbia, from which it departed. When Yugoslavia broke up and blew up in the 1990s, it was the scene of fierce ethnic conflict. Outside intervention and separation from Serbia got things calmed down. It is well on its way to recovery from the war of the ‘90s. Its economy is growing and it is trying to integrate into Europe more generally. This plan will have the EU grant 90-day visa-free travel for Kosovars to they can easily travel in and out of the EU for short visits (tourism, business trips, etc.). A visa is a formal document granting permission to visit the country that you would have to obtain in advance and apply for at a foreign embassy within your home country. You stick it into your passport and show it upon arrival at the destination country. Visas cost money and take time and paperwork to apply for, so traveling “visa free” is a benefit to tourism and trade. Visa-free travel is typically done for many other advanced countries where there is little risk of the visitors illegally staying and becoming a burden to society. For example, a US citizen can travel to France and enter without a visa for a stay up to 90 days, probably because there’s not a big influx of Americans at risk of trying to illegally immigrate or commit terrorism in France, so they don’t need to have a lot of pre-screening for American tourists. But Kosovo as of now is not on the visa-free list for entry into the EU, and this plan would put it on that list. Understand that this visa reform has nothing to do with immigration, because the Kosovars coming into the EU would only be able to stay for 90 days and could not settle in the EU nor apply for work. It’s only useful for tourism and short business trips, not for resettlement and immigration. Unless, that is, the Kosovars use the visas just to get into the EU and then illegally stay longer or start illegally applying for jobs.

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NEG: Kosovo Visas

TOPICALITY

1. Not an “immigration” policy

Link: The plan is about “short stay” visas, nothing more than 90 days

European Commission 2016. (executive branch of government of the EU) European Commission proposes visa-free travel for the people of Kosovo 4 May 2016 <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_1626>

The European Commission is today proposing to the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament to lift the visa requirements for the people of Kosovo by transferring Kosovo to the visa-free list for short-stays in the Schengen area.
**[END QUOTE. THEY GO ON LATER IN THE SAME ARTICLE TO SAY QUOTE**:]

Once the proposal has been adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, the people of Kosovo with biometric passports will no longer require visas when travelling for short stays of up to 90 days to all EU Member States except for Ireland and the UK, as well as the four Schengen associated countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland). The exemption concerns only short-stay visas valid for up to 90 days of travel in any 180-day period for business, tourist or family purposes.

Definitions of “IMMIGRATION” involve long term staying, settling, permanency

Collins English Dictionary 2012. “immigration” <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/immigration?s=t>

the movement of non-native people into a country in order to settle there

Merriam Webster Online Dictionary 2020. “Definition of immigration” <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/immigration?src=search-dict-hed>

travel into a country for the purpose of permanent residence there

Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary & Thesaurus copyright 2020. “Meaning of immigration in English” <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/immigration>

the [act](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/act) of someone coming to [live](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/live) in a different [country](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/country):

Cambridge Business English Dictionary copyright 2020. “immigration” <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/immigration>

the [process](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/process) of coming to a [country](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/country) in [order](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/order) to [live](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/live) in it [permanently](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/permanently):

McMillan Dictionary copyright 2020. “IMMIGRATION definitions and synonyms” <https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/immigration>

the [process](https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/process_1) in which [people](https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/people_1) [enter](https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/enter) a [country](https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/country) in [order](https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/order_1) to [live](https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/live_1) there [permanently](https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/permanently)

Link: Visa liberalization doesn’t allow anyone to immigrate

Urtina Zeka 2019 (BS in applied arts & sciences, Rochester Institute of Technology, Kosovo in May 2019) The Impact of Visa Liberalization on Kosovo’s Migration Patterns, August 2019, Honors Society project In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for Membership in the Honors Society of RIT Kosovo <https://scholarworks.rit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=11379&context=theses>

According to the Ministry of European Integration, visa liberalization implies free movement within the Schengen zone. Visa liberalization gives the right to visit EU member states and Schengen area states for up to 90 days, every six months. It should be noted that this process does not give the liberty to work, live, or study in Schengen countries.

Reasons to prefer our definition

Volume of evidence and mainstream common usage. AFF may have found one off beat definition somewhere that says immigration includes a short stay of 90 days or less. But that’s not the common normal use of the term, and we overwhelm you with multiple dictionaries that say otherwise. Take it from your own common use of the term, Judge: When you agreed to judge at this tournament and heard what the resolution was, did you expect to be judging cases about tourism? If not, then in your heart of hearts, you know our argument is right.

Violation: Visiting for 90 days is not “immigration”

It’s tourism or a business trip. You can’t immigrate to a country and settle there if you have to leave it within 90 days.

Impact: Abusive to Negative teams and harms educational value of debate

If the resolution is broadened to include tourism along with immigration policies, the resolution becomes abusively broad. Negative teams have enough work on their hands to research the topic itself, without trying to guess what other topics sneaky Affirmatives might try to add to it. This harms the educational value of debate, and we need to teach debaters not to do that by awarding a Negative ballot whenever they do.

SOLVENCY

1. Won’t increase jobs / economy

1) Visa exemption won’t allow Kosovars to get jobs in the EU. 2) EU citizens can already travel to Kosovo visa-free [so any job benefit should already be happening for them]

European Commission 2016. (executive branch of government of the EU) European Commission proposes visa-free travel for the people of Kosovo 4 May 2016 <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_1626>

Once the proposal has been adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, the people of Kosovo with biometric passports will no longer require visas when travelling for short stays of up to 90 days to all EU Member States except for Ireland and the UK, as well as the four Schengen associated countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland). The exemption concerns only short-stay visas valid for up to 90 days of travel in any 180-day period for business, tourist or family purposes. EU citizens can already travel to Kosovo visa-free. Other entry conditions for access to the Schengen area will continue to apply, including the need to be able to prove sufficient financial means and the purpose of travel. The visa exemption does not provide for the right to work in the EU.

Kosovo visa-free travel would allow ZERO economic activity

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A visa-free regime without membership in EU comes with its limitations. Kosovars cannot seek employment or engage in any economic activity during their stay in the Schengen country. For studying purposes, the citizen needs to be equipped with an additional visa which is obtained through the respective embassy. However, short-term trainings lasting less than 90 days are permitted with no special visa being required (MEI, Visa Liberalization).

Only way it could “increase jobs” is if the visa waiver visitors stayed illegally in the EU and started working at illegal employment

Paula Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik 2019 (with German government’s Federal Office for Migration and Refugees) Developments in Germany in the context of visa liberalisation <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/11a_germany_visa_liberalisation_en.pdf>

The abolition of the examination of visa applications creates the potential for misuse of the visa waiver, for example through entry and stay for purposes other than a short stay or through illegal employment during the visa-free stay. In the area of illegal employment, there has been an increase in the number of pre-trial investigations in the years following visa liberalisation.

They can’t immigrate and they can’t apply for jobs. Have to leave within 90 days

Paula Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik 2019 (with German government’s Federal Office for Migration and Refugees) Developments in Germany in the context of visa liberalisation (Note about date: Paper was written in Nov 2018 and published in January 2019. The author inside the paper says it should be cited as 2019) <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/11a_germany_visa_liberalisation_en.pdf>

Third-country nationals who are exempt from the visa requirement for short stays can enter the Schengen area without making a previous application. However, they must also fulfil the entry requirements of the Schengen Borders Code, including having sufficient means of subsistence and the willingness to leave before the end of the 90 days. The general ban on employment also applies during the visa-free stay (Article 6 para. 1 lit. c of the Schengen Borders Code, Section 17 of the Ordinance governing Residence).

2. No educational benefit

Link: Visa liberalization doesn’t allow anyone to study in the EU [this is same card used in Topicality]

**…and it’s only 90 days. What kind of degree could you get in 90 days?**

**[“Schengen countries” is a reference to the Schengen Agreement that created open borders among most countries within the EU. It allows anyone to travel, for example, between Italy and France or Netherlands and Belgium without any border controls or passport checks.]**

Urtina Zeka 2019 (BS in applied arts & sciences, Rochester Institute of Technology, Kosovo in May 2019) The Impact of Visa Liberalization on Kosovo’s Migration Patterns, August 2019, Honors Society project In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for Membership in the Honors Society of RIT Kosovo <https://scholarworks.rit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=11379&context=theses>

According to the Ministry of European Integration, visa liberalization implies free movement within the Schengen zone. Visa liberalization gives the right to visit EU member states and Schengen area states for up to 90 days, every six months. It should be noted that this process does not give the liberty to work, live, or study in Schengen countries.

3. Visa-free visits have little benefit

German study finds: Short-term visa liberalization doesn’t do much – changes in activity come from other factors

Paula Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik 2019 (with German government’s Federal Office for Migration and Refugees) Developments in Germany in the context of visa liberalisation (Note about date: Paper was written in Nov 2018 and published in January 2019. The author inside the paper says it should be cited as 2019) <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/11a_germany_visa_liberalisation_en.pdf>

Figure 3 shows that the number of residence permits issued to Kosovar nationals also increased from 2012 onwards, in a similar way to the other Western Balkan countries. As Kosovo is not exempt from the visa requirement, this may be an indication that the increase in longer-term migration to Germany is not linked to the liberalisation of short-term visas. Other factors, such as the introduction of the simplified legal labour migration channel for nationals of the Western Balkan countries, which also applies to Kosovar nationals, are having a more direct and stronger impact on longer term migration.

The reason France & Netherlands oppose Kosovo visa liberalization is because “new experiences” and benefits won’t happen. All that will happen is illegal immigration will increase

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The representative from the Chamber of Commerce sees this as an opportunity for young people to open up, to gain new experiences and in the best cases, to return to the country and bring new knowledge. However, in today's circumstances, it is less likely that such a thing will happen and a negative impact can be seen because the qualified labor force as well as vocational workers are fleeing to those countries without a "return ticket (2019)". It seems like countries such as France and Netherlands are realizing the latter possibility as they have objected the decision for visa liberalization in the EU Parliament. As assumed in the background information of this study, France fears illegal migration from Kosovo.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Crime and terrorism

Link: Kosovo doesn’t meet the conditions of “rule of law” and “fight against organized crime” to qualify for the visa plan

Schengen Visa Info 2020. (independent news service) France Extinguishes Kosovo Hopes for Visa Liberalization in the Near Future 15 Oct 2020 <https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/news/france-extinguishes-kosovo-hopes-for-visa-liberalization-in-the-near-future/#:~:text=Kosovo%20is%20the%20only%20country,can%20enter%20Kosovo%20visa%2Dfree.&text=On%20July%2018%2C%202018%2C%20the,two%20special%20visa%20liberalization%20requirements>.

The main reasons why France is still not convinced regarding the prospering of Kosovo in this process, according to French officials, are crime and corruption affairs. Diplomatic sources in France emphasized that according to them, Kosovo has not accomplished all visa liberalization criteria. *“A short-stay visa indicates that certain conditions should be met, especially when it comes to the rule of law and fight against organized crime and criminal activities. Currently, these conditions have not been met by Kosovo,”*a diplomatic source told Kosovo-based Gazeta Express.

Impact: Crime and terrorism can be imported from Kosovo – that’s why the conditions were set on changing the visa

European Commission 2016. REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 4 May 2016. Fourth report on progress by Kosovo\* in fulfilling the requirements of the visa liberalisation roadmap <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160504/fourth_progress_report_on_kosovo_visa_liberalisation_roadmap_swd_en.pdf>

Albanian-speaking organised crime groups are already present and engaged in criminal activities in 19 Member States and Schengen Associated States. Such groups can be composed of persons not only from Kosovo, but also of Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Serbia. Some also hold EU citizenship. They often have interests in their region of origin and maintain contacts with diaspora communities. Some members of these groups return to Kosovo to evade prosecution abroad, while others have been known to run operations in the EU from Kosovo. Criminal sectors These groups are active in a considerable range of crime areas, and there are indications that they could pose a threat in the following sectors: - Drug trafficking, such as the production and trafficking of cannabis and trafficking of heroin and cocaine; - Some groups have become active in facilitating irregular migration from Kosovo and, recently, third-country nationals in the European refugee crisis; - Corruption, money-laundering and fraud, including excise and benefit fraud; - Trafficking in human beings, notably for sexual exploitation; - The illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons; - Foreign terrorist fighters originating from Kosovo who have returned from Syria or Iraq.

Impact: Visa-free entry from Kosovo can increase crime

European Commission 2016. REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL 4 May 2016. Fourth report on progress by Kosovo\* in fulfilling the requirements of the visa liberalisation roadmap <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160504/fourth_progress_report_on_kosovo_visa_liberalisation_roadmap_swd_en.pdf>

Albanian-speaking organised crime groups are capable of managing movement between the EU and Kosovo and are often connected to organised crime groups in their diaspora. It remains unclear to what extent visa-free travel might contribute to cross-border criminality. Nevertheless , the difference in living standards between the EU and Kosovo may facilitate an increase in certain crime areas, such as organised property crime and mobile itinerant crime. Visa liberalisation could also have an impact on undetected entry into the EU of persons from Kosovo who return from war zones where they had joined terrorist networks.

2. Increased illegal immigration into the EU

Link: German study finds an increase in “removals” (deporting people who stayed too long or illegally) after visa liberalization for other Balkan countries, and Kosovars are particularly problematic even under existing law

Paula Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik 2019 (with German government’s Federal Office for Migration and Refugees) Developments in Germany in the context of visa liberalisation (Note about date: Paper was written in Nov 2018 and published in January 2019. The author inside the paper says it should be cited as 2019) <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/11a_germany_visa_liberalisation_en.pdf>

The figures on persons ordered to leave the federal territory, assisted voluntary returns and removals show a similar trend to the statistics previously considered, in particular the trend is similar to that of asylum applications. In 2010 - the year after visa liberalisation for Serbia, FYR [Former Yugoslav Republic of] Macedonia and Montenegro - there was a marked increase in assited voluntary returns, especially among Serbian and Macedonian nationals (Table 8). The total number of departures of Western Balkan nationals under the REAG/GARP programme rose steadily until 2014 (Table 9). In 2015, a particularly sharp increase in the number of returns can be observed (Figure 18). This occurred in parallel with the sharp increase in asylum applications, particularly by Kosovar and Albanian nationals (Table 4), and in the context of an overall sharp rise in the influx of asylum seekers. As a result of the high number of asylum decisions taken and the low level of protection granted to nationals of the Western Balkan countries (Table 5), the number of government-assisted departures rose sharply too. This increasing trend continued in 2016. In 2017, the number of government-assisted departures to the Western Balkan countries fell significantly again. The number of departures of Georgian, Moldovan and Ukrainian nationals under the REAG/GARP programme also increased with a time lag in relation to the number of asylum applications submitted and roughly in parallel to the number of irregular residents from the respective countries detected (Chapters 3.4.2 and 3.5.3). In the case of Georgia, a continuous and significant increase can be observed between 2013 and 2017 (Table 8). For Moldovan nationals, the figures are at a very low level up to and including 2015 and then rise sharply in 2016. In the case of Ukraine, there has been an increase in departures from 2015 onwards; in 2016 the number rose particularly sharply (Table 8). Up to and including 2014, Serbian nationals represented the largest group among the countries surveyed in this study, both among those leaving voluntarily and among those removed (Table 8; Table 9). In 2015, Kosovar nationals constituted the largest group of persons removed, while Albanian nationals represented the largest group of returning voluntarily.

Link: Even Kosovo government fears visa liberalization will result in big increase in illegal immigration to the EU

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These elements will produce delays in political decision-making by the European Union in case of visa liberalization for Kosovo (Veseli, 2018). According to analysts, the fears of migration is mutual for European Union and for Kosovar Institutions (Veseli, 2018). The EU Institutions are currently preparing for the upcoming elections and there are various political calculations of political parties within EU institutions. They are taking into account the penalties they may have if they support visa liberalization for Kosovo. The fear for the government of Kosovo is that they might not be able to control migration. By the end of 2014 and early 2015, using the border between Serbia and Hungary, thousands of Kosovo citizens moved illegally to European Union countries. The great wave of migration from Ko sovo has forced the authorities in Hungary, Serbia, Austria and Germany to strengthen border controls to prevent the illegal passage (Veseli, 2018).

Impact: Lost jobs from illegal immigration

Dr. Pia Orrenius and Dr. Madeline Zavodny 2016 (Pia M. Orrenius, holds a PhD in Economics from the University of California at Los Angeles. She is Vice President and Senior Economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. Madeline Zavodny received a PhD in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. She is a Professor of Economics at Agnes Scott College, Department of Economics & Business Management) January 2016 “Irregular Immigration in the European Union” <https://www.eapmigrationpanel.org/sites/default/files/2016_2_epa_eng_1.pdf>

Few studies of the labor market effects of immigration look specifically at unauthorized immigrants because of the difficulty of determining immigrants’ legal status. Evidence suggests that unauthorized immigrants typically earn less than natives or legal immigrants. In Italy, for example, irregular immigrants earn about 8 percent less than comparable legal immigrants; in Spain, 12 percent less (Baldacci, Inglese, and Strozza, 1999; Connor and Massey, 2010). Research shows that immigrants working illegally in the shadow economy in Italy reduce employment of legal labor there (Venturini, 1999). However, natives working illegally (off the books) have a more adverse effect on legal employment there than immigrants working illegally.

Impact: Black market work causes economic and social harm

Report by Solidarite and Diesis 2010 (With the financial support of the European Community Programme for Employment and Social Solidarity PROGRESS (2007-2013)) “THE ILLEGAL WORK OF MIGRANTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION” (no month given in the publication) <https://www.pourlasolidarite.eu/sites/default/files/publications/files/report_illegal_work_of_migrants_in_the_eu_0.pdf>

The development of an informal economy weakens the European social model. Since 2007, the European social affair Commissioner, Vladimar Spidla, has assessed the black market as being „extremely harmful to our economies. The fact that neither the employer, nor the employee pays taxes strongly weakens social security systems, which has already been put to the test by the economic crisis and Europe’s aging population. If we do nothing, these practices will lead to a form of social dumping, which means that salaries in some sectors will become very low for companies to stay competitive’ he underlines.

Link: Illegal immigrants destroy native jobs in irregular sectors

Prof. Alessandra Venturini 2004 (Associate Professor, Dept of Economics, University of Turin, Italy) January/February 2004 “Do Illegal Migrants Compete with National Workers?” <https://www.intereconomics.eu/pdf-download/year/2004/number/1/article/the-illegal-employment-of-foreigners-in-europe.html>

In their excellent field work in Northern Greece, Lianos, Sarris and Katseli estimated by interviews the gross substitution of native workers by foreigners, i.e. how many jobs previously done by Greeks are now done by foreigners. The gross substitution rate was very high: 12% with reference to regular immigrants and 21% with reference to irregular immigrants, but taking into account the reduced willingness of native workers to do certain kinds of jobs and tasks, the net substitution rate is reduced to 0.5% for regular and 5.8% for irregular labour. These results suggest that in each labour market immigrants play a competitive role, but in the irregular labour market their role is much larger, as is to be expected from neoclassical theory, because the effect is larger where the market is more flexible. In addition these results suggest that irregular labour damages native workers more than regular labour and thus it is better to legalise immigrants.

Big Links to DA’s 3 through 6 – Fracturing / dividing / weakening the European Union

Big Link: The reason EU hasn’t approved Kosovo visa liberalization is fear of mass migration, and its divisive effect on the EU

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Also, there is a non-positive climate within the powerful European Union countries because of the issue of migration (Veseli, 2018). The concerns that the Italian populist government has with what is called the burden of emigrants are evident. The Italian government demands that this burden of emigrants is shared with all EU member states and not borne by one country. Furthermore, the disagreements between Chancellor Angela Merkel and Christian Social Union to close the borders for immigrants strengthens the hostility towards mass migrations, whether from the East or from Kosovo. These elements will produce delays in political decision-making by the European Union in case of visa liberalization for Kosovo (Veseli, 2018).

Historical precedent: 300% increase in asylum applications when other Balkan nations got visa liberalization

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With emphasis on Macedonia and Serbia, the number of asylum seekers from Western Balkans increased from 10,000 in 2009 to 26,000 in 2011 and 30,000 in 2012. Clearly, this increase of 300% was a direct result of visa abolishment despite the informative campaigns for free movement regulations and measures taken towards the readmission and integration of emigrants (RIDEA, 2016).

Big Brink: EU is on the brink of disintegration over immigration

Bodo Weber 2020 (senior associate of the [Democratization Policy Council](http://www.democratizationpolicy.org/), based in Berlin) 9 March 2020 “Threat to EU on Greece-Turkey border is EU-made” <https://euobserver.com/opinion/147672>

The current narrative's complete avoidance of core questions is astounding. Reasoned, rational discussion seems to now be a collective pan-European taboo. EU leaders evidently fear that just by opening up such discussion, the Union would disintegrate. In September 2015, when some of the Visegrád countries declared they would not implement the EU's legally-binding relocation scheme, the Union collapsed as a legal entity in the area of asylum and migration.

3. Reduced world stability from fracturing the EU

Example: Disagreement over immigration policy was a major reason Britain left the EU

Max Boot 2016 (leading military historian and foreign policy analyst. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York) July 2016 “Brexit: Isolationism or Atlanticism?” <https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/issues/resources/strategika_issue_33_web.pdf>

Britons might never have voted to leave the European Union had it not been for the refugee crisis that hit Europe as a result of the Syrian civil war. Even though Britain has accepted only some 5,000 Syrian refugees, German premier Angela Merkel agreed to take in 800,000, thus fueling fears across the continent of an influx of possible terrorists. Those fears were exploited by elements of the “Leave” campaign, principally Nigel Farage and the UK Independence Party, and no doubt contributed crucial momentum to the final outcome.

Brink: EU faces an uncertain future with multiple crises threatening unity and increasing division

Meagan Araki, Annie Chang, Troy Lindell, Alison Wendler 2017. (members of the “Challenges to European Unity Task Force” at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Univ. of Washington) March 2017 CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN UNITY: OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS <https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Task-Force-J-Report-2017_Lorenz.pdf>

Today, Europe faces an uncertain future. The migration crisis, rise in terrorism, economic downturn, mounting external pressures and a responsive populist movement, have threatened the basis of European stability. The major influx of refugees into Europe has placed immense pressure on the EU’s infrastructure and capacity to integrate refugees into the European identity. Europe has experienced a growing number of terrorist attacks, leading to nationalist and xenophobic policies. Additionally, Russia’s encroachment into Eastern Europe has strained Russia and Europe’s relationship. The Euro crisis has furthered the divide between the core and peripheral EU countries, revealing the inequality between European citizens and growing stagnant employment and growth opportunities.

Link: EU stability promotes US ability to maintain global security and stability

Meagan Araki, Annie Chang, Troy Lindell, Alison Wendler 2017. (members of the “Challenges to European Unity Task Force” at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Univ. of Washington) March 2017 CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN UNITY: OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS <https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Task-Force-J-Report-2017_Lorenz.pdf>

Policies that encourage the unity between EU member states should be strongly supported. It is significant that the United States demonstrate support in this ongoing migration crisis, as it will help relieve the pressures member states are experiencing, as well as help mend existing tensions. The cohesion, stability, and cooperation of European Union serve a key interests of the United States. With these aspects, a more unified European Union can strengthen its position as a global actor, as well as strengthen its existing relations with the United States. This can further United States’ objectives of security and stability throughout the international community.

Impact: World peace & prosperity at risk without US influence. US hegemony is key to global peace & prosperity

Capt. M. V. Prato 2009 (United States Marine Corps,Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Combat Development Command,Marine Corps University) “The Need for American Hegemony” Feb 2009 <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a508040.pdf>

The world witnessed a vast shift in the polarity of geopolitics after the Cold War. The United States became the world’s greatest hegemon with an unequalled ability to globally project cultural, political, economic, and military power in a manner not seen since the days of the Roman Empire. Coined the “unipolar moment” by syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer, the disparity of power between the U.S. and all other nations allows the U.S. to influence the world for the mutual benefit of all responsible states. Unfortunately, the United States is increasingly forced to act unilaterally as a result of both foreign and domestic resentment to U.S. dominance and the rise of liberal internationalism. The United States must exercise benevolent global hegemony, unilaterally if necessary, to ensure its security and maintain global peace and prosperity.

4. Populism and Authoritarian Government

Link: AFF plan weakens / fractures the EU

Cross apply the BIG LINK.

Link: Fear, anxiety and skepticism about the EU leads to the rise of populist authoritarian figures

Meagan Araki, Annie Chang, Troy Lindell, Alison Wendler 2017. (members of the “Challenges to European Unity Task Force” at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Univ. of Washington) March 2017 CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN UNITY: OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS <https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Task-Force-J-Report-2017_Lorenz.pdf>

Additionally, the complications surrounding EU accession and instability in Turkey and the Balkans present unique challenges to the dynamic of the EU. These real and perceived threats have induced fear and anxiety into the European public. As these security threats have worsened with little to no progress made, Euroscepticism has grown and enabled the populist movement. By capitalizing on this sentiment, populist parties have gained increasing support throughout Europe. Populists promise to take back power from the corrupt and inefficient political elite, and give it back to the general public. Europeans have increasingly turned to strongman figures who value strength and security over tolerance and unity.

Brink & Example: Hungary now has authoritarian government, putting EU at high risk right now

Philippe Dam 2020 (master’s degree in international administration; Human Rights Watch’s advocacy director for Europe and Central Asia) 1 Apr 2020 “Hungary’s Authoritarian Takeover Puts European Union at Risk” <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/01/hungarys-authoritarian-takeover-puts-european-union-risk>

On Monday, under the pretext of addressing the COVID-19 public health emergency, [Hungary's](https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/hungary) parliament gave [green light to the Orban-led government](https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/23/hungarys-orban-uses-pandemic-seize-unlimited-power) to rule with unlimited power for an indefinite time. Prime Minister Viktor Orban can now suspend any existing law and implement others by decree, without parliamentary or judicial scrutiny. Elections have been suspended. The law allows for new criminal penalties of five years in prison for publishing vaguely defined “false” or “distorted” facts – another blow to media freedom in the country. With this law, Hungary becomes the first country in the European Union to virtually abolish all democratic checks-and-balances. How has it come to this? In the past [10 years](https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/05/16/wrong-direction-rights/assessing-impact-hungarys-new-constitution-and-laws), the government has spared no efforts to [curb judicial independence](https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/hungary), restrict [civil society](https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/17/hungary-determined-silence-any-critics-left-standing) activities, and gain near full [control over the media](https://www.euronews.com/2019/06/12/don-t-be-fooled-hungary-s-government-remains-a-threat-to-european-values-view). Having repeatedly failed to appreciate the gravity of the situation, EU institutions risk making the same mistake again.

Link & Impact: Weak EU leads to rise of dictatorship and loss of freedom for millions more

Kenneth Roth 2020 (executive director of Human Rights Watch, one of the world's leading international human rights organizations; former federal prosecutor in New York; graduate of Yale Law School) 27 Apr 2020 “Stopping the Authoritarian Rot in Europe” [https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/27/stopping-authoritarian-rot-europe#](https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/27/stopping-authoritarian-rot-europe)

Rot tends to spread when it encounters no resistance. Dictator wannabes prey upon weakness. EU and member state leaders now need to ask themselves: is the EU only a trading bloc or also a club of democracies? The answer to that question used to be obvious. Sadly, it no longer is. Ten million EU citizens now live under authoritarian rule. How many millions more will have to suffer the loss of their freedoms before Europe’s leaders draw the line?

5. Economic recession (from weakening / fracturing the EU)

Link: AFF plan weakens / fractures the EU with greater division

Cross-apply the BIG LINK.

Link: EU unity is necessary for beneficial trade deals

Julian Bonte-Friedheim 2020 (head writer at The Perspective) “IS THE EU BETTER OFF DIVIDED OR TOGETHER?” (month not given in the published article) <https://www.theperspective.com/debates/businessandtechnology/is-the-eu-better-off-divided-or-together/>

Better trade deals can be negotiated from within the EU. For any European nation, negotiating trade deals with other countries is much more advantageous as part of the EU rather than as an independent economy. As one of the world’s [biggest economic unions](https://www.thebalance.com/world-s-largest-economy-3306044), the EU has a lot more leverage when brokering a deal with China or India. Being able to offer (or withhold) access to its many consumers is a strong bargaining tool. Additionally, there is [free trading](https://www.ft.com/content/1688d0e4-15ef-11e6-b197-a4af20d5575e) between members of the EU, as it is a customs union. Individual countries, while able to create their own terms, are unlikely to reach deals as beneficial as the EU does on its own.

Brink: Cracks already being seen in EU unity, and even partial non-cooperation will eventually bleed it to death

Hans Vollaard 2020 ( Lecturer in Dutch and European Politics at Utrecht University, the Netherlands.) “One down, many to go? European disintegration after Brexit” 23 March 2020 <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2020/03/23/one-down-many-to-go-european-disintegration-after-brexit/>

Even though there may not be other instances of European disintegration like Brexit, dissatisfaction may lead to other forms of disintegration. Not by countries leaving the EU entirely, but only partially. These partial exits involve member states not complying with the EU rules, for instance with respect to public finances in the Eurozone (Italy), or the Schengen rules, many member states have introduced “temporary” national border surveillance since the migration crisis of 2015. Another partial exit is the desire to pay less money to ‘Brussels’, such as expressed by the so-called Hanseatic group of EU member states led by the Netherlands. Disintegration can also occur involuntarily, when one member state wants to exclude another member state, such as the calls to push Greece out of the euro or the Schengen area. These partial forms of disintegration undermine the functioning of the EU. Its rules are less respected, and it gets fewer resources to function properly. In such a scenario, the EU would gradually ‘bleed to death’.

Impact: Devastating economic impact. Financial recession

Mauro Guillen 2016 (holder of the Zandman Endowed Professorship in International Management at the Wharton School. He served as Director of the Lauder Institute of Management & International Studies between 2007 and 2019. PhD in sociology from Yale University and a Doctorate in political economy from the University of Oviedo in Spain.) 13 June 2016 “On the Brink: How a Brexit Could Fracture a Fragile Europe” <https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/on-the-brink-how-brexit-could-fracture-a-fragile-europe/>

The European Union is the largest economy in the world. It’s not as rich as the U.S., but it is bigger in terms of gross domestic product if you combine those 28 countries. If there is a crisis of confidence that undermines consumer spending and business confidence, then you are going to get into maybe even a third recession. That would be devastating for Europe itself, but it would be really bad for everybody else in the world that has business with Europe, including the United States. Exporters to Europe and American companies that have investments in Europe are going to suffer. Companies such as GE or GM or Boeing, 20% to 30% of their business is in Europe, so it could have a large impact.

Past precedent: Brexit caused serious economic damage

Kimberly Amadeo 2020 (over 20 years of senior-level corporate experience in economic analysis and business strategy. She is a U.S. Economy expert for The Balance and president of WorldMoneyWatch, which produces publications about the global economy) “Brexit Consequences for the U.K., the EU, and the United States” last updated 14 Mar 2020 <https://www.thebalance.com/brexit-consequences-4062999>

The day after the Brexit vote, the currency markets were in turmoil. The [euro fell 2% to $1.11](https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-euro-to-dollar-conversion-its-history-3306091).﻿ The pound fell 8% to $1.36.﻿ Both increased the [value of the dollar](https://www.thebalance.com/value-of-us-dollar-3306268). That strength is not good for U.S. [stock markets](https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-stock-market-how-it-works-3305893). It makes American shares more expensive for foreign investors. A weak pound also makes U.S. exports to the U.K. more expensive. The United States has an $18.9 billion trade surplus with the U.K. In 2018, it exported $141 billion while importing $122 billion.﻿ Brexit could turn this surplus into a deficit if a weak pound makes U.K. imports more competitive. Brexit dampens business growth for companies that operate in Europe. U.S. companies invested $758 billion in the U.K. in 2018.﻿ Most of this was the finance sector with some manufacturing. These companies use the U.K. as the gateway to free trade with the EU nations. U.K. businesses invested $561 billion in the United States. Brexit puts at risk jobs in both countries. In addition, there were 716,000 U.K. immigrants in the United States and 215,000 U.S. immigrants in the U.K. in 2019.

6. Russia gains influence

Link: AFF divides / weakens the EU

Cross-apply the BIG LINK.

Link: Russia uses EU division to advance its agenda and gain influence to accomplish bad things

Ian Kearns 2018 (co-founder, former director and board member of the European Leadership Network, a pan-European group of senior political, military and diplomatic leaders. Former specialist advisor to the Joint House of Commons/House of Lords Committee on National Security Strategy. Former deputy chair and director of secretariat to former NATO Secretary General George Robertson) Collapse: Europe After The European Union (no month given in the published article) <https://books.google.com/books?id=ZVBSDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT223&lpg=PT223&dq=EU+immigration+reform+hopeless&source=bl&ots=79cHvPH2qu&sig=ACfU3U3diw6xbMj9V9bRAyJPoyV-5N1epA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjswYPI-ZrqAhWyneAKHfCQBCE4ChDoATAAegQIChAB#v=onepage&q=EU%20immigration%20reform%20hopeless&f=false>



Impact: Russian influence damages democracy, promotes authoritarian rule

Geir Hagen Karlsen 2019 (Lieutenant Colonel and Lecturer, Norwegian Defence University College) 8 Feb 2019 “Divide and rule: ten lessons about Russian political influence activities in Europe” <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0227-8>

Russia is an authoritarian and corrupt state that regards the EU and, more specifically, NATO, as a challenge, a competitor and a threat. Its influence activities are malicious, undermining alliances and creating distrust, weakening what Moscow sees as their opponents and thus ensuring the survival of this authoritarian regime. Their interference is worrisome at several levels. First, Russia is undermining core democratic processes, like elections, and trust in the political system and its institutions. Second, their disinformation and manipulation of media and social media is directly undermining the political discourse, essential to democracy. Third, this is further exacerbated by their malicious attacks on individuals, like the Finnish journalist Jessika Aro, who has been tracked and harassed systematically after exposing Russian trolling of social media (Aro, [2015](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0227-8#ref-CR3)). However, the overall Russian approach is simple, divide and rule.

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