Negative: Japan

By “Coach Vance” Trefethen

**Resolved: The United States Federal Government should considerably reduce its military commitments**

Affirmative plan will reduce US military commitment to Japan, probably by removing US troops stationed there. This isn’t needed because they’re not that expensive to maintain (Japan pays a lot of the cost) and the benefits outweigh the cost anyway. But the disadvantages massively outweigh. These include: harm to US national security, destabilizing East Asia, allowing the growth of Chinese hegemony, and encouraging the remilitarization of Japan, which increases the risk of war.

Negative: Japan 3

INHERENCY 3

1. A/T “Problems in Okinawa / Futenma” 3

Futenma Replacement Facility and realignment of some troops to Guam are underway 3

Some troops have moved off Okinawa to reduce problems there 3

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE 4

1. Cost of troops in Japan – not a problem 4

Cost shouldn’t be a big concern: They’re contributing a lot, and we need to prioritize alliance cohesion 4

Japan covers most of the cost of US forces 4

Costs are worth the benefit of maintaining the alliance 4

Cost not a problem: 1) Japan pays a lot of it. 2) it’s only $2 billion/year. 3) US gets significant strategic benefits in return. 4) US gets cost savings by having forward-deployed military 4

2. Not free-riding on the U.S. 5

Japan has already taken more of the defense burden 5

3. Turn: Costs would be worse after withdrawal 5

Cheaper to leave forces in Japan. Today, Japan pays some of the cost. US would pay ALL the cost if they come home 5

DISADVANTAGES 5

1. East Asia instability / risk of war 5

Link: US military forces in Japan are key to maintaining peace and stability in east Asia 5

Brink: US/Japan defense relationship is the linchpin of US alliances in the Western Pacific 6

Link & Brink: US presence in Japan deters aggression 6

Link: Must have forces in place, forward deployed, due to vast distance across the Pacific (too long to get there in case of crisis) 6

Link: Must have forces deployed over there for: short response times, joint training with allies, and deterring miscalculation by adversaries 7

Impact: High risk of war in East Asia if stability with China isn’t preserved 7

Impact: Net benefits to US national security. Benefits of forward-positioned troop commitments outweigh the cost 7

Impact: Peace and prosperity in East Asia depends on maintaining existing US defense posture and military presence 8

2. China / US hegemony 8

Link: Reducing US forces weakens US global power and emboldens bad guys 8

Link: US and China are in a struggle for international dominance. China threatens US hegemony 8

Link: China is growing its military, intends to become a challenger to American power, and not just in East Asia 9

Brink: US on the brink of losing East Asia hegemony to China 9

Link: China wants Asia hegemony, wants to replace U.S. in the region 9

Link: China gaining Asian regional hegemony leads to gaining global hegemony, replacing USA 9

Link: China wants Indo-Pacific hegemony, wants to replace U.S. in the region 10

Impact: Apocalyptic consequences if we lose US hegemony 10

Impact: World peace & prosperity at risk without US influence. US hegemony is key to global peace & prosperity 11

3. Nuclear proliferation 11

Link: Intensifying threat from N. Korea is influencing some in Japan to push for acquiring nukes 11

Link: Japan may consider developing nukes in response to N. Korea threat if they doubt US protection 11

Link: 2 things trigger doubts. 1) eliminating extended deterrence commitments; 2) removing US troops 11

Link: Weakening US security commitments would encourage Japan to build nukes 12

Link: Japan has the materials and technology to make a bomb. Stockpiling the materials in itself creates the nuclear threat 12

Link: Japan wants China and N. Korea to think they’re building a bomb, or will build it quickly if needed 12

Link: Telling Japan to “do more” for its own defense = encouraging it to develop its own nukes 13

Link: Japan developing nukes would encourage proliferation – other nations would consider doing the same 13

Link: Cascade of proliferation if list of Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) grows Impact: Nuclear terrorism 13

Impact: Peace and the inhabitability of the planet depend on opposing nuclear proliferation 13

Impacts to Nuc. Proliferation: Terrorists get nukes, massive deaths, increased poverty, lives lived in fear, oppression of human rights 14

4. Re-militarization of Japan 14

Background: Japanese history and its renunciation of military power 14

Link: While Japan relies on US protection, even with it, threats from China and N. Korea motivate Japan to consider restoring its military power 14

Link: Even if Japanese remilitarization is justified, it will still be perceived as offensively threatening 14

Brink: Northeast Asia is extremely volatile and Japanese remilitarization makes it worse 15

Link: Weakening the US/Japan alliance is bad because Japan would remilitarize and be a danger to itself and the region 15

Impact: Remilitarization of Japan could trigger World War 3 with China 15

Works Cited 16

Negative: Japan

INHERENCY

1. A/T “Problems in Okinawa / Futenma”

Futenma Replacement Facility and realignment of some troops to Guam are underway

Admiral HARRY B. HARRIS JR. 2018 (U.S. NAVY; COMMANDER of U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND) Statement BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE 14 FEBRUARY 2018 <https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20180214/106847/HHRG-115-AS00-Wstate-HarrisJrH-20180214.pdf> (brackets added)

Defense Posture Realignment Initiative (DPRI)/USMC Distributed Laydown: DPRI is a vital part of the larger U.S. military Integrated Global Basing and Presence Strategy. A major goal of DPRI is to create an environment that is geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable to better support the enduring presence of U.S. forces in Japan. USPACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] maintains significant focus and effort on these initiatives. DPRI is one of the largest construction efforts since the end of the Cold War. Much work by both the U.S and Japan remain, but progress is being made towards realigning some U.S. Marines from Okinawa to 34 Guam and build-up of facilities at other locations such as Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni, Japan. Military construction investments in the FY18 NDAA include projects for DPRI in Guam and Iwakuni. Another critical cooperative effort, the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) at Camp Schwab/Henoko will enable the U.S. to fulfill its security obligations to Japan while also enabling the return of MCAS Futenma to Okinawa. In the past year, top leaders from the U.S. and Japan have reaffirmed the commitment of both countries to construct the FRF. This solution maintains our presence at MCAS Futenma until the FRF is completed.

Some troops have moved off Okinawa to reduce problems there

Evan Polisar 2020 (Senior Legislative Assistant and Rules Committe Associate for Rep. Alcee L. Hastings - U.S. House of Representatives ) Slot Machine Warfare, JOURNAL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES (published by the US Marine Corps University) <https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/JAMS_Spring2020_11_1_WEB_1.pdf>

Recent presidential administrations have sought to increase the role of the United States in shaping the region through strategies such as the Pivot to Asia and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, while simultaneously pursuing the ongoing realignment of the American military presence on Okinawa to address long-standing grievances held by the government of Japan. Against this backdrop, the DOD has pursued new joint military training capabilities in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) to address 42 training deficiencies identified in a 2013 study of the United States Indo-Pacific Command.3 One of four independent regions (or “hubs”) within the geographic area of responsibility with a concentration of units that meet or exceed the size of a squadron or battalion, the CNMI is expected to play an important role in maintaining American combat readiness in the Western Pacific following the repositioning of thousands of Marines from Japan to Guam, Hawaii, the western United States, and the rotational force in Darwin, Australia

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE

1. Cost of troops in Japan – not a problem

Cost shouldn’t be a big concern: They’re contributing a lot, and we need to prioritize alliance cohesion

Bruce Klingner 2019 (specializes in Korean and Japanese affairs as the senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at Heritage Foundation) 26 Nov 2019 Don’t break alliances over money <https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/dont-break-alliances-over-money>

[President Donald Trump is demanding](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/america-and-south-korea-must-negotiate-fair-extension-sma-97552) an immediate five-fold increase in South Korea’s annual reimbursement for the cost of stationing U.S. troops overseas, with all signs pointing to a similar demand coming on Japan. Through successive administrations, the U.S. has long sought greater allied compensatory costs and involvement in overseas operations. However, such exorbitant demands overlook not only the key contributions already made by both allies but the fact that our alliances are all about shared interests. Trump should adopt an incremental approach to address his concerns with cost—one that can also maintain allied cohesion. At a time when Pyongyang is rejecting a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear crisis and threatening to take more dire actions by year’s end, the need for a careful approach could not be more evident.

Japan covers most of the cost of US forces

Bruce Klingner 2019 (specializes in Korean and Japanese affairs as the senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at Heritage Foundation) 26 Nov 2019 Don’t break alliances over money <https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/dont-break-alliances-over-money>

Japan covers approximately 75 percent of the cost of deployed U.S. forces as well as nearly all of the construction costs of new large U.S. facilities at Futenma and Iwakuni, and one-third of the cost of new Marine Corps facilities in Guam. Tokyo also purchases 90 percent of its defense equipment from the United States, including F-35 jets and V-22 Osprey aircraft.

Costs are worth the benefit of maintaining the alliance

Bruce Klingner 2019 (specializes in Korean and Japanese affairs as the senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at Heritage Foundation) 26 Nov 2019 Don’t break alliances over money <https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/dont-break-alliances-over-money>

The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy states: “U.S. allies are critical to responding to mutual threats, such as North Korea, and preserving our mutual interests in the Indo-Pacific region.” That’s 100 percent correct. Negotiating with allies over reimbursement costs is always contentious. But as Winston Churchill sagely advised, “There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies and that is fighting without them.”

Cost not a problem: 1) Japan pays a lot of it. 2) it’s only $2 billion/year. 3) US gets significant strategic benefits in return. 4) US gets cost savings by having forward-deployed military

[Lindsay Maizland](https://www.cfr.org/bio/lindsay-maizland) and [Beina Xu](https://www.cfr.org/bio/beina-xu) 2019. (Maizland – staff writer for the Council on Foreign Relations. Xu - journalist) 22 Aug 2019 “The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance” <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-japan-security-alliance>

Determining how much Japan and the United States spend on the alliance is complicated, and there is no widely accepted balance sheet. Japan’s defense minister said in 2017 that Japan paid [86 percent of the total cost](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/01/31/national/much-japan-pay-host-u-s-forces-depends-ask/#.XS8rvfJKiUk), though media outlets have estimated the number to be [between 40 and 50 percent](https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/burden-sharing-allies-examining-budgetary-realities/). Japan is responsible for providing host-nation support to the United States—the land, labor, and utilities for stationing U.S. forces throughout the country—the cost of which ranges from $1.7 billion to $2.1 billion per year, according to a [2019 report](https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf) [PDF] by the Congressional Research Service. The United States spends approximately $2 billion per year on the bases. Experts note that the United States enjoys significant strategic benefits from the bases, such as the ability to deter aggression from China and North Korea as well as cost savings by having its military forward deployed in Japan.

2. Not free-riding on the U.S.

Japan has already taken more of the defense burden

[Lindsay Maizland](https://www.cfr.org/bio/lindsay-maizland) and [Beina Xu](https://www.cfr.org/bio/beina-xu) 2019. (Maizland – staff writer for the Council on Foreign Relations. Xu - journalist) 22 Aug 2019 “The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance” <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-japan-security-alliance>

Many analysts believe the alliance has become more balanced as Japan has boosted its defense capabilities and integrated more with U.S. forces. The countries’ joint response to the 2011 earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan’s Tohoku region marked the [largest bilateral mission](http://japansocietyny.blogspot.com/2011/11/operation-admiral-patrick-m-walsh.html) in the history of the alliance. In a sign of Japan taking on a larger security role in the world, the SDF opened its first permanent overseas base in Djibouti in 2011, and [announced expansion plans](http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201811150063.html) after China opened a base there in 2017. In 2018, Japanese lawmakers approved a $47 billion defense budget, the country’s largest in years and one that included plans to purchase advanced weapons from the United States. The budget is part of a plan to [increase defense spending](https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Japan-targets-record-defense-spending-in-new-5-year-plan) to $240 billion by 2023.

3. Turn: Costs would be worse after withdrawal

Cheaper to leave forces in Japan. Today, Japan pays some of the cost. US would pay ALL the cost if they come home

Prof. Takao Sebata 2012. (professor and the dean of the Graduate School of Global Communication at the University of Nagasaki) Pros and cons for keepingUnited States Forces in Japan (USFJ) <http://reposit.sun.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/10561/944/1/v13p199_sebata.pdf>

Sixthly, the United States could save a lot of money. Keeping USFJ is much cheaper than keeping the armed forces in the United States. The Japanese government pays a huge amount of money for HNS every year to keep USFJ including utilities cost not just for soldiers and civilian employees but for their family members as well. (Sebata, 2011) If the United States military have to go back to the United States, they would have to pay 100% of maintenance cost including utilities. The major reason why USFJ have not been reduced while many United States overseas bases are shut down is because Japan pays HNS.

DISADVANTAGES

1. East Asia instability / risk of war

Link: US military forces in Japan are key to maintaining peace and stability in east Asia

Bruce Klingner 2019 (specializes in Korean and Japanese affairs as the senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at Heritage Foundation) 26 Nov 2019 Don’t break alliances over money <https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/dont-break-alliances-over-money>

Attaining and defending American national interests in Asia requires U.S. bases and access, sufficient forward-deployed military forces to deter aggression, robust follow-on forces, and strong alliances and security relationships with South Korea, Japan and other countries in that part of the world. The U.S. military presence in Asia is also an indisputable signal of Washington’s commitment to defend its allies and maintain peace and stability in the region.

Brink: US/Japan defense relationship is the linchpin of US alliances in the Western Pacific

Jeff Smith, Dean Cheng, Bruce Klingner, and Walter Lohman 2020 (Jeff M. Smith is a research fellow in Heritage's Asian Studies Center, focusing on South Asia, Dean Cheng brings detailed knowledge of China's military and space capabilities to bear as The Heritage Foundation's research fellow on Chinese political and security affairs. Bruce Klingner specializes in Korean and Japanese affairs as the senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center. Walter Lohman leads the think tank's oldest research center. Established in 1983, The Asian Studies Center is home to research fellows and scholars who develop recommendations to further American interests in freedom and security in the Indo-Pacific region.) “Asia” The Heritage Foundation. November 17, 2020 <https://www.heritage.org/military-strength/assessing-the-global-operating-environment/asia>

The U.S.–Japan defense relationship is the linchpin of the American network of relations in the Western Pacific. The U.S.–Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, signed in 1960, provided for a deep alliance between two of the world’s largest economies and most sophisticated military establishments, and changes in Japanese defense policies are now enabling an even greater level of cooperation on security issues, both between the two allies and with other countries in the region.

Link & Brink: US presence in Japan deters aggression

JIM GARAMONE 2019 (spokesperson for the US Dept of Defense) 10 Jan 2019 Japan Alliance Remains Cornerstone of Peace in Asia, Commander Says  
<https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1729086/us-japan-alliance-remains-cornerstone-of-peace-in-asia-commander-says/> (brackets added)

 “Our presence in Japan and the region is a deterrent against those countries who leverage coercion and intimidation to influence other nations economic, diplomatic and security decisions,” he [Air Force Lt. Gen. Jerry Martinez] said. “We must remain ready to serve as a credible deterrent to fight and win if others close the path of aggression.” Readiness requires training to be prepared for any contingency, the general said. “If we are going to send our sons and daughters into harm’s way, they must be the very best at what they do,” he added. They need to train in all types of weather, at all hours, and in all conditions and circumstances, “so they can be as prepared as possible to the nations’ business,” Martinez said. “When it comes to our mutual defense, there is no room for second place.”

Link: Must have forces in place, forward deployed, due to vast distance across the Pacific (too long to get there in case of crisis)

Admiral HARRY B. HARRIS JR. 2018 (U.S. NAVY; COMMANDER of U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND) Statement BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE 14 FEBRUARY 2018 <https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20180214/106847/HHRG-115-AS00-Wstate-HarrisJrH-20180214.pdf> (brackets added)

USPACOM’s [U.S. Pacific Command] ability to execute national tasking and meet national objectives is reflected in military construction investments that support increased resiliency for the Joint Force via projects in Japan, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), and Australia. The vast distances associated with the Indo-Pacific, coupled with the 33 short timelines to respond to crises, require investment in infrastructure to properly preposition capabilities and capacity throughout the region. Military construction supports critical capabilities to include Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for increased intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (Republic of Korea), Cyber Mission Force teams (Hawaii), Special Operations Forces (Japan), increased critical munitions storage capacity in Washington State, and quality of life investments for the Joint Force and their families in Guam, Republic of Korea, Japan, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands.

Link: Must have forces deployed over there for: short response times, joint training with allies, and deterring miscalculation by adversaries

Admiral HARRY B. HARRIS JR. 2018 (U.S. NAVY; COMMANDER of U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND) Statement BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE 14 FEBRUARY 2018 <https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20180214/106847/HHRG-115-AS00-Wstate-HarrisJrH-20180214.pdf> (brackets added)

USPACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] is a “fight tonight” theater with short response timelines across vast spaces. Threats as discussed earlier require U.S. military forces in the region maintain a high level of readiness to respond rapidly to crisis. USPACOM’s readiness is evaluated against its ability to execute operational and contingency plans, which place a premium on forwardstationed, ready forces that can exercise, train, and operate with our partner nations’ militaries and follow-on forces to respond to operational contingencies. Forward-stationed forces west of the International Date Line increase decision space and decrease response times, bolster the 36 confidence of allies and partners, and reduce the chance of miscalculation by potential adversaries.

Impact: High risk of war in East Asia if stability with China isn’t preserved

Prof. Øystein Tunsjø 2014. (Professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies) The Cold War as a Guide to the Risk of War in East Asia, Sept 2014 <https://www.globalasia.org/v9no3/cover/the-cold-war-as-a-guide-to-the-risk-of-war-in-east-asia_%C3%98ystein-tunsj%C3%B8>

It is difficult to predict whether these developments will lead to war. The origins of the Cold War in Europe were driven by fear of the Soviet Union's land power and its ambitions to establish spheres of influence and regional hegemony. Contemporary China remains a dominating land power, but the emerging US-China security dynamics are driven by China's sea power ambitions and its emphasis on establishing a sphere of influence in maritime East Asia, not by the fear of a land invasion by China's army. A major war between two great powers possessing nuclear weapons remains unlikely. Nonetheless, it is more likely that there will be war in East Asia than was the case in Europe during the previous bipolar system. The land-sea regional geopolitics of East Asia are more dynamic and unstable than the static European geostrategic politics of the Cold War. If the militaries of either the Warsaw Pact countries or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had crossed the East-West divide in Europe during the Cold War, this would likely have triggered a major war, posed an existential threat and risked a nuclear war. In contrast, the contested areas in East Asia today are in the maritime domain, where a battle at sea could largely be confined to East Asian waters and not pose a direct existential threat in the form of a land invasion. The use of nuclear weapons is, therefore, less likely, and this might paradoxically increase the risk of war or a battle at sea.

Impact: Net benefits to US national security. Benefits of forward-positioned troop commitments outweigh the cost

**[In context, this card is talking about S. Korea and Japan – note the title of the article]**

Troy Stangarone 2016 (Senior Director and Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute) Is Trump Right to Suggest that South Korea and Japan Should Go Nuclear? April 2016 (ethical disclosure: Article is undated but refers to the recently completed Wisconsin primary, which occurred in April 2016) <http://keia.org/trump-right-suggest-south-korea-and-japan-should-go-nuclear>

This brings us to the last of Trump’s arguments, that the United States does not benefit enough from its commitments abroad. Is this the case? As previously noted, U.S. commitments to our allies have helped constrain nuclear proliferation, but the United States benefits in other ways as well. U.S. commitments abroad provide necessary stability around the world to maintain the peace and order that helps to enable the international commerce necessary for U.S. prosperity. U.S. bases abroad also provide forward positioning to allow the United States to deal with military threats abroad before they endanger the homeland.

Impact: Peace and prosperity in East Asia depends on maintaining existing US defense posture and military presence

Admiral HARRY B. HARRIS JR. 2018 (U.S. NAVY; COMMANDER of U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND) Statement BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE 14 FEBRUARY 2018 <https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20180214/106847/HHRG-115-AS00-Wstate-HarrisJrH-20180214.pdf>

Following the upheaval of World War II, the rules-based international order – or what the 2018 National Defense Strategy described as a free and open international order – flourished to keep the Indo-Pacific largely peaceful, creating the stability necessary for economic prosperity in the U.S. and countries throughout the region. Ironically, the country that has benefitted the most from regional stability is China. The collective respect for, and adherence to, international law and standards have produced the longest era of peace and prosperity in modern times. This was not happenstance. This was made possible by seven decades of robust and persistent U.S. military presence and credible combat power. America’s security treaties with Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Philippines, and Thailand have buttressed this security order, which is consequently strengthened even further by growing partnerships with India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam.

1. China / US hegemony

Link: Reducing US forces weakens US global power and emboldens bad guys

[in context, Klingner mentions US forces in Japan and S. Korea]

Bruce Klingner 2019 (specializes in Korean and Japanese affairs as the senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at Heritage Foundation) 26 Nov 2019 Don’t break alliances over money <https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/dont-break-alliances-over-money>

Reducing U.S. forces deployed overseas would: make America weaker on the world stage; drive a wedge between Washington and its allies in Asia and Europe; risk triggering stronger actions by North Korea, China, and Russia; and exacerbate already growing concerns in Seoul and Tokyo about the continued viability of the United States as an ally.

Link: US and China are in a struggle for international dominance. China threatens US hegemony

Ashley Tellis 2020 (Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs and a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is also a counselor at the National Bureau of Asian Research and the research director of the Strategic Asia Program) 4 May 2020 "COVID-19 Knocks on American Hegemony" <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/04/covid-19-knocks-on-american-hegemony-pub-81719>

After almost two decades of conflicted hesitancy, the United States finally acknowledged that it is involved in a long-term strategic competition with China. This rivalry, almost by definition, is not merely a wrangle between two major states. Rather, it involves a struggle for dominance in the international system, even if China as the rising power disavows any such ambition. China’s very ascendancy—if sustained—could over time threaten the U.S. hegemony that has been in place since the end of World War II. It is this reality of unequal growth—which has nourished China’s expanding influence and military capabilities—that lies at the root of the evolving rivalry.

Link: China is growing its military, intends to become a challenger to American power, and not just in East Asia

Dr. Kim R. Holmes 2015 (PhD in history from Georgetown Univ.; formerly worked for the Defense Policy Board, the U.S. defense secretary’s primary resource for expert outside advice; and public member of the U.S. delegation to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) 3 June 2015 China prepping for regional hegemony <https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/china-prepping-regional-hegemony>

The Chinese government is putting its money where its mouth is. It announced a 10 percent increase of the military budget for 2015. That would make China the second-largest military spender in the world. Increases in defense spending have been outpacing GDP growth rates for years, and although China’s defense spending is still far below America’s, it is growing while the U.S. is cutting its defense expenditures. All of this adds up to a bold new role for China’s armed forces. Long thought to be content with the mere defense of its mainland territory, China is clearly staking a larger claim for itself. It is striving to become the dominant military power in East Asia for sure, but also, in the long run, a rival challenger to American military power.

Brink: US on the brink of losing East Asia hegemony to China

Prof. Jennifer Lind 2018 (associate professor of government at Dartmouth Univ.) “Life in China’s Asia What Regional Hegemony Would Look Like” <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-02-13/life-chinas-asia>

For now, the United States remains the dominant power in East Asia, but China is quickly closing the gap. Although an economic crisis or domestic political turmoil could [derail China’s rise](about:blank), if current trends continue, China will before long [supplant the United States](about:blank) as the region’s economic, military, and political hegemon.

Link: China wants Asia hegemony, wants to replace U.S. in the region

Prof. Oriana Mastro 2019 (Assistant Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown Univ) “The Stealth Superpower” <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/china-plan-rule-asia> Jan/Feb 2019

China has no interest in establishing a web of global alliances, sustaining a far-flung global military presence, sending troops thousands of miles from its borders, leading international institutions that would constrain its own behavior, or spreading its system of government abroad. But to focus on this reluctance, and the reassuring Chinese statements reflecting it, [is a mistake](about:blank). Although China does not want to usurp the United States’ position as the leader of a global order, its actual aim is nearly as consequential. In the Indo-Pacific region, China wants complete dominance; it wants to force the United States out and become the region’s unchallenged political, economic, and military hegemon. And globally, even though it is happy to leave the United States in the driver’s seat, it wants to be powerful enough to counter Washington when needed.

Link: China gaining Asian regional hegemony leads to gaining global hegemony, replacing USA

Min-Hyung Kim 2019 (Department of Political Science and International Relations, Kyung Hee University, South Korea) 4 Feb 2019 “A real driver of US–China trade conflict: The Sino–US competition for global hegemony and its implications for the future” <https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/ITPD-02-2019-003/full/html>

Although China repeatedly claims that it does not seek to replace US hegemony in the world, its behavior revealed by the initiatives of the BRI, the AIIB and Made in China 2015 illustrates that its ultimate goal is to be a global hegemon. This is not surprising because all the rising powers in history invariably sought to first dominate the region they are situated ([Mearsheimer, 2011, 2014](about:blank#ref031%20ref032)) and expand their power globally ([Gilpin, 1981](about:blank#ref012)).

Link: China wants Indo-Pacific hegemony, wants to replace U.S. in the region

Prof. Oriana Mastro 2019 (Assistant Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown Univ) “The Stealth Superpower” [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/china-plan-rule-asia](about:blank) Jan/Feb 2019

China has no interest in establishing a web of global alliances, sustaining a far-flung global military presence, sending troops thousands of miles from its borders, leading international institutions that would constrain its own behavior, or spreading its system of government abroad. But to focus on this reluctance, and the reassuring Chinese statements reflecting it, [is a mistake](about:blank). Although China does not want to usurp the United States’ position as the leader of a global order, its actual aim is nearly as consequential. In the Indo-Pacific region, China wants complete dominance; it wants to force the United States out and become the region’s unchallenged political, economic, and military hegemon. And globally, even though it is happy to leave the United States in the driver’s seat, it wants to be powerful enough to counter Washington when needed.

Impact: Apocalyptic consequences if we lose US hegemony

Brook Manville 2018 (principal of Brook Manville LLC, consulting on strategy and organization) 14 Oct 2018 “Why A Crumbling World Order Urgently Needs U.S. Leadership” FORBES [https://www.forbes.com/sites/brookmanville/2018/10/14/why-a-crumbling-world-order-urgently-needs-u-s-leadership/#2bb8912f2e61](about:blank#2bb8912f2e61) (brackets added)

The botanical metaphor in [Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Robert] Kagan’s book title began our recent conversation. “We’ve been living in a tranquil garden of largely peaceful practices and liberal expectations across much of the world, ignoring the dark forces of jungle multiplying under the rocks. If we don’t defend civilization’s cultivation—especially American’s guarantee of peace and economic integration across the world—the toxic creatures and weeds will roar back.” Thus China’s determined military rise, Russia’s continuing aggressions, fiery authoritarians on the march in so many once democratic countries. [**END QUOTE]** As [Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Robert] Kagan continued, “Trump has been damaging the system—he too seems to have forgotten what good it has delivered—but actually America’s desire for maintaining the global order has been diminishing for years. After the dissolution of the Soviet empire in the 1990s, people talked about ‘the end of history”—that America didn’t have to worry anymore about war or aggression. History doesn’t end, it simply paused. [**He goes on later in the same context to say QUOTE:]** The ugliest aspects of human nature are surging again.”  
**Vanishing Leadership, Vanishing Peace**  
Kagan’s apocalyptic message, repeated in other recent writings, is lucid and terrifying, all the more devastating for its relentless use of history. It’s a footnoted plea that “we’ve seen this movie before.” He reminds us that Americans have frequently turned away from defending world order, with regrettably familiar outcomes: to be dragged in later at greater cost (e.g. helping to stop Hitler earlier might have prevented World War II); or, simply hoping that “the problem would go away,” to watch it get ten times worse (e.g. Obama’s policy in Syria). Kagan acknowledges that America has sometimes misstepped (e.g. Viet Nam, Iraq), but he still argues that overall our foreign engagement has produced more peace and prosperity than not. “History shows,” he summarized, “that world order has never been achieved without some constructive force to keep the peace. The relative harmony and fair play we’ve created in the modern world will vanish if the U.S. forsakes international leadership.”

Impact: World peace & prosperity at risk without US influence. US hegemony is key to global peace & prosperity

Capt. M. V. Prato 2009 (United States Marine Corps,Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Combat Development Command,Marine Corps University) “The Need for American Hegemony” <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a508040.pdf>

The world witnessed a vast shift in the polarity of geopolitics after the Cold War. The United States became the world’s greatest hegemon with an unequalled ability to globally project cultural, political, economic, and military power in a manner not seen since the days of the Roman Empire. **[END QUOTE]** Coined the “unipolar moment” by syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer, the disparity of power between the U.S. and all other nations allows the U.S. to influence the world for the mutual benefit of all responsible states. Unfortunately, the United States is increasingly forced to act unilaterally as a result of both foreign and domestic resentment to U.S. dominance and the rise of liberal internationalism. [**He goes on to conclude later in the same context QUOTE**:] The United States must exercise benevolent global hegemony, unilaterally if necessary, to ensure its security and maintain global peace and prosperity.

3. Nuclear proliferation

Link: Intensifying threat from N. Korea is influencing some in Japan to push for acquiring nukes

[Lindsay Maizland](https://www.cfr.org/bio/lindsay-maizland) and [Beina Xu](https://www.cfr.org/bio/beina-xu) 2019. (Maizland – staff writer for the Council on Foreign Relations. Xu - journalist ) 22 Aug 2019 “The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance” <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-japan-security-alliance>

Tokyo and Washington started working more closely on missile defense after North Korea fired another missile over Japan in 1998. Since then, North Korea has launched dozens of missiles over Japan and claims it can [mass-produce medium-range missiles](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/21/world/asia/north-korea-missile.html). The intensifying threat has led some in Japan to push for acquiring nuclear weapons for self-defense and missiles for preemptive strikes.

Link: Japan may consider developing nukes in response to N. Korea threat if they doubt US protection

Mark Fitzpatrick 2019 ( Associate Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies) 3 Oct 2019 FOREIGN AFFAIR S “How Japan Could Go Nuclear It Has the Smarts and the Resources, but Does Tokyo Have the Will?” <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2019-10-03/how-japan-could-go-nuclear>

In a speech on September 6, the U.S. special representative for North Korea, Stephen Biegun, warned that Japan might respond to the growing nuclear threat from North Korea by developing nuclear weapons of its own. Japan has long had the means to go nuclear, thanks to its sophisticated nuclear power industry. But since agreeing to a security treaty in 1951, Japan has relied on Washington’s “extended deterrence”—the promise that any attack on Japan will trigger a retaliatory attack from the United States. The Japanese government’s confidence in that commitment has fluctuated over the last half century, and Biegun is not the first U.S. official to fret that Tokyo will lose faith in it altogether.

Link: 2 things trigger doubts. 1) eliminating extended deterrence commitments; 2) removing US troops

**[“Extended Deterrence” is the Status Quo’s guarantee of US nuclear retaliation against any country using nukes against Japan]**

Troy Stangarone 2016 (Senior Director and Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute) Is Trump Right to Suggest that South Korea and Japan Should Go Nuclear? April 2016 (ethical disclosure: Article is undated but refers to the recently completed Wisconsin primary, which occurred in April 2016) <http://keia.org/trump-right-suggest-south-korea-and-japan-should-go-nuclear>

Eliminating U.S. extended deterrence commitments to South Korea and Japan, along with Trump’s previous suggestions that he would withdraw U.S. troops if both countries did not pay more for their stationing, raises questions about how the United States would fulfill its obligations on the mutual defense treaties it has with both nations.

Link: Weakening US security commitments would encourage Japan to build nukes

Troy Stangarone 2016 (Senior Director and Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute) Is Trump Right to Suggest that South Korea and Japan Should Go Nuclear? April 2016 (ethical disclosure: Article is undated but refers to the recently completed Wisconsin primary, which occurred in April 2016) <http://keia.org/trump-right-suggest-south-korea-and-japan-should-go-nuclear>

Is it inevitable that South Korea and Japan will develop nuclear weapons? As [Mark Fitzpatrick](http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/adelphi/by%20year/2015-9b13/asias-latent-nuclear-powers-7b8a) of the Institute for International Security Studies points out, the United States’ nuclear umbrella and policy of extended deterrence have provided reassurances to Seoul and Tokyo about their security posture. Both countries would likely pursue a nuclear option if they believed that the security assurances of the United States were in doubt.  
At the same time, both South Korea and Japan have refrained from developing nuclear weapons despite North Korea’s continued pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. If the possession of nuclear weapons by a neighboring state were an indicator of a country’s likelihood of developing nuclear weapons, one would have expected South Korea and Japan to already have done so. Ultimately, a Trump administration policy of weakening U.S. security commitments to Seoul and Tokyo would likely do more to encourage them to develop a nuclear weapons program than anything North Korea has done to date.

Link: Japan has the materials and technology to make a bomb. Stockpiling the materials in itself creates the nuclear threat

Robert Windrem 2014 (journalist with NBC News) 11 Mar 2014 “Japan Has Nuclear 'Bomb in the Basement,' and China Isn't Happy” <https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/fukushima-anniversary/japan-has-nuclear-bomb-basement-china-isn-t-happy-n48976>

Japan now has 9 tons of plutonium stockpiled at several locations in Japan and another 35 tons stored in France and the U.K. The material is enough to create 5,000 nuclear bombs. The country also has 1.2 tons of enriched uranium. Technical ability doesn’t equate to a bomb, but experts suggest getting from raw plutonium to a nuclear weapon could take as little as six months after the political decision to go forward. A senior U.S. official familiar with Japanese nuclear strategy said the six-month figure for a country with Japan’s advanced nuclear engineering infrastructure was not out of the ballpark, and no expert gave an estimate of more than two years. In fact, many of Japan’s conservative politicians have long supported Japan’s nuclear power program because of its military potential. “The hawks love nuclear weapons, so they like the nuclear power program as the best they can do,” said Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Non-Proliferation Program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California. “They don’t want to give up the idea they have, to use it as a deterrent.” Many experts now see statements by Japanese politicians about the potential military use of the nation’s nuclear stores as part of the “bomb in the basement” strategy, at least as much about celebrating Japan’s abilities and keeping its neighbors guessing as actually building weapons.

Link: Japan wants China and N. Korea to think they’re building a bomb, or will build it quickly if needed

Robert Windrem 2014 (journalist with NBC News) 11 Mar 2014 “Japan Has Nuclear 'Bomb in the Basement,' and China Isn't Happy” <https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/fukushima-anniversary/japan-has-nuclear-bomb-basement-china-isn-t-happy-n48976>

But government officials and proliferation experts say Japan is happy to let neighbors like China and North Korea believe it is part of the nuclear club, because it has a “bomb in the basement” -– the material and the means to produce nuclear weapons within six months, according to some estimates. And with tensions rising in the region, China’s belief in the “bomb in the basement” is strong enough that it has demanded Japan get rid of its massive stockpile of plutonium and drop plans to open a new breeder reactor this fall.

Link: Telling Japan to “do more” for its own defense = encouraging it to develop its own nukes

James L. Schoff 2009 (Associate Director of Asia-Pacific Studies at Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis) March 2009 “Realigning Priorities The U.S.-Japan Alliance & the Future of Extended Deterrence” <http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/RealignPriorities.pdf>

More broadly, there is an increasingly widespread belief in the U.S. government (and within the Defense Department in particular) that Japan can and should become a fuller partner in preserving global order and contributing more tangibly to the protection of democracy and free-market economies around the world. To some extent, Japan is already playing a more active role as a U.S. ally in and beyond the Asia-Pacific area, though Washington has higher hopes. This is not to say that the U.S. government advocates or expects Japan to develop nuclear weapons as a result, but if Japan’s military does eventually operate abroad more frequently and robustly, Tokyo could determine that it needs its own nuclear deterrent to compensate for dispersing its forces around the world. In this hypothetical scenario, the U.S. government would be hard pressed to argue against such an approach, having pushed for it in the first place.

Link: Japan developing nukes would encourage proliferation – other nations would consider doing the same

Emma Chanlett-Avery, Mary Beth Nikitin 2009. (Chanlett-Avery – Specialist in Asian Affairs. Nikitin – Analys in Nonproliferation. Both are with Congressional Research Service) 19 Feb 2009 “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and US Interests” <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf>

Japan’s development of its own nuclear arsenal could also have damaging impact on U.S. nonproliferation policy. It would be more difficult for the United States to convince non-nuclear weapon states to keep their non-nuclear status or to persuade countries such as North Korea to give up their weapons programs. The damage to the NPT as a guarantor of nuclear power for peaceful use and the IAEA as an inspection regime could be irreparable if Japan were to leave or violate the treaty. If a close ally under its nuclear umbrella chose to acquire the bomb, perhaps other countries enjoying a strong bilateral relationship with the United States would be less inhibited in pursuing their own option.

Link: Cascade of proliferation if list of Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) grows Impact: Nuclear terrorism

James L. Schoff 2009 (Associate Director of Asia-Pacific Studies at Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis) March 2009 “Realigning Priorities The U.S.-Japan Alliance & the Future of Extended Deterrence” <http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/RealignPriorities.pdf>

A common theme in many of these reports is the overriding concern about nuclear proliferation and the potential negative consequences such as nuclear terrorism or a possible cascade of proliferation if the list of NWS begins to grow

Impact: Peace and the inhabitability of the planet depend on opposing nuclear proliferation

Prof. Gary J. Bass 2020 (Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University) ETHICS April 2020 “Just and Unjust Proliferation” <https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gjbass/files/bass_ethics.pdf>

In March 1963, not long after the Cuban missile crisis, John F. Kennedy worried that without nuclear arms control, “I see the possibility in the 1970s of the President of the United States having to face a world in which fifteen or twenty or twenty-five nations may have these weapons. I regard this as the greatest possible danger and hazard.”1 With nine nuclear-armed states today, he was wrong about the numbers but prescient about the dawning challenge. What once primarily preoccupied Americans and Soviets is now a problem for a host of nations from China to Israel—as well as everyone living in a common environment, and future generations entitled to an inhabitable planet. The ongoing spread of nuclear weaponry poses moral issues of the highest importance, in addition to the more obvious, if no less terrifying, problems of maintaining the peace.

Impacts to Nuc. Proliferation: Terrorists get nukes, massive deaths, increased poverty, lives lived in fear, oppression of human rights

Prof. Gary J. Bass 2020 (Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University) ETHICS April 2020 “Just and Unjust Proliferation” <https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gjbass/files/bass_ethics.pdf>

Nuclear proliferation today sparks a series of serious moral objections, even beyond those voiced in the Cold War. Some of these nuclear-armed states could provide nuclear technology to terrorist groups, which would result in the deaths of vast numbers of innocent civilians. Nuclear arms races cost money, which poor countries—and rich ones too—could better spend on providing public services for their people. (Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto said in 1965 that if India got the bomb, then so would Pakistan “even if we have to feed on grass and leaves.”) The more nuclear states there are on a hair-trigger, the higher the chances are of an accidental launch or a blunder into an unwanted apocalypse. There is some harm done to citizens of neighboring states by forcing them to live in fear of extermination and the potential for vastly worse harm should the weapons ever be used. Proliferation tends to beget proliferation, with newly armed states providing help to other newly armed states or to unarmed states. The taboo against nuclear weaponry is eroded, arguably to the detriment of all. And acquisition of nuclear weapons by repressive governments renders them immune to foreign pressure to respect the human rights of their citizens.

4. Re-militarization of Japan

Background: Japanese history and its renunciation of military power

David L. Prosser 2017 (Master’s thesis at the US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif.) ANALYSIS OF KEY FACTORS DRIVING JAPAN’S MILITARY NORMALIZATION <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1046911.pdf>

When the United States defeated Japan in World War II, members of General MacArthur’s staff wrote a new constitution for Japan. While the world has changed in unimaginable ways since the end of World War II, the Japanese constitution has not. Its Article 9 abolished Japan’s right to maintain a military or wage war.

Link: While Japan relies on US protection, even with it, threats from China and N. Korea motivate Japan to consider restoring its military power

David L. Prosser 2017 (Master’s thesis at the US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif.) ANALYSIS OF KEY FACTORS DRIVING JAPAN’S MILITARY NORMALIZATION <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1046911.pdf>

Japanese prime ministers’ reactions to it vary, but the regional security threat is menacing and increasing, and it significantly influences national policy and normalization. The continuing military growth of China and the nuclear and missile advancements of North Korea provide constant pressure on Japan to counter regional security issues. Though the United States provides a security umbrella, the rise of China and increased volatility of North Korea offer sufficient impetus to normalize the Japanese military.

Link: Even if Japanese remilitarization is justified, it will still be perceived as offensively threatening

David L. Prosser 2017 (Master’s thesis at the US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif.) ANALYSIS OF KEY FACTORS DRIVING JAPAN’S MILITARY NORMALIZATION <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1046911.pdf>

The artillery and missiles fielded by North Korea, and pointed at both South Korea and Japan, are a devastating current driver for improving defenses and normalizing the Japanese military. North Korea’s perception of Japan is also influenced by negative memories from World War II, and the two countries’ standoff has been exacerbated by lack of economic reliance, poor diplomatic ties, and a series of abductions in the 1970s and 1980s. North Korean missile testing aimed at Japan is a direct stimulus for Japan to improve its missile defense capability. Due to the unpredictability of North Korea, Japan’s behavior must be characterized as defensive and reactionary, but increased defenses can be perceived as offensively threatening.

Brink: Northeast Asia is extremely volatile and Japanese remilitarization makes it worse

David L. Prosser 2017 (Master’s thesis at the US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif.) ANALYSIS OF KEY FACTORS DRIVING JAPAN’S MILITARY NORMALIZATION <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1046911.pdf>

There are a myriad number of complicated relationships in the region, and Japanese military normalization further adds complexity. Only the notorious international relations situation in the Middle East compares to the volatility of Northeast Asia. North Korea is the most daunting outlier, but South Korea, Russia, and especially China must be considered as potent factors influencing the tempo of Japan’s normalization.

Link: Weakening the US/Japan alliance is bad because Japan would remilitarize and be a danger to itself and the region

Robert Kaplan 2019. (Senior Fellow at the [Center for a New American Security](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Center_for_a_New_American_Security) ) WALL STREET JOURNAL 22 Feb 2019 Japan grows nervous about the US <https://www.eurasiagroup.net/live-post/japan-grows-nervous-about-the-us>

Neoisolationists believe Japan, like other US allies, should stand on its own two feet. But thanks to its deepening military insecurity, the Japanese are already toughening their armed forces. Unlike the Europeans, the Japanese don't need lectures. Japan's leadership wants to escape the shackles of its pacifist constitution, get its various armed services to work better together, and acquire amphibious assault vehicles, tanker aircraft, and much more. That should be troubling. A Japan unbounded by a dependable US alliance system is a danger to itself and the region. Japan is the universal joint of American power in Asia; any weakening of the US-Japan alliance would signal the final eclipse of the American-led world.

Impact: Remilitarization of Japan could trigger World War 3 with China

Alex Ward 2019. (journalist) 30 Apr 2019 “The rise of Japanese militarism” (brackets in original) <https://www.vox.com/2019/4/30/18100066/japan-shinzo-abe-sdf-emperor-china>

Having new and upgraded weaponry will help defend against and deter a possible attack. But with an eye to the future, it may also allow Japan to ably protect itself should a war with Beijing break out. Japanese officials balk at any suggestion that the country would ever get into a shooting war with China. “China has been our neighbor for thousands of years, and it’s going to be for thousands more,” the top diplomat said, reassuring me that Tokyo has no designs to use force against its regional foe despite Japan’s “more and more active” military. A top Japanese defense official made the same point in starker terms: “We can’t provoke China. That would be suicide for us.” But convincing China of Japan’s harmless intentions is proving to be a bit harder. “Such [a] move by the Japanese side is not conducive to the improvement and development of China-Japan ties or the peace and stability in the region,” [Hua Chunying](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1623094.shtml), a spokesperson for China’s foreign ministry, said at a news conference in December. “We urge Japan to keep its commitment to the ‘purely defensive defense’ strategy, stay committed to the path of peaceful development and act cautiously in the area of military security,” she continued. It again highlights the problem Japan has breaking out of its postwar hangover without angering China. Should Tokyo develop too slowly, it could fall further behind Beijing in military strength. But if it arms too quickly, China and other adversaries may miscalculate and believe it’s laying the foundations for war. That, of course, would be the worst outcome. A war between China and Japan would almost certainly be the catalyst for a third world war, some experts say.

Works Cited

1. Admiral HARRY B. HARRIS JR. 2018 (U.S. NAVY; COMMANDER of U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND) Statement BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE 14 FEBRUARY 2018 https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20180214/106847/HHRG-115-AS00-Wstate-HarrisJrH-20180214.pdf
2. Evan Polisar 2020 (Senior Legislative Assistant and Rules Committe Associate for Rep. Alcee L. Hastings - U.S. House of Representatives ) Slot Machine Warfare, JOURNAL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES (published by the US Marine Corps University) https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/JAMS\_Spring2020\_11\_1\_WEB\_1.pdf
3. Bruce Klingner 2019 (specializes in Korean and Japanese affairs as the senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at Heritage Foundation) 26 Nov 2019 Don’t break alliances over money https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/dont-break-alliances-over-money
4. Lindsay Maizland and Beina Xu 2019. (Maizland – staff writer for the Council on Foreign Relations. Xu - journalist) 22 Aug 2019 “The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance” https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-japan-security-alliance
5. Prof. Takao Sebata 2012. (professor and the dean of the Graduate School of Global Communication at the University of Nagasaki) Pros and cons for keepingUnited States Forces in Japan (USFJ) http://reposit.sun.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/10561/944/1/v13p199\_sebata.pdf
6. Jeff Smith, Dean Cheng, Bruce Klingner, and Walter Lohman 2020 (Jeff M. Smith is a research fellow in Heritage's Asian Studies Center, focusing on South Asia, Dean Cheng brings detailed knowledge of China's military and space capabilities to bear as The Heritage Foundation's research fellow on Chinese political and security affairs. Bruce Klingner specializes in Korean and Japanese affairs as the senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center. Walter Lohman leads the think tank's oldest research center. Established in 1983, The Asian Studies Center is home to research fellows and scholars who develop recommendations to further American interests in freedom and security in the Indo-Pacific region.) “Asia” The Heritage Foundation. November 17, 2020 <https://www.heritage.org/military-strength/assessing-the-global-operating-environment/asia>
7. JIM GARAMONE 2019 (spokesperson for the US Dept of Defense) 10 Jan 2019 Japan Alliance Remains Cornerstone of Peace in Asia, Commander Says https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1729086/us-japan-alliance-remains-cornerstone-of-peace-in-asia-commander-says/
8. Prof. Øystein Tunsjø 2014. (Professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies) The Cold War as a Guide to the Risk of War in East Asia, Sept 2014 https://www.globalasia.org/v9no3/cover/the-cold-war-as-a-guide-to-the-risk-of-war-in-east-asia\_%C3%98ystein-tunsj%C3%B8
9. Troy Stangarone 2016 (Senior Director and Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute) Is Trump Right to Suggest that South Korea and Japan Should Go Nuclear? April 2016 (ethical disclosure: Article is undated but refers to the recently completed Wisconsin primary, which occurred in April 2016) http://keia.org/trump-right-suggest-south-korea-and-japan-should-go-nuclear
10. Ashley Tellis 2020 (Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs and a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is also a counselor at the National Bureau of Asian Research and the research director of the Strategic Asia Program) 4 May 2020 "COVID-19 Knocks on American Hegemony" https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/04/covid-19-knocks-on-american-hegemony-pub-81719
11. Dr. Kim R. Holmes 2015 (PhD in history from Georgetown Univ.; formerly worked for the Defense Policy Board, the U.S. defense secretary’s primary resource for expert outside advice; and public member of the U.S. delegation to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) 3 June 2015 China prepping for regional hegemony https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/china-prepping-regional-hegemony
12. Prof. Jennifer Lind 2018 (associate professor of government at Dartmouth Univ.) “Life in China’s Asia What Regional Hegemony Would Look Like” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-02-13/life-chinas-asia
13. Prof. Oriana Mastro 2019 (Assistant Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown Univ) “The Stealth Superpower” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/china-plan-rule-asia Jan/Feb 2019
14. Min-Hyung Kim 2019 (Department of Political Science and International Relations, Kyung Hee University, South Korea) 4 Feb 2019 “A real driver of US–China trade conflict: The Sino–US competition for global hegemony and its implications for the future” https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/ITPD-02-2019-003/full/html
15. Brook Manville 2018 (principal of Brook Manville LLC, consulting on strategy and organization) 14 Oct 2018 “Why A Crumbling World Order Urgently Needs U.S. Leadership” FORBES https://www.forbes.com/sites/brookmanville/2018/10/14/why-a-crumbling-world-order-urgently-needs-u-s-leadership/#2bb8912f2e61
16. Capt. M. V. Prato 2009 (United States Marine Corps,Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Combat Development Command,Marine Corps University) “The Need for American Hegemony” http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a508040.pdf
17. Mark Fitzpatrick 2019 ( Associate Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies) 3 Oct 2019 FOREIGN AFFAIR S “How Japan Could Go Nuclear It Has the Smarts and the Resources, but Does Tokyo Have the Will?” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2019-10-03/how-japan-could-go-nuclear
18. Robert Windrem 2014 (journalist with NBC News) 11 Mar 2014 “Japan Has Nuclear 'Bomb in the Basement,' and China Isn't Happy” https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/fukushima-anniversary/japan-has-nuclear-bomb-basement-china-isn-t-happy-n48976
19. James L. Schoff 2009 (Associate Director of Asia-Pacific Studies at Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis) March 2009 “Realigning Priorities The U.S.-Japan Alliance & the Future of Extended Deterrence” http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/RealignPriorities.pdf
20. Emma Chanlett-Avery, Mary Beth Nikitin 2009. (Chanlett-Avery – Specialist in Asian Affairs. Nikitin – Analys in Nonproliferation. Both are with Congressional Research Service) 19 Feb 2009 “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and US Interests” https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf
21. Prof. Gary J. Bass 2020 (Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University) ETHICS April 2020 “Just and Unjust Proliferation” https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gjbass/files/bass\_ethics.pdf
22. David L. Prosser 2017 (Master’s thesis at the US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif.) ANALYSIS OF KEY FACTORS DRIVING JAPAN’S MILITARY NORMALIZATION https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1046911.pdf
23. Robert Kaplan 2019. (Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security ) WALL STREET JOURNAL 22 Feb 2019 Japan grows nervous about the US https://www.eurasiagroup.net/live-post/japan-grows-nervous-about-the-us
24. Alex Ward 2019. (journalist) 30 Apr 2019 “The rise of Japanese militarism” (brackets in original) https://www.vox.com/2019/4/30/18100066/japan-shinzo-abe-sdf-emperor-china