Negative: Greek Tragedy

By “Coach Vance” Trefethen

***Resolved: The European Union should substantially reform its immigration policy.***

The affirmative case argues that Greece is illegally refusing migrants the opportunity to apply for asylum. This brief argues that Turkey is to blame for mishandling the refugee crisis, and that most of the migrants aren’t genuine “refugees” at all – they’re economic migrants looking for better jobs. The migrants trying to get into Greece can just stay in Turkey and they’ll be fine. And trying to force a controversial plan that involves admitting more immigrants into Greece and then relocating them into the rest of Europe would probably lead to the dissolution of the European Union.

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MINOR REPAIR / COUNTERPLAN

Sanction Turkey instead of Greece: Turkey is to blame for the migrant problems in Greece

George G. Horiates 2020 (attorney; President of American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association ) 3 March 2020 “AHEPA backs Greek decision to secure border, urges Turkey sanctions” <https://www.ekathimerini.com/250140/article/ekathimerini/news/ahepa-backs-greek-decision-to-secure-border-urges-turkey-sanctions>

Greece, because of its geographic location and its 8,700-mile border, the longest in Europe, continues to bear the brunt of the burden whenever Turkey chooses to “open the gates.” It is unacceptable for Turkey, whenever it is in a bind, repeatedly to use Syrian refugees as political pawns to pressure and threaten Europe and NATO members for their support-in this case because of Turkey's illegal and misguided policy in Syria. AHEPA condemns the provocative rhetoric of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has threatened the release of “millions” of people going to the border and the dissemination of Turkish propaganda that has escalated tensions with seemingly no rebuke. The migrant crisis in Greece is a crisis for all of Europe. The instability it has created is not in the best interest of the United States or the European Union. It has left the American Hellenic community and diaspora frustrated, angry, and concerned for the stability of the region and safety of individuals affected by this crisis instigated by Turkey. AHEPA appreciates the recent statements of support from the United States and solidarity from the European Union and European capitals. Further, AHEPA is encouraged by the engagement of Frontex and EU leadership, who will visit the border with Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis. However, Europe must back its words and statements with sustained action. This is another in an endless line of provocative actions by Turkey. It bears repeating, Turkey has engaged in the purposeful transfer of migrants, which Turkey itself has displaced, and many of whom are not from Syria, to Europe's borders in order to advance its bargaining power with Europe and the world. Turkey is not a friend of the West. It cannot be trusted, does not play fair, and certainly cannot claim any stake to international law. This is the Turkey that warranted our “Sanction Turkey” call with which the international community is dealing.

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE

1. Claims exaggerated

Allegations of misconduct by Greece are exaggerated and mostly Turkish propaganda

**[keep in mind Turkey and Greece are bitter enemies]**

Dilara Aslan 2020 (journalist) DAILY SABAH Greek PM denies refugee pushback, claims 'tough but fair' border management 20 Aug 2020 <https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/eu-affairs/greek-pm-denies-refugee-pushback-claims-tough-but-fair-border-management>

Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis on Wednesday denied once again allegations that Athens was illegally pushing back asylum-seekers at sea, defended its "tough but fair" border management, and accused Turkey of peddling "misinformation." "If there's any incident that needs to be explored, if there's any exaggeration at any given point, I'm going to be the first to look into it," Mitsotakis told CNN.

"Greece is a country that respects the rule of law, we've granted asylum to tens of thousands of people," the prime minister said. The New York Times on Aug. 14 reported Greece was "abandoning" migrants at sea for the Turkish coastguard to rescue. It said it had interviewed survivors from five such episodes and cited additional evidence from independent watchdogs, two academic researchers and the Turkish Coast Guard. Based on its research, the Times said more than 1,000 asylum seekers had been "dropped at sea" since March. Mitsotakis, however, said the reports "essentially originate from Turkey." "Some of these reporters, who do these types of exploratory journalism, should be more careful in checking their sources," he said. "These types of reports are also an insult to our coast guard (which) has saved literally tens of thousands of refugees and migrants at sea, and our islands have always provided shelter to those in greater need," Mitsotakis said.

2. Turkey at fault, not Greece [and remember, Turkey isn’t in the EU]

Turkey was at fault. Greece did the right thing and followed the law

Prof. [Achilles Skordas](https://www.mpil.de/en/pub/institute/personnel/academic-staff/askordas.cfm) 2020 (Professor of International Law, Univ of Bristol; Senior Research Fellow, [Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law](https://www.mpil.de/en/pub/news.cfm), Heidelberg) May 2020 The Twenty-Day Greek-Turkish Border Crisis and Beyond: Geopolitics of Migration and Asylum Law (Part II) <http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/the-twenty-day-greek-turkish-border-crisis-and-beyond-geopolitics-of-migration-and-asylum-law-part-ii/>

Turkey clearly violated numerous aspects of the obligation of cooperation to prevent and combat the smuggling of migrants. As the known facts and official public statements prove, Turkish officials guided the movement of migrants to the Greek border. If Turkish officials have also encouraged and facilitated the actions of smugglers, they may also incur individual criminal responsibility under Art. 6(2)(c) of the Protocol and Turkey may face international responsibility for not launching criminal investigation against these individuals. This sequence of events and the violation of multiple provisions of the Protocol should also be taken into account when making the legal assessment of the Greek response. By closing the border, Greece ensured that Turkey did not succeed in making the Protocols obsolete, prevented the illegal en mass border crossings, and preserved the *effet utile* of the Protocols. The enforcement of the Protocols by the Greek authorities corresponds to the obligations of Turkey under the law of State responsibility ‘to cease the wrongful conduct and ‘to re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed’ ([ILC Articles](https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/71/resp_of_states.shtml) 30 and 35, Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, UNGA Res. 56/83, 28.01.2002, my italics).

Greek border violence was started by the refugees, caused by Turkey trying to send migrants over the border

MARION MACGREGOR 2020 (Has extensive experience in journalism; holds an MA from the Univesity of Melbourne) 5 June 2020 “Frontex expects more migrants will try to enter EU from Turkey” <https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/24629/frontex-expects-more-migrants-will-try-to-enter-eu-from-turkey>

In late February, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared that the door was open for migrants to travel to the EU. Following the announcement, thousands of migrants approached the Turkish-Greek border and tried to cross into Europe, triggering violent clashes.

3. No harm to staying in Turkey

**If the problem is that the refugees are in Turkey and trying to get into Greece, and Greece won’t accept them, here’s a cool idea: Just stay in Turkey!**

Syrian refugees can integrate into Turkey

Alan Makovsky 2019 (senior fellow for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress) 13 March 2019 “Turkey’s Refugee Dilemma” <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2019/03/13/467183/turkeys-refugee-dilemma/>

While most Turks hope all the Syrians will eventually return to Syria, that prospect looks unrealistic; sizable numbers of Syrians are indeed likely to remain. The issue of their remaining is politically explosive in Turkey, and the Turkish government has been hesitant to acknowledge publicly that it foresees the long-term integration of the refugees into Turkish society. In fact, bowing to public sentiment, Turkish leaders often proclaim that all Syrians will ultimately return to Syria, and they are likely to express this sentiment repeatedly as March 31 nationwide local elections approach. Yet, whether by default or by design, the government seems to have begun gradually implementing a policy of integration, suggesting that, regardless of their public declarations, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and other key leaders realize that many Syrians are in Turkey to stay. Ultimately, Turkish society may view integration as necessary for social harmony and recognize that, if integration is to be successful, it must be pursued as early and thoroughly as possible. Turkey’s future stability may depend on such decisions.

Refugees are well cared for in Turkey

Alan Makovsky 2019 (senior fellow for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress) 13 March 2019 “Turkey’s Refugee Dilemma” <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2019/03/13/467183/turkeys-refugee-dilemma/>

Turkey hosts the largest number of refugees in the world, and it has spent generously on their behalf. Ankara provides free health care and education to the refugees as well as full services for the hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees who have come through, or still live in, refugee camps sprinkled around the Turkish south.

Turkey welcomes integration of Syrian refugees. Example: public schools

Alan Makovsky 2019 (senior fellow for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress) 13 March 2019 “Turkey’s Refugee Dilemma” https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2019/03/13/467183/turkeys-refugee-dilemma/

The Turkish educational system is essential to the integration of the Syrians into Turkish society. In its most remarkably pro-integration decision to date, the Turkish government seems to have made a decision to use this system to the fullest: Soon, all Syrian students will attend Turkish public schools. From the beginning, Turkey welcomed the refugees into Turkish schools, but few attended initially. In September 2014, Turkey opened—or, in some cases, recognized already informally existing—temporary education centers (TEC), which taught a modified Syrian curriculum in Arabic. As of August 2017, there were 404 TECs.The TECs, however, were established on the premise that the refugees would soon return to Syria. Over time, presumably as the Turkish government came to accept that the Syrians would likely remain, the government made the momentous decision to transfer and integrate the Syrians into the Turkish state educational system. This decision seems explicable only as an attempt to facilitate Syrian integration into Turkish society.

Refugees in Turkey are well funded

Alan Makovsky 2019 (senior fellow for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress) 13 March 2019 “Turkey’s Refugee Dilemma” <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2019/03/13/467183/turkeys-refugee-dilemma/>

Since 2016, Turkey and the refugees have benefited from sizable aid from the European Union, courtesy of a March 2016 EU-Turkey agreement that helps Turkey defray health, education, and other refugee-associated costs. By the terms of that agreement, Turkey agreed to take measures to prevent unauthorized refugee crossings to Greece—that is, to EU territory—and to take back any refugees who illegally made that crossing. In return, the European Union pledged, among other things, to provide 6 billion euros over the following three years in programmatic support for refugees in Turkey.To this point, the European Union has committed 4.2 billion euros to what is officially called “The EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey” and has actually disbursed a little more than 2.1 billion euros.As part of this aid program, the European Union funds two major direct assistance programs for Syrian refugees in Turkey: the Emergency Social Safety Net program, which provides support to needy Syrians and their families—more than 1.5 million people, as of January 2019—and the Conditional Cash Transfer for Education program, which provides funding to families who send their children to school and is paid out on a per-student basis, to parents of 410,000 students, as of January 2019. The latter program is intended to incentivize parents to send their children to Turkish state schools.Both programs are implemented by Turkish agencies, which may contribute to the many Turks’ misperception that Turkey is funding those programs as well. ESSN beneficiaries receive 120 Turkish lira each month, plus an additional quarterly payment of 50 to 250 Turkish lira per household, depending on its size. CCTE payments are made every two months on the following basis: 35 Turkish lira for each boy and 40 Turkish lira for each girl in primary school, as well as 50 Turkish lira for each boy and 60 Turkish lira for each girl in high school.As of September 21, 2017, the United States had contributed $572 million to support Syrian refugees in Turkey since the beginning of the crisis. It had contributed far more for refugee support to Lebanon, $1.6 billion, and Jordan, a little more than $1 billion, both of which Washington deemed needier than Turkey

4. Refoulement responses

Non-refoulement only prevents removal when it would put the migrant in serious danger

**[Analysis: Cross-apply the cards above under #3 about Turkey. If Turkey isn’t a bad place, and Greece is simply blocking them from crossing from Turkey into Greece, that’s not a violation of refoulement. Telling them to stay in a good place (Status Quo policy) isn’t the same as sending them back to a bad place (refoulement).]**

Pieter Boeles 2017 (visiting professor migration law, University Amsterdam; emeritus professor University Leiden) 14 January 2017 “Non-refoulement: is part of the EU’s qualification Directive invalid?” <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2017/01/non-refoulement-is-part-of-eus.html>

Basically, the dogmatic point of departure is simple: the EU principle of non-refoulement is anchored in Article 19(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, which contains a prohibition to remove, expel or extradite any person to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The Charter should govern the uniform interpretation of the principle of non-refoulement in Union law, both in the Treaties and in secondary legislation (like the Returns Directive and the Qualification Directive). As the prohibition of refoulement is absolute in the ECHR, it should universally be interpreted to be absolute regardless of the legal context of EU law in which it appears. Article 19(2) of the Charter corresponds to Article 3 ECHR, and so must be interpreted the same way (Article 52(3) of the Charter).

It’s OK to send migrants to countries in which they are not in danger

Pieter Boeles 2017 (visiting professor migration law, University Amsterdam; emeritus professor University Leiden) 14 January 2017 “Non-refoulement: is part of the EU’s qualification Directive invalid?” <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2017/01/non-refoulement-is-part-of-eus.html> (brackets in original)

The discussion on this topic is complicated by a number of circumstances. First, refoulement only refers to deportation to the country where the person is in danger. Non-refoulement as such does not stand in the way of expulsion to other countries (as can be seen in Article 32 of the Refugee Convention allowing a limited possibility of removals to other countries, even if a refugee is ‘lawfully in [the] territory’). Further, the protection granted by the Qualification Directive takes the form of issuing statuses and residence permits, among other things, to protected persons. What follows from this? Status and residence permit are two different things, as can be seen in Article 24 Qualification Directive. Revoking a residence permit cannot lead to the revocation of the refugee status (*H.T.* judgment, para. 74). Neither will the status of subsidiary protection be affected by revocation of the residence permit.

5. They’re not legitimate refugees

They’re not “refugees,” they’re just looking for better jobs

Michael B. Bougherty 2017. (Senior Writer for National Review) “Listen to Eastern Europe” <https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/06/sanctions-punishing-poland-eastern-europe-are-mistake/>

The Eastern European governments are right to reject the farcical 2015 scheme. First because it is based on so many lies. Western Europe’s policy on “refugees” has been dishonest from beginning to end. The vast majority of people arriving are not fleeing war in Syria or Iraq. They are coming from Chad, Afghanistan, and Eritrea, and they are looking for economic opportunity in Europe.

They’re economic migrants, not refugees. If they were genuine asylum seekers, they would have claimed asylum in the first safe country

NBC News 2019 (journalist Saphora Smith) 2 Feb 2019 “Europe grapples with distinction between refugees and economic migrants” <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/europe-grapples-distinction-between-refugees-economic-migrants-n965161> (brackets added)

“There is more and more emphasis that those who travel to Europe are economic migrants, as if they were real asylum-seekers they would have stayed in the conflict region and claimed asylum” in the first safe country they arrived in, [Univ. of Birmingham migration researcher Nando] Sigona said. According to the United Nations, a refugee is someone who is “unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a [well-founded fear of being persecuted](https://www.unhcr.org/uk/what-is-a-refugee.html)” and has the right to asylum in another country. An economic migrant is generally considered to be someone who leaves their country in search of work or a higher standard of living, not to flee persecution.

Job seekers don’t qualify for protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention, nor any who aren’t fleeing specific persecution

Ionel Zamfir 2015 (with European Parliamentary Research Service) 27 Oct 2015 “Refugee Status Under International Law” <https://epthinktank.eu/2015/10/27/refugee-status-under-international-law/>

Refugees are a special class of migrants who under international law deserve specific protection by their host state. According to Article 1 of the 1951 UN Convention, as modified by the 1967 Protocol, a refugee is defined as a person who ‘owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.’ This definition implies that several qualifying conditions apply to be considered a refugee: (1) **presence outside home country; (2) well-founded fear of persecution**(being at risk of harm is insufficient reason in the absence of discriminatory persecution); (3)**incapacity to enjoy the protection of one’s own state** from the persecution feared. The definition of refugees was actually **intended to exclude** internally displaced persons, economic migrants, victims of natural disasters, and persons fleeing violent conflict but not subject to discrimination amounting to persecution.

SOLVENCY

1. No capacity – Greece physically can’t do it

Greek government doesn’t have the manpower to process the enormous caseload

 [Ingeborg Eliassen](https://www.investigate-europe.eu/en/team/ingeborg-eliassen/) and [Stavros Malichudis](https://www.investigate-europe.eu/en/team/stavros-malichudis/) 2020 (journalists) 19 Feb 2020 “Europe’s refugee regime pushes external borders to the limit” <https://www.investigate-europe.eu/en/2020/europes-new-refugee-regime-pushing-external-borders-to-the-limit/>

The second obstacle to the system Knaus outlined is Greek bureaucracy. Before 2013, the country had no specialised asylum authority. Even with considerable help, the task of being Europe’s gatekeeper has been too big for the new system. The young Greek bureaucracy has not been able to process the enormous caseload both fairly and effectively. In the [first 33 months](https://www.esiweb.org/pdf/ESI%20core%20facts%20-%20EU-Turkey%20Statement%20three%20years%20on%20-%2015%20April%202019.pdf) of the EU-Turkey agreement, 84,000 asylum seekers came to Greece from Turkey, most of them from war-torn countries.

2. Enforcement impossible

Link: AFF will ask other countries to take refugees from Greece. Last time EU did that, they got practically ZERO response

 [Ingeborg Eliassen](https://www.investigate-europe.eu/en/team/ingeborg-eliassen/) and [Stavros Malichudis](https://www.investigate-europe.eu/en/team/stavros-malichudis/) 2020 (journalists) 19 Feb 2020 “Europe’s refugee regime pushes external borders to the limit” <https://www.investigate-europe.eu/en/2020/europes-new-refugee-regime-pushing-external-borders-to-the-limit/>

In 2018, five of the EU’s 28 member states received as much as 75 percent of the asylum seekers to the union. Some countries carry a burden 300 times heavier than others, according to the unofficial memo from the German Ministry of the Interior. When the Greek government in September last year appealed to other countries to divide 2,500 of the country’s then 4,500 single minors between them, there was practically zero interest across the continent.

Link: Greece can’t solve without more funding AND cooperation from other EU countries

Jennifer Rankin 2020 (journalist) 2 Apr 2020 “EU court rules three member states broke law over refugee quotas” <https://www.theguardian.com/law/2020/apr/02/eu-court-rules-three-countries-czech-republic-hungary-poland-broke-law-over-refugee-quotas>

Greece’s minister for migration, Notis Mitarachi, told members of the European parliament’s home affairs committee on Thursday that 20 asylum seekers living at a camp near Athens had been confirmed as having coronavirus. He said no cases had been confirmed on the Greek islands and urged other EU countries to take in people on the islands. Responding to widespread concern about filthy camp conditions, he said: “Some have argued to transfer people to the mainland – that is from non-infected areas to infected areas – but we do not have empty spaces to do that. We will require additional funding for additional spaces, but these spaces cannot be ready within a few days. “We will strongly welcome any offers of relocation from member states that have capacity because we cannot resolve this crisis instantly and alone.”

DISADVANTAGES

1. Schengen collapse

**The “Schengen” area is a set of European countries that agreed 20 years ago to open borders amongst themselves. For example, there’s no customs check or passport control point on the border between France and Belgium, nor lots of other European countries. That allows free movement of goods and people within Europe and it works great. Unless, that is, people start flowing in from outside the EU without being properly checked. Once these unknown unverified people get in, they can go anywhere in the Schengen Area without inspection, posing security risks to Europe and prompting the rest of Europe to get mad and demand closure of Schengen and re-establish border checks on every country.**

Link: Greece doesn’t have the capacity to properly process the number of refugees AFF is insisting they handle quickly

Cross apply Solvency #1 card above.

Link: EU threatened Greece with sanctions in 2016 for processing migrants “too quickly” because fast processing leads to sloppy or no verification

 **[And now AFF wants to sanction them for processing too slowly!]**

**Helena Smith and Ian Traynor**2016. (journalists) 28 Jan 2016 “Is the writing on the wall for Europe’s borderless Schengen Area?” (ellipses in original) <https://www.theworldweekly.com/reader/view/2317/is-the-writing-on-the-wall-for-europes-borderless-schengen-area>

Greece has hit back angrily after being given three months to avoid being suspended from Europe’s free-travel Schengen area because of its alleged failures to get a grip on the continent’s mass migration crisis. The European commission said on Wednesday that Athens was failing to observe its obligations under the rules governing Europe’s 26-country passport-free travel area, known as Schengen. “Greece is under pressure,” said Valdis Dombrovskis, a commission vice-president. “Greece seriously neglected its obligations … There are serious deficiencies in the carrying out of external border control that must be overcome.” Greece has been the main gateway to Europe via Turkey for more than a million people over the past year, the majority of them from the Middle East. The influx shows little sign of letting up, with more than 35,000 having made the short but hazardous crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands this month alone. The Germans, as well as several other EU countries taking in large numbers of migrants, have long been furious with the Greeks for allegedly simply waving the new arrivals through without registration and ID checks and setting them on the Balkan route towards Austria and Germany.

Link: If Greece lets them in, other countries will close Schengen

Theresa Papademetriou 2016 (Senior Foreign Law Specialist at Library of Congress, Law Library) Refugee Law and Policy: Greece March 2016 <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/greece.php>

Greece has experienced the brunt of migratory flows during the refugee crisis due to its geographical location and as first country of entry pursuant to the Dublin Regulation. The crisis has also jeopardized the functioning of Schengen, a free area of movement and travel, as some EU countries have re-imposed border controls. Other Schengen Member States are considering reintroducing border controls if Greece fails to control the current migratory flow.

Link: Affirmative repeats the 2016 mistake of having Greece process migrants quickly even when they don’t have capacity

It’s in their mandates.

Link: Panic over sloppy processing (and resulting semi-open immigration) leads to collapse of Schengen

**Helena Smith and Ian Traynor**2016. (journalists) 28 Jan 2016 “Is the writing on the wall for Europe’s borderless Schengen Area?” (ellipses in original) <https://www.theworldweekly.com/reader/view/2317/is-the-writing-on-the-wall-for-europes-borderless-schengen-area>

The unprecedented move to sanction Greece is being combined with national governments acting to extend and prolong national border controls for up to two years, dealing a potentially terminal blow to the Schengen regime which has been in effect for more than 20 years and is generally viewed as one of the EU’s biggest and most popular achievements. Note: Manuel Valls, the French prime minister, told the BBC this week that the refugee crisis endangered not just Schengen but the entire European Union. Asked whether visa-free travel within the bloc was “at the point of death”, he responded: “No, it’s Europe that could die”. Clarifying, he added: “Yes, the European project, not Europe as such but our values, the concept we have of Europe, that the founding fathers had of Europe, yes it is in grave danger”.

Impact: 5 to 18 billion euros per year in economic damage if Schengen ends

European Parliament 2016. “The economic impact of suspending Schengen” March 2016 <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2016/579074/EPRS_ATA%282016%29579074_EN.pdf>

The suspension of the Schengen Agreement and re-establishment of permanent border controls would lead to a restriction of the four freedoms of the Single Market and have a negative economic impact. Estimates show that the costs of rolling back Schengen would – depending on region, sector and alternative trade channels – be between €5 billion and €18 billion per year.

DISADVATAGES 2 through 5 – Related to EU breakup from enacting controversial immigration policy

AFF can fiat that their plan takes effect, but they can’t fiat that everyone likes it or agrees with it. And they can’t fiat that EU countries that don’t like it wouldn’t secede from the EU and break it up over this issue. That’s what will happen if an immigration policy that is sharply opposed by many countries is fiated into existence with an AFF ballot.

BIG LINKS TO EVERYTHING in DAs 2-5

Link: AFF plan requires other EU members to take refugees from Greece

It’s in their Mandate.

Link: Status Quo already tried it and it won’t work. Too controversial!

Voice of America News 2020 (journalist Jamie Dettmer; US government-funded news agency) 23 Sept 2020 “EU Migration Proposal Draws Ire of Central European States” <https://www.voanews.com/europe/eu-migration-proposal-draws-ire-central-european-states>

Under the German-backed plan all 27 EU countries would be required to take part with member states either agreeing to admit asylum-seekers or to take charge of deporting migrants and refugees whose asylum applications are denied. The overall aim is to relieve pressure on the bloc’s Mediterranean coastal countries, mainly Italy and Greece, and assist in other ways. But approval of the plan by the EU's 27 heads of state and government is far from assured, say analysts, and opposition to the proposal is already building. Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz cast doubt on the idea of distributing asylum seekers across Europe. “It won't work like this,” he told the AFP news agency.

Link: Numerous members of the EU will not accept any plan that has them taking more migrants

Voice of America News 2020 (journalist Jamie Dettmer; US government-funded news agency) 23 Sept 2020 “EU Migration Proposal Draws Ire of Central European States” <https://www.voanews.com/europe/eu-migration-proposal-draws-ire-central-european-states>

Numerous attempts to overhaul EU migration policy in the past have failed, largely because of resistance from a handful of member states mainly in central Europe to any compulsory distribution of asylum-seekers. EU Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson told reporters this week that she’s ready for tough resistance from Hungary, Poland and several rich northern European nations, but hopes to overcome opposition by providing the EU's 27 countries with “flexible options” for how to participate.
**[END QUOTE]
[THEY GO ON TO REPORT LATER IN THE SAME CONTEXT QUOTE:]**Hungarian leader Viktor Orban made clear this week that he has no intention of compromising and accepting relocated asylum-seekers. He doubled down on his disapproval in a combative essay for Magyar Nemzet, a right-wing Hungarian newspaper, in which he said there’s an impasse between conservative central and eastern Europe and the liberal western European states, one he can’t see can be overcome. “Loopy liberals see no reason to fear even a flood of immigration,” he wrote. He added: “Central European countries have chosen a different future, free of immigration and migration.”

Brink: Any further discussion of EU immigration reform will disintegrate the EU

Bodo Weber 2020 (senior associate of the Democratization Policy Council, based in Berlin) 9 March 2020 “Threat to EU on Greece-Turkey border is EU-made” <https://euobserver.com/opinion/147672>

The current narrative's complete avoidance of core questions is astounding. Reasoned, rational discussion seems to now be a collective pan-European taboo. EU leaders evidently fear that just by opening up such discussion, the Union would disintegrate. In September 2015, when some of the Visegrád countries declared they would not implement the EU's legally-binding relocation scheme, the Union collapsed as a legal entity in the area of asylum and migration.

2. Reduced world stability from fracturing the EU

Example: Disagreement over immigration policy was a major reason Britain left the EU

Max Boot 2016 (leading military historian and foreign policy analyst. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York) July 2016 “Brexit: Isolationism or Atlanticism?” <https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/issues/resources/strategika_issue_33_web.pdf>

Britons might never have voted to leave the European Union had it not been for the refugee crisis that hit Europe as a result of the Syrian civil war. Even though Britain has accepted only some 5,000 Syrian refugees, German premier Angela Merkel agreed to take in 800,000, thus fueling fears across the continent of an influx of possible terrorists. Those fears were exploited by elements of the “Leave” campaign, principally Nigel Farage and the UK Independence Party, and no doubt contributed crucial momentum to the final outcome.

Brink: EU faces an uncertain future with multiple crises threatening unity and increasing division

Meagan Araki, Annie Chang, Troy Lindell, Alison Wendler 2017. (members of the “Challenges to European Unity Task Force” at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Univ. of Washington) March 2017 CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN UNITY: OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS <https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Task-Force-J-Report-2017_Lorenz.pdf>

Today, Europe faces an uncertain future. The migration crisis, rise in terrorism, economic downturn, mounting external pressures and a responsive populist movement, have threatened the basis of European stability. The major influx of refugees into Europe has placed immense pressure on the EU’s infrastructure and capacity to integrate refugees into the European identity. Europe has experienced a growing number of terrorist attacks, leading to nationalist and xenophobic policies. Additionally, Russia’s encroachment into Eastern Europe has strained Russia and Europe’s relationship. The Euro crisis has furthered the divide between the core and peripheral EU countries, revealing the inequality between European citizens and growing stagnant employment and growth opportunities.

Link: EU stability promotes US ability to maintain global security and stability

Meagan Araki, Annie Chang, Troy Lindell, Alison Wendler 2017. (members of the “Challenges to European Unity Task Force” at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Univ. of Washington) March 2017 CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN UNITY: OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS <https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Task-Force-J-Report-2017_Lorenz.pdf>

Policies that encourage the unity between EU member states should be strongly supported. It is significant that the United States demonstrate support in this ongoing migration crisis, as it will help relieve the pressures member states are experiencing, as well as help mend existing tensions. The cohesion, stability, and cooperation of European Union serve a key interests of the United States. With these aspects, a more unified European Union can strengthen its position as a global actor, as well as strengthen its existing relations with the United States. This can further United States’ objectives of security and stability throughout the international community.

Impact: World peace & prosperity at risk without US influence. US hegemony is key to global peace & prosperity

Capt. M. V. Prato 2009 (United States Marine Corps,Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Combat Development Command,Marine Corps University) “The Need for American Hegemony” Feb 2009 <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a508040.pdf>

The world witnessed a vast shift in the polarity of geopolitics after the Cold War. The United States became the world’s greatest hegemon with an unequalled ability to globally project cultural, political, economic, and military power in a manner not seen since the days of the Roman Empire. Coined the “unipolar moment” by syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer, the disparity of power between the U.S. and all other nations allows the U.S. to influence the world for the mutual benefit of all responsible states. Unfortunately, the United States is increasingly forced to act unilaterally as a result of both foreign and domestic resentment to U.S. dominance and the rise of liberal internationalism. The United States must exercise benevolent global hegemony, unilaterally if necessary, to ensure its security and maintain global peace and prosperity.

3. Populism and Authoritarian Government

Link: AFF plan weakens / fractures the EU

Cross apply all the BIG LINK evidence.

Link: Fear, anxiety and skepticism about the EU leads to the rise of populist authoritarian figures

Meagan Araki, Annie Chang, Troy Lindell, Alison Wendler 2017. (members of the “Challenges to European Unity Task Force” at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, Univ. of Washington) March 2017 CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN UNITY: OPTIONS FOR U.S. POLICYMAKERS <https://jsis.washington.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Task-Force-J-Report-2017_Lorenz.pdf>

Additionally, the complications surrounding EU accession and instability in Turkey and the Balkans present unique challenges to the dynamic of the EU. These real and perceived threats have induced fear and anxiety into the European public. As these security threats have worsened with little to no progress made, Euroscepticism has grown and enabled the populist movement. By capitalizing on this sentiment, populist parties have gained increasing support throughout Europe. Populists promise to take back power from the corrupt and inefficient political elite, and give it back to the general public. Europeans have increasingly turned to strongman figures who value strength and security over tolerance and unity.

Brink & Example: Hungary now has authoritarian government, putting EU at high risk right now

Philippe Dam 2020 (master’s degree in international administration; Human Rights Watch’s advocacy director for Europe and Central Asia) 1 Apr 2020 “Hungary’s Authoritarian Takeover Puts European Union at Risk” <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/01/hungarys-authoritarian-takeover-puts-european-union-risk>

On Monday, under the pretext of addressing the COVID-19 public health emergency, [Hungary's](https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/hungary) parliament gave [green light to the Orban-led government](https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/23/hungarys-orban-uses-pandemic-seize-unlimited-power) to rule with unlimited power for an indefinite time. Prime Minister Viktor Orban can now suspend any existing law and implement others by decree, without parliamentary or judicial scrutiny. Elections have been suspended. The law allows for new criminal penalties of five years in prison for publishing vaguely defined “false” or “distorted” facts – another blow to media freedom in the country. With this law, Hungary becomes the first country in the European Union to virtually abolish all democratic checks-and-balances. How has it come to this? In the past [10 years](https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/05/16/wrong-direction-rights/assessing-impact-hungarys-new-constitution-and-laws), the government has spared no efforts to [curb judicial independence](https://www.hrw.org/europe/central-asia/hungary), restrict [civil society](https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/17/hungary-determined-silence-any-critics-left-standing) activities, and gain near full [control over the media](https://www.euronews.com/2019/06/12/don-t-be-fooled-hungary-s-government-remains-a-threat-to-european-values-view). Having repeatedly failed to appreciate the gravity of the situation, EU institutions risk making the same mistake again.

Link & Impact: Weak EU leads to rise of dictatorship and loss of freedom for millions more

Kenneth Roth 2020 (executive director of Human Rights Watch, one of the world's leading international human rights organizations; former federal prosecutor in New York; graduate of Yale Law School) 27 Apr 2020 “Stopping the Authoritarian Rot in Europe” [https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/27/stopping-authoritarian-rot-europe#](https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/27/stopping-authoritarian-rot-europe)

Rot tends to spread when it encounters no resistance. Dictator wannabes prey upon weakness. EU and member state leaders now need to ask themselves: is the EU only a trading bloc or also a club of democracies? The answer to that question used to be obvious. Sadly, it no longer is. Ten million EU citizens now live under authoritarian rule. How many millions more will have to suffer the loss of their freedoms before Europe’s leaders draw the line?

4. Economic recession (from weakening / fracturing the EU)

Link: AFF plan weakens / fractures the EU with greater division

Cross-apply the BIG LINK.

Link: EU unity is necessary for beneficial trade deals

Julian Bonte-Friedheim 2020 (head writer at The Perspective) “IS THE EU BETTER OFF DIVIDED OR TOGETHER?” (month not given in the published article) <https://www.theperspective.com/debates/businessandtechnology/is-the-eu-better-off-divided-or-together/>

Better trade deals can be negotiated from within the EU. For any European nation, negotiating trade deals with other countries is much more advantageous as part of the EU rather than as an independent economy. As one of the world’s [biggest economic unions](https://www.thebalance.com/world-s-largest-economy-3306044), the EU has a lot more leverage when brokering a deal with China or India. Being able to offer (or withhold) access to its many consumers is a strong bargaining tool. Additionally, there is [free trading](https://www.ft.com/content/1688d0e4-15ef-11e6-b197-a4af20d5575e) between members of the EU, as it is a customs union. Individual countries, while able to create their own terms, are unlikely to reach deals as beneficial as the EU does on its own.

Brink: Cracks already being seen in EU unity, and even partial non-cooperation will eventually bleed it to death

Hans Vollaard 2020 ( Lecturer in Dutch and European Politics at Utrecht University, the Netherlands.) “One down, many to go? European disintegration after Brexit” 23 March 2020 <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2020/03/23/one-down-many-to-go-european-disintegration-after-brexit/>

Even though there may not be other instances of European disintegration like Brexit, dissatisfaction may lead to other forms of disintegration. Not by countries leaving the EU entirely, but only partially. These partial exits involve member states not complying with the EU rules, for instance with respect to public finances in the Eurozone (Italy), or the Schengen rules, many member states have introduced “temporary” national border surveillance since the migration crisis of 2015. Another partial exit is the desire to pay less money to ‘Brussels’, such as expressed by the so-called Hanseatic group of EU member states led by the Netherlands. Disintegration can also occur involuntarily, when one member state wants to exclude another member state, such as the calls to push Greece out of the euro or the Schengen area. These partial forms of disintegration undermine the functioning of the EU. Its rules are less respected, and it gets fewer resources to function properly. In such a scenario, the EU would gradually ‘bleed to death’.

Impact: Devastating economic impact. Financial recession

Mauro Guillen 2016 (holder of the Zandman Endowed Professorship in International Management at the Wharton School. He served as Director of the Lauder Institute of Management & International Studies between 2007 and 2019. PhD in sociology from Yale University and a Doctorate in political economy from the University of Oviedo in Spain.) 13 June 2016 “On the Brink: How a Brexit Could Fracture a Fragile Europe” <https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/on-the-brink-how-brexit-could-fracture-a-fragile-europe/>

The European Union is the largest economy in the world. It’s not as rich as the U.S., but it is bigger in terms of gross domestic product if you combine those 28 countries. If there is a crisis of confidence that undermines consumer spending and business confidence, then you are going to get into maybe even a third recession. That would be devastating for Europe itself, but it would be really bad for everybody else in the world that has business with Europe, including the United States. Exporters to Europe and American companies that have investments in Europe are going to suffer. Companies such as GE or GM or Boeing, 20% to 30% of their business is in Europe, so it could have a large impact.

Past precedent: Brexit caused serious economic damage

Kimberly Amadeo 2020 (over 20 years of senior-level corporate experience in economic analysis and business strategy. She is a U.S. Economy expert for The Balance and president of WorldMoneyWatch, which produces publications about the global economy) “Brexit Consequences for the U.K., the EU, and the United States” last updated 14 Mar 2020 <https://www.thebalance.com/brexit-consequences-4062999>

The day after the Brexit vote, the currency markets were in turmoil. The [euro fell 2% to $1.11](https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-euro-to-dollar-conversion-its-history-3306091).﻿ The pound fell 8% to $1.36.﻿ Both increased the [value of the dollar](https://www.thebalance.com/value-of-us-dollar-3306268). That strength is not good for U.S. [stock markets](https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-stock-market-how-it-works-3305893). It makes American shares more expensive for foreign investors. A weak pound also makes U.S. exports to the U.K. more expensive. The United States has an $18.9 billion trade surplus with the U.K. In 2018, it exported $141 billion while importing $122 billion.﻿ Brexit could turn this surplus into a deficit if a weak pound makes U.K. imports more competitive. Brexit dampens business growth for companies that operate in Europe. U.S. companies invested $758 billion in the U.K. in 2018.﻿ Most of this was the finance sector with some manufacturing. These companies use the U.K. as the gateway to free trade with the EU nations. U.K. businesses invested $561 billion in the United States. Brexit puts at risk jobs in both countries. In addition, there were 716,000 U.K. immigrants in the United States and 215,000 U.S. immigrants in the U.K. in 2019.

5. Russia gains influence

Link: AFF divides / weakens the EU

Cross-apply the BIG LINK.

Link: Russia uses EU division to advance its agenda and gain influence to accomplish bad things

Ian Kearns 2018 (co-founder, former director and board member of the European Leadership Network, a pan-European group of senior political, military and diplomatic leaders. Former specialist advisor to the Joint House of Commons/House of Lords Committee on National Security Strategy. Former deputy chair and director of secretariat to former NATO Secretary General George Robertson) Collapse: Europe After The European Union (no month given in the published article) <https://books.google.com/books?id=ZVBSDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT223&lpg=PT223&dq=EU+immigration+reform+hopeless&source=bl&ots=79cHvPH2qu&sig=ACfU3U3diw6xbMj9V9bRAyJPoyV-5N1epA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjswYPI-ZrqAhWyneAKHfCQBCE4ChDoATAAegQIChAB#v=onepage&q=EU%20immigration%20reform%20hopeless&f=false>



Impact: Russian influence damages democracy, promotes authoritarian rule

Geir Hagen Karlsen 2019 (Lieutenant Colonel and Lecturer, Norwegian Defence University College) 8 Feb 2019 “Divide and rule: ten lessons about Russian political influence activities in Europe” <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0227-8>

Russia is an authoritarian and corrupt state that regards the EU and, more specifically, NATO, as a challenge, a competitor and a threat. Its influence activities are malicious, undermining alliances and creating distrust, weakening what Moscow sees as their opponents and thus ensuring the survival of this authoritarian regime. Their interference is worrisome at several levels. First, Russia is undermining core democratic processes, like elections, and trust in the political system and its institutions. Second, their disinformation and manipulation of media and social media is directly undermining the political discourse, essential to democracy. Third, this is further exacerbated by their malicious attacks on individuals, like the Finnish journalist Jessika Aro, who has been tracked and harassed systematically after exposing Russian trolling of social media (Aro, [2015](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-019-0227-8#ref-CR3)). However, the overall Russian approach is simple, divide and rule.

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