Japan-Demic: Withdraw US Troops from japan

By “Coach Vance” Trefethen and Steven Errico

***Resolved: The United States federal government should considerably decrease its military commitments.***

Case Summary: Japan hosts more US troops than any other foreign country. They’ve been there since the end of World War II, and in case you haven’t heard, that war ended 75 years ago. US forces in Japan cause more problems than they solve. They risk getting the US involved in a war with China over uninhabited islands and they waste money by defending a rich nation that should be able to defend itself. It’s time to bring them home.

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Japan-demic: Withdraw US Troops from Japan

The United States has escalated its military intervention in Africa under the guise of fighting terrorism. But the proposed cure is worse than the disease; in fact, it’s one of the causes of the disease. Please join us in affirming that: The United States Federal Government should considerably reduce its military commitments.

OBSERVATION 1. DEFINITIONS

Considerable

Merriam Webster Online Dictionary copyright 2020. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/considerably>

1**:**worth [consideration](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consideration) **:**[SIGNIFICANT](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/significant)

Military

Merriam Webster Online Dictionary copyright 2020 <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/military>

b**:**of or relating to armed forces

Commitment

Merriam Webster Online Dictionary copyright 2020. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/commitment>

c**:**the state or an instance of being obligated or emotionally [impelled](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/impel)

OBSERVATION 1. INHERENCY, the structure of the Status Quo. One simple FACT:

US forces stationed in Japan are a significant military commitment

US State Dept., Bureau of Political-Military Affairs 2020. U.S. Security Cooperation With Japan, 9 July 2020 <https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-japan/>

The depth of the U.S. commitment to the U.S.-Japan Alliance is evidenced by the approximately 55,000 U.S. military personnel stationed in Japan, and the thousands of Department of Defense civilians and family members who live and work alongside them. The United States has also deployed its most capable and advanced military assets to Japan, including the U.S.S. Ronald Reagan carrier strike group and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

OBSERVATION 2. We offer the following PLAN implemented by Congress and the President

1. Remove all US military forces stationed in Japan until and unless Japan comes under attack by a hostile power, except for guards at US embassies and consulates.
2. Cancel US security guarantees for disputed uninhabited Japanese islands.

3. Funding through existing budgets of existing agencies and Congress cancels funding for anything not in compliance with the plan.
4. Enforcement through the normal military chain of command.
5. Plan begins 90 days after an affirmative ballot, and phased out over a period of 5 years.
6. All Affirmative speeches may clarify.

OBSERVATION 3. ADVANTAGES

ADVANTAGE 1. Four billion dollars per year

A. The Link: $4 billion annual cost. Japan pays one point seven out of the $5.7 billion cost

Prof. Michael Flynn, Prof. Carla Machain, Prof. Michael Allen 2019. (Flynn – assistant professor of political science, Kansas State U. Machain – assoc. professor of political science, Kansas State U. Allen – associate professor of political science, Boise State U.) **Why does the US pay so much for the defense of its allies? 5 questions answered 1 Dec 2019** <https://theconversation.com/why-does-the-us-pay-so-much-for-the-defense-of-its-allies-5-questions-answered-127683>

Japan’s current agreement doesn’t provide a clear statement on total contributions. However, [Japan’s current support](https://www.wsj.com/articles/q-a-how-much-do-u-s-military-bases-in-japan-and-korea-cost-1461822624) amounts to approximately $1.7 billion. By comparison, the [Department of Defense currently estimates](https://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/) the total cost of maintaining the U.S. presence in South Korea and Japan at $4.5 billion and $5.7 billion, respectively.

B. Impacts: Aside from the harm to taxpayers, every increase in the deficit affects the economy

Dr William Gale and Benjamin Harris 2010. (Gale - PhD in economics, Stanford Univ.; senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and co-director of the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center; former assistant professor of Economics at UCLA, and a senior economist for the Council of Economic Advisers under President George H.W. Bush; Harris - master’s degree in economics from Cornell Univ and master’s degree in quantitative methods from Columbia University; senior research associate with the Economics Studies Program at the Brookings Institution) “A VAT for the United States: Part of the Solution” (notes about the date: This article is one of several in the overall publication at this source. The publication date was 2011, but this article was written in 2010) <https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/1001418-A-Value-Added-Tax-for-the-United-States-Part-of-the-Solution.PDF>

But even in the absence of a crisis, sustained deficits have deleterious effects, as they translate into lower national savings, higher interest rates, and increased indebtedness to foreign investors, all of which serve to reduce future national income. Gale and Orszag (2004a) estimate that a 1 percent of GDP increase in the deficit will raise interest rates by 25 to 35 basis points and reduce national saving by 0.5 to 0.8 percentage points of GDP.

ADVANTAGE 2. Reduced risk of war for America

A. The Link: Foreign deployments and commitments increase risk of war with China

John Glaser 2016 (Glaser is Associate Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute.)“Why We Should Close America’s Overseas Military Bases” 7 Oct 2016 <https://time.com/4511744/american-military-bases-overseas/>

6. They risk entangling us in unnecessary wars.

U.S. bases often cause officials to urge American intervention wherever conflict might break out. But this risks entangling us in foreign wars that are none of our business. If conflict breaks out over maritime or territorial disputes in the East and South China Sea, the U.S. may be obligated to intervene against China to fulfill its security guarantee to Taiwan, Japan, or the Philippines. Getting into a war with China over some uninhabited rocks of no strategic importance to us is not in our interests.

B. The Solution: Withdrawal of US forces from Japan reduces America’s exposure to war

Doug Bandow 2020 (Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute; former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan) 20 Aug 2020 “Japan Must Take China Seriously, Even If That Means Arming Up” <https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/japan-must-take-china-seriously-even-means-arming?queryID=b2a0528754beef4b394a695a83949230>

Rather than essentially sell the services of American military personnel, Washington should limit America’s exposure to another nation’s wars and turn the “mutual” defense treaty into a more modest agreement facilitating military cooperation rather than providing security guarantees. Responsibility for the latter would remain on Tokyo, with the U.S. emphasizing its commitment to Japanese independence. America should enjoy its position of relative geographical invulnerability while being ready to act in the unlikely event that a potential hegemon attempted to control the Asia‐​Pacific. This would allow the withdrawal of U.S. forces, especially from Okinawa, where residents suffer from a disproportionate basing burden arising from America’s occupation of the Japanese island until 1972.

ADVANTAGE 3. Okinawa

A. Link: Okinawa suffers from US military presence

Vindu Mai Chotani 2019 (M.Sc. in International Relations from the University of Bristol ; Ph.D. scholar at the Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of Tokyo and a visiting associate with the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi ) 22 Feb 2019 “Bearing the Burden: An Okinawan Perspective on U.S. Bases” TOKYO REVIEW <https://www.tokyoreview.net/2019/02/bearing-the-burden-an-okinawan-perspective-on-bases/> (brackets added)

Okinawans suffered terribly in the so-called “Typhoon of Steel” — the U.S. invasion during the closing stages of World War II. An estimated 150,000 civilian casualties were killed, both by the Americans and by the Japanese forces that were nominally defending the island. Everything was razed to the ground. The ensuing U.S. occupation of Japan essentially turned Okinawa into an American colony and it was only in 1972 — 27 years after the conclusion of the war — that Okinawa was finally returned to Japan. Yet the bases remain, and alleviating the burden is easier said than done. Amid the finger pointing over who is responsible for this situation, the population of Okinawa continues to live with the consequences. The base at the heart of the current referendum, MCAS [Marine Corps Air Station] Futenma, has been dubbed “the most dangerous base in the world” due to its location in the center of densely populated Ginowan city, where the lives of the 100,000 citizens that live around it are put at risk. But moving the base out of Ginowan would simply disrupt the lives of citizens in Nago, its intended new location, not to mention the environmental damage it would cause to the [local marine ecosystem](https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/species/mammals/Okinawa_dugong/pdfs/Dugong_CAS.pdf) in Oura Bay.

B. The Solution: Withdraw from Okinawa and tell Japan to take responsibility for their own defense

Doug Bandow 2016 (Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute; former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan) 10 June 2016 “Bring Home American Forces from Okinawa” <https://www.cato.org/blog/bring-home-american-forces-okinawa?queryID=794ace57a13a9243f32d05866a622309>

Could the U.S.-Japan alliance founder as a result of alcohol? Apparently. At least, that’s the implication of the U.S. Navy’s ban on drinking by personnel stationed on the Japanese island of Okinawa. It would be far better to phase out America’s military presence on Okinawa, turning U.S. bases back to the Japanese government. More than seven decades after the end of World War II, Tokyo should take over responsibility for Japan’s defense.

2A Evidence: Japan

INHERENCY

U.S. Military Presence in Japan

U.S. Forces, Japan updated 2020 (official website for U.S. forces in Japan) “Guidance from the Commander, U.S. Forces Japan” <https://www.usfj.mil/About-USFJ/>

Originally established at Fuchu Air Station on July 1, 1957, USFJ, with its U.S. Army, U.S Marine Corps, U.S Navy, and U.S Air Force elements, consists of approximately 54,000 military personnel, 42,000 dependents, 8,000 DoD civilian employees, and 25,000 Japanese workers. U.S. forces are stationed in Japan pursuant to the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960.

A/T “Partial relocation of troops out of Okinawa to Camp Schwab, Guam” – Doesn’t solve

Julian Ryall 2019 (journalist) 15 May 2019 “US troops relocating to Guam but scepticism in Okinawa lingers. And even some in the US military are unconvinced” <https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/3010314/us-troops-relocating-guam-scepticism-okinawa-lingers-and-even>

“This is positive news for the people of Okinawa, but we are not sure that it will actually happen as it depends on the completion of the new US base at Camp Schwab,” said Yasukatsu Matsushima, a professor of economics at Kyoto’s Ryukoku University and a firm advocate of Okinawan independence. “There are many problems at the site, not least the fact that the seabed where the government is planning to carry out reclamation work for the construction of new runways is soft mud that cannot bear the weight required. “Even if this does go ahead, there will still be thousands of Marines in Okinawa. The people of Okinawa want them all to leave – but we also want them to go to the US mainland because transferring them to Guam only makes them somebody else’s problem.

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE

A/T “Japan pays the cost of US forces” – But they don’t cover the biggest cost: Creating the military units in the first place

Doug Bandow 2020 (Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute; former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan) 20 Aug 2020 “Japan Must Take China Seriously, Even If That Means Arming Up” <https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/japan-must-take-china-seriously-even-means-arming?queryID=b2a0528754beef4b394a695a83949230>

The Trump administration is trying to shake down Tokyo, turning American service members into de facto mercenaries. Japan provides about $2 billion annually in host nation support for roughly 54,000 U.S. military personnel. However, the biggest cost is not basing the units, but creating them. Every additional defense guarantee requires augmenting force structure. For this Tokyo contributes nothing.

A/T “Have to pay the troops anyway even if they’re in the US” – But it costs more to put them overseas

John Glaser 2017 (Associate Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute.) “Withdrawing from Overseas Bases: Why a Forward-Deployed Military Posture Is Unnecessary, Outdated, and Dangerous” 18 July 2017 <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/withdrawing-overseas-bases-why-forward-deployed-military-posture> (brackets in original)

The financial burden on U.S. taxpayers of maintaining a global military base presence is exceedingly difficult to calculate, primarily because neither the Pentagon nor Congress provides reliable estimates to the public. Most of the estimates they do provide are not comprehensive. According to Rand, “stationing forces and maintaining bases overseas does entail measurably higher direct financial costs to [the Defense Department]” as compared with bases in the continental United States. It costs an average of $10,000–$40,000 more per year to station a single member of the military in Europe or Asia, in zones without war, than in the United States.

Okinawans resent US military presence. Relocation plan hasn’t been implemented yet and they oppose that too

[Lindsay Maizland](https://www.cfr.org/bio/lindsay-maizland) and [Beina Xu](https://www.cfr.org/bio/beina-xu) 2019. (Maizland – staff writer for the Council on Foreign Relations. Xu - journalist) 22 Aug 2019 “The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance” <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-japan-security-alliance>

Thirty-one of the eighty-five U.S. military facilities in Japan are on Okinawa, despite it being the poorest and among the smallest of Japan’s prefectures. Many Okinawans resent military activity in the prefecture, which was the site of one of the bloodiest battles between Japanese and U.S. forces during World War II. An [estimated 40,000 to 150,000](https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/battle-of-okinawa) Okinawan citizens were killed. Today, one of the biggest magnets for local criticism is the U.S. Marine Corps Futenma air base, which is located near schools and hospitals. While the base provides some economic benefits, such as jobs, residents have repeatedly voiced concerns about accidents and violent crime. The gang rape of a twelve-year-old girl in 1995 by U.S. service members galvanized eighty-five thousand residents to protest. Other allegations of sexual violence by U.S. military personnel surfaced in 2008 and 2012. In a bid to ease tensions, the United States and Japan [agreed in 2006](https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0605.html) to relocate Futenma to a less populated area on Okinawa and transfer eight thousand Marines to Guam. But the agreement has yet to be realized. Many residents and local officials oppose keeping the base on Okinawa, [voting in early 2019](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-okinawa/japan-to-push-ahead-with-u-s-base-relocation-despite-okinawa-referendum-result-idUSKCN1QE06Q) against the relocation plan. Abe, however, has insisted that the relocation happen soon, and some Marines [could be transferred](https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/05/14/national/okinawa-based-u-s-marines-may-start-moving-guam-october-2024/#.XTC_D_JKiUl) in the next few years.

Those “uninhabited islands”: Japan is expecting US to come to their rescue if China tries to take the islands

Prof. Michael Mandelbaum 2019 (Professor Emeritus of American Foreign Policy at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies) 22 Nov 2019 “Japan Confronts a Nuclear Future” <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2019/11/22/japan-confronts-a-nuclear-future/>

Both China and Japan claim ownership of eight small, uninhabited, Japanese-controlled islands known as the Senkakus (they are called the Diaoyu by the Chinese), which are located in the East China Sea roughly halfway between the two countries. In recent years China has increased its maritime presence in the waters surrounding them, leading to fears that the Chinese navy might one day try forcibly to seize them. In such an eventuality, as with North Korea, Japan would have to depend on the United States for military support; but as in the Korean case, the combination of increasing Chinese military power and doubts about American reliability lead to the question of how Japan could supplement, if not replace entirely, American military might.

SOLVENCY / ADVOCACY / ADVANTAGES

Reduce risk to America and solve suffering of Okinawa

Doug Bandow 2013. (Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan; Senior Fellow in International Religious Persecution with the Institute on Religion and Public Policy; graduate of Florida State University and Stanford Law School.) “It’s Time to End Japan’s Defense Dependence on The United States” 28 Jan 2013 <https://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2013/01/28/its-time-to-end-japans-defense-dependence-on-the-united-states/#4344d4003185>

Washington should reject Tokyo’s (and Manila’s) invitations to put Americans at risk to guarantee those nations’ contested and peripheral territorial claims. More broadly, the U.S. should stop treating its allies, especially Japan, as helpless dependents. Rather than augmenting American military forces in the Pacific, Washington should begin turning defense responsibilities over to Tokyo. (The plight of the Okinawan people on an island crowded with U.S. military facilities—highlighted by an alleged sexual assault by an American in October—adds a special imperative to act there.)

US should withdraw military presence and cancel commitment to local disputes

John Glaser 2017 (Associate Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute.) “Withdrawing from Overseas Bases: Why a Forward-Deployed Military Posture Is Unnecessary, Outdated, and Dangerous” 18 July 2017 <https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/withdrawing-overseas-bases-why-forward-deployed-military-posture> (brackets in original)

In the near term, careful retrenchment would likely have a favorable influence on U.S.-China relations. The job of defending allies such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia should be left to those countries to perform on their own. U.S. military presence and security guarantees discourage active self‐​defense among regional allies and unwisely obligate American intervention into local disputes that have little to no inherent importance for U.S. interests and security. Even if the United States were to maintain its commitments to allies, withdrawing the military presence from the region would allow allies to be the first line of defense in case of war, forcing the countries to do the heavy lifting, while America plays the role of balancer.

Withdrawal of US Forces Japan (USFJ) would reduce tensions in Northeast Asia

Prof. Takao Sebata 2012. (professor and the dean of the Graduate School of Global Communication at the University of Nagasaki) Pros and cons for keepingUnited States Forces in Japan (USFJ) <http://reposit.sun.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/10561/944/1/v13p199_sebata.pdf>

Sixthly, the United States forces create a threat to China or North Korea. Many Japanese and Americans do not realize that USFJ pose a threat to the Chinese and the North Koreans. From their viewpoints, they are surrounded by the armed forces of South Korea, Japan, and the United States. In other words, USFJ create tension in North East Asia. In fact, North Korea protests against the United States for landing exercises called “Team Sprit” every year. Therefore, decreasing USFJ would lead to reduction of tension in North East Asia.

DISAD RESPONSES

A/T “China”

China is no threat

Doug Bandow 2020 (Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute; former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan) 20 Aug 2020 “Japan Must Take China Seriously, Even If That Means Arming Up” <https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/japan-must-take-china-seriously-even-means-arming?queryID=b2a0528754beef4b394a695a83949230>

Bipartisan sentiments have hardened against China. Although now viewed as a military threat, Beijing does not menace the U.S.—no one imagines a naval armada seizing Hawaii or bombarding California. The issue is American influence in East Asia and security of allied states, most importantly Japan. The latter danger has been greatly overstated, however. The People’s Republic of China has aggressively contested claims to a variety of islands, reefs, and other geographic hotspots, but has not directly threatened any country or challenged the independence of any nation, except Taiwan, which is not recognized by the majority of governments, including America. Although behaving badly, the PRC is seeking to overturn the results of the “century of humiliation,” not create a vast new empire. Beijing has yet to exhibit America’s persistent military aggressiveness of recent decades.

Don’t need US troops in Japan to prevent war with China

Doug Bandow 2017 (Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute; former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan) 29 Oct 2017 “Time to Let Japan Be a Regular Military Power” <https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-let-japan-be-regular-military-power?queryID=9465d6b3d30cf1b64e817943470588b6>

Some analysts look beyond Japan. [Argued David Feith](https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-u-s-japan-alliance-of-hope-1486686558) of the Wall Street Journal: America’s fifty thousand personnel in Japan are “Washington’s most valuable asset for deterring conflict across the region.” Others make the same claim, but never offer any convincing support. What war are U.S. troops supposedly preventing? China and Japan, though at odds over the Senkaku/​Diaoyu Islands, don’t appear to be at the brink of war. Could conflict erupt? Anything is possible, but there’s still no reason why wealthy Japan should not do the deterring.

China’s neighbors can restrain China on their own – they’re not helpless

Doug Bandow 2020 (Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute; former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan) 20 Aug 2020 “Japan Must Take China Seriously, Even If That Means Arming Up” <https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/japan-must-take-china-seriously-even-means-arming?queryID=b2a0528754beef4b394a695a83949230>

Yet America’s friends and allies are not helpless. To the contrary, several—Australia, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, most importantly—are advanced, industrialized states. Indonesia and Vietnam have substantial potential. India is both rising and more involved in the region. Collectively they should be able to restrain Beijing.

Japan isn’t committed to helping the US against China

Caitlin Doornbos 2020 (journalist) 21 Jan 2020 “As US-Japan defense treaty turns 60, experts call for more Japanese investment in US alliance” <https://www.stripes.com/as-us-japan-defense-treaty-turns-60-experts-call-for-more-japanese-investment-in-us-alliance-1.615587>

Speaking Monday at the “U.S.-Japan Cooperation for Peace” public panel, economist Clyde Prestowitz Jr. said “there’s a question mark about to what extent is Japan committed to the U.S.-Japan security alliance and how far will Japan be willing to go” in a conflict with China. Genron NPO, a Japanese think tank, sponsored the event. “There is not a clear definition of the future collaboration of the U.S. and Japan,” Prestowitz said.

US forces can’t defend Japan against China. 2 Studies find Chinese missiles would disable them all in the first hour of the war

Tanner Greer 2019 (writer and strategist based in Taiwan.) “American Bases in Japan are Sitting Ducks” FOREIGN POLICY 4 Sept 2019 <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/04/american-bases-in-japan-are-sitting-ducks/>

The threat posed by China to forces stationed in Japan is real: Over the last ten years the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has drastically increased its ability to strike at the Japanese home islands, especially by missile or rocket. Ten years ago the PLA had fewer than 100 cruise or ballistic missiles capable of targeting U.S. air bases in Japan; according to the U.S. Department of Defense’s most recent report on the PLA, they now have around 1,000 ballistic or land-attack cruise missiles with this capability. Missiles like these fly at extreme speeds. In a potential conflict, the first wave would arrive in Japan 6 to 9 minutes after being launched from mobile missile launchers scattered across China. This wave’s target list would include anti-missile and air defense systems, command centers, and communication systems. A review of PLA documents by Ian Easton and Oriana Skylar Mastro reveal a special focus on targeting runways of American bases in Japan. With runways cratered, American aircraft would be stranded, sitting ducks for the next wave of inbound missiles. Simulations of these attacks are nauseating. In a 2017 report for the Center for a New American Security, Tom Shugart and Javier Gonzales conclude that the missile defense systems of every single American air and naval base in Japan would be overwhelmed by the PLA Rocket Force’s very first volley. They estimate that more than 200 aircraft, almost all fixed American command centers, every U.S. runway, and most of the American fleet at berth would be destroyed—tens of billions of dollars in military equipment gone in less than 30 minutes of fighting. Recent Rand Corp. war games found similar results.

US front-line forces in Japan would be crippled in the first moments of conflict with China

Tanner Greer 2019 (writer and strategist based in Taiwan.) “American Bases in Japan are Sitting Ducks” FOREIGN POLICY 4 Sept 2019 <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/04/american-bases-in-japan-are-sitting-ducks/>

In response to the games, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work offered a caustic assessment: “In every case I know of, the F-35 rules the sky when it’s in the sky, but it gets killed on the ground in large numbers.” There is a very real chance that America’s front-line forces would be crippled in the first moments of a conflict with China. This outcome is not an inevitable result of increasing Chinese power. The crisis derives from the poor planning, lack of any sense of urgency, and timidity on the part of American statesmen when dealing with their Japanese counterparts. China has a huge advantage, thanks to the absurd overconcentration of fixed U.S. targets in Japan. U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) stations the majority of its personnel and weaponry in seven locations: Misawa Air Base in northern Japan, Yokota and Atsugi Air Bases near Tokyo, Iwakuni Air Base in southern Japan, naval bases in both Sasebo and Yokosuka, and a patchwork of military facilitates in Okinawa. The most concentrated military presence is found on that island. Over half of USFJ’s military personnel are located on Okinawa, though it comprises less than 1 percent of Japan’s total land area.

A/T “East Asia hegemony / US National Security”

No US security need to occupy East Asia

Doug Bandow 2017 (Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute; former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan) 29 Oct 2017 “Time to Let Japan Be a Regular Military Power” <https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-let-japan-be-regular-military-power?queryID=9465d6b3d30cf1b64e817943470588b6>

Of course, some argue that the United States occupies East Asia for its own security. That was the case at the end of World War II. But the Cold War is over, Russia is a shadow of the Soviet Union and Japan has recovered economically. Tokyo is well able to defend itself, as well as cooperate with its neighbors to ensure regional security.

Moving Marines out of Okinawa isn’t a problem: They can easily be deployed from elsewhere

Vindu Mai Chotani 2019 (M.Sc. in International Relations from the University of Bristol ; Ph.D. scholar at the Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of Tokyo and a visiting associate with the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi ) 22 Feb 2019 “Bearing the Burden: An Okinawan Perspective on U.S. Bases” TOKYO REVIEW <https://www.tokyoreview.net/2019/02/bearing-the-burden-an-okinawan-perspective-on-bases/>

Both the United States and Japan claim that transferring bases out of the prefecture would strip Japan of its deterrent, a point that has only been stressed further with the rise of China and its assertive behavior in the East China Sea. These claims don’t stand up upon closer examination. Although Okinawa’s location may be ideal, the Marine Corps can be deployed from anywhere in the Indo-Pacific — Guam, Hawaii, or even mainland Japan. As can be seen from recent U.S. military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, Marines are typically not the first U.S. military assets to be deployed in a conflict. It is the U.S. Air Force that strikes first, followed by aircraft carriers and finally other warships. Only when the ground battle starts are the Marines deployed.

A/T “Forward deployment = better US national security”

Forward deployed US troops aren’t necessary – they don’t add to US security

John Glaser 2016 (Associate Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute.)“Why We Should Close America’s Overseas Military Bases” 7 Oct 2016 <https://time.com/4511744/american-military-bases-overseas/>

1. They don’t protect the homeland from direct attack. U.S. leaders often argue that bases are the centerpiece of a liberal, rules-based world order. They claim that bases in Europe protect European allies from Russia, bases in the Middle East ensure the free flow of oil and contain Iranian influence, and bases in Asia defend our Asian allies from a rising China and an unstable North Korea. But stationing 80,000 troops at 350 installations in Europe is not directly related to securing Americans’ physical safety. The same goes for the more than 154,000 active-duty personnel based throughout Asia. And the argument that maintaining a forward-deployed military posture in the Middle East protects the free flow of oil is supported by pitifully sparse empirical evidence. If we brought our troops home, we wouldn’t be much more or less safe than we are now. That’s mostly because we are already the strongest nation economically and militarily by far and probably the most secure great power in history, isolated from other powerful states by two great oceans and protected with an arsenal of thousands of nuclear weapons. On top of that, the world is a safer place these days. Interstate conflict has declined dramatically in recent decades and may even be on a path to obsolescence for reasons that have little to do with all these military bases.

Forward-deployed military doesn’t add to US national security. Costs outweigh benefits

John Glaser 2016 (Associate Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute.)“Why We Should Close America’s Overseas Military Bases” 7 Oct 2016 <https://time.com/4511744/american-military-bases-overseas/>

Despite our unorthodox presidential election, America’s overseas military bases are largely taken for granted in today’s foreign policy debates. The U.S. maintains a veritable empire of military bases throughout the world—about 800 of them in more than 70 countries. Many view our bases as a symbol of our status as the dominant world power. But America’s forward-deployed military posture incurs substantial costs and disadvantages, exposing the U.S. to vulnerabilities and unintended consequences. Our overseas bases simply do not pay enough dividends when it comes to core national interests. Here are seven reasons why it’s time to close them.

Forward deployment adds nothing because distances are no longer a problem – technology solves

John Glaser 2016 (Associate Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute.)“Why We Should Close America’s Overseas Military Bases” 7 Oct 2016 <https://time.com/4511744/american-military-bases-overseas/>

7. Technology has largely made them obsolete. Some argue that bases allow rapid military response. That’s certainly true to some extent. But modern military technology has significantly reduced the problems of travel times over long distances. According to a recent RAND Corporation report, “lighter ground forces can deploy by air from the United States almost as quickly as they can from within a region.” Long-range bombers can fly missions up to 9,000 miles, and after that they can be refueled in the air, reducing the need to have in-place forces abroad. The bottom line is that troops can deploy to virtually any region fast enough to be based right here in America. But even this misses the point. We shouldn’t be intervening militarily all over the world unless there is a clear and present danger to U.S. security. Despite the habitual threat inflation in our politics and punditry, the world is increasingly peaceful, and the U.S. is exceptionally insulated from foreign dangers. Our remarkable level of security simply doesn’t call for such an activist foreign policy.

Forward deployment isn’t important because we simply don’t need to be intervening all over the world

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Forward deployment in Japan doesn’t add anything to US intervention a conflict in Korea

Jarek Buss 2018 (Foreign Service Officer with the United States Department of State, currently serving in Guangzhou, China. He completed a bachelors in political science from Brigham Young University – Hawaii and a masters in [Security Policy Studies](https://elliott.gwu.edu/security-policy-studies) from George Washington University; completed internships with the Department of State in Chengdu, China and in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs in Washington) 18 Aug 2018 “Why America Should Pull Out of Okinawa” <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/why-america-should-pull-out-okinawa-29112>

Presumably Allied forces could land on the beach some twenty-five miles from Pyongyang, seize Nampo to control access to the Taedong River, or blow up the Nampo Dam and travel sixty miles upriver to Pyongyang. But this type of attack likely plays to North Korea’s strengths (numbers and ground forces) and eschews U.S. advantages (air power and standoff weapons). Furthermore, amphibious assault implies a full invasion, and thus far more than ten thousand personnel. If such an attack were necessary, the United States would need time to bring in forces from around the world—what then is the advantage of having a few men pre-deployed? Equipment and materiel can be prepositioned across East Asia, but with strong U.S. airlift capabilities and Japan’s increasing willingness and [ability](https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/604526/us-japanese-officials-announce-new-defense-guidelines/) to facilitate staging, it can be used by Marines permanently based elsewhere.

A/T “Nuclear proliferation”

Cuts both ways: US security guarantees sometimes reduce nuc. prolif., but sometimes increase it. Example: N. Korea

John Glaser 2016 (Associate Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute.) 7 Oct 2016 “Why We Should Close America’s Overseas Military Bases” <https://time.com/4511744/american-military-bases-overseas/>

Another core argument is that the U.S.’s forward presence prevents arms races, particularly nuclear proliferation, by reassuring allies. The record on that score is mixed. While U.S. security guarantees to countries like Japan and South Korea have likely dissuaded them from developing nuclear weapons, those same guarantees can provoke nuclear proliferation in other regional actors, like North Korea. Prior to the recent nuclear deal, Iran built up its nuclear program in large part as a deterrent to threatening nearby U.S. bases. And allied countries, like Britain, France, and Israel, acquired nukes despite the protection of in-country or nearby U.S. bases.

Nuclear proliferation doesn’t have any real impact

John Mueller 2017 ( senior fellow at the Cato Institute. He is also a member of the political science department and senior research scientist with the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at Ohio State University) 76. Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Terrorism <https://www.cato.org/cato-handbook-policymakers/cato-handbook-policy-makers-8th-edition-2017/nuclear-weapons>

Except for their effects on agonies, obsessions, rhetoric, posturing, and spending, the consequences of nuclear proliferation have been largely benign: those who have acquired the weapons have “used” them simply to stoke their egos or to deter real or imagined threats. For the most part, nuclear powers have found the weapons to be a notable waste of time, money, effort, and scientific talent. They have quietly kept the weapons in storage and haven’t even found much benefit in rattling them from time to time.

Nuclear terrorism isn’t a serious risk

John Mueller 2017 ( senior fellow at the Cato Institute. He is also a member of the political science department and senior research scientist with the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at Ohio State University) 76. Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Terrorism <https://www.cato.org/cato-handbook-policymakers/cato-handbook-policy-makers-8th-edition-2017/nuclear-weapons>

The possibility that small groups could set off nuclear weapons is an alarm that has been raised repeatedly over the decades. However, terrorist groups thus far seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. Perhaps, after a brief exploration of the possible routes, they have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to succeed. One route a would‐​be atomic terrorist might take would be to receive or buy a bomb from a generous, like‐​minded nuclear state for delivery abroad. That route, however, is highly improbable. The risk would be too great — even for a country led by extremists — that the source of the weapon would ultimately be discovered. Here, the rapidly developing science (and art) of “nuclear forensics” — connecting nuclear materials to their sources even after a bomb has been detonated — provides an important deterrent. Moreover, the weapon could explode in a manner or on a target the donor would not approve — including, potentially, the donor itself. Almost no one, for example, is likely to trust al Qaeda: its explicit enemies list includes all Middle Eastern regimes, as well as the governments of Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Russia.

Turn: Nuclear bomb development by our allies would be better than the risks we’re taking in Status Quo

Doug Bandow 2020 (J.D. from Stanford Univ. Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan) 19 May 2020 Should Washington acquiesce to its allies developing nuclear weapons? <https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2020/05/19/should-washington-acquiesce-to-its-allies-developing-nuclear-weapons/>

Assume Beijing amasses a nuclear arsenal equal to America’s, would a U.S. president risk Los Angeles for Taipei, as [a Chinese general once challenged an American official](https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/15/washington/world/chinese-general-threatens-use-of-abombs-if-us-intrudes.html)? Or for Tokyo, Seoul, Manila, Sydney, and Auckland? Even if the risk is small, how much risk of existential destruction should Washington take for the independence of friendly but not essential states. Especially knowing that China has a greater interest in its region than the U.S. does, and Beijing authorities, knowing that, might dismiss the likelihood of the nuclear umbrella being opened. A sensible alternative might be measured proliferation. [**END QUOTE**]The U.S. always has accepted, sometimes formally, sometimes informally, the growth of the nuclear club. But others have won America’s opposition. Today Washington could reasonably oppose Saudi Arabia while accepting Germany and South Korea, for instance. A good solution, no, but only second bests exist. The U.S. government’s chief responsibility is to its people. Doing more to protect others while endangering Americans is bad policy. Allowing, if not necessarily encouraging, others to build their own deterrent, would help constrain China. The impacts would be many, but the issue deserves to be debated rather than dismissed. [**HE GOES ON LATER IN THE CONTEXT TO SAY QUOTE:]** The other options look worse. Washington has found it difficult enough — meaning almost impossible — to prevent hostile regimes from developing nuclear weapons. It should not waste time trying to stop allies from doing so. To the contrary, friendly proliferation might be the best strategy to constrain dangerous powers in the future without risking U.S. involvement in multiple unnecessary wars.

A/T “Japan’s defense”

Japan can defend itself even totally without US security guarantees

Prof. Takao Sebata 2012. (professor and the dean of the Graduate School of Global Communication at the University of Nagasaki) Pros and cons for keepingUnited States Forces in Japan (USFJ) <http://reposit.sun.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/10561/944/1/v13p199_sebata.pdf>

Finally, Japan should eventually abolish the Security Treaty and establish a neutral Japan to regain her sovereignty. The Security Treaty is a legacy of the Cold War. It is now a time for Japan to abolish the Security Treaty and carry out a neutral policy. Many Japanese immediately think that Japan must increase her military capability and defense budget if she abrogates the Security Treaty. However, there is no need to do so. Japan must improve her relations with China, establish diplomatic relations with North Korea, and conclude a peace treaty with Russia even though Japan gives up the Northern Territory. These policies would certainly bring about economic benefits, security, and peace to Japan in place of the Security Treaty. China is now the most important trading partner for Japan. Therefore, Japan and China must cooperate with each other putting the territorial issue aside.

A/T “Japan remilitarizes”

Japan will not renew its imperial conquests. It can be trusted to act like a normal country

Doug Bandow 2016 (Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute; former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan) 10 June 2016 “Bring Home American Forces from Okinawa” <https://www.cato.org/blog/bring-home-american-forces-okinawa?queryID=794ace57a13a9243f32d05866a622309>

A serious Japanese military build-up is opposed by some of Tokyo’s neighbors, but no one seriously suggests that Japan is about to embark upon a new round of imperial conquests. More than seven decades after World War II Japan should finally act like a normal country—defending itself, guarding its region, and ending its dependence on America.

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