Negative: NATO Nukes

By Emmanuel Huang

**Resolved: The United States Federal Government should considerably reduce its military commitments**

Case Summary: The U.S. has tactical (short-range) nuclear weapons stationed in several NATO countries as part of our commitment to the defense of our allies. AFF will argue that they are a useless relic of the Cold War and that their risks outweigh their benefits. However, NATO nukes still have value. They deter Russian aggression and strengthen the NATO alliance. Pulling out nukes from NATO would motivate some NATO members to pursue their own nuclear weapons, leading to bigger problems in the future. Status Quo is the best option; we should leave our nuclear weapons right where they are.

To debate this properly, you need to understand the difference between “strategic” and “tactical” nuclear weapons. Strategic nuclear weapons are launched from the homeland of one country (e.g. a missile silo in Kansas) to directly attack the homeland of the enemy (e.g. Moscow). Tactical weapons are weapons located near, and intended to be used at, the site of a conventional battle during hostilities. For example, a nuclear bomb in Turkey being dropped on invading forces coming across the Turkish border from Russia.

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Negative: NATO Nukes

NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY: Threats is too great to remove nukes

Nuclear weapons should be reduced in small steps (if reduced at all)

Franklin Miller, George Robertson & Kori Schake 2010. (Miller is former senior career policy official in the Pentagon and the White House. Robertson is former NATO secretary-general and former UK defence secretary. Schake is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution) Centre for European Reform, GERMANY OPENS PANDORA’S BOX, 8 Feb 2010 <http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/bn_pandora_final_8feb10-245.pdf>

Advisors to Chancellor Merkel say that Germany is just doing its part to further President Barack Obama’s policy (the US president has called in early 2009 for a world without nuclear weapons, in order to stop the circle of nuclear powers from expanding). But this is self-serving. Nuclear disarmament, were it to happen, would need to take place in carefully orchestrated moves, which avoid destabilising existing alliances. The US government has proceeded in small steps, focusing initially on reducing strategic nuclear arsenals with Russia.

MINOR REPAIR / COUNTERPLAN

Don’t “reduce” military commitment. Instead: 1) Maintain NATO nukes. 2) Build NATO missile defense. 3) Start arms control negotiations. = Best way to minimize nuclear war risk

Dr. James J. Carafano 2019 (PhD; adjunct professor at Georgetown University and visiting professor at National Defense University; formerly assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point, and as director of military studies at the Army's Center of Military History) 11 Sept 2019 “Setting the Agenda for NATO at London and Beyond” <https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/setting-the-agenda-nato-london-and-beyond>

Now that the United States has withdrawn from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty, it is time for America and its allies to start closing the gap in extended deterrence. Beyond taking a unified approach to countering the Russian intermediate-range nuclear missiles that threaten Europe, NATO members need to work together for a broader, more comprehensive and more effective arms control regime that includes [Moscow and Beijing](https://nationalinterest.org/feature/trump-channels-reagan-path-toward-arms-control-77261). Meanwhile, the alliance needs to continue to invest in missile defense. A credible conventional and nuclear deterrence, effective missile defense, and cooperative arms control provide the most stable strategic environment to minimize the threat of nuclear conflict.

INHERENCY

1. Status Quo “wait and see” policy is best

Decision about NATO tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) should be subordinate to maintaining NATO stability. Decisions have to be shared, not unilateral, and we can wait for a consensus to develop

Dr. Paolo Foradori 2012 (PhD; Assistant Professor in International Politics at Univ of Trento (Italy). From 2009 to 2011, was Marie Curie Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, and at the Managing the Atom Project, Harvard Kennedy School) “EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES” Chapter 12 TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NATO <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=706112>

Undoubtedly, the issue must be addressed with great caution because it is difficult to reach agreement on perceptions and symbols, especially in the current period of profound transformation and reorganization of Euro-Atlantic security. Decisions that are not shared risk weakening the cohesion of the Alliance on which the credibility of NATO depends. The priority on both sides of the Atlantic is to avoid casting doubt on the principle of indivisibility in the Alliance’s security. Consequently, the debate on TNWs is widely perceived as subordinate to the more relevant objective of maintaining NATO’s stability and cohesion. As such, and because intermediate options between maintaining TNWs and withdrawing them completely are not easy to envisage, a final decision on nuclear forward deployment can be temporarily postponed.

2. Most nukes already removed

96% of nuclear warheads already removed (7000 out of 7300)

Nuclear Threat Initiative 2017 (non-profit research and advocacy group founded in 2001 by former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn and philanthropist Ted Turner ) 10 Feb 2017 “Nuclear Disarmament NATO” <https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/nato-nuclear-disarmament/>

Warheads Dismantled
In 1971, U.S. nuclear warheads in Europe peaked at approximately 7,300. Since then, more than 7,000 warheads have been removed.

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE

1. NATO nukes don’t violate NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty)

NATO Allies are strongly committed to NPT

NATO’s official website, 2017 (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is an intergovernmental military alliance between 30 North American and European countries) March 2017 “NATO and the Non-Proliferation Treaty” <https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_03/20170323_170323-npt-factsheet.pdf>

NATO Allies are strongly committed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which is a cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, and to achieve the goal of nuclear disarmament. It achieves a remarkable balance among its three mutually reinforcing pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation plays an important role in reaching the Alliance’s security objectives. At the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, NATO Allies reiterated NATO’s commitment to arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament, acknowledging the threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as their means of delivery, by states and non-state actors.

2. US nukes in NATO countries reduce (not increase) risk of nuclear war

US nukes contribute to reassurance, so that countries don’t start their own arsenals

Prof. Matthew Fuhrmann and Prof. Todd S. Sechser, 2019 (Fuhrmann is professor of political science at Texas A&M University. Sechser is Professor of Politics and Public Policy at Univ of Virginia and Senior Fellow at the Miller Center of Public Affairs.) 18 Oct 2019 “Can the U.S. protect its nuclear weapons in Turkey?” <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/18/can-us-protect-its-nuclear-weapons-turkey/>

U.S. nuclear forces in Turkey might, however, contribute to reassurance and nonproliferation. Political scientist Dan Reiter, for instance, has shown how countries with foreign nuclear weapons on their soil are less likely to explore their own nuclear options. Still, most U.S. allies — including Japan and South Korea after the early 1990s — have remained nonnuclear even without U.S. nuclear forces in place.

3. Little risk of US nuke theft

US nukes are really secure against being set off

Joe Pappalardo, 2019 (contributing editor at Popular Mechanics) October 25, 2019, “Could Someone Actually Steal a U.S. Nuke?” <https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a29576180/us-nuke-theft/> (Brackets added)

But can you even set off a stolen nuke? It’s not easy — but that is not the only risk that a rogue nuke poses. Naturally, there are many methods in place to make nukes hard to set off by accident or without authorization. But the technical details about the bombs themselves are seldom discussed, so what we know is based on public sources, some dating back decades to when these weapons were first created.
[**END QUOTE. HE goes on later in the same article to continue QUOTE:**]
The nukes in Turkey have the most advanced Category F permissive action lock, which “incorporates a multiple-code, 12-digit switch with lockout which disables the warhead after repeated attempts to enter codes,” Hansen says.

US nukes strongly secured against theft.

Miles A. Pomper, 2019 (Senior Fellow, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury) October 23, 2019, “Why the US has nuclear weapons in Turkey – and may try to put the bombs away” <https://theconversation.com/why-the-us-has-nuclear-weapons-in-turkey-and-may-try-to-put-the-bombs-away-125477>

U.S. nuclear weapons are stored in hardened bunkers, protected by electronic systems and heavily armed U.S. troops. The Pentagon has recently reinforced both of those methods of defense.

No real risk of theft from European nuclear sites

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change - NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2011/managing_change_lr.pdf>

It is true that physical security at European nuclear sites has not always been maintained to American standards and that intrusions on some military bases have confirmed the existence of security lapses; but it is equally true that no recorded incident has in any way shown that there is a real risk of weapons theft.

Even if stolen, nukes can be disabled without any danger

Miles A. Pomper, 2019 (Senior Fellow, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury) October 23, 2019, “Why the US has nuclear weapons in Turkey – and may try to put the bombs away” <https://theconversation.com/why-the-us-has-nuclear-weapons-in-turkey-and-may-try-to-put-the-bombs-away-125477>

The bombs themselves also require 12-digit codes to activate them. However, those protections are only strong enough to delay unauthorized use, rather than actually prevent it. If those barriers were overcome, U.S forces could disable the weapons by destroying electrical components or detonating their chemical high explosive without causing a nuclear release. In the worst case, they could blow up the weapons or the facilities at Incirlik.

4. Not causing tensions with Russia

Tensions with Russia are the fault of Putin and his aggressive behavior, not NATO

Dr. James Jay Carafano 2019 (PhD; adjunct professor at Georgetown University and visiting professor at National Defense University; formerly assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point, and as director of military studies at the Army's Center of Military History. ) 8 Apr 2019 “America Needs a Bigger NATO to Stymie Russia’s Ambitions” <https://www.heritage.org/europe/commentary/america-needs-bigger-nato-stymie-russias-ambitions>

Unlike Putin's Russia, NATO poses no threat of aggression. It is and always has been a purely defensive alliance. Even at the height of the Cold War, NATO harbored no designs on Soviet Russia and its satellites. And once the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union crumbled without a shot being fired, NATO welcomed new members to the alliance – contributing further to the mutual security of all and the expansion of freedom and democracy in Europe. NATO and the new Russia lived peacefully side-by-side for years, until Putin embraced the fiction that, by increasing its membership, NATO was somehow encroaching on Russia and threatening its security. Inside and outside the alliance, no one wants to pick a fight with Russia. Yet Putin's aggressiveness – from his invasions of Georgia and Crimea to his militarism in Ukraine – has made joining the alliance even more attractive.

SOLVENCY

1. No arms control benefit.

Removing nukes from Europe doesn't make much sense for arms control - we should use them to bargain with Russia instead

Dr. Oliver Thränert 2008 (Senior Fellow, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin) PROLIFERATION ANALYSIS, DECEMBER 10, 2008, U.S. Nuclear Forces in Europe to Zero? Yes, But Not Yet, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22533>

“First: Arms control. In that regard, eliminating all U.S. nuclear forces in Europe does not make much sense. The aim of Soviet as well as Russian political leaders has always been to achieve a Western Europe free of U.S. nuclear weapons without removing its own non-strategic nuclear forces in which it enjoys massive numerical superiority. At a minimum, NATO should use the U.S. nuclear weapons based in Europe as a bargaining chip. However, Russia will not go to zero with its own non-strategic nuclear forces. Moscow perceives them as a counterweight to NATO’s overwhelming conventional superiority and its ongoing expansion ever closer to the Russian border. Today, we do not even know how many non-strategic nuclear forces Moscow possesses, nor do we know where they are located and whether they are appropriately protected against unauthorized use. For NATO, therefore, a more important first step than bringing Russian non-strategic nuclear forces to zero should be enhanced transparency. Removing all U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe without transparency and reciprocal reductions in return would run counter to Western interests.”

2. No Non-Proliferation Benefit:

 Proliferators ignored other nuclear weapons reductions, they will ignore NATO too

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/natosupremealliedcommandtransformationuniversityofbolognaandistitutoaffariinternazionali4ecb8572a627c.pdf>

There are few, if any, reasons to believe that the unilateral withdrawal of US nuclear weapons – or a significant reduction of the existing Europe-based arsenal – would have any measurable non-proliferation and disarmament benefit. In the past fifteen years, the massive nuclear reductions undertaken by the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom and France have had no apparent impact on nuclear proliferation dynamics and the non-proliferation regime. India, Iran, Israel, Libya, North Korea and Syria were obviously not impressed. And the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries have not shown any interest in seriously reinforcing the regime.

3. Can’t improve relations with Russia

Relations with Russia are hopeless because Putin is evil and greedy

Dr. James J. Carafano 2019 (PhD; adjunct professor at Georgetown University and visiting professor at National Defense University; formerly assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy in West Point, and as director of military studies at the Army's Center of Military History) 11 Sept 2019 “Setting the Agenda for NATO at London and Beyond” <https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/setting-the-agenda-nato-london-and-beyond>

There is no shortage of proposals for how to “reset” yet again the West’s relations with Russia, but all share a common flaw: they are based on dealing with the Russia we want, not the Russia we have. The Russia we want is a country run by a leader who is willing to be reasonable. The Russia we have has zero interest in living side-by-side in peace and prosperity. Putin is greedy, mistrustful, and untrustworthy, intent on perpetuating his power by undermining the solidarity of the transatlantic community and extending his influence by controlling his neighbors.

4. The alternative to stationing in Europe (keep in US / bring back during a crisis) won’t work

Bringing the nukes back to Europe in time of crisis isn’t realistic: It would be divisive and could lower the cost of aggression

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change - NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2011/managing_change_lr.pdf>

The adoption by NATO of what could be called a new “Turkish Clause” allowing for the return of B-61s in crisis time is not a credible option. This would imply that nuclear-capable aircraft and bases would continue to be certified, and that pilots would continue to be trained for nuclear missions. It is very dubious that NATO would be willing to bear such costs in the absence of real nuclear-sharing. More importantly, such a decision in crisis time would probably open a divisive debate within the Alliance, that would be highly escalatory. This might lower the possible cost of aggression, as cogently argued by a trio of former US and British officials.

5. Won’t save money

The cost of building up conventional forces to replace the lost capability of NATO nukes would be even more expensive

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change - NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2011/managing_change_lr.pdf>

What about non-nuclear “replacements”? The idea of an “appropriate mix” of capabilities suggests that NATO could compensate reduced reliance on nuclear deterrence with stronger reliance on advanced conventional weapons and missile defense. But neither of these are substitutes: this is not a zero-sum game. Increased investment in those two capabilities will not create the conditions that existed before further reduction of NATO nuclear assets. For both physical and psychological reasons, conventional weapons do not have the same deterrent power as nuclear ones. Conventional deterrence has a long record of failure – in fact, as long as civilization itself. The threat of conventional bombing is not enough to make an adversary desist when the stakes become extreme or vital, or even when they are more limited: the crises of the past twenty years have shown that it does not always lead the adversary to change its strategic calculus. There is still a large difference today – at least one order of magnitude – between conventional and nuclear yields. For this reason, conventional weapons cost much more for an equivalent effect.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Lose deterrence against Russian threat

Link: Russia is a big aggressive conventional and nuclear threat and NATO nukes are key to deterring them

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg 2020. “Germany’s support for nuclear sharing is vital to protect peace and freedom” 11 May 2020 <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_175663.html>

The Coronavirus is among the greatest threats the world has faced since the Second World War. However, that does not mean that others have gone away. We face the most difficult security environment for a generation. Around the world, terrorism continues, authoritarian regimes challenge liberal democracies, and we see the proliferation of nuclear weapons to countries like North Korea, as well as the continuing aggressive actions by Russia. In recent years, Russia has invested significantly in its military capabilities, and especially in its nuclear arsenal. While NATO views its own nuclear deterrent primarily as a political tool, Russia has firmly integrated its nuclear arsenal into its military strategy. It has placed nuclear-capable missiles in Kaliningrad, just 500km from Berlin. It has threatened Allies such as Denmark, Poland and Romania with nuclear strikes. Russia also forcibly and illegally annexed part of Ukraine, a country whose borders it had previously committed to respect in return for Ukraine giving up its own nuclear protection.

Link: Nuclear weapons are better at deterrence than conventional

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change - NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2011/managing_change_lr.pdf>

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Link: NATO nukes deter by making the risk of attack on NATO far outweigh any possible gain

Franklin Miller, George Robertson & Kori Schake 2010. (Franklin Miller is former senior career policy official in the Pentagon and the White House, George Robertson is former NATO secretary-general and former UK defence secretary, and Kori Schake is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution in the US.) Centre for European Reform, GERMANY OPENS PANDORA’S BOX, 8 Feb 2010 <http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/bn_pandora_final_8feb10-245.pdf>

Their presence in Europe, however, affirms the coupling of US nuclear forces – including US strategic forces – to the defence of NATO’s territory. Bluntly put, the nuclear arsenal in Europe serves to put the US homeland at risk to nuclear attack if NATO is forced to resort to using Europe-based nuclear bombs to defend its borders. This in turn signals to any potential aggressor that the risks of an attack against NATO far outweigh any possible gains.

Link: European allies agree Russia is a threat

Rose Gottemoeller, 2020 (nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.) 29 Jan 2020 “Russia Is Updating Their Nuclear Weapons: What Does That Mean for the Rest of Us?” <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/01/29/russia-is-updating-their-nuclear-weapons-what-does-that-mean-for-rest-of-us-pub-80895>

The Europeans, most prominently the NATO allies, are very concerned about Russia’s nuclear modernization programs. Their concerns revolve more around new nuclear missiles to be deployed on European soil than the intercontinental systems that threaten the United States. Poland and Lithuania, for example, are NATO countries bordering Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave in the heart of NATO territory. Russia has put increasingly capable missiles there, including the Iskander, a highly accurate modern missile that is capable of launching either nuclear or conventional warheads. Likewise, the Europeans are of one mind about the threat posed by a missile known as the 9M729 (SSC-8 in NATO parlance), which is an intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile that the Russians developed and deployed in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The allies all agree that this missile poses a threat to NATO. Although it has not been deployed forward in Kaliningrad, its range is sufficient to threaten all of NATO Europe when deployed in European Russia. It too is said to support both nuclear and conventional weapons.

Link: Withdrawal of US nukes would send a signal of weakness to Russia

Simon Lunn 2010. (Associate Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies; former Secretary General of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly) Nato’s Tactical Nuclear Dilemma, A Crucial Decision: NATO’s Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century 2010 <https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201003_op_natos_tactical_nuclear_dilemma.pdf>

“Other new members made similar comments and leave little room for doubt as to the importance they attach to the presence of American nuclear warheads on European territory. The new members see no reason, therefore, to change existing arrangements. As one said: ‘Why do it? No one will thank you, certainly not the Russians. We may get our weapons out but the Russians never will. So will we be safer or less safe?’ Furthermore, a withdrawal of the warheads would send all the wrong signals. Russia, another ambassador noted, is about power. ‘If you draw down it is a sign of weakening’”

Link & Impact: US weakness increases risk of war. Example: Russian invasion of Georgia

Daniel Benjamin, 2008. (was confirmed by the Senate as the U.S. State Dept's coordinator for counter-terrorism in ‘09; at the time this article was written, he was Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution ) 20 Aug 2008 “The Russians Moved Because They Know You Are Weak” (brackets in original) <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-russians-moved-because-they-know-you-are-weak/>

“And we are very far from the foreign policy envisioned by Condoleezza Rice in her 2000 Foreign Affairs manifesto for candidate Bush's foreign policy, which promised a new focus on "comprehensive relationships with the big powers, particularly Russia and China, that can and will mold the character of the international political system." As Rice wrote then but quickly seems to have forgotten, "These states are capable of disruption on a grand scale, and their fits of anger or acts of beneficence affect hundreds of millions of people." There is another aspect of the current crisis that is made in America. It was summed up by a European diplomat who told me last week, "The Russians moved because they know you are weak." He hardly needed to explain. With the U.S. military overstretched and publicly complaining about not having enough troops for Afghanistan, Moscow knew it had a propitious moment. Had we not been so bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, the White House—which has been watching this crisis build for months—might have left a thousand or so troops in Georgia after our last joint exercise or sent more warships for a visit to the Black Sea. Few would argue that we should get into a shooting match with the Russians over Georgia. But the presence of U.S. forces on the ground, or even the knowledge that there was a significant reserve available in Europe, might have given the Russians pause or at least a healthy fear of miscalculation. As it was, they had a perfect set of circumstances for their strike. Chalk it up as another indirect cost of the U.S. engagement in Iraq—of the fact that for most of Bush's tenure in office, we have had an Iraq policy, not a foreign policy. Dick Cheney often repeats the platitude that "[t]errorist attacks are not caused by the use of strength. They are invited by the perception of weakness." Too bad that Cheney and the administration could only think about terrorists—of whom there were virtually none in Iraq—and not all the other American interests that would be undermined by palpable evidence of our weakness.”

Impact: Net benefits. Reverse Plan Advocacy - Deterrence value of NATO nukes justifies keeping Status Quo

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change - NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2011/managing_change_lr.pdf>

An end to NATO nuclear arrangements would diminish transatlantic burden-sharing and solidarity, and weaken deterrence at a time when threats to NATO’s collective security are increasing. These arrangements should thus be maintained.

Impact: Need NATO nukes to deter threats from Russia and Iran

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change - NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2011/managing_change_lr.pdf>

The current trajectory of Russia’s policies is leading Moscow towards increasing friction with NATO in Europe and with the Western world in general. Likewise, the radicalization of the Iranian leadership and Tehran’s arrival at the nuclear threshold places it on a collision course with Western interests. Of course, the threat is far from being as grave and immediate as it was during the Cold War. But it is a credible hypothesis that by 2015 NATO, for the first time in its history, will face two revisionist nuclear-armed countries along its borders. This is not the right time to let down the nuclear guard.

2. Increased tensions with Russia

Link: Withdrawal of European nuclear weapons would require more military exercises, which would escalate tensions with Russia

Franklin Miller, George Robertson & Kori Schake 2010. (Miller is former senior career policy official in the Pentagon and the White House. Robertson is former NATO secretary-general and former UK defence secretary. Schake is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution.) Centre for European Reform, GERMANY OPENS PANDORA’S BOX, 8 Feb 2010 <http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/bn_pandora_final_8feb10-245.pdf>

As a practical matter, the withdrawal of Europe-based weapons to the US would make it difficult for the allies to keep those portions of their forces tasked with deploying the weapons in top fighting shape. They would have to compensate by increasing exercises, which is also likely to raise tensions with Russia and cause concern among domestic critics of nuclear weapons.

Link & Brink: US and Russia are on the brink of losing vital nuclear treaties because of bad relations now

Henry Foy, Ben Hall and Katrina Manson 2018 (journalists) US-Russia tensions threaten nuclear arms curbs, says Moscow, FINANCIAL TIMES 10 Oct 2018 <https://www.kyivpost.com/russia/financial-times-moscow-warns-us-russia-tensions-put-nuclear-arms-curbs-at-risk.html>

Critical elements of the arms control regime intended to prevent nuclear war between Russia and the US risk falling apart because of poor relations between the two countries, Moscow has warned. As US and Russian officials begin talks in Geneva on Wednesday to try to shore up a largely cold war-era system for limiting nuclear weapons, Sergei Ryabkov, Russia’s deputy foreign minister, said a “complete malfunction of the American system” meant vital treaties could lapse and leave nuclear powers without constraint in the event of a conflict. “We could lose several elements on arms control infrastructure,” Mr Ryabkov said in an interview. “The building is shaky.”

Brink & Impact: Must reduce tensions now, or else we risk catastrophic war between NATO and Russia

Alexandr Khramchikhin 2018. (deputy director of the Institute for Political and Military Analysis in Moscow) Rethinking the Danger of Escalation: The Russia-NATO Military Balance, 25 Jan 2018 <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/01/25/rethinking-danger-of-escalation-russia-nato-military-balance-pub-75346>

In an atmosphere of crisis permeated by mutual recriminations and suspicions, both sides—NATO and Russia—have engaged in a series of military activities along the line of contact. These maneuvers in turn have triggered multiple warnings from both sides of a sharp deterioration in European security, a growing threat of a military confrontation between Russia and NATO, and an urgent need to deescalate the situation in order to avoid a catastrophic war with disastrous consequences for all. An emerging conventional wisdom maintains that the new Cold War in Europe, if allowed to continue unchecked, runs the risk of escalating into a hot war unless steps to reduce tensions are taken swiftly.

Impact: Increased risk of “Unmanageable escalation” between US & Russia

Henry Foy, Ben Hall and Katrina Manson 2018 (journalists) US-Russia tensions threaten nuclear arms curbs, says Moscow, FINANCIAL TIMES 10 Oct 2018 <https://www.kyivpost.com/russia/financial-times-moscow-warns-us-russia-tensions-put-nuclear-arms-curbs-at-risk.html>

The breakdown of the relationship posed a real threat to progress on buttressing nuclear arms controls treaties, since the Trump administration had refused to engage in substantive talks, he said. Security experts say the mutual mistrust has left the two nuclear superpowers at risk of an unmanageable escalation in the event of a crisis, while a new generation of weapons and cyber warfare capabilities could leave existing arms-control treaties in tatters.

3. Weakens NATO alliance

Link: AFF doesn’t consult the allies before doing their plan

The plan is simply US unilateral action. They don’t wait for other NATO countries to discuss it an d agree.

Link: Consensual planning among the NATO countries is a key principle of its nuclear policy

NATO official web site 2020. “NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy and forces” last updated 16 Apr 2020 <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50068.htm>

The key principles of NATO’s nuclear policy are established by the Heads of State and Government of the 30 members of the Alliance. The development and implementation of NATO’s nuclear policy are the responsibility of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). The NPG provides the forum for consultation on all issues that relate to NATO nuclear deterrence. All Allies, with the exception of France, which has decided not to participate, are members of the NPG.

Link: Germany disagrees with AFF Plan – they want to keep NATO nukes

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg 2020. “Germany’s support for nuclear sharing is vital to protect peace and freedom” 11 May 2020 <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_175663.html>

We will maintain an effective deterrence and defence, including through our existing nuclear deterrent. Therefore, I welcome Germany’s clear commitment to NATO and our nuclear deterrent. This is even more significant since we have just marked the 75th anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Europe. Our Alliance was built on the ruins of that devastating war, to ensure peace and freedom for future generations. Germany joined our Alliance just 10 years after the war ended, on May 6 1955. Since then, you have been a valued member of the NATO family, with all the benefits and responsibilities that implies. Our nuclear deterrence remains a vital part of keeping our peace and freedom. It is for the security of the whole alliance, for Germany, its neighbours, friends and Allies, who all have legitimate security concerns and who are all protected by NATO’s nuclear deterrent.

Link: Agreement and joint decision-making on nuclear weapons is politically significant. It’s important to alliance trust

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg 2020. “Germany’s support for nuclear sharing is vital to protect peace and freedom” 11 May 2020 <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_175663.html>

An important part of our nuclear deterrence strategy is nuclear sharing. NATO’s nuclear sharing is a multilateral arrangement that ensures the benefits, responsibilities and risks of nuclear deterrence are shared among Allies. Politically, this is significant. It means that participating Allies, like Germany, make joint decisions on nuclear policy and planning, and maintain appropriate equipment. It has also always been an important trust-building measure for Germany’s neighbours. Our common procedures, doctrine and exercises give Allies a voice on nuclear matters that they would not otherwise have.

Link: Questioning nuclear sharing could damage NATO cohesion

Lt Col. Aaron Bazin and Dominika Kunertova 2018. (Bazin – US Army lieutenant colonel. Kunertova - PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Université de Montréal, Quebec, Canada.) “An Alliance Divided? Five Factors That Could Fracture NATO” Jan/Feb 2018 MILITARY REVIEW <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2018/An-Alliance-Divided-Five-Factors-That-Could-Fracture-NATO/>

Furthermore, the Alliance’s institutional structures allow for information exchange among allies that can raise the level of alliance cohesion independently from external factors. Additionally, the transatlantic bond has depended on credible signaling (i.e., an ally’s trust in another’s assurances). Especially in the context of nuclear sharing, “weak signals” of U.S. commitment to Europe could damage NATO’s cohesion.

Link: Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW), by just their presence, maintain alliance solidarity and strengthen unity

Dr. Paolo Foradori 2012 (PhD; Assistant Professor in International Politics at Univ of Trento (Italy). From 2009 to 2011, was Marie Curie Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, and at the Managing the Atom Project, Harvard Kennedy School ) “EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES” Chapter 12 TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NATO <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=706112>

In the third section, I argue that, despite the prevailing post-Cold War thinking in most of NATO Europe, different security threat perceptions exist among the allies, and some of the new members in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) continue to attribute residual political and symbolic importance to the physical presence of TNWs on European soil. However, the status quo position of these members does not seem entirely intransigent, especially when balanced by a NATO/U.S. commitment to their defense by other (i.e., non-nuclear) means. Indeed, the issue of TNW forward deployment in Europe is, to a great extent, a proxy for lack of confidence in the future of the U.S. commitment and the diminished solidarity within the Alliance that these countries have experienced. NATO leaders are well aware of this complex dialectic within the Alliance and of the risk that decisions that are not unanimous may weaken the solidarity and indivisibility of Atlantic security.n:

Link: AFF plan doesn’t replace NATO TNW with any other strategy. That’s bad because we need a strategy in place for alliance cohesion first before we eliminate the TNW

Dr. Paolo Foradori 2012 (PhD; Assistant Professor in International Politics at Univ of Trento (Italy). From 2009 to 2011, was Marie Curie Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, and at the Managing the Atom Project, Harvard Kennedy School) “EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES” Chapter 12 TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NATO <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=706112>

If the wider concerns of those countries regarding the allied commitment to their defense can be suitably addressed, progress on further reduction in the numbers of TNWs and on softening NATO’s nuclear posture might be possible. In the final analysis, one cannot exclude the possibility that a properly tailored and strengthened “Asian model” of extended deterrence, whereby the U.S. nuclear umbrella can continue to function credibly without forward basing, could, in principle, be applicable to the European context.

Link: Without cohesion, NATO will fail

Lt Col. Aaron Bazin and Dominika Kunertova 2018. (Bazin – US Army lieutenant colonel. Kunertova - PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Université de Montréal, Quebec, Canada.) “An Alliance Divided? Five Factors That Could Fracture NATO” Jan/Feb 2018 MILITARY REVIEW <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2018/An-Alliance-Divided-Five-Factors-That-Could-Fracture-NATO/>

For almost seventy years, NATO has positively influenced the world. The Alliance’s many credits include acting as a major factor in deterrence of nuclear war, contributing to the erosion of the communist ideology of the Soviet Union, and projecting stability in difficult places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Although these measures of past performance indicate that NATO could continue to succeed in the future, there are no guarantees. In fact, if the complex and adaptive security environment continues to evolve on its present course, it will become increasingly difficult to maintain cohesion of the Alliance. Arguably, it is one of the most successful alliances in human history, but without cohesion, NATO can and will fail.

Impact: WMD’s and Terrorism. Europe without NATO would be more vulnerable to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and terrorism

Dr. Hans Binnendijk & Dr. Richard Kugler in 2003. (Binnendijk - PhD in international relations; Vice President for Research at National Defense University, Director and Roosevelt Chair, Center for Technology and National Security Policy. Kugler - PhD, Distinguished Research Professor in the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University) Nov 2003, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Dual-Track Transformation for the Atlantic Alliance," DEFENSE HORIZONS, <https://archive.org/stream/DTIC_ADA496472/DTIC_ADA496472_djvu.txt> (WMD = weapons of mass destruction)

“Even if bigger budgets were forthcoming, European militaries no longer would enjoy U.S. help in developing new-era doctrines, structures, and technologies. In the military transformation arena, they would be left on the outside looking in. Without U.S. contributions, they could be hard-pressed to muster the wherewithal to deploy missile defenses to shield Europe from WMD attacks. Developing serious forces for power-projection outside Europe also would be difficult, without American help in such critical areas as C4ISR, strategic lift, and logistic support. Overall, the collapse of NATO could leave Europe more vulnerable to threats across the spectrum from terrorism to WMD proliferation and less able to exert influence in the regions that produce these threats.”

Impact: NATO is essential to world peace, saving lives

Admiral James Stavridis 2019 (US Navy Admiral; former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO) 4 Apr 2019 “Why NATO Is Essential For World Peace, According to Its Former Commander <https://time.com/5564171/why-nato-is-essential-world-peace/>

Moreover, despite all the frustrations of coalition warfare, most observers would agree with Winston Churchill that “there is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.” The greatest single advantage the U.S. has on the global stage is our network of allies, partners and friends. That network is under deliberate pressure: from China, with its “One Belt, One Road” competitive strategy, and from Russia, with its relentless attacks on coalition unity. A strong NATO means not only having allies in a fight, should it come to that, but also a powerful deterrent to the aggression of ambitious adversaries. Perhaps NATO’s greatest accomplishment is not even its unblemished record of deterring attack against its members but rather the fact that no alliance nation has ever attacked another. NATO’s most fundamental deliverable has been peace among Europe’s major powers for 70 years after two millennia of unhesitating slaughter on the continent. The disasters of the 20th century alone pulled the U.S. into two world wars that killed more than half a million Americans. History provides few achievements that compare to those seven decades of peace.

4. Nuclear proliferation

Link: NATO nukes prevent nuclear proliferation

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg 2020. “Germany’s support for nuclear sharing is vital to protect peace and freedom” 11 May 2020 <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_175663.html>

NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements also directly support non-proliferation. For many decades, it has provided European Allies with an effective nuclear umbrella. This was essential for the development of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which prevents the spread of nuclear weapons, as it removed the incentive for nations to develop their own nuclear capability. If our nuclear sharing arrangements came to an end, more countries may again seek their own nuclear weapons. This would result in a world this is less safe, not more.

Removing nukes triggers Turkey and other countries to start their own nuclear weapons, increasing risk of war

Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd S. Sechser, 2019 (Matthew Fuhrmann (@mcfuhrmann) is professor of political science at Texas A&M University. Todd S. Sechser is the Pamela Feinour Edmonds and Franklin S. Edmonds Jr. Discovery Professor of Politics and Public Policy at the University of Virginia and Senior Fellow at the Miller Center of Public Affairs.) 18 Oct 2019 “Can the U.S. protect its nuclear weapons in Turkey?” <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/18/can-us-protect-its-nuclear-weapons-turkey/>

There is also a security challenge with withdrawing the weapons in the short term. Removing them from their storage vaults during a period of intense hostility could invite an act of sabotage. In the long term, the larger risk is that removing the weapons will prompt Turkey to try to acquire its own nuclear weapons. After all, Erdogan reportedly is exploring this option. But as relations with Turkey deteriorate, it is by no means certain that the presence of a few U.S. weapons will prevent this outcome. And there are other political and diplomatic tools for dissuading Turkey from venturing down the nuclear path if the United States pulls out its nuclear forces.

Removing nukes would cause Turkey to develop their own, and could trigger Greece, Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia to do the same

Joseph V. Micallef, 2019 (Joseph V. Micallef is a best-selling military history and world affairs author, and keynote speaker.) “Is It Time to Withdraw US Nuclear Weapons from Incirlik?” 14 Nov 2019 <https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/11/14/it-time-withdraw-us-nuclear-weapons-incirlik.html>

Removing the bombs will likely trigger renewed Turkish rhetoric about the desirability of obtaining atomic weapons. Turkish plans to do so, even if they never come to fruition, will have a direct impact on Iran's nuclear weapons program and on the U.S. and Europe's attempts to curb it. It may also trigger other countries in the region, especially Greece, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to consider starting their own development programs.

Link: Withdrawal of NATO nukes leads to increased risk of nuclear proliferation

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change - NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2011/managing_change_lr.pdf>

It is also possible that the end of NATO nuclear arrangements in Europe could create the perception that the American defense umbrella is folding. This could foster unease among US allies around the world, and perhaps become an additional factor for some of them to consider embarking on a nuclear program. This could also be an encouragement for potential adversaries to develop or continue their own nuclear programs. A historical example to bear in mind is North Korea. The withdrawal of all US nuclear weapons from South Korea in 1992 did nothing to slow down the North Korean nuclear program. Might it even have accelerated it? At the time, the White House was concerned that Pyongyang might see the end of the American nuclear presence on the peninsula as “the beginning of a US withdrawal”.

Impact: Proliferation = increased risk of nuclear war

GEORGE P. SHULTZ, WILLIAM J. PERRY, HENRY A. KISSINGER AND SAM NUNN 2011 (Mr. Shultz was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989. Mr. Perry was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997. Mr. Kissinger was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977. Mr. Nunn is former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.) March 7, 2011 “Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Proliferation” THE WALL STREET JOURNAL <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703300904576178760530169414.html>

Today, the Cold War is almost 20 years behind us, but many leaders and publics cannot conceive of deterrence without a strategy of mutual assured destruction. We have written previously that reliance on this strategy is becoming increasingly hazardous. With the spread of nuclear weapons, technology, materials and know-how, there is an increasing risk that nuclear weapons will be used. It is not possible to replicate the high-risk stability that prevailed between the two nuclear superpowers during the Cold War in such an environment. The growing number of nations with nuclear arms and differing motives, aims and ambitions poses very high and unpredictable risks and increased instability.

Impact: Nuclear proliferation = bigger risk of nuclear detonation. Terrorist theft, unauthorized launch, cyber hacking, regional rivalries

Nuclear Threat Initiative 2015. (non-profit, non-partisan advocacy group) 31 Dec 2015 “THE NUCLEAR THREAT” <https://www.nti.org/learn/nuclear/>

We know that terrorists are seeking nuclear weapons. Today, there are more than 1,800 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials-highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium—stored in hundreds of sites across 25 countries, some of them poorly secured. To build a bomb, terrorists won't necessarily look to the biggest stockpiles; they'll go where nuclear materials are the most vulnerable. That makes global nuclear security only as strong as the weakest link in the chain.
Systems Vulnerabilities
Command and control systems are not perfect. People make mistakes. Sabotage can happen. Technology has flaws and systems fail. The possibility of an unauthorized launch—or even an authorized launch without time for due consideration—is simply too high.
Nuclear Proliferation
Nuclear technology and the know-how to build a bomb is no longer a monopoly controlled by states. The threat of cyber-terrorism looms large, and experts are working furiously to keep up with cyber vulnerabilities that could be exploited by hackers to initiate a catastrophe.
Regional Dangers
Bitter regional rivalries in the Middle East, Northeast Asia, South Asia and elsewhere pose clear and present nuclear dangers to global security. These rivalries raise the risk that a nuclear weapon might be used in a deliberate attack, and the consequences of a regional nuclear exchange would reverberate across the globe.

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